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ABSTRACT

The author examines how severely disabled children and their mothers, who are usually their primary
caregivers, are treated by Canadian law and policy. She identifies and analyzes deficiencies in care and
other supports the state makes available to them. She further provides an analysis of the role of the state
as it increasingly privatizes responsibility for supports, including unpredictable and often complex forms
of care, situating them in practice, with mothers. Caregiving mothers are required to provide what
comprises maternally complex care, which may be medical, neurological or psychiatric in nature. Within
complex care, visible and hidden costs have been off loaded onto caregiving mothers by government.
Using conceptual frameworks from feminist standpoint theory and drawing on Paolo Freire’s theory of
critical consciousness, the author analyzes legal cases, legislation and policies, as being founded upon a
series of powerful myths. She assesses the paradigms that underlie current legal arrangements, in
particular, the roles assigned to mothers of children with severe disabilities. Her analysis engages with
administrative, tort and constitutional law, and includes a focus on the steps taken by the province of
Ontario to end the voluntary care provision to mothers with disabled children through its child welfare
jurisdiction. She shows where such practice may not comply with legal requirements in each of the areas
of law she examines, building an argument that Ontario may not refuse such care to mothers. Legal
reforms and other approaches that could enable severely disabled children and their mothers to achieve
more just outcomes are presented as a series of recommendations.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

The goal of this dissertation is to present a clear picture of what legal rights to support mothers with
severely disabled children have in Canada; to present their situation within a framework that makes
visible areas where rights for mothers and their severely disabled children are absent or weak; and to
propose ways for mothers to have their rights conceived in a more just manner consistent with
entitlements.
The legal rights to state support of mothers with severely disabled children have not been closely
examined either by legal scholars or by practicing lawyers in Canada.1 Some scholars have examined
legal-oriented advocacy for disabled children in education domains, i.e. with respect to accessing special
education and needed assistive devices.2 These scholars discovered that it was primarily mothers who
advanced rights for disabled children. Mothers themselves have examined legal issues affecting their care
for their own disabled children in books and public talks, but these are few, and have garnered little public
attention. In neither case is the issue framed in the context of the need to assert and protect mothers’ legal
rights to support in their role as caregivers to severely disabled children, who are themselves also rights’
bearers.
In order to address this oversight, I pursue four research questions with a view to reframing
discussions concerning mothers with severely disabled children. These four questions are as follows:
(i) What are the legal rights of mothers of children with severe disabilities to state support in Canada? (ii)
What should the legal rights of mothers of children with severe disabilities be? (iii) What are the legal

1

Although some interviews have been given and articles published by them about issues that have arisen in their
practices: see Interview of Doug Elliott by Karen Howlett in Karen Howlett, “Ontario Minister’s Departure Leaves
Disabled Kids in Limbo” The Globe and Mail (4 July 2005) A5. Elliott was one of the legal counsel in A.L. 2 v
Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (2003) 65 OR (3d) 289, 41 RFL (5th) 123 (ONSC) [Larcade
(2003) cited to OR] (The Larcade litigation began in 2003 with the A.L. 2 motion for class certification, on appeal
the style of cause was changed to Larcade v Ontario.[Larcade v Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social
Services) (2006), 32 RFL (6th) 390, 2006 CanLII 17943 (ON SCDC)]. I will refer to all levels of decision in this
matter as Larcade, though I specify which decision in the footnotes.); Gary Joseph, “Adult Child Support
Distinction Raises Charter Issues” (2012) 32:26 The Lawyers Weekly 14, Joseph was the father’s legal counsel in
Vivian v Courtney 2012 ONSC 6585, [Vivian (2012)]; Estate lawyer Daniel Dochylo’s book Entitlement to Support
of the Adult Disabled Child – From a Parent or Estate (Toronto: Ontario Bar Association, Institute of Continuing
Legal Education, 2009); Abby L. Griener, “Evidence Based Analysis of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines in
Alberta” (Paper delivered at the Canadian Bar Association Alberta, Alberta Law Conference, 30-31 January 2014)
online: Vogel Lawyers <http://www.vogel-llp.ca/~ASSETS/DOCUMENT/PDF/2/A2D2-00093939.PDF>.
2
See Katherine Runswicke-Cole, Parents as Advocates: The Experiences of Parents Who Register an Appeal with
the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal (Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Sheffield, School
of Education, 2007) [unpublished]; Denise Frankoff, Exploring Legal Consciousness: Experiences of Families
Seeking Funding for Assistive Technologies for Children with Disabilities (Doctoral Dissertation, Northeastern
University, Department of Law, Policy and Society, 2010) [unpublished].

2
rights of children with disabilities to state support? And (iv) how do the legal rights of the child with a
disability fit with the legal rights of mothers to public support within existing frameworks?. These
questions, as I detail more fully below, are best informed by caregiving mothers’ own knowledge and
experiences of attempting to provide care to their disabled children from within an inadequate system of
state support. In answering these questions, and informed by the knowledge and experience of caregiving
mothers, I propose what I consider to be a more just and caring alternative to the state supports currently
available to mothers under primarily provincial, but also federal, law in Canada. .
Overview of My Arguments
I explore and analyze the role and conduct of the state as it increasingly privatizes care of severely
disabled children, entrenching responsibility for complex disability care primarily with mothers. As I
show, the shifting of supports available to mothers with disabled children by the state has had profound
political, social and economic impacts on them.
Given the weak patchwork of systems of state supports available to mothers of disabled children,
the ‘trapping’ of supports into limited and ineffectual spheres of allocation and adjudication, and the
pervasiveness of a particular cultural understanding of caregiving mothers, it is often extremely difficult
for mothers to access needed and appropriate levels of support. How difficult it is cannot be appreciated
without examining the steps these mothers must take to try to access supports. Accordingly, in order to
understand what is missing from existing supports to mothers, this research analyzes where gaps in
available provincial supports lie through reference to the legal cases and other activism of caregiving
mothers of severely disabled children.
By examining the activism3 of caregiving mothers in their attempts, through legal proceedings, to
secure appropriate support for their severely disabled children, one can learn about the shortcomings of
the current legal contexts of state care provision to disabled families. Further, one can identify and
interrogate the gendered conceptual barriers of notions of motherhood that force caregiving mothers to
relinquish care of their severely disabled children to the state. My research reveals that the claims of
mothers with severely disabled children are confined in ways that prevent systemic remediation of their

3

I note here that in the context of disability, ‘conscientization’ as a framework has been has been undertaken
elsewhere. For example, published after I defended my research proposal, is Beatriz Miranda-Galarza et al’s “The
Power of personal knowledge: reflecting on conscientization in lives of disabled people affected by leprosy in
Cirebon, Indonesia.” (2013) 9(2): Knowledge Management for Development J 85-104. These authors focus on
critical consciousness of researchers, some of whom are disabled, researching with disabled people. They comment
that “Understanding how personal knowledge is produced, appropriated and shared will facilitate a move from
solely valuing personal knowledge as ‘experience’ to seeing it as an important component of emancipatory disability
research, ibid at 89.

3
need of support, and that their efforts to obtain more support merely add to their hardships.4 This research
suggests that in no area of law are mothers’ claims to support routinely anticipated, included, facilitated or
realized. An analysis of a controversial and legally contested Ontario policy is used (a) to contextualize
the unsupportive practices and policies used by governments for caregiving mothers, and (b) point to
manifestations of maternal awareness of disability support law’s harshly gendered features, which are
strikingly similar across Canada. Consequently, in taking steps to address their legal right to support, and
in order to realize their rights to it, mothers with disabled children must be conceived and treated as a
dyad, unique in law
There are deep contradictions between the way society represents caregiving mothers, and the
harsh realities of the under-supported and unsupported complex or otherwise onerous forms of care
demanded of them. Shifting long-held cultural understandings of the complex care required of mothers of
the severely disabled child can do powerful ideological work in the legal and policy domains, presently
fraught with tension and injustice in addressing the real needs of mothers with severely disabled children.
Legal Rights
Martha Minow defines ‘rights’ as legal rules that govern relationships between private individuals/groups
and between private individuals/groups and the state. These rules or rights are presented in the shape of
enforceable claims.5 In referring to legal rights in my thesis, I refer to the following. (i) Statutory
entitlements, which are provisions in statutes that entitle mothers with severely disabled children to bring
claims for support. (ii) The right of mothers with severely disabled children to apply for benefits where
eligible. In my thesis I treat benefits as legal rights because other kinds of legal claims can be made in
respect of them. In certain circumstances for instance, claims may be brought for judicial review of denial
of a government benefit. (iii) Rights claims made where no ‘caregiver-mother specific’ legal right exists.
Such claims encompass forms of support that exist already (like CPP), but have either not been extended
to caregiving mothers, or are denied to them in their caregiving situations. Rights claims include novel
claims to rights that caregiving mothers want to be able to exercise, such as having a court require
government to extend certain rights to them. These rights may be asserted as constitutional law claims.
4

The word ‘confined’ is used with reference to the use of the word “enclave” by Nancy Fraser in her work. She
refers to the enclaving of certain matters into specialized arenas where “they are shielded from general contestation”.
Once thus confined, these matters “entrench as authoritative” the interpretation of needs. Nancy Fraser, “Talking
About Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies” (1989) 99:2 Ethics 291 at 299
[Fraser, “Talking About Needs”]. Fraser also describes androcentric value patterns as structuring social interaction.
She theorizes that these are legally codified in family (and other) law and inform legal constructs. Nancy Fraser,
“Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice” (2007) 1:1 Studies
in Social Justice 23 at 26 [Fraser, “Feminist Politics”]. This explains the mother’s status subordination, examples of
which include the dismissal of the weight and expense of complex care in disputes with government or fathers, as
well as the construction of care as an extension of woman’s biological function of reproduction.	
  
5
Martha Minow. “Interpreting Rights: An Essay For Robert Covert”. (1987).96 Yale Law Journal 8, 1860, at 1866.

4
(iv) International human rights treaties and declarations. This refers to the obligations of government to
consider the rights provided in provisions contained in international human right instruments, to which
Canada is a signatory. (v) Human rights codes are included as rights. For instance “family status” is a
ground of discrimination that may be claimed by mothers with severely disabled children. Finally, (vi)
there are relational rights, which are not recognized in law, and so do not have force of law. However, the
concept of relational rights is helpful in analyzing the dependency of severely disabled children on their
mothers for extraordinary care. For example, relational rights scholarship elucidates the fact that legal
rights cannot account for support of mothers with severely disabled children as long as they retain an
individual focus. I argue it is the combination of the present conceptualization of rights as individual,
rather than relational, along with the social and political positioning of caregiving mothers in neo-liberal
and investment state politics of supporting those children presenting as comprising a good return on the
state’s investment in them, that have led to the cobbling together of an inadequate and indeed dangerously
unstable ‘system’ of supports.
The Contexts
This dissertation is informed by a broad range of scholarly disciplines and areas of law, therefore, it is
important to discuss context. In sum, the contexts on which I particularly focus are the Canadian legal
landscape, with privatization forming part of that context. Legal decisions concerning mothers with
severely disabled children provides further context. Another context is child disability activism as it
relates to mother’s pursuit of recognition and support. Other context addressed includes the conceptual
frameworks of feminist standpoint theory and critical consciousness. I further include media coverage and
analyses of situations that have arisen. I address the role of resistance and transformations of caregiving
mothers, and finally I consider the context of social standing of caregiving mothers in Canada.
My involvement and interest in children with disabilities led me to question the fairness of their
circumstances, which I realized in the 1990s, included their mothers’ provision of care. The flurry of
litigation against the province of Ontario in the 1990s by mothers with disabled children, challenging
state approaches to public supports6 brought my attention to the inadequacy of state-sponsored care to
address the needs of mothers with disabled children. An analysis of this activity, activism and litigation
against the provincial government forms the primary context of my dissertation. This research asks ‘what

6

According to Christopher P. Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, “Reversal of Fortune: Litigating Health Care Reform in
Auton v British Columbia” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev 112 at 134, who reference data from the Autism Society of
Canada, “180 cases involving 1,600 families” of autistic children were still before the courts in Canada in 2004
while Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (AG), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657 [Auton (2004)] was
being heard. This is an avalanche of childhood disability litigation, yet this is a fact of which few, including many
disability rights activists, are aware.

5
are the legal rights of mothers and severely disabled children to state support?’ and ‘what should they
be?’ questions that I will address in my literature review and arguments.
Contextualizing Context
Context has been defined as “the circumstances that form the setting of an event, statement, or
idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood and assessed.”7 With respect to this research,
important questions to ask regarding caregiver rights are ‘who frames the context under discussion?’ and
‘for what purposes?’8 My project is situated within different contexts. The first is the context I use to
approach my research. For my purposes, the Canadian legal landscape forms the dominant context, since
the issues I seek to address are those relating to the legal rights of caregiving mothers of severely disabled
children in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada. The province of Ontario’s privatization of available
provincial supports is a significant context that demonstrates institutional indifference to the seriousness
and complexity of care needed by severely disabled children. Of course, law and policy are inherently
embedded in the cultural, political, and socio-economic contexts in which they are created and shaped and
so I consider these too.
Secondly, there is contextualized judicial decision making: a reading of the contexts in which the
right to support of children with severe disabilities is concerned may involve narrow legal issues such as
which court orders were enforced previously, when and why. Notably, some judges in obiter dicta and in
decisions respecting the right to support have insisted that in deciding issues about social justice,
contextual approaches to facts and law are essential. For example, in her dissent in the Supreme Court of
Canada case Gosselin v Quebec, Madam Justice Louise Arbour expressed this view.9 Justice Arbour held
that to exclude context from an evaluation of a claimant’s Charter10 rights results in unjust decisions.
Contextualized approaches taken by non-dissenting judges have likewise been supported by
scholars examining gendered disability discrimination.11 In Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney

7

Oxford Dictionaries Online, sub verbo “context”, online:
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/context>.
8
I suggest that the framing of context is something that ties into epistemological considerations, such as whose
knowledge is under consideration, as raised by Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the
Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) [Code, What Can She Know?].
9
Gosselin v Quebec (AG), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429 [Gosselin]. The court in Doré v Barreau du Quebec,
2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 concerning the adjudication of the Charter right used the word ‘context’ 20 times
in its decision [Doré].
10
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
11
See e.g. Fiona Sampson “Beyond Compassion and Sympathy to Respect and Equality: Gendered Disability and
Equality Rights Law” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy,
Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 270. Disabled women may be discriminated against in
ways disabled men and non-disabled women are not.
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General),12 a case where persons who are deaf alleged that not having been provided with interpreters
impaired their ability to receive proper treatment and that this lack was discriminatory and breached their
right to equality under s 15(1) of the Charter, the word ‘context’ appears 15 times. Drawing on the words
of Justice Wilson in R v Turpin,13 the Eldridge court reiterated that the determination of whether a law is
discriminatory requires a contextual examination, and one that must go beyond the legislation itself, to the
social, political and legal context of appellants.14 This provides a legal context for disability rights. A
broader reading of the context of a lawsuit would therefore consider the circumstances under which the
claim for a right to support for children with disabilities is being advanced, or rejected.
Such circumstances may be social or they may be legal, but most often, they are both. J.M.S. v
F.J.M. was an appeal from an order varying child support to the mother of a disabled child who was a
charge of the state as a crown ward.15 The majority held that while the child welfare agency might seek
support from the appellant father16, the mother of the child could not, because although she continued to
care for and support the child, she no longer had (legal) charge of him. In her dissenting judgment,
Madam Justice Anne M. Molloy opined that in determining the mother’s entitlement to support, it was
relevant to consider the particular context in which the protection order arose, and that it involved a child
with disabilities, wherein “the nature of those disabilities made it impossible for his mother to continue
caring for him on her own. He required a residential placement, the cost of which was beyond his
mother’s financial means.”17 Context, like this one, may be contested, depending who is framing the
context and for what purpose.
A third context for my project is child disability activism outside of Canada, which has had an
impact on activism within Canada. Caregiving mothers in diverse nations have been confronting the
impacts of neo-liberal and post-neo-liberal ideals of at-home complex care for severely disabled children
all over the world, and their challenges can helpfully inform Canadian research on disability rights. By
studying international cases in the provision (or denial) of state-sponsored disability support, one can get
a sense of the different ways that varying ideologies affect the availability of state support to marginalized
families. Uncovering and considering these ideologies provides context for understanding the various
barriers caregiving mothers of severely disabled children face. Interrogating the belief systems that inform
legal policy is another significant context of my project. Context framed by mothers is typically in pursuit
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Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge cited to SCR].
R v Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296, 96 NR 115 [Turpin cited to SCR].
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Eldridge, supra note 12 at para 55.
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J.M.S. v F.J.M., [2005] 79 OR (3d) 528 at para 46, 2005 CanLII 25769 (ON SCDC) [J.M.S.].
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Ibid at para 33.
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of recognition and support. This context is tied to my conceptual frameworks of feminist standpoint and
critical consciousness, discussed below.
Canadian media has reported on the plight of children with severe disabilities and their mothers.18
As well, Canadian media has reported on the childhood disability-related reports of provincial
government-appointed watchdogs.19 Some media reports reflect outrage at the status quo for caregiving
mothers and disabled children, while others reflect support for the state’s version of acceptable care.
Media interacts with (and reports on) the social, political and economic contexts informing legal policy,
therefore analyzing media reports allows me to take a deeper look at how the issue is presented, debated
and thought about publicly, and I analyze public attitudes made apparent by contemporary media reports
in Chapter Four. Media, as will be seen, can assist with contextualizing need of support to caregiving
mothers.
Resistance and transformation is a further context for my project. Thus my research includes
mothers’ voices in the context of political transformation and resistance.20 My dissertation tracks how
mothers with severely disabled children have come to resist “motherhood’s gendered requirement of
18

See, for example, the series of articles by Tanya Talaga in the Toronto Star, as well as the series on difficulties
with autism services that also ran in the Star. Shelley Page has reported on these issues in The Ottawa Citizen.
Tanya Talaga, “Watchdog called his role ‘bulwark of democracy’: in Marin’s First Report Since Attempted Ouster,
Ombudsman Outlines Work Done in Past Year”, The Toronto Star (16 June 2010) online: Ontario Ombudsman, <
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Newsroom/Ombudsman-in-the-News/2010/Watchdog-calls-his-role--bulwark-ofdemocracy-;-In.aspx>; Tanya Talaga, “‘Where’s Ontario’s Humanity?’ Mom Asks”, The Toronto Star (30 July
2009) online: The Star
<http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2009/07/23/wheres_ontarios_humanity_mom_asks.html.>; Tanya Talaga,
“No One Should Be Forced to Give Up Their Child”, The Toronto Star (20 July 2009 online: The Star,
<http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2009/07/20/no_one_should_be_forced_to_give_up_their_child.html>;
Shelley Page, “Whose Child Is This”, The Ottawa Citizen (7 February 2009) online: Ottawacitizen.com
<http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/observer/story.html?id=5daf3500-8df4-4342-ab39-32cd2e32e63f>
[Page, “Whose Child is this?”].
19
Examples are the work of The British Columbia Representative for Children and Youth, Mary Ellen TurpellLafond Examples include her offices’ Reports: Representative of Children and Youth of British Columbia, Update:
System of Services for Children and Youth with Special Needs (Victoria: Author, 2010) online:
https://www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/reports_publications/update_system_of_services_2010.pdf>
[BCRCY, Update 2010]; and Representative of Children and Youth of British Columbia, Isolated and Invisible:
When Children with Special Needs are Seen but not Seen (Victoria: Author, 2011) online:
https://www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/reports_publications/isolated_and_invisible.pdf [BCRCY,
Isolated and Invisible].
20
Transformation is a framework that stands in opposition to the dominant ‘coping’ framework applied to the
situations of ‘failed’ mothers. The coping framework is a myth promoted by many, including some gender-blind
critical disability studies scholars. For instance, unnamed commentators on the Council for Canadians with
Disabilities (CCD) website have openly criticized caregiving mothers who state they required respite. Alison Cocks
and Jenny Morris have criticized the dominant characterization and use of respite care as segregationist, which
suggests that mothers actively engage in segregation of their own children. Cocks suggests respite care may be seen
as a tool used to prop up the ableist social order. One could just as easily argue that to refuse respite care does
exactly the same thing to women. In fact, many mothers with medically fragile and/or technology dependent
children, are segregated. See Alison Cocks, “Respite Care for Disabled Children: Micro and Macro Reflections”
(2000) 15:3 Disability & Society 507, and Jenny Morris, Accessing Human Rights: Disabled Children and the
Children’s Act (Barkinside, UK: Barnardos, 1998).
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female self-sacrifice,”21 in an effort to protect the care interests of themselves in context of the
extraordinary care required by their children, doing so in a variety of ways. Canadian blogger, ‘Claire,’
writing in her fifties as a sole-support parent of two, provides an example of this. In her final blog entry,
entitled “Moving on” Claire states,
Most of us are tired. But there are some words of advice that I think I can give. There is no
question that we make mistakes along this road of caring for another. The biggest one, I have
come to realize, is to imagine that it is somehow morally mandated that to become a martyr in the
name of a severely disabled kid. …remember, all the enrichment you believe your child deserves,
you deserve too. As advice, I would say to any new parent that, all along this road, make sure you
factor yourself into the equation: and of course I know that a world lacking in supports can make
this near impossible. 22
This research argues that moments of insight offered by support-seeking mothers of severely disabled
children should shape the context in which support policy is formed. As psychologist Phyllis Chesler
strongly states, “In a mother-hating culture it is cowardly and shortsighted to plead the case for children’s
rights while remaining silent about mothers’ rights.”23 There is cultural ambivalence towards mothers and
in the case of children with severe disabilities that ambivalence is pronounced. As well, the disparate
perspectives apparent in majority court decisions and dissents in the case law concerning mothers who are
asserting their right to support reveal differences in judicial understandings of both caregiving mothers’
needs and their rights, as well as of the obligations of the state towards them. However, in order to better
understand what mothers of the severely disabled need, one must have an understanding of their lived
realities.
Atypical social standing is an important context. Caregiving mother’s socio-economic situations
challenge any application of the blunt instrument of ‘class’ to them. Both highly educated, along with
those much less educated, sole support mothers are often in no position to offer care to their severely
child, unless they can find a partner willing and able to share in the care and expense. As a result severely
disabled children with mothers from different ‘classes’ are made wards of the state. Consequently, many
lone mothers in Canada from different socio-economic groups simply do not have an enforceable right to
keep their severely disabled child, and those who try to retain custody often live with very modest or
extremely low levels of support. Research conducted by The Canadian Roeher Institute Finding a Way In:
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Alison Diduck, “Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood” (1993) 2 Social & Legal Studies 461. She refers to
Marlee Kline and Susan Boyd as making this same assertion at 462.
22
Claire, “Moving on” (17 July 2014), Life with a Severely Disabled Child: The Title Explains It All, Doesn’t It?
(blog), online: <http://severedisabilitykid.blogspot.ca/>. See Appendix A. (Italics not in the original).
23
Phyllis Chesler, Mothers on Trial: The Battle for Children and Custody (Seattle: The Seal Press, 1986) at 356.
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Parents on Social Assistance Caring for Children with Disabilities,24 demonstrated that the presence of a
disabled child lowered the ability of caregiving mothers to leave welfare.25 There is other literature that
points out barriers to needed levels of support where mothers are caring for disabled children. It is a
problem that defies resolution under present neo-liberal policy approaches in many jurisdictions.
Canadian lawyer, Shelagh Day,26 notes that few legal scholars have written about ‘defending’ the
rights of mothers as opposed to ‘women’s rights’ more generally. Day comments that feminists ignored
mother’s rights, believing such rights to be the realm of social conservatives. She states however that our
job in defending the rights of women includes the rights of mothers.27 She also comments that if we
believe in women’s emancipation, we must defend the poorest single mothers.28 Meanwhile social
conservatives have not advanced the rights of less well-off single mothers to state supports. This category
includes mothers with severely disabled children trying to survive in our weak welfare state. Thus the
plight of caregiving mothers has not benefitted from the attention of feminist legal scholars they have
needed. Moreover, there is a weakly developed children’s constitutional rights jurisprudence in Canada.29
In light of these points, it should be no surprise that the support rights of mothers with disabled children
are unclear and little-understood.
This dissertation attempts to bring mothers’ voices into the discussion about their rights together
with those of their severely disabled children in order to recommend paradigm shifts in the way that care
provision is conceived, legally enshrined and made available to mothers caring for severely disabled
children.
An Outline of the Chapters
Beyond this introductory first chapter, in Chapter Two, I introduce my research pathway, which includes
the frameworks I use to examine the legal right to support of mothers with severely disabled children, as
24

L’Institut Roeher Institute, Finding a Way In: Parents on Social Assistance Caring for Children with Disabilities
(North York, ON: Author, 2000) [Roeher, Finding a Way In].
25
Peter Brandon and Denis Hogan’s research examined the relationship between both maternal disability and child
disability on the ability of unmarried mothers to leave welfare. They found children with disabilities have the same
effect on the ability of a woman to leave welfare as a mother’s own disabilities. Their research concludes that the
presence of disability in mother and child “are essential to understanding why a mother may be unable to exit
welfare in the face of a variety of welfare reforms designed to encourage work.” See Peter Brandon & Denis Hogan,
“Impediments to Mothers Leaving Welfare: The Role of Maternal and Child Disability” (2004) 23:4 Population
Research and Policy Review 419 at 431.
26
Shelagh Day, “Mothering in Law: Defending mothers’ rights” (Paper delivered at National Association of Women
in the Law Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, 11-12, 14 May 2007) (Ottawa: National Association of Women in the Law,
2007) online: NAWL <http://www.nawl.ca/en/documents/2007NAWLconfProcedings.pdf>.
27
Ibid at 2
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Day note 26 at 11
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Nicholas Bala & Douglas J. Redfearn, “Family Law and the ‘Liberty Interest’ Section 7 of the Canadian Charter
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be gained from analysis of American jurisprudence in this area, ibid at 275.
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well as a discussion of the specific sources I use. I work primarily with two theories to inform my
interpretation of the subject matter: feminist standpoint theory and the theory of critical consciousness.
The contextual factors I addressed above have varying roles to play. The contextual factor of the
Canadian legal landscape undergirds every chapter. The contextual factor of ‘class’ is described as socioeconomic features of caregiving and is a thread that weaves throughout chapters, as it is central to the
need of support. Judicial decision-making as a context features largely in chapters 4, 6, and 7 where legal
cases are examined with particular focus on decisions where context was considered and seen to matter.
Finally, the context of mother’s resistance and transformation, like the legal and policy context, is focal.
Particular attention is paid to legal claims and the submissions made in legal proceedings.
In Chapter Three, I move on to review selected relevant literatures, considering works from
medicine, political science, economics, history, sociology, feminist and other legal theory, and Canadian
public policy scholarship. The literature is necessarily diverse as my project cuts across numerous fields
of inquiry and disciplines. Avoiding such a cross-disciplinary approach would result in gaps in an
understanding of the complex legal situation in which mothers with disabled children find themselves.
There is a focus on literature concerning legal rights of mothers with disabled children, as well as an
examination of feminist and critical legal theories about state treatment of mothers.
In Chapter Four, I describe how care for severely disabled children has been represented in
differently informed models of care, referred to as the charity model, the medical model, the social model,
and finally, what I consider to be a more nuanced approach to thinking about care that I refer to as the
combined model. Historically, these models of care have been at ideological odds and through elaborating
and analyzing each, I critique the contested concept of ‘care burdens,’ (also referred to as burdens of
care), that appear in different guises in these models. This critique is helpful in that it illustrates the
history and complexity of thinking and theory in the area of disability and care. Classically, disabled
people have been viewed as burdens to both their families and to the state, and this is an important matter
I interrogate in the dissertation. I argue that a newer characterization of the burdens of care on mothers
with severely disabled children will be important to considerations in advancing legal rights to support.
Moreover, a mother’s process of problematizing the complexities of skilled care, including medical tasks,
night work, expensive care and so on, represents a rejection of of how such care is represented in major
models of disability, as well as reflecting expressions of evolved critical consciousness of mothers under
circumstances of oppression. The combined model, in countering and reframing mainstream critical
disability and medical model characterizations of caregiving mothers, is an example of intellectual
activism and, since it challenges two dominant ideologies concerning women and care, it is also an
example of critically conscious feminist thought. This combined model, I later argue, has application to
arguments concerning legal rights to support.

11
In a later section of Chapter Four under the subheading, “Going Judicial,” I address a celebrated
Supreme Court of Canada disability rights case brought by a caregiving mother. It involves the issue of
decisional capacity and the rights of caregiving mothers not to have to provide disability support and care
across generations. I include this case in Chapter Four rather than in Chapter Seven, which examines
private support, as I consider this case as key to an interrogation of societal burdens of care placed on
women who have borne severely disabled children.
In Chapter Five, I provide a sketch of supports available to caregiving mothers of disabled
children primarily in the province of Ontario, but with some attention to other jurisdictions. These include
such things as stipends paid by the state to parents, homecare and enhanced respite, typical respite care,
tax credits and deductions, and other related benefits. In doing so, I also provide a critical policy analysis,
arguing that existing supports are inadequate and exist in weak administrative systems with low
accountability to mothers. This section provides a foundation for the subsequent chapters in which
caregiving mother’s legal activism is seen in legal cases brought by them for various forms of support.
In Chapter Six, I discuss Canadian legal cases where mothers have brought claims against the
state concerning its denial of disability-related supports to their families. I use selected cases revealing
diverse perspectives on such supports from the bench, to illustrate some of the challenges that caregiving
mothers of severely disabled children face as they confront prevailing societal myths about childhood
disability and themselves. Chapter Six exposes the chasm between how caregiving mothers understand
their needs for support and how governments (informed by outdated but persistent cultural views of
motherhood) view those needs differently. The chapter also exposes a series of prominent myths in the
area of public law as it affects caregiving mothers. The rationale for doing so is to show that although
supports may appear in statutes, and may be widely assumed to exist in the culture, it does not necessarily
flow from this that such support will be realized by those in need of it. My analysis of these myths, along
with mothers’ efforts to reveal the truth in the face of them, serves to illustrate how public law corrals
mothers’ claims for support in the setting of childhood disability, rather than facilitating them. The
overarching difficulty however, is that of mothers’ inability to hold the state accountable for their ongoing
support, the very thing to which, I argue, they have a right. As well, the abandoning mother forms part of
an ideology, one that undergirds motherhood in general, but which is more pernicious towards mothers in
its ableist manifestations. Failed, bad, and non-coping mothers abandon; coping, successful, and good
mothers do not. In comparison, the abandoning state does not receive such a harsh condemnation. Where
caregiving mothers are concerned, their competence and value appear to be constructed through binary
opposites, with (bad) abandoners as one construction and exemplary mothers as the other. Both are
oppressive, with maternal deprivation and maternal exploitation taking place respectively.
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In Chapter Seven, I unpack core cultural attitudes towards mothers, mothers’ roles in caregiving,
and attitudes towards the severely disabled that shape mothers’ legal experiences in their efforts to secure
appropriate care and financial support for their children through private avenues. I also examine the effect
of their private litigation for support on public support responsibilities. Thus, I examine an estate case,
and family law litigation, including a family law case that intersects with a (public law) child protection
matter. In so doing aspects of their activism can be seen. I consider their acts of their bringing novel
claims and in their speaking to the media about challenges to existing legal provisions in statutes dealing
with their support and that of their disabled children. I also examine a tort case that has relevance to my
thesis and which involves a mother advancing rights to support for care.
In Chapter Eight, I provide a conclusion to my dissertation, ending with a recommendation that
seems to offer the most promise to require that the state support mothers and severely disabled children.
I now present my research pathway, which includes detailed information about my methodology.
As will be appreciated, the pathway is a means to illustrate not only the right to support, but also the
barriers experienced in realizing it.
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CHAPTER TWO: The Research Pathway
The Scope and Limitations of My Research
The rights I consider are legal rights and include rights based in legislation, case law, and constitutional
law. I also consider international human rights law in making my arguments that mothers with severely
disabled children have legal rights to support. The types of supports that I consider therefore include those
made available by government, including disability and income support provisions, family policy,
provincial home care and enhanced respite, inter alia and child welfare systems. Family policy includes
family law and legislation implemented by the state. My research ended April 30, 2017.30 Given that the
scope of my research is jurisdictionally specific, and given the challenges in defining disability, among
other matters I note immediately below, there are limitations as to what I can examine.
This study does not include an inquiry into all mothers with disabled children in Canada who
require and who are, arguably, entitled to support. First Nations on-reserve mothers and their disabled
children are not included.31
A second limitation is the inability to define a scientifically or administratively or other agreed
upon approach to categorizing children as ‘severely disabled’. Severely disabled children form a group
with fuzzy boundaries.
Another limitation is that in Canada there is little information about these mothers and children.
Some information about their needs appear in reported cases and government and Ombuds Reports.
However census and other kinds of data related to support is incomplete. Information mothers provide to
provincial governments when they are applying for support is not made public. Although it would be
helpful to know how many applications have been filed in courts by mothers across Canada, there is no
tracking of these cases federally or provincially. Moreover, applications for state support may be filed and
abandoned, or judicially decided, but not reported. Some matters will have settled.
I would also like to have included information from parents’ affidavits in child welfare and
family law proceedings from across the provinces since 1996 (a date chosen as it corresponds with the
end of the Canada Assistance Plan and many of the shifts in policy pertaining to care took place after it
ended). However, that would have required a different methodological approach than the one I proposed,
as well as greater time and resources than were at my disposal.
30

Any legal developments that occurred after that date are not addressed, although significant changes in law and
policy after this date are noted where applicable.
31
The obligation to support this group of mothers and children falls under federal jurisdiction. There has been
protracted litigation in the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal concerning First Nations status children with severe
disabilities rights to support. One example of this is First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and
Assembly of First Nations v Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development), 2011 CHRT 4. Although provincial child welfare jurisdiction governs as well, this area, while
pressing, is beyond the scope of my research.

14
Childhood Disability Defined
Disability cannot be succinctly or neatly defined. For the purposes of my dissertation, I rely upon an
impairment definition first, and later argue for a relational re-envisioning of severe disability in
childhood. Children whose impairments fall within the purview of my project are those who have
episodic or permanent chronic physical, severe developmental, behavioural, neurological or psychiatric
conditions and who require an array of complex health and social services and supports that go far beyond
that required by typical children or children with mild impairments. Important within this group are
medically fragile and/or technology-dependent children with intensive health and social care
requirements. This includes, but is not limited to, children who have a congenital or acquired multisystem
diseases and severe neurological conditions. It includes those children with serious immune and - in some
cases - nonspecific severe conditions.
This definition has been drawn from and expands upon that provided by Canadian pediatrician
Eyal Cohen et al. who, while noting there is no uniform definition for children with medical complexity,
also noted there were nevertheless family service needs for this group. Cohen et al. who provde a lengthy
definition based on a broad range of impairments proposed that further research in the area might use a
common description and evaluate needs, seeking such information from medically complex children, their
families and health care system providers.32
My description goes beyond Cohen’s in that I include all children whose care is what I refer to as
maternally complex.33 Mine is not a medical or social model definition of disability, but rather a
maternally-oriented definition, one that works with my research goals.
I am well aware that disability has been defined in the social model not as impairment, but rather
as the result of constraints placed on people with impairments by society.34 It is the social model of
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Eyal Cohen et al, “Children with Medical Complexity: An Emerging Population for Clinical and Research
Initiatives” (2011) 127:3 Pediatrics, 529 at 529. I choose a medical foundation for my definition to avoid the bias in
Canadian disability rights advocacy for children, which I suggest favors responses to disability discrimination
against those children with intellectual disabilities, over those children with serious medical disabilities. I also seek
to go beyond needs of the healthy physically disabled child. Attending to the often-extreme needs associated with
severe medical impairments in a child is central in the lives of a percentage of caregiving mothers. This issue has
been overlooked outside of medicine.
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In 1999, The Roeher Institute used the title “Supporting Children with Complex Medical Needs and Their
Families: Synthesis of Three Reports” for an important policy document. See Cameron Crawford, “New from the
Roeher Institute” (ND) online: <http://abilities.ca/new-from-the-roeher-institute/>. Notably the Roeher Institute
document referenced, at 15, C.G. Petr, B. Murdock & R. Chapin, “Home Care for Children Dependent on Medical
Technology: The Family Perspective” (1995) 21:1 Social Work in Health Care 5, and therefore had medical
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Carol Thomas, “Sociologies of Disability and Illness” (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) at 57.
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disability that informs the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD).35
However, since a large part of severely disabled children’s ‘environment’ is provided to them by
their mothers, who both legally advocate and care for them, the social model of disability on its own runs
into difficulty in my project. In my view, mothers do not form part of a disabling milieu to children with
severe impairments; on the contrary, they work hard to enable their children’s optimal health status and
inclusion.
Although even this point has been challenged by some in critical disability studies. Moreover, as I
argue, mothers are themselves disabled, by virtue of their assigned roles as caregivers of severely disabled
children. They have been socially disabled by (among others36) the patriarchal arm of the disability rights
movement, a feature I discuss in detail later.
As a result of these shortcomings, the social model definition of disability is not my primary
definition. This does not mean that I subscribe to a “personal tragedy” childhood disability narrative such
as has been attributed to the medical model of disability.37 The medical model, with the modification of
the description of complex care as maternally complex care in this project, serves the aims of a legal
rights’ analysis, which has to do with improving support for mothers who care for severely disabled
children.
My Research Goals and Methodology
To reiterate, my aim is to portray the legal rights to support mothers with severely disabled children have
in Canada; to present their situation within a framework that makes visible areas where rights for mothers
and their severely disabled children are absent or weak; and to propose ways for mothers to have their
rights conceived in a more just manner consistent with entitlements.
In examining the law concerning their support, I have chosen methods that fit within an
overarching feminist legal methodology. Feminist legal methodology is noted to “encompass[es] multiple
approaches, and methodologically broadly speaking it includes an analysis and critique of law as a
patriarchal institution.”38 In her now classic article, Feminist Legal Methods, Elizabeth Bartlett advocates
the use of legal methodologies in legal research that are grounded in women’s experiences of exclusion,
that rely upon feminist reasoning and that pay attention to the matter of consciousness-raising. 39
Bartlett’s rationale is that such methods can uncover features of legal issues that mainstream
35
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methodologies may suppress or fail to see. According to Bartlett, methodology matters because the
methods selected by a researcher will influence suggestions made for legal reform.40 Thus, while
classically briefing the body of support law I have gathered would provide information about claims
made, facts relied upon, evidence that was provided, what the decision was and what principle the ratio of
the case articulated, such an approach on its own would be inadequate in answering my questions.
More than a classic brief-and-discussion is needed to ‘get at’ barriers standing in the way of the
realization of support by caregiving mothers. Typical analyses fail, for example, to address sub-textual
and contextual issues that are embedded in the text of legal cases. They cannot address attitudes, biases,
assumptions, hidden litigation strategies, or other features that form part of disputes where caregiving
mothers are concerned. As such, a typical analysis of a case may fail to elicit the impact of complex care
on a woman’s economic survival or on her health, or her ability to continue to care for her disabled child
in the absence of particular supports. Important obiter dicta and dissenting judgments that challenge the
legal status quo, which are tied to structures that subordinate caregiving mothers, may also be overlooked.
In order to do as Bartlett suggests, and use legal research that is grounded in women’s experiences of
exclusion, I draw from the scholarship of A.W. Phinney III. Phinney’s research comprises a textual
analysis of decisions, which keeps in mind the question of whether claimant’s rights to support are even
seriously examined in the very law concerning their right to it.
Finally, I am mindful that “doing disability research” appropriately requires the use of research
methods capable of addressing the unique aspects of disability oppression, and thus, a critical approach to
legal analysis that is sensitive to issues of disability should prevail. Further, in keeping with the view held
by some advocates that disability research should only be undertaken by disabled people themselves,41 my
experiences of disability are set out in the section on my standpoint. Thus the requirement that “nothing
about us, without us” advanced from within disability rights is fully met in my project, and from all
possible angles.
Sources Relied Upon
In light of my research questions, the method I adopted to answer them involves a lengthy literature
review. It also includes: an examination of relevant statutes, consideration of legal decisions involving
mothers with disabled children, and reference to bar association publications. It includes nongovernmental and governmental policy documents and the broader grey literature, which is notably very
important in disability research, as well as to applicable international law. Below, I summarize the means
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I used to access the literature, subsequently, I move on to discuss aspects of methods related to my
particular use of legal cases sourced.
Academic Literature
To inform my research, law, policy, medical and social science and humanities journal articles were
reviewed. Databases consulted included: Ethos; Osgoode Law Library Journals Portal and LexisNexis
Quicklaw Commentary and Journals. York University eResources; Medline; Pubmed; CINAHL and
ERIC were used. To keep the review current, literature was updated through searches in Google Scholar,
including Google Scholar UK. Some items were accessed through universities other than the York
University libraries, such as the Bora Laskin Law Library at the University of Toronto. I also requested
individuals at other universities to track down articles and I used Racer Dam for an international
interlibrary loan.
Grey Literature - Reports and Papers and Media
Much of the grey literature referred to, such as policy documents and non-governmental reports, was
accessed either online or personally, from disability rights advocates. I used ProQuest to access older
newspaper and other reports. I also relied upon the Dissertations &Theses @York database through York
University. Trade newspapers were consulted. I examined Canadian federal and provincial government
reports, websites, policy briefs and white papers, reports on government strategies; Fatality Inquiries;
Ombudsman Reports; reports and books published by policy institutes;42 joint provincial government and
policy institute reports; Senate Reports; American joint state and university reports;43 case comments;
conference papers;44 blogs; podcasts: newspaper and online news reports and radio interviews.45 Some
grey literature I refer to was recommended to me by disability advocates. I looked for blogs and radio
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interviews by caregiving mothers that reflected in my view a changed consciousness. I looked for
newspaper articles that reflected dissonance between what mothers reported versus what the state held out
through its spokespersons. I also looked for media reports on disability litigation. I also had in my
possession a collection of still-relevant policy documents referred to in my M.A. research, which
examined Canadian pediatric homecare in the context of human rights. That project involved
communication with government offices, such as the Office des personnes handicapées du Québec.
Statutes
I examined statutes and their regulations from different jurisdictions as they arose in the cases and policy
gaps I discuss. Thus, the examination of legislation was by no means exhaustive.46 It would not have been
possible for me to examine every statute that touched upon the support of caregiving mothers. However, I
did not list this as a limitation to the research, since this approach yielded significant amounts of
information about a great deal of the law with which caregiving mothers interact.
International Law
International human rights instruments and websites about them were examined, along with secondary
sources about their relevance and application.
Legal Cases
Since I sought to survey the legal landscape of supports offered to mothers with disabled children, I
examined cases from across jurisdictions. At the very least, I looked at every case my search terms
produced. Many cases were similar to one another within support domains, and I refer to some of these,
but I also selected cases that had something additional to say, for example, revelations in submissions or
obiter dicta, or useful or interesting comments in reasons given by judges. I also looked for cases that
were further litigated in a higher court, as I was interested in the characteristics of these disputes. Thus, I
refer to matters heard in provincial, territorial and federal courts and tribunals. Child welfare cases
discussed include those from Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan.
Family law cases include those from Newfoundland and Labrador, Manitoba, the Yukon, Nova
Scotia, British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. Cases comprised of actions brought by fathers and
mothers, and, adult disabled ‘children’.
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I also examined replies to applications to vary child or spousal support and appeals of those
matters. A celebrated disability rights case from Prince Edward Island is examined in detail.
Cases for supports brought against government include those from Nunavut, Nova Scotia, British
Columbia and Ontario. Discussions of the Blais matter in Quebec provided information about challenges
with supports to sole-support mothers in that province.47
In terms of legal jurisdiction, in addition to drawing cases from provincial and territorial support
domains, I refer to federal cases brought in the areas of disability pensions, taxation, immigration and
employment insurance. Thus, cases were drawn from across Canadian jurisdictions in diverse matters.
However, given the number of provinces and territories to consider and the added federal disputes, since
mine is neither a statistical nor a quantitative research study, I selected Ontario as a focus in Chapter Five.
Generation of Cases and Rationales for Choice
I searched for cases primarily in two well-known Canadian databases, CanLII (The Canadian Legal
Information Institute) and NexisLexis Quicklaw. In total, using all methods to generate cases, I gathered
and read approximately 184 decisions. I referred to the Westlaw database only to locate cases referred to
elsewhere, but that I could not find in NexisLexis Quicklaw or CANLII. CanLII, the primary database, is
a reputable database set up by and funded by the Canadian Federation of Law Societies. It has several
search functions with which to access Canadian cases dating back to at least 2000, which covers the
timeframe I am most interested in.48 CANLII describes its reporting of decisions as ‘comprehensive’.
Thus, I chose cases primarily from a comprehensive bilingual and reputable Canadian collection.
Moreover, CanLII is user-friendly, widely accessible, and free of charge.49
I chose to present for analysis cases that narrate common experiences of support-seeking
activities of caregiving mothers. Cases I selected demonstrate in the text of their decisions that among the
difficulties mothers encounter in support law are pervasive and tightly held cultural understandings about
mothers in relation to disabled children. Although mine is neither participatory nor empirical research, in
referring to cases found in CanLII, lay people, in particular self-representing mothers and non-legal
scholars, can access decisions to which I refer. Moreover, the feature of accessible cases I rely upon in
most of my arguments allows for a form of replication and substantiation of my legal arguments by
interested others from any discipline. The overall accessibility of cases used was an important
consideration in their selection for analysis.
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Search Terms Used to Find Cases and Other Means to Access Cases
Search terms I used in looking for cases relevant to my dissertation were: disabled; disability; complex
care; disabled child; adult disabled child; mother; child of the marriage; father; income, work;
employment; support; care; protection; child support; homecare; respite; pension; enhanced respite; cost;
access; health; custody, assistance; charge and government. These terms allowed me to access cases
decided in the private law and public law litigation.
Within cases, I also used a variation of the snowball approach used in qualitative research, by
following up on cases or academic articles judges refer to in their decisions and cases that parties used to
support their claims. This was done to ensure my arguments either made reference to or kept in view, the
body of cases to which judges may refer. In my view, this also added rigour to my approach, because as a
group, such cases function as a beacon in what could otherwise be seen as an endless sea of cases.
In addition to searching in digital databases, I visited the Great Law Library (of the Law Society
of Upper Canada) and systematically looked through the stacks of older Family Law Reporters for earlierthan CanLII’s reporting decisions involving adult children with disabilities.50 I also reviewed the Ontario
Reports provided to me as a Barrister and Solicitor by the Law Society of Upper Canada each month.
However, notably, during the tenure of my research, I did not come across a case examining support of
mothers with severely disabled children.
Information about cases, and some court documents, were provided to me by lawyers at ARCH
Disability Law Centre, Income Security Advisory Centre (ISAC), and the Ontario Administrative Justice
Network (OAJN). Where Bar Association publications that I accessed mention certain cases as being
important to the issues I examine, I refer to them. Where an author whose work was central to my project,
referred to a legal case or law in a book as relevant, I accessed it.
One important public law case I came across appeared in the form of a published factum51
prepared by children’s lawyer Jeffrey Wilson at his and Alexandra Seaton’s Toronto Family and
Children’s law office waiting room in 2014.52 However, while I used cases harvested from diverse
sources, as noted, I relied primarily on CanLII and secondarily on NexisLexis Quicklaw to help me
answer my research questions.
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Case Selection and Analysis Employed in Chapters Six and Seven
My research into the areas of public and secondarily, private support cases, as noted, was not designed as
an empirical study. I did not create a document to track every single case I came across, nor did I create a
matrix to record data from cases I do and do not refer to. In clarifying this point, my dissertation was not
designed as research that relied on, for example, either coding, or statistical analyses. Nor was it a
comparative legal analysis designed to compare decisions in one jurisdiction against those in another. I
did not select decisions that reflected only one approach or orientation to support.
Instead, I selected a wide variety of cases, choosing cases that were: both older and more recent;
that represented middle-class, upper middle-class, working-class and non-income earning mothers with
severely disabled children; that were from different jurisdictions; that dealt with a variety of forms of
support and with children with different kinds of disabilities. I selected cases where on occasion: one or
other parent also had a disability; where judges appeared more and less sympathetic to the support claims
being made. I looked for tribunal and arbitration decisions, motions, trial and appellate-level decisions in
the provincial lower and superior courts and in federal courts.
I looked for cases in all areas of the law where disability-related support to caregiving mothers
was dealt with. Thus, I examined at least one case in each of the following areas: labour law; employment
law; disability pension regulations; criminal law; and income tax provisions.
In some instances, I only came across one case in an area of law dealing with support to
caregiving mothers. The cases of Cyndy Moore and Cynthia Harris appear to be unique, for example, but
important in spite of that. I looked in the area of child welfare law, social benefits law, including
disability income support provisions. I examined a case in estate law, several in tort and in family law.
Some of these cases did not strictly fall within one area of law, rather there was overlapping, which is a
feature of disability support.
In my analysis of cases in Chapters Six and Seven, I drew from the techniques described in
Phinney III’s article, Feminism, Epistemology and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen v Gilliard.53 Here
I set out Phinney III’s ideas and his use of them in his approach to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Gilliard v Bowen.54 Phinney III suggests that legal decisions may be read as text and as
representing a challenge not only to the law, but also to ideology.55 He observes that even though certain
issues before the courts have impacted poor women’s lives, the legal issues appear not to be about their
legal rights. He argues that this has rendered certain mothers’ rights invisible, in the very cases that are
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about their right to support.56 To illustrate this, Phinney III uses the example of the infamous American
Supreme Court case, Gilliard v Bowen, which involved a legal challenge to an amendment of a provision
in a federal social welfare law, Aid to Families of Dependent Children Act (AFDC). Before 1975
American families applying for AFDC were allowed to exclude from their entitlement calculation child
support or a child’s work earnings. This meant an entire family in need of support would not be
disqualified from receiving benefits because a separated parent paid child support. After 1975 the AFDC
Program was amended to require the right to receive child support be assigned to the state. The later 1984
Deficit Reduction Act required that families receiving AFDC declare child support paid to families living
together and children had to give up all of their child support except the first $50.57 The amendment
therefore resulted in the clawback by the state of child support payments made to single mothers in
receipt of AFDC. In Gilliard, as Phinney notes, the court relayed that the standard of review was whether
Congress had a rational basis58 for its decision and the United States Supreme Court decided that it did.59
However, Phinney points out that “in the end the court can maintain rationality as a justification for the
child’s loss only through considerable sleight of hand.”60
The history of Gilliard is best summarized in the decision on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, which upheld the legislation as not violating the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. It sets out the
history of the matter and I have reproduced that in Appendix B. Phinney III’s claim is that the Gilliard
decision served to create further hardships for poor mothers who were dependent on the state for support
by upholding the practice of state clawbacks of child support. He states that the decision, read as a
text…“suggests the ways in which rhetoric and ideology can interlock to produce applications of law that
discriminate against women and the economically disadvantaged.”61 He states that his focus in analyzing
the case is “less on traditional legal analysis than on the nature and effects of the rhetoric at work in both
the majority decision authored by Justice Stevens and the dissent written by Justice Brennan, trying to
show how the literary qualities of these opinions both reflect and condition their antithetical
conclusions.”62
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The use of the word ‘rhetoric’ by Phinney III may be analogized to my use of the word ‘myth’,
which likewise draws attention to what is taking place in support cases that may not be apparent on the
surface, but which are influential regardless.
It became apparent that I had reached what a qualitative researcher would call saturation, after
approximately a year of gathering and reading the cases I had amassed. At this point, I began to note the
same or similar kinds of arguments and submissions repeated, which, I argue below, reflects the
persistence of particularly entrenched and powerful myths that get deployed in all areas of support law
pertaining to caregiving of disabled children by their mothers. As my literature review reveals, caregiving
mothers and their severely disabled children are socially situated in ways contested by these mothers. I
was interested in accessing cases that provided typical examples of how public and private law both
adequately and inadequately account for the support needs of mothers, and how legislation and decisions
act to ‘tame’ their claims to support, even at times where mothers prevail. Rosemary Coombe, a Canadian
scholar in critical cultural legal studies, posits that instead of emphasizing statutes or decisions in one’s
legal research, one might instead pay attention to “the textuality and legal life of cultural forms as it is
expressed in the specific practices of socially situated subjects”.63 In reading such cases, I attended closely
to: obiter dicta and dissenting judgments that had something different to say about maternally complex
care and the support of it; the text and the subtext of submissions to the court, as well of course to the
nature of allegations made by and about parties to the case. Phinney’s analysis showed me how support
law can create conflicts between the rights to support of a child versus his or her mother. Coomb’s
writing suggested that the law’s impact is often felt where it is least evident, in particular where people
are misrecognized or unacknowledged in law’s legitimation. What law does not say it does or omits to do
can be as impacting as what it does do and the question of for whom conflicts are made or who are
silenced in law is worthy of note as it has application in my project. I kept my eye open for these legal
dynamics in reading legal cases.
I do address situations where courts (including dissenting judgments) have gone beyond the usual
understanding of statutory or regulatory provisions, and I address what happened there. This was
important in discussions of problems mothers experience in seeking support in amounts greater than that
which is typically available under present schemes or whose claims do not fit neatly into statutory
requirements. Although there are limitations in what courts can do jurisdictionally with regard to awards
of support, there are not the same kinds of limitations on what courts can say about support law. Thus, I
include important obiter dicta seen in the discussions of cases I examined.
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The Interpretive Frameworks Employed
I employ two conceptual frameworks in this dissertation; that of feminist standpoint theory, and that of
Freire’s concept of critical consciousness. Standpoint theory has been stated to work well in tandem with
the theory of critical consciousness, with the exercise of one’s standpoint having been stated to be a key
element in developing critical consciousness.”64 It has been clarified that, “standpoint theory is more
about the creation of groups’ consciousness than about shifts in consciousness of individuals.”65 My
project considers both individual and group standpoint perspectives.
Standpoint Theory
Standpoint theory is a feminist critical theory concerned with practices of power and the production of
knowledge.66 It is also a methodology. The theory claims that obtaining a standpoint offers critical
insights.67 I acknowledge at the outset that as a theory, standpoint has been controversial; with theorist
Sandra Harding noting that it has been critiqued with both ‘vigour’ and ‘overt emotional investment’.68
This suggests that it proposes something threatening. Exploring why such reactions occur, Harding
suggests reasons include standpoint theory’s engagement with the “anxieties of our era” and in particular,
identity politics. She adds that standpoint theory has been seen as contentious to both non-feminist and
feminists alike. She counters these criticisms of standpoint theory with the reminder that the underlying
rationale of standpoint applies importantly to feminism, in that women have long been “the object of
others’ knowledge projects”, noting that previously, research areas and social policy that bear on women
disallowed conceptual frameworks in which women were authors of such knowledge.69 This, she notes,
“ensured systematic ignorance and error, not only about women’s lives but also about men’s lives, in all
their diversity, and about how any particular society’s gender relations worked.”70
Standpoint theory has been persuasively defended by many other feminist theorists as well, which
is why I employ it.71 Addressing its detractors, Nancy Hartstock asserts, “standpoint is not simply an
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interested position, but is interested in the sense that it is engaged.”72 Hartstock emphasizes that we
cannot deal with the use and misuse of power, if we do not participate in exposing it.73
One may expose misuse of power from the inside, and I aim to expose aspects of the use and
misuse of legal power in this manner in the chapters that follow. Notably, research methodologists Doucet
and Mauthner74 refer to the difficulty in defining what an “insider” in research is.75 They state that, “at the
core of standpoint epistemology is the assertion that the world can best be represented from a particular
socially situated perspective, one which represents epistemic privilege or authority.”76 This is not to say
that by merely relating what I have experienced or seen, or recording what other caregiving mothers say
they have seen or experienced I automatically privilege what is stated or seen, for as Harding points out, it
takes more than this to identify and locate material and political forms of oppression, and to understand
oppressive hierarchical structures.77 However, in such feminist research, the ways in which scholars
position themselves are understood to bear a relationship to claims of knowledge, and scholars are
understood as present in the telling of theirs.78
In my research, I abide by Canadian philosopher Lorraine Code’s view that women do, in fact,
have situated knowledge, realized through their experiences in both social and institutional settings.79
Clearly, motherhood is one setting, and courts and tribunals are another, in which feminist standpoints
may evolve. The evolution of a feminist litigant standpoint is not a new phenomenon. In the 1880s,
British activist Georgina Weldon litigated to change the Lunacy Laws used in conjunction with the
doctrine of couverture, by husbands against their wives.80 Legal scholar Kristin Kalsem states of Georgina
Weldon that “she was the author of her own legal story. In the courtroom, in her writing, in her public
performances – she was always representing herself.”81 Weldon herself stated of those on the other side of
a case, “they also do their best to confuse me with the inextricable labyrinth of law, trying to get rid of me
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at any price, but I stand up to them and I appeal and appeal and appeal.”82 Overtly conscious of law’s
capacity in the guise of protection to trap and push married women, Weldon pushed back, making
demands for legal rights in her case to change the legal ability of husbands to have their wives declared
psychiatrically disabled for personal and financial gain, when they were not. Her views on her courtroom
experiences would be very different than that of a male observer, even though male observers at the time
commented that she, although not a lawyer, presented her case well.83
For mothers with disabled children to present their cases well is no simple matter, for as Yi-Ting
84

Shih has stated, “mothers of disabled children may be viewed as a marginalized group whose
perspectives can be easily neglected, since they are not men, not mothers of non-disabled children, not
disabled persons, or not professionals.”85 However, while this is so, Code claims women reposition
themselves at the point where they have managed to reconstruct ‘meanings’ that have evolved from their
experiences. According to Code, women participate in transformative strategies towards “a changed
politics of care,” and I would add to that a changed law of care.86
Mothers learn along different pathways. These include medical learning. For example, acquisition
of the skills required to watch for subtle signs of a medical status of one’s child. One is through formal
education targeting the mothers of ‘special needs’ children. It is well-documented that the mothers of
severely disabled children become well-educated about their child’s disability.87 They conduct research,
attend information sessions, participate in private workshops and parenting conferences and, as nursing
scholar Cheryl Gibson describes, ask pointed questions of their child’s physicians. This education
provides mothers with specialized knowledge and the recognition of what the state will and will not take
responsibility for. Kathy Levine’s word, ‘authoritative knowledge’, describes a form of knowledge that
caregiving mothers of disabled children acquire. 88 Referencing Brigitte Jordan,89 Levine states that “[t]he
label of ‘authoritative’ is meant to draw attention to the status of knowledge of a social group. She adds
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“the power of authoritative knowledge is not that it is right, but that it matters.”90 Anna Karin Kingston
states that her experiences with her son were parallel to those of her research participants.91 Like them,
she observes, “I was also involved in legal proceedings against the department of education, which
culminated in the High Court.”92 Kingston’s approach, the referencing of experiential knowledge and
social location, is not uncommon in this area of research. Kingston is a professional, a researcher, a
mother of a child with disabilities and a non-disabled child and also as a litigator suing the government of
Ireland.
Standpoint theory claims that research cannot be neutral93 and Kingston points out the nonneutrality of her research.94 My view is that mothers’ knowledge is an important part of research overall,
and particularly disability research. In the setting of her research on the knowledge and agency of
mothers of children with chronic illness, Gibson claims “we live in a culture that has left the mother’s
experience, the mother’s perspective, and the mother’s power, in the shadow.”95 This includes a shadow
having been cast over their legal experiences. My standpoint as a medically disabled female lawyer and
longtime caregiving mother enters into my own research as well, for reasons I address below.
In this project, it is an individual (myself) whose knowledge and understanding of mothering a
severely medically disabled child has an experiential component to it. Lorelei Carpenter and Helena
Austin claim that caregiving mothers perceive themselves as differently situated than typical mothers,96
with unique understandings derived from their social locations.97 They state “the experience of living
liminality facilitates the development of distinct orienting contexts for making-meaning and navigating
intrapersonal and interpersonal experiences,” and that these “manifest[ed] in a reappraisal and
reconstruction of maternal subjectivity”.98
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Care scholar Jonathan Herring notes that care issues, in particular those concerning mothers, have
been marginalized, including in academia.99 He observes that the businessman, with rights of autonomy
and freedom to contract, is well-situated and recognized in law. He adds, “[t]he exhausted mother of the
disabled child, with little autonomy” or freedom is not. He further suggests that she is a legal anomaly:
“Not even perhaps, of particular interest to lawyers.”100
This anomalous aspect of the status of mothers with severely disabled children has yet to be
accounted for legally. I build on the suggestions of Shih, Levine, and Code to demonstrate that caregiving
mothers can and do use their knowledge to transform law, having commenced a collective, albeit
fragmented, process with their individual (and less often group101) aims of transforming motherhood. I
concur with Lorraine Code’s view that an ‘epistemic shift’ in institutional make-up can occur.102 Her
belief acknowledges that presently, even though mothers do not always prevail in courts and tribunals,
and even though their various forms of advocacy are not bringing about sought-after results rapidly, they
are nonetheless instrumental in shifting the boundaries of ableist motherhood as an institution, and in
transforming it through law.
Rather than experiential and subjective knowledge being central to a personal or intimate selftransformation as Levine describes, I construct as transformative mothers’ changed consciousness and
subsequent activism as something that suggests acquired critical consciousness.
Now, I turn to present three features of my own standpoint, and do so by narrating salient features
from my background, my experience of disability, and a few experiences and insights as a caregiving
mother. Then, I explain my particular use of critical consciousness in this thesis.
My Standpoint
Reflecting on “why it has taken so long for moral, political, and spiritual thinkers—who have
written so much about so many things—to think deeply about disability issues … It is…only
when those who do the caretaking can also do the writing that this issue seriously comes to the
fore.”103
My initial exposure to disability began with Jerry Lewis telethons. This was undoubtedly what led to my
little sister Maggie, her kindergarten friend, Mia Sheard104, and I to collect money for “the crippled
children” in 1969. Our parents sent the money we collected and we were subsequently invited to visit the
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(then) Hospital for Crippled Children in Toronto.105 My memories are of getting dressed up and later
standing in a corridor, face-to-face with a young boy, who seemed to be about my age at the time. His
legs were splayed, and he wore leg braces. A nurse told me that the boy had arthritis. I did not know then
that I would go on to have severe inflammatory arthritis myself, nor that I would one day have a son with
severe and chronic autoimmune illnesses.
At the time of that visit, I was a student at Rosedale Public School. Later, I attended a private
school in southern Ontario and then, a Church of England grammar school for girls in London, England. I
am privileged to have had a post-secondary education. After a short period of time studying French at the
Sorbonne and working as an au pair, I earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from McGill University,
followed by a qualifying year in sociology, also at McGill. Subsequently, I married and attended law
school at The University of Detroit Mercy and The University of Windsor Law Schools. I have an M.A.
degree in Critical Disability Studies, earned after I closed my law practice.
Further learning on my part occurred while working as a project coordinator and researcher in the
Faculty of Health at York University, where I conducted thirty interviews with immigrant mothers of
disabled children and twenty-eight interviews with stakeholders involved with caregiving mothers from
across Canada. In 2011, I became a PhD student.
As noted, part of my personal background is that I have a moderately severe inflammatory
condition, which arose after my marriage ended. As a single mother with a solo law practice, I struggled
with my health, along with that of two of my three children. Eventually, I closed my practice as the result
of a serious health crisis. As I was unable to afford the $20,000 plus a year for the biologic agent my
rheumatologist said I required, I spent a year bedridden, taking different disease-modifying drugs. When
my body responded badly to these treatments, I joined a pharmaceutical trial for an injected and
unlicensed drug, and participated in other medical research too. I learned how to manage bedside
parenting.106 Meanwhile, the Canadian Arthritis Patients Alliance (CAPA) advocated for me to access the
biologic agent I needed, as did my specialists. CAPA members were in regular contact with one another,
105

Tracy O’Dell, “Not Your Average Childhood: Lived Experience of Children with Physical Disabilities Raised in
Bloorview Hospital, Home and School from 1960-1989” (2011) 26:1 Disability &Society 49, offers a perspective as
a former resident at Bloorview during the era I visited.
106
As I discuss in Chapter 6, there is data on increased prevalence of illness in mothers of children with severe
disabilities based on a 2006 Statistics Canada study, “The Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS)
2006: Technical and Methodological Report” (Ottawa: Author, 2007) online: Statistics Canada
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-628-x/89-628-x2007002-eng.htm#archived> [Statistics Canada, “PALS:
Report”]. There is also the evidence for this that comes through in my literature review. Court decisions provide
strongest evidence, backed up with medical documentation and affidavits. For example, in Morrison v Morrison,
2001 YKSC 521, [2001] YJ No 50 (QL) [Morrison], the mother had severe diabetes which required a 24-hour-a-day
insulin pump and she had diabetic retinopathy. Two of her four children were disabled. The judge emphasized the
difficulty this mother had working three and a half days a week with her illness in addition to caregiving obligations
and the lack of access exercised by the children’s father. The latter is noted to be the reason this sick mother got very
little respite.

30
media, politicians, and with me. The Arthritis Society (TAS) provided me with a social worker and with a
physiotherapist who came to my home. I had a family doctor and a seasoned family lawyer, both of
whom stood by me as I became sicker and more disabled. During this crisis, my former spouse, his wife
and their lawyers went to lengths to portray me in a poor light as a wife, mother and lawyer. It was
alternatively alleged that I was not sick or that I had always been sick. My athletic, outgoing non-disabled
son, when faced with the choice, chose to remain with his siblings and with me, living as we were with
disabilities of various kinds.
My dissertation is not about the plight of disabled mothers with disabled children in family law
settings. However, having been a single mother with young children and a serious medical condition who
has experienced protracted contested proceedings firsthand, specifically over disability-related support
issues for myself and my children, it is part of my standpoint, as are my dealings with government
agencies for supports. My history has provided me with insights into how disability support to mothers is
seen and dealt with in both private and public contexts.
The discovery that two of my children had disabilities required me to seek out child experts.107 It
also required me to engage in expensive, time- and energy-consuming programs and practices, including
during the time when I was trying to build my law practice, and later, when I was myself becoming ill.
These demands required me to learn many new things. I met with special education teachers and became
familiar with the workings of special education departments, from the inside. I attended Identification,
Placement, Review Committees (IPRC) meetings and Individualized Education Program consultations. I
met with school principals, attended educational testing sessions and experienced having a child in a selfcontained segregated classroom for two years.108 Many of the children who came over to play with my
children had disabilities, and I connected with their parents. I appealed education-related test results and
had disputes in the education system. I attended children’s social skills groups, including the Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health, (CAMH’s) (then) group for children on the autistic spectrum.
Over the years, my children attended private and public schools, as we struggled to find a good
fit. I learned that not all schools are equal, but overall, I found special education teachers to be wonderful
people. I engaged private tutors and a private teacher. For a short time, along with their father, I also
home-schooled my children.
I was taught to use puffers, and a chamber to administer medication to my son. I was taught in a
hospital to use both the chamber and a nebulizer machine.109 From age three, my son wore a rubber mask

107

Andrew Solomon, Far from the Tree: Parents, Children and the Search for Identity (New York: Scribner, 2012).
Mother’s must become adept at negotiating special education issues. I learned that every aspect of my son’s life
was touched by his health conditions, including the task of learning to write. See Appendix C
109
Appendix D shows how the nebulizer machine became integrated as part of life in our home.
108

31
attached by a tube to a machine to inhale his treatments at home, and when that was insufficient, in
hospitals.
I learned how to identify when my son was medically in trouble. This was one of the many
medical “lessons” in which I was “schooled” in a hospital setting. There were more learning curves to
follow. I have had involvement over the years with: diagnoses of mild cerebral palsy, autism, immune
disorder, neonatal sepsis, learning disabilities, herpetic esophagitis, and others. I attended children’s
hospital clinics and wards; emergency rooms; autism centres; autism support groups; autism skills
classes. I participated in research studies for mothers with disabled children. I met with hospital-based
physicians: paediatricians; paediatric immunologists and ophthalmologists; gastroenterologists; infectious
disease specialists, child psychiatrists; clinical child psychologists; home care nurses; public school and
hospital clinic social workers and speech language pathologists (the latter for two of my children).
There were scans for esophageal reflux disease and tests for cystic fibrosis. I learned about,
administered and consented to the use of strong and experimental paediatric medications on one of my
children. I observed what medications did to my child, to his skin, his gut, to his mood and to his ability
or inability to attend school. Over the years, I have fearfully watched the effects on him as his complex
and life-threatening medical history unfolded. I have had a child speak to me about our times together,
stating at different points, “It was touch and go there for a while Mum, touch and go” and, “I died”.110
Over the years I have sought out psycho-educational evaluations111 and respite services, publicly
and not publicly-funded. For years, I was attached to wall nebulizers containing Ventolin and steroids in
hospital emergency rooms (usually between midnight and 4 a.m.) with a child wearing a green rubber
mask over his nose and mouth sitting on my lap, sometimes kicking and screaming for the duration. For
years, I administered antibiotic eye drops for my son’s eye sockets that frequently had pus draining from
them. On these occasions, he was also prescribed pulsed dosages of dexamethasone to be administered at
home. There were ongoing skin infections, boils, and abscesses and drainages. There were continual
prescriptions to be filled; purchases of lost and run-out asthma puffers after midnight, oral and inhaled
steroid medications, constant vigilance for medication compliance, suspensions from school, disputes
about the suspensions from school, missed school and make-up lessons and sick notes and explanations,
peanut allergy concerns and Epipen teacher education in the schools (over many years).
These experiences weighed heavily on me. Like many other mothers, whatever was required, no
matter how late at night, no matter how horrific, expensive or difficult to access – I, too, have been there.
I have found it, I have done it, I have accessed it, I have bought it, and importantly, I have heard and
witnessed it.
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I was fortunate in that I am comfortable speaking with professionals in medical and educational
settings. This means I have been at relative ease speaking with professionals about my children’s medical
conditions. I was able to consult on treatment and diagnoses with medical personnel and with family
members who were physicians, and I researched medical journals when problems arose. In addition, I
often felt protected due to my having had legal training and having physicians in the family. Perhaps
connected to these advantages, I have always trusted my instincts when my children were ill, and felt I
could act on them.112 Once, I telephoned a pediatrician at home at two in the morning, insisting to her
husband that I had to speak with her immediately. This paediatrician told me that mothers’ impressions
were taken as part of the clinical signs. In other words, she relayed that my view comprised maternal
medical knowledge.
The responsibility for care however, fell squarely on my shoulders. Prior to becoming sick
myself, I had been physically and emotionally exhausted for years. In my efforts to hold onto my career,
on more than a few occasions, I attended court for a client first thing in the morning on a contested matter
after spending a night in surgery or a night in the ER with a very sick child, sometimes with my other
children in attendance in their pajamas. I also did so when I, myself had spent an evening in an
emergency room. Once, I was too tired to realize that I still had an intravenous shunt inserted in a vein
taped on my right hand, until I was leaving my office for an appearance at the courthouse. Another
lawyer’s clerk pointed this out to me. That event was indicative of my state of body and of mind.
Perpetually fatigued and frequently called away, I worried whether my practicing law was unfair
to my clients. In a crisis, a working mother could find help on short notice. When chronicity of illness of
mother and child is the reality, it is a different matter.113 As Gibson notes “chronic illness requires an
orientation to care that is different from episodic or acute care”.114 Yet, somehow, one is expected to
make it work.
My standpoint is a mixed one, with both privileged and under-privileged statuses informing it. I
was trying to practice law because I had to support myself, but I also wanted to have a career, something
that was clearly unrealistic under the circumstances. It was a reality with long-term legal implications
concerning my own right to support, and later, the support of my youths.
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Group Standpoint of Caregiving Mothers
Experiential knowledge also forms part of a larger group standpoint.115 My standpoint is my own, for as
Shih notes, mothers of disabled children are a diverse group. Even so, caregiving mothers may share
historical, geographical, political and legal spaces, as well as their being “subordinate to the same
normative regime.”116 A crucial feature of any common standpoint among us is the change in
consciousness we undergo in our roles as mothers who seek to redefine the institution of motherhood in a
manner that reflects justice for ourselves and for our disabled children. The end result of all of these
experiences combined was unique ‘knowledge’ that was anything but “a view from nowhere.”117 I have
been reluctant to reflect on places and times where my knowledge grew most. I questioned whether the
inclusion of my experience in my thesis would make an appreciable difference to what I hope to achieve
here. I told myself, ‘I am studying law and there can be no meaningful relationship between what I
experienced as a mother and a doctoral project in law.’ Furthermore, I have long been aware that some
memories, even after many years, still engender uncomfortable reactions when I reflect on them. It has
been easy for me to appreciate how profoundly my son’s illnesses have impacted on who he is.118
However, it has been more difficult to acknowledge how his illnesses informed my identity. This is true,
even though he and I were in this together. Caregiving mothers socialize, attend workshops and lectures
together. They share literature and advice. We caregiving mothers who used to socialize still do so,even
though our children are now adults. We also shared experiences with one another that we felt no one else
could ‘get’. In a moment of great distress a leader in one support group stated that “we” beg CAS to take
our kids, but they refuse. The word ‘we’ was expressed from a group position and we knew she did not
mean it and we understood why she said it (and none of us wanted to give up our children). Something
else occurs when one is frequently bed-side with one’s medically complex child. One is referred to as
“Mom” by medical teams. Sometimes it felt like a form of erasure. It was disempowering. Caregiving
advocate Donna Thompson has blogged about her request that this practice stop in the case of her
attendance at medical meetings for her disabled son Nicholas. In my case, I felt its use alluded to a
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‘medical mum’ and that a medical mom was a woman who alternately had all the power and none of the
power in the care of her very sick child. Sometimes we felt empowered, other times we did not. Our
standpoint as a group was that we were mothering in a parallel world to other mothers. We found it more
intense, more fraught with risk, more precarious and more judged. At the same time we saw ourselves as
fighters and we have all maintained that sense all these years later. We felt that being in a parallel world
renedered us that way. Group standpoint helps to explain how the autism litigation got off the ground.
Reflexivity and Researcher Accountability
Doucet and Mauthner suggest that the requirement for reflexivity “is largely a point of consensus” in
feminist research.119 They comment that reflexivity, “also refers to actively reflecting on personal,
interpersonal, institutional, pragmatic, emotional, theoretical, epistemological and ontological influence
on our research and interpretation processes” and they state it is equally relevant in areas such as data
analysis.120 Reflexivity is relevant here because it relates to the role of the researcher in ‘constructing’
knowledge.121 Doucet and Mauthner also assert that reflexivity is tied to researcher accountability. In light
of the above, it goes without saying that my interpretation of material I examine has been filtered through
my own subjectivity, which has evolved over the past years.
Like many other mothers who have conducted research about the adverse social construction of
their role, and the ramifications of that, my interest in and my relationship to other mothers and disabled
children have their origins in my experience. It would not be possible for me to set that aside. In any
event, Chantell Burrows asserts that “the legal conceptualization of motherhood should reflect the social
experience of mothers.”122 She points out that “it is crucial that societal and legal doctrines of motherhood
coincide to present a comprehensive understanding.”123 She references Fineman for advancing the
position that even though mothers are poorly represented legally and politically, their views are
nevertheless crucial in proposals in the areas of policy and law.124 With this in mind, I next discuss the
conceptual framework of critical consciousness.
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Critical Consciousness
Consciousness per se has been discussed widely in legal literature and forms the foundation of critical
legal theory.125 American Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg examined the question of
“awakening consciousness in law schools” with regard to women’s treatment by law over 40 years ago.126
Other scholars, such as Sheila Rowbotham,127 Adrienne Rich128 and Patricia Collins have considered
women’s consciousness.129 It has been described as an awakening process by both Ginsburg and Collins,
and as an arising process by Collins.
I distinguish between becoming more aware and critical consciousness. The former can happen in
any number of ways.130 The latter comes about through learning, and the cognitive process of
problematization. For Freire, the term conscientizacao refers to learning to perceive social, political, and
economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality.”131 Referencing
Freire, Maritza Montero describes critical reflection as leading to new meaning. New meanings erode
“uncritical acceptance of ideologies”132 and uncover myths.
Importantly, problematization has been described as a method of ‘breaking mythology.’133 In my
research, I am particularly interested in problematization and the exposing of myths present in legal
determinations involving caregiving mothers.
Feminist legal scholar Fran Olsen describes the structure of consciousness as comprising a shared
vision of the world, giving the example of the dichotomy of a ‘market’ versus ‘family’ vision that
“underlies a society's culture and also shapes the society's view of which social relationships are "natural"
and, therefore, which social reforms are possible.”134 Olsen’s idea is useful to my project. One may
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extrapolate and theorize that the dominant meanings ascribed to childhood are likewise structures of
consciousness. i.e., shared societal notions respecting what childhood should look like and lead to. The
dominant view of children as ‘becomings’ and, in the investment state, future taxpayers, is a largely
shared societal vision for example. ‘Mothering’ as relationship is genericized without reference to
severely disabled children.
Shared visions do not always remain shared though, including with respect to the assumed
‘natural’ mother and ‘normal’ child and indeed, shifts in mothers’ consciousness have been documented
as arising through the experience of having a disabled child. In this experience, mothers may cease to
share society’s vision of motherhood and concomitantly, childhood. The “culture of silence”135 as to the
realities of caregiving mothers’ lives plays a role in mothers turning away from the dominant structure of
consciousness. The process of deviating from shared consciousness that Olsen,136 a feminist legal scholar,
refers to corresponds with the development of critical consciousness in my use of the term in my project.
Paolo Freire, who theorized critical consciousness, claimed that education was central to the
acquisition of a form of critical consciousness. Considering this, I myself theorize that the formal and
informal “education” that mothers with disabled children receive likewise triggers the process of
conscientization.137 According to Montero, problematization can be generated without set techniques.138 It
is apparent that mothers become adept at “reading” and “hearing” the meta-message of what ableist social
agents tell them. They also become adept at “learning” from external constructions of their experiences. I
theorize the status quo is challenged by mothers when they perceive their and their children’s care and
support have reached an intolerably low threshold. When they become aware their circumstances are
impossible, wrong, harmful or unjust and they have the agency to do so, they challenge expectations. For
example, American actress Marianne Leone describes her required attendance at “Early Intervention”
state-run classes held for “CP Kids”139 and their mothers in New York in the 1980s.140 The program
offered physical therapy, speech therapy and occupational therapy, as well as social worker support.
Leone found that the ‘mothering’ education wasted her time, and moreover, that she was being asked to
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participate in approaches to treatment she disagreed with. In response, she wrote a controversial article in
Exceptional Parent called “Early Interference.”141 The title reveals how she had problematized,
reinterpreted and reframed what she had experienced. Unlike the emancipatory education described by
Freire in his book142 that is designed to elicit self-liberation, the education for mothers of disabled
children Leone critiques is designed to train mothers in how to think about disability and how to manage
their children’s conditions. It is mothers reflecting upon and questioning or resisting such education that
lays the groundwork for the evolution of their critical consciousness.143 This description is also in keeping
with Kathleen Weiler’s feminist adaptation of Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed. Weiler asserts that
“teachers are not always on the same side as [the] oppressed” learners.144 Moral philosopher MustakovaPossardt145 asserts that a variety of experiences may place one along a pathway to critical consciousness
and that having a disabled child may itself constitute one such experience.
Another “education” mothers receive is arrived at through experience with litigation. While it is
clear that it is through problematization that most mothers end up in front of a judge asking for support
for their disabled child, it is also the case that there are valuable lessons learned at each stage of a legal
proceeding. A further feature of critical consciousness may include the formation of a new identity, by
becoming a caregiving mother litigant, for example.146 The process towards critical consciousness is also
noted to accompany a sense of responsibility for others.147
Liberation is the goal of those seeking social change. The violence from which people seek to be
liberated includes “structural violence”,148 which I argue includes constraints provided by unjust and
gendered law. With critical consciousness, injustice is acted upon as a result of a new-found sense of
agency, and with the exercise of this comes empowerment.149 Melanie Panitch,150 Margaret Newman151
141
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and Elena Mustakova-Possardt152 reference critical consciousness in their work on mothers with disabled
children, independently of one another. Panitch, a social worker by training, employs a social work
orientation, describing the community and political activities of Canadian mothers of children with
intellectual disabilities. She asserts that her descriptions demonstrate an evolving socially-oriented
maternal critical consciousness.153 Mustakova-Possardt, a psychologist by training, focuses on the
psychological and moral evolution of critical consciousness as part of the social growth and personal
transformation of a Bulgarian mother with a severely disabled daughter.154 Mustakova-Possardt presents
sections of her interview with a mother who acquired a “mature degree” of critical consciousness in her
orientation towards her daughter and towards a society that Mustakova-Possardt describes as ableist,
classist and sexist. Both Panitch, writing in Canada, and Mustakova-Possardt, writing in Bulgaria, name
ableism as a systemic force that has a powerful effect on consciousness of and in motherhood.155
In Health as Expanding Consciousness, Newman references graduate student research entitled
Patterns of Health in Mothers of Developmentally Disabled Children.156 Of mothers with disabled
children Newman observes that they “embrace their present situation and allow themselves to be
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transformed by it. [They] …were able to go beyond themselves and beyond reason into a new order of
reality, a new level of consciousness.”157
It is clear that for some caregiving mothers, advancing social change is important.158 Work
produced by mothers and those working closely with mothers from social science,159 from critical
disability studies,160 and from disciplines other than law suggest that a range of profound changes take
place in mothers’ thought in seeking disability supports. I am suggesting that in the process of their
litigation, there are signs of changes in maternal consciousness.161 Empowerment can come about as a
result of different confrontations with the legal and care systems. At the same time caregiving mothers
can be disempowered. Indeed, a litigating mother can be both empowered and disempowered over the
course of a single legal proceeding. Experiences of disempowerment can provide impetus to further
resist.162 Different terms have been used to describe transformations, of various kinds.163
157
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According to Gibson, ultimately, it is the recognition of frustration that forces mothers to
critically examine their circumstances.164 Gibson’s study, which focuses on the role of frustration in
empowerment, supports an aspect of Fraser’s theory of status misrecognition. Gibson observes that in
advocating for their chronically ill children, caregiving mothers move into positions of participatory
competence, allowing them to be heard by those in control.
However, only Panitch’s description of conscious and oppositional motherhood, situated in the
experience of mothers with disabled children,165 and Mustakova-Possardt’s description of critical
consciousness in the setting of a mother with a daughter with Down Syndrome and a spinal disability166
correspond to the form of transformation I rely on here. Mustakova-Possardt’s chapter on Emily, the
young mother of a severely disabled daughter, states “Emily reflects the transition to the intellectual,
moral and spiritual integration of authentic consciousness…Emily has challenged practically every social
norm and has brought herself double stigma…”.167 Both scholars’ descriptions include caregiving mothers
with views different from those of mainstream society with respect to equality and discrimination.
Although I am unable to make any direct claims about specific litigating mothers’ acquisition of
critical consciousness, given that mine is not an empirical study, I can claim that features of it may be
perceived in the words and activities of mothers whose names and cases arose in the course of my
research. Therefore, I only suggest aspects of changed consciousness in the setting of maternal disability
activism. Examples of changed consciousness are also seen in Panitch’s work (which was empirical,
involving interviews) and also in that of Mustakova-Possardt. Mustakova-Possardt describes a caregiving
mother she interviewed as continually searching for meaning and referring in interviews to living in an
alternative social reality. This mother is further described as engaged in critical dialogue about sociocultural practices with respect to her disabled child and societal views that she deems oppressive; she
referred to her own version of ‘justice’ and ‘equity’, according to her interviewer.168 I draw from their
observations in my interpretation.
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My claim is that mothers, in speaking their realizations and understandings through the medium
of law and politics, can foster social reform.169 Biographical sketches demonstrate this in relation to what
I perceive to be changed consciousness. British Columbia’s Sabrina Freeman is an example of a mother
who may be described as exhibiting some features of critical consciousness.170 Freeman, who holds a PhD
in sociology, was guardian ad litem for her daughter, Michelle Tamir, in the Auton litigation at the
Supreme Court of Canada.171 Prior to the lawsuit, Freeman managed Families for Early Autism Treatment
Centre (FEAT) in Vancouver.172 While running FEAT and demanding services for her daughter from the
British Columbia government, Freeman may be described as having experienced “the force of
restructured consciousness” described by theorist Montero.173
Montero states that one response to the force of restructured consciousness is a willingness to
engage in conflict and to make use of available resources to change society. It is the force of this
restructured consciousness which enables individuals to set out their demands.174 Freeman is an author,
speaker and blogger (“The Autism Pundit”), now working in the area of international autism awareness,
advocacy and education.175
Nova Scotia’s Joyce Dassonville also provides an example of a mother whose activities suggest
changed consciousness. Dassonville practiced law for over a decade, working in disability, health and
family law litigation. For several years, she was a hearing officer for appeals of workers compensation
support claims. She also spent years advocating and litigating on behalf of herself and her severely
disabled daughter. She states that her “professional experiences gave her the background necessary to get
the job done. Her professional skills proved useful in handling all the health, education, and legal issues
169
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that arose when caring for a child of her own, with autism.”176 While in British Columbia, Dassonville
stated on the FEATBC online discussion board “As I am going to commence this action on behalf of my
daughter anyway, I will be happy to assist other families to do the same, at a significantly reduced cost
from my (and other lawyers’) normal fee.”177 Dassonville placed a sample letter for others to use on this
same discussion board in their demands of government for funding.178
Turning to a non-Canadian, Ireland’s Dr. Anna Kingston likewise qualifies as a mother who
changed through advocating for her disabled child and working with other mothers doing the same. Her
book’s title179 refers to mothering disabled children as a different maternal journey; one she describes as
ending at times with mothers suing the state due to “strong maternal conviction.”180 Kingston also
describes the need to “emancipate mothers” and urges that “feminists should build upon this emerging
change of consciousness”181 and that is what I aim to do in writing this dissertation.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided details about my research methods, including the reasons why I chose to
follow the research pathway described above. This information provides a foundational framework for
this research to the reader. In the next chapter, I review literature that informs my analyses and arguments
concerning the legal rights of mothers with severely disabled children to support.
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CHAPTER THREE: Review of the Literature
Introduction
This review addresses the literature informing my analysis of the legal right to support of mothers with
severely disabled children. I begin with literature central to this project - that of legal rights, important to
my discussions in Chapters Four, Six, and Seven. Then, I address the literature concerning mothers’
social, economic and legal locations in society, followed with a review of the feminist literature on
privatization of care and then, a discussion of the literature about disabled children. Each of these sections
is relevant to the entire dissertation.
My review follows the order it does because I argue it is the combination of the present
conceptualizations of rights as individual, rather than relational, along with the social and political
positioning of caregiving mothers in neo-liberal and state investment politics, that together, have led to
the cobbling together of an inadequate and indeed dangerously unstable ‘system’ of supports.
The Legal Rights Literature
As noted in my arguments section, I refer to rights to capture not only statutory rights to bring a claim for
support (statutory entitlements), but also benefits (though not technically ‘rights’), rights-claims or
arguments made to persuade decision makers that there ought to be legal rights to needed forms of
support subject to force of law, rights guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, international
human rights, and finally, relational rights.
Few academics have examined the legal rights of mothers with disabled children to state support
in any of these areas.182 Bridgeman, Manhas, Goodman, Herring, and Sossin are among the handful of
legal scholars who have.183
Within the area of state support to caregiving mothers, still fewer scholars have examined the
important area of disabled child custody loss through law pertaining to the provision of housing, care and
treatment support available to caregiving mothers. In an Alberta Law Review article, Gwen Goodman
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provides a discussion of the effects of forced custody relinquishment in exchange for state-supported
caregiving services in America.184 She asserts that the practice causes trauma to the child and to the
parents “since it separates the sick child from the family that cannot afford treatment.”185 Goodman refers
to this practice as being “a nationwide problem.”186
In Canada, this issue has been explored in the grey literature, for example by the Office of the
Ontario Ombudsman187 and in local188 and national189 newspaper coverage, as well as by British
Columbia’s Pivot Legal Society.190
In Anglo-American liberalist culture, people are perceived as individuals separate from one
another.191 Our legal rights are predicated upon the concept of an autonomous individual capable of
realizing her rights individually. As feminist legal scholars discuss, autonomy has not been envisioned in
a manner fitting most women’s lives. Autonomy has been extended to children in rights discourses, with
scholars noting that in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, child interests have
shifted from protection to choice. Children’s interests are now conceived as separate192 from those of their
mothers.
The work of feminist theorists assists in the conceptualization of problems caregiving mothers
experience with being unable to realize their legal rights to support. One of these is political theorist,
Jennifer Nedelsky. She challenges the standard meaning of autonomy, which is characterized by
individual rights and boundaries. She asserts that one can learn about autonomy not from the lone man’s
existence, but based on the requirements of childcare.193 Nedelsky reconfigures autonomy as a maternal
construct, asserting that autonomy should be considered in terms of the interactions in which it evolves.
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She views autonomy instead as a capacity that can be developed or lost. Her version of autonomy is
found in relationships, which ought to be supported. Stating that the collective is constitutive of
individuals, Nedelsky argues that “law, rights and the state bear a large responsibility for constituting
relations”194 and as such, legal obligations should attach to them. In the same discussion, she comments
further that individual rights approaches undermine autonomy, providing the example of disputes in the
area of social assistance.195 Such a reconceptualization would have implications for mothers’ legal rights
to support, which presently are limited to possible statutory claims and applications for determination of
eligibility for benefits. However, Nedelsky’s relational version of autonomy is not the one upon which
Canadian law is based. In Canada, there is a legal expectation that even isolated, sole support caregiving
mothers should (be able to) achieve liberal autonomy.
Nedelsky’s ideas help one to understand what the cases I examine show, which is that many
mothers fail to become ‘autonomous’ and require state support. The law is one problem. Policy is another.
Nedelsky explains that when policy is gendered, policymakers “remain ignorant of key dimensions of
human life,” and lack the experience and knowledge to govern effectively.196 Policymakers appear to be
unaware about detailed care realities for severely disabled children, in spite of an abundance of
explanatory literature.197
In a similar vein, Martha Fineman argues that policy development ought to focus on what
appropriate expectations of the family should be, especially in light of poverty.198 Fineman asserts that
there is a collective responsibility for dependency, both of the child and of what she has coined as being
the ‘derivative dependency of the caregiver.’ This derivative dependency is evidenced in Chapter Six and
Seven, where caregiving mothers struggle to access needed monetary supports through provisions for
their disabled children. Fineman argues that justice demands a robust obligation towards those who
provide care. Her suggestion resonates in the setting of mothers of disabled children, where mothers
perform the ‘work’ of caring, often in an extraordinary way.199 Fineman reminds us that it is common for
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family caregivers to be uncompensated, as well as unrecognized,200 and Canadian reports support her
observation.201 She argues that the gendered nature of (the assumed) family is crucial to the maintenance
of the “foundational myths of individual independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency.”202 I tackle these
and other myths as they relate to law that constrains caregiving mothers in subsequent chapters.
Fineman suggests that assuming a particular family formation in public policy is problematic, and
I note that this is especially true where disability is concerned. Examining policy for disabled children in
Ontario, the assumed family for provincial policymakers does not appear to include a severely disabled
child, the single-parent family, disabled mothers and so on. It is still concerned with the policy needs of
the normative nuclear family, which is premised upon male support.
At the same time, Canada has become a country that characterizes responsibility for the care of
dependent individuals as primarily one of ‘the family’, which ultimately translates into the responsibility
of women. This is done such that male responsibility for children “has been rendered invisible.”203 There
have been different responses to the predicament mothers and disabled children find themselves in.
Burton et al. made suggestions arising out of their research for support to mothers with severely disabled
children, such as workplace accommodations and caregiver allowances.204 Fineman, on the other hand,
has proposed a collective responsibility approach to support.205 However, as legal scholars like Nedelsky
note, a collective approach does not ‘fit’ with liberal legal tenets such as individualism and autonomy.
Nor does the increasing privatization of care into the hands of mothers and private, largely female
childcare workers fit with a collective approach.206
Characterizing care as quintessentially a private act remains strongly reflected in Canadian
support policy.207 This is the backdrop to the barriers Canadian mothers with disabled children face when
seeking support. Societal representations interact, such that the combination of the expectation of
autonomy in mothers and difficulties inherent in the realization of the private support obligation, in fact,
translate into sole-support caregiving mothers struggling for unattainable or inadequate private support.
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At the time when welfare reform was in full swing, feminist political theorists like Nedelsky,
Minow, and Shanley (among others) advanced a relational theory of rights to address problems women
have with support in law. These scholars engaged with welfare reform in their writing about power,
politics and the family.208 Martha Minow also worked in legal clinics and advocated for marginalized
clients. For example, they reviewed American constitutional law cases that dealt with family law issues,
noting that rights discourses do not always agree as to which rights are relevant and which ought to
prevail.
Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley advance a theory of rights which conceive of the
individual as separate, and yet also as being situated in a nexus of relationships involving care and
dependency and, importantly, attachments.209 They ask what it is that people owe one another as family
members and as citizens. They posit that rights to financial support and care ought to arise from
relationships of varying ranges of intimacy, and would focus attention on claims arising from
interdependence.210 Not limiting their discussion to private law, Minow and Shanley consider such themes
as whether government has obligations to ensure the health and welfare of children, and raise the issue of
social change in the area of medical technology as requiring new thought in the areas of respite and
disability care.211 They further discuss whether an individual rights-based discourse would ever be an
adequate basis on which to found a legal theory of the family.
Minow and Shanley thus raise the issue of interdependence, which is a significant feature of
maternally complex care. The dependency of severely disabled children on their mothers for intimate and
health-related needs and their extraordinary requirements for care, make it is apparent that the ‘individual’
articulation of legal rights advanced in law cannot account for support of such complex care. Indeed,
Britain’s Jo Bridgeman states that a relational approach to rights best captures the situation where there
are children with significant disabilities.212
Canadian law professor Jennifer Llewellyn examined legal rights as expressed in Auton213 and
Chaoulli,214 arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada’s employment of the liberal, individualist concept
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of rights has led to an inability to properly respond to claims in healthcare. She argues that this is because
Canadian courts have failed to appreciate the relational features inherent in s 7 and s 15 of the Charter, a
failure which has resulted in difficulty in arriving at just decisions.215 Llewellyn’s insights have
implications for my project, particularly since part of what caregiving mothers provide is healthcare.
Again claims brought by mothers in chapters six and seven reveal difficulties with caregiving mothers’
ability to access supports that are legally framed in statutes and policy as for the individual, rather than
support for care.
The Status of Caregiving Mothers
In critiquing motherhood, labels are important. Chamallas,216 like Fraser and Gordon,217 states that words
used to describe mothering reveal cultural norms. Phrases seen in past and present law and policy such as
‘single mother,’ ‘welfare mother,’ ‘working mother,’218 ‘unfit mother’ and ‘unwed mother,’219 solo
mothers who get a “free-ride”,220 contain normative information. Yet there is no term to describe
‘caregiving mothers’, although the care they perform is itself characterized in society as benevolent.221
Words control and stigmatize mothers whose children do not meet societal expectations for good
mothers.222 Words also reveal status. Legal theorist Dorothy Roberts writes that features of the political
institution of motherhood subordinate women. She points to society giving women the “enormous
responsibility of child rearing” and states that it is “the status of child-bearer that is determinative of a
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woman’s identity” adding that the work mothers do is degraded and unremunerated.”223 She discusses
words used historically to devalue black mothers in particular and adds that the word ‘motherhood’ in
America describes a white institution.224
Terms such as those above reflect status misrecognition of mothers who fall outside the idealized
version of motherhood. The literature describes “drug addicts” who were poor, black, pregnant women
and mothers found by the child welfare and the criminal justice systems to be guilty of fetal harm and
drug use respectively. I suggest here that they were also judged for ‘imposing’ the ‘burden’ of care for
their (believed to be) disabled infants on the state, whom the mothers alone are responsibilized for
bringing into the world.225 These vulnerable mothers’ own disability as addicts is moreover framed as
crime.226 Interacting statuses placed these women on the extreme margins of motherhood. All the while,
predictions about “crack babies” have apparently not been borne out. One researcher found “nothing to
back up predictions that cocaine-exposed babies were doomed for life,” stating, “[w]hen you have a myth,
it tends to linger for a long time.”227
This provides an example of how economically-marginalized and/or racialized mothers have been
treated by the state at the intersection of poverty and possibly disabled children. Such attitudes introduce
false notions of maternal choice and impose maternal responsibility for disability. At one time, law was
concerned with women being caused a fright, as a belief was held that a fright could be responsible for the
birth of a disabled infant.228 In this much older legal ‘concern’, mothers were not always responsibilized
for causing a child’s disability. Philip Ferguson’s explanation however accords with the statement above
which is that between1820 and 1910 the economically marginalized were ‘morally blamed’ for most
childhood disability, “especially those with the bad judgement to be both poor and female.”229 He states
from 1920 to 1980 the belief held was that disabled children harmed families.230 The subsequent shifts he
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describes are the neurotic parent, the dysfunctional parent and the suffering parent. He ends with what he
states is the least seen approach to child disability, which is that of the powerless parent. This approach
arose from parent narratives, referencing scholarship from the 1970s and 1980s. He states that the focus
more recently has been on the adaptive family.231 This approach poses other kinds of problems for
caregiving mothers, which I discuss in my thesis.
According to Adrienne Rich, motherhood denies women the ability to fully actualize
themselves,232 although not all mothers would agree. In this project, the presence of a disabled child is
seen to provide an opportunity for self-actualization by some mothers, but not necessarily in a chosen
manner. Related to this, Carpenter and Austin use metaphors of text and margin to interpret the
experiences of mothers with children with ADHD. Their observations have relevance to the framework I
employ in examining support law. They explain that the text of the patriarchal motherhood myth is
occupied by the good mothers and that beyond the text, is the margin. It is in the margin that the children
with ADHD and their mothers are situated by society. The authors explain that “mothers measure poorly
if their children are outside the text.”233 The boundaries of the text are carefully policed by involved
others who judge the value of mothers as being lower when they and their children are situated outside the
text.234 These authors state that mothers do not passively sit in the margins, and their mothering is seen
to mess up the margins, in particular when they trouble the margins.235 Carpenter and Austin claim that
troubling the borders of the motherhood myth is ‘work.’ They also claim that this work is effortful,
consequential and disabling, something that requires careful strategy.236 Their study found that mothers
outside the text felt the impacts of being silenced, criticized and hurt, but also states mothers found ways
to manage that. They also state that in struggling to find a place within the text of motherhood, some
mothers had complex experiences from which they were able to critique the text.237 In other words, they
problematized the content of the text. However they found that the mothers who troubled the margins in
order to be included in the text actually reinscribed the mythology of motherhood that placed them
outside-of-the-text of the myth. These metaphors of text and margin can be applied to mothers with
severely disabled children who seek support in law. For example, as I later discuss, there are example of
support provisions for women that have been crafted for mothers in the text and as such exclude mothers
in the margins.
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Literature dealing with the status of mothers provides important context for arguments made
regarding the right to support. Generally, oppression has been described as taking form socially through
processes of marginalization, stigmatization, exclusion and isolation.238 It takes shape in experiences of
the devaluation of a mother’s self and the devaluation of her child(ren).239 Forms of oppression “such as
racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, ageism, disablism (sic) are interlocked”, being described as
socially-constructed power imbalances and ideologies benefitting one group at the expense of others.240
Where mothers care for disabled children, Home states that their oppression is hidden. She points
to the “denial of a group’s right to full participation in society, through undervaluing the group and
limiting its access to power and resources.”241 This denial has been described as a failure in inclusion by
the disability rights community,242 and has been described as emblematic of status misrecognition by
feminist political theorist Nancy Frazer.243
Status misrecognition of caregiving mothers has relevance to their ongoing low visibility in laws
that affect them and to their weak positioning in relation to laws they seek to challenge. Indeed, as seen in
Roberts’ work, at the intersection of race, disability, and motherhood, law itself deals with mothers
oppressively.
Status misrecognition manifests in various ways; one is through the unspoken discourse of the
failed mother. This has relevance because of what this discourse brings to law. Linda Blum asserts that
mother-blame “serves as a metaphor for a range of political fears,” arguing that “[w]hile all mothers are
potentially unfit, mothers raising children with disabilities pose an important deviant case” because they
defy simple classification.244 This may also explain some of the difficulties inherent in including them in
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support legislation.245 Other literature is informative also. The lack of interest in, and at times even
disdain, regarding caregiving mothers’ needs that characterizes mainstream critical disability studies
forms an ironic thread in negative discourses concerning mothers.
Janice McLaughlin’s work confirms that “the reticence to debate the significance of care has
created a lack of engagement with and even hostility towards parents of children with disabilities.”246 Her
insight regarding negative consideration runs counter to state representations of caregiving mothers as
noble, a feature I address in Chapter Four.
Clearly there is both complexity and difficulty in how mothers with disabled children are
perceived. Notably, Lewiecki-Wilson and Cellio have observed that “the figure of the mother is
overdetermined and vexed for both feminism and disability studies.”247 They add, “[m]others have often
been blamed for their children's impairments or perceived impairments; the figure of the mother is closely
linked to cultural scripts of care and dependency,” noting that “the role of nondisabled parents (and
perhaps especially, of mothers) within disability rights movements and disability activism remains
controversial.”248
Being marked by complex controversy is not conducive to easily understood and accepted claims
to support. On the contrary, it undermines such claims at various turns, in ways that are difficult to
counter.
Another side of this is that disabled mothers with disabled children ought to be less vexed in
some of these contexts, but paradoxically they are not. For example, within disability studies there has
been a relative silence on the matter of disabled mothers with disabled children, which is one reason why
Hansen and Turnbull’s article, “Disability and Care: Still Not ‘Getting It’” is so important.249 Cultural
scripts of the kind these authors refer to are reflected in how law deals with mothers with disabled
children. Or as Hansen and Turnbull show, fails to do so. The fact of disabled mothers of disabled
children being controversial contributes at least in part to their rights to support remaining elusive. This is
not the only obstacle that gets in the way of mothers accessing supports for disabled children and
themselves, however.
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To the limited extent that the mainstream of the Canadian disability rights movement has taken an
interest in children, it has often advocated for the child in isolation.250 In Sobsey’s early work, for
example, the role and needs of mothers are aggressively overlooked.251 At the same time, as Cockburn
points out in Children and the Feminist Ethic of Care, rights-based approaches are adversarial: rights
compete and one set of rights may trump another set of rights.252
In disability rights, disabled children’s rights have trumped those of their caregiving mothers, a
phenomenon I examine at length in Chapter Seven. It makes no sense to pit the rights of a severely
disabled child against those of a mother when it is maternal-disabled, child-oriented support under
discussion.
Cockburn253 and Garland-Thomson254 point out that until recently, disability research focused on
the caregiver and that “the critical or radical perspectives of disability politics countered this trend.”255
Critical disability politics had in mind the medical model disability research concerning care provided to
disabled people in institutions.256 Mother-caregivers have been seen not to matter in the critical disability
discourses, whose theorists have done the very thing they complain of, which is the failure to recognize.
Discounting caregiving mothers and adding to their status misrecognition makes no sense in the context
of disability in childhood, even if to do so may confer some sort of advantage on disability status.257
Saetersdal argues that while acknowledging the problems with the previous era’s improper
“fixation on crisis and misery” was important, the idealization of parenting disabled children that
followed invited another oppressive ideology. The danger, she argues, is that this new orientation will
herald “dominating political and theoretical trends” that will suppress the perspectives of those struggling,
especially in an era of cutbacks.258 Her point, made in 1997, turns out to be correct. Knight would agree,
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recently stating that mothers of disabled children must “project the identity” of the good mother,259 and
further commenting that they “occupy a problematic and transgressive social space.”260
This literature suggests that the support needs of such mothers troubles and threatens critical
disability theory. Such theory, to the extent that it discounts caregiving mothers’ roles in the lives of
disabled people, may actually contribute to the invisibility of mothers in disability discourses, discourses
that are crucial to social, and therefore legal, change.
Meanwhile, important political conversations continue to exclude mothers, allowing for the
omission of the costs mothers incur when they assume complex care.261 Disability advocacy groups are
called upon to consult with government, but to the extent that mothers are not central to such
consultations, their interests are not represented. Indeed, the contested space caregiving mothers occupy is
demonstrated in disability theory itself. Garland-Thomson asserts “a feminist disability study complicates
both the feminist ethic of care and liberal feminism in regard to the politics of care and dependency.”262
Some feminist-oriented critical disability work manages to conflate the rights of women who care for
disabled children with their children’s rights, undermining rights to support. If mothers break down and
can no longer provide care, then the disabled child is at risk of institutionalization, the very thing that
disability rights fought against. Cockburn references Anita Silvers as also stating that the care provided
by caregivers of disabled people is valorized socially over disabled people themselves.263 These
approaches serve the ends of critical disability theory perhaps, which is to advance autonomy, but they do
not serve severely disabled children whose autonomy is tied to their relationship with their mothers.
Mothers with disabled children face difficulty in other quarters as well. For example, the goals of
ameliorating child poverty have been pursued separately from maternal poverty.264 As well, Dobrowolsky
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asserts that rhetoric may not match up with realities for children.265 Her observation resonates in
discussions concerning disabled children.266 A child focus in poverty advocacy has been best described as
having “effectively struck women’s full citizenship from the political agenda.”267
Policy practice that separates mothers and children is troubling where disability is concerned. As
noted above, Martha Fineman describes how families are portrayed in policy, stating that myths govern
what constitutes a normal family. Confronting myths is likewise central in an examination of the legal
right to support of mothers with disabled children, a domain dominated by interweaving myths. Fineman
characterizes myths as masking familial realities.268 Where there are children with severe disabilities, the
literature suggests that these myths are bigger, the masking greater. For example, a central assumption of
the normative family is that children grow up and become independent.269 This harks back to the issue of
classic autonomy, itself, I argue, a normative concept. The assumption of child independence is not
reflective of the reality today, including for many non-disabled children. Yet it remains an assumption in
support policy. The actual circumstances of mothers with disabled children thus escape policy attention.
In reality, there is great diversity in Canadian families. Wanda Weiger’s work ties in with
Fineman’s observations. She argues that single, lesbian, racialized, and working-class mothers are
constructed as bad mothers because in their differences they have deviated from the idealized family
form,270 or to use Fineman’s characterization, they have formed the non-normative family.271 This
characterization also accords with what Roberts suggests: that where black motherhood is less valued, it
reflects an overall “disregard for black humanity.”272 Thus women mothering children, who fail to accord
with society’s roles for its children, are deemed deviant for falling short of the ideal.273
Disabled children and their mothers are part of the diversity Weiger and Fineman refer to.
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mothers in the mainstream and also in disability discourses. What this has to do with politics is, as Blum
posits, that neo-liberal restructuring may place disabled children “below the threshold deemed worthy of
social investment, leaving even middle-class mothers scrambling.”274 Today, the non-normative family
includes a caregiving mother and her severely disabled child, where the child may not be perceived
politically as being “the best indicator of the capacity” for Canada’s “economy tomorrow” where that is
being measured by “the quality of our children today”, to quote and borrow from Lister.275 This raises the
question, how can rights claims be made for this dyad?
Overall, the literature reveals that mothers’ claims to support have not been well-received. Claims
brought by mothers have been described by the state as having been brought by ‘militants.’276 Resisting
this imagery, there has been a responsive adversarial positioning by mothers. For example, the
characterization of the “warrior-mother”277 is part of a newer cultural construction of identity embraced
and advanced by mothers of disabled children. The characterization suggests the state of consciousness of
some mothers in the context of low levels of public support for family care, along with disability and
gender discrimination, as well as these mothers’ unwillingness to accept the way that the state represents
both care and them.278 Mothers themselves state that their situations call on them to be ‘fierce’.279 The
term warrior-mother also reflects a dual character in a culture that defines the ideal mother not as a
combatant, but as a nurturer.
Litigating mothers are situated in a particular context. It is one in which they provide forms of
care at the behest of the privatizing state and also themselves, The refutation to the allegation that they
care as a matter of choice would be that the desperate responses of caregiving mothers to state strategies,
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such as litigation, legal abandonment and at times, suicide and filicide, indicate a lack of choice.280 To
understand how such “choices” came to be, one needs to grasp what has happened to mothers politically.
Privatization, Mothers and Severely Disabled Children
Having now examined some perspectives on rights and caregiving mothers, I have set the stage for my
discussion of privatization of care, both scholarly areas that inform my later arguments concerning the
right to support. It is essential to grasp the meaning of privatization in order to understand gaps in support
to mothers.281
Privatization is a political approach that relies on the market to allocate resources, with
proponents believing it to be efficient. Under it, social welfare and other similar state supports are seen as
primarily the responsibility of families and charities. There is no or minimal obligation perceived that the
state ensures in the support of its citizens.282 This latter feature is a launching point for discussing the
intersection of privatization and gender. Central to note is that the state’s privatizing projects rely heavily
on women taking up former state obligations to support/care. This was made possible because of a range
of social role expectations on women already in place, but also, I argue, due to a remarkable expansion of
healthcare performance expectations on mothers. Roberts,283 referencing McKinnon, states that
motherhood features heavily in women’s ‘subordination’ overall, and one can see how this is particularly
true in the setting of children with considerable complex care needs.
The process of privatization of state care for severely disabled children was built on social
expectations already in place.284 Roberts goes so far as to state that mothering is a defining aspect of how
gender is socially structured and agrees with Fineman that patriarchy is the defining ideology constructing
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motherhood.285 So, as other literature suggests, is ableism.286 Under privatization, mother’s (unarticulated)
rights are trodden on by the state. There is literature fleshing out the ways in which privatized care
policies in combination with deinstitutionalization and social role expectations on women negatively
impacted mothers’ autonomy.287 Indeed, Katherine Vatri Boydell described deinstitutionalization as being
a women’s issue.288 The result has been that many mothers with disabled children have not been able to
do things that others may choose to do as a matter of course, including work. Some caregiving mothers
accuse both government and feminism of leaving them behind.289 As discussed below, this reality is
reflected in the words chosen by the state to describe policies that now responsibilize complex care within
‘families’.290
Rowbotham links language and women’s consciousness. She states that language conveys power,
dominance, and control and has the power to silence those who are subordinate.291 Chamallas,292 as well
as Fraser and Gordon,293 note that language connotes whose responsibility it is to perform care. The major
programs that provide support in Ontario are called Assistance for Children with Severe Disabilities
(ACSD), and the Family Responsibility Act. There is also the Ontario Disability Support Program Act .294
ODSP states that families and individuals are also responsible for disabled adults’ support. Respite
services in Ontario were made available through “Special Services at Home”. Bold, assuming words like
‘special,’ ‘assistance,’ ‘family responsibility’ and ‘home’ make clear where obligations to support lie.

285

Roberts, “Racism and Patriarchy”, supra note 219 at 3. However, Roberts states that racism must be added as
heavily influencing that ideology. Ibid, at 23 n 124.
286
This idea comes across in the interviews of mothers in Sara Ryan & Katherine Runswick-Cole, “Repositioning
Mothers: Mothers, Disabled Children and Disability Studies (2009) 23:3 Disability & Society 199.
287
See e.g. Nancy M. Yantzi, Mark W. Rosenberg & Patricia T. McKeever, “Getting Out of the House: the
Challenges Mothers Face when their Children Have Long-Term Care Needs” (2007) 15:1 Health Social Care
Community 45; and Nicole M. Yantzi & Mark W. Rosenberg, “The Contested Meanings of Home for Women
Caring for Children with Long-Term Needs in Canada” (2008) 15:3 Gender, Place & Culture 302.
288
She states that most adults in treatment for serious conditions were living at home at the time of writing her
dissertation. Katherine Vatri Boydell, Mothering Adult Children with Schizophrenia: The Hidden Realities of Caring
(Doctoral Thesis, York University, Department of Sociology, 1996) [unpublished] at 27.
289
The connection between lack of care supports and ability of mothers to work is addressed below in depth. See
Sue Robbins, “The Ones Left Behind. How do our governments and workplaces support, or fail to support, those of
us who care for vulnerable children?”, Huffington Post (21 December 2016) online:
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-ones-they-left-behind_us_585b479ce4b014e7c72eda33>.
290
One need only look to statutes providing disability supports. Alberta’s Family Support for Children with
Disabilities Act, Chapter F-5.3, s 3, (also known as Samantha’s Law) sets out that province’s Family Support
Services.
291
Rowbotham, supra note127 at 32.
292
Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 241 at 290, examines words used to describe single mothers
receiving social assistance. Single mothers on social assistance are lone-carers semantically constructed as
dependents by the state.
293
Fraser & Gordon, supra note 217 at 21, discuss “the semantics of dependency.”
294
Family Responsibility Act, RSO 1990, c F.3 (as opposed to the Father’s Responsibility Act). See also the
preamble to the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, SO 1997, c 25 [ODSPA]. The ACSD program is for
children rather than being framed as assistance for mothers with severely disabled children.

59
Crittenden too writes that institutions define motherhood, and that ideologies are responsible for
giving it form. Ideology is expressed, in part, through language. Issues understood to contribute to
mothers’ inequality are greater in the setting of disability in childhood. Crittenden, for example, provides
an informative discussion of the employment situation of a mother with a graduate degree in special
education. She had cared full-time for a severely disabled child for 13 years. Crittenden describes how the
mother was instructed by an employment counselor to leave her caregiving experience out of her resume
and in job interviews.295
Linguistic features thus facilitate status misrecognition of caregiving mothers. This has links to
the law, as language interpretation is a feature of support litigation. In support law, words may limit,
delineate, mislead, render vague, and frame. Words may be challenged however, including with outcomes
that undermine the goals of equality for mothers under the Charter. In 1986, poor single mothers with
“illegitimate” children in Nova Scotia who were benefit recipients under provincial family support policy
found themselves unsupported as a result of a Charter challenge to the use of language in legislation
specifically targeted and tailored to support them.296 This older example shows the degree to which
language plays a role for caregiving mothers, in particular, in maintaining support. I return to other
similar examples in Chapter Six.297
There is something distinctly difficult about the ability to realize the right to support of mothers
per se. Perhaps as figures heavily weighed down by myth in our cultural imagination, it remains difficult
for mothers to be seen as legal subjects, even where law has been enacted for them.
The ability and ease with which the state has implemented privatizing policies in the face of
community opposition also raises questions about mothers’ legal rights.298 In Mothering in Law:
Defending Mother’s Rights, Day asserts that feminists have not taken up the defense of the legal rights of
mothers and suggests that feminists have perceived mothering as the project of social conservatives.299
However, Hallstein argues that issues concerning the institution of motherhood have “come out of the
295
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closet for many feminist contemporary writers,”300 although she is not addressing legal rights to support,
as is Day. Hallstein suggests that motherhood poses problems for feminist thought,301 something to which
Day also alludes in the introductory paragraph of her paper, when she says that all women are affected by
how mothers are perceived and treated.”302 Day points out that mothers are never only mothers, and notes
that, “[w]omen need freedom from family, as well as freedom to family. Only when that is a fully
realizable choice, without economic or social penalty, will women be liberated. We are not there yet.”303
Likewise, women need freedom to provide care and freedom from providing care. The latter requires the
realization of rights and state support. We are not there yet either.
Since Day’s paper, other feminist legal scholars, for example Nedelsky304 and Cossman, have
expressed concerns about the status of mothers in Canadian society. Cossman asks to what extent we are
in the midst of evolving “new cultural norm[s] of mothering” such as the idealization of the stay-at-home
mother as a signifier of status and whether such norms are even possible for single, working-class or poor
mothers.305 This question is interesting in light of severely disabled children presenting as a unique and
little understood subset population within childhood.306 It is also interesting because it draws attention to
class, an important under-examined feature in the privatization of care. There is a poor meshing of new
mothering norms as described by Cossman307 and this newer subset within childhood described in the
health literature, which clearly contributes to a weakening of the legal rights of caregiving mothers. This
is especially so for mothers who are not well-off or, who are not well. Mothering norms deal with
normative children, and not those children who require complex care.308
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‘Intensive mothering’ is the term used to describe care of typical children today. This requires
that care involve large amounts of maternal attention and time.309 Care norms for the typical child are thus
understood to be demanding.
Mothers of disabled children also engage in intensive mothering, but with additional health care
and disability support features. Currently, mothers who perform both typical intensive310 and maternally
complex care who leave the labour market to care for their children are understood to have done so as a
matter of personal/private ‘choice’.311 Caregiving mothers’ reasons for departure from the workforce
vary, but lack of appropriate and affordable childcare is certainly one of them.312 Cossman states that
there are costs to mothers for ‘opting out’ of the workforce, seen to be the result of choice.313 She argues
that this issue needs to be examined so that legal rights in the area of family law are not weakened.
Cossman’s insight applies to other areas of law, and includes those pertaining to my project.
Privatization of care for working mothers in the setting of typical children has been described as a
double shift. The situation for those providing complex care is dire, and Manhas observes that society is
happy to have caregiving mothers “do all the heavy lifting.”314 Extending the ‘opting-out’ explanation
attributed to mothers of non-disabled children to mothers with disabled children will further hide the fact
that many mothers with severely disabled children have no such choice,315 since the privatizing state has
tasked them with numerous forms of care. Legal cases I address in Chapters Four, Six, and Seven reveal
that mothers are also expected to carry over time, the economic, social and physical risks associated with
complex care.316
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The silencing of maternal challenges is “part of a broader pattern of isolation and
privatization”.317 This is reflected in employment policy, which affects all mothers, with the impact on
mothers with disabled children being especially harsh, as case law discussed later shows. Cain comments
that current approaches “denigrate ‘love’s labour’ and caring relations even as they demand them in order
to operate profitably”.318 Overall, the literature on developments in normative mothering provides useful
information in considerations of non-normative, maternally complex care.
It can be seen from the literature that mothering does not take place in a political vacuum.319 Yet,
classic critical theorists have ignored the specific economic, social and political positioning of mothers.320
Nancy Fraser critiques problems that the capitalist welfare state poses for mothers’ status. She claims that
the location of women is problematic in this arrangement because their roles and interests as mothers,
citizens and as workers are ‘in conflict’ with the structure and workings of the state itself.321 Fraser’s
insight here is invaluable. It helps one to understand why support-seeking mothers face challenges
asserting legal claims for support or in the alternative “fitting in” to paid work. If they are supported
neither as carers nor as workers, it might be surmised they are outside the general scheme of legal life.
Currently, legal and political decisions concerning the support of mothers of disabled children are made
within available options in the neo-liberal state. This is a state described by Sawer as the right-wing,
liberal, capitalist state and as the ‘night watchman’ or ‘minimalist’ state.322 According to Sawer, the
minimalist state emphasizes self-reliant citizens,323 therefore not recognizing the support needs of
caregiving mothers with severely disabled children. Sawer describes this state formation as being a male
construct, asserting “the image of the citizen is an essentially self-contained individual rather than the
social liberal/feminist view of the individual caught up in a web of interdependence within the
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community.”324 Sawer states that the neo-liberal concepts of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’ hide
“relations of dependency and interdependency within the family.”325 Sawer refers to the state rendering of
care as invisible as “a vanishing trick”, whereby mothers implicitly lack the characteristics of citizens.326
In this sense, her comments also underscore the source of caregiving mothers’ misrecognition. Later, I
explore the issue of caregiving mothers’ lack of full citizenship status in relation to unmet private support
obligations for disabled children.
Looking closer into the politics of neo-liberalism, Kendra Coulter points out that it was not just
an economic agenda, and was not only an ideology. She describes it as comprising a multi-pronged
strategy that restructured culture, institutions, and economic processes.327 In addition, she states that neoliberalism was an economic, political and moral doctrine that centered the individual as the basis for
society. Flowing from the focus on individualism was the goal of having consumption be the source of
individual identity and means to participation. Under neo-liberalism, according to Coulter, one is
identified as a tax-payer and as a service-user. This accords with the aim of creating optimal conditions
for the market place and for capital. In addition to privatization through selling off state assets,
governments de list services from public provision. Coulter adds that it includes user fees, and privatepublic collaboration in investment, and lauds volunteerism and fundraising in the stead of public
investment. 328 Of particular relevance to my project is that there is a significant emphasis on a highly
decontextualized push for individual responsibility and choice. Coulter points out that inequities in power
and economic status between genders are ignored.329
Political scientists debate whether neo-liberalism is actually gone or whether it has been
modified. Some scholars assert that neo-liberalism has given way to the ideals of the social investment
state330 (also referred to as the Third Way Approach). The neo-liberalism of the 1970’s did change in the
1990’s, when social justice and social inclusion issues were “added” to political agendas.331 However
these items added had investment rationales to support their retention. As such scholars have described
the Third Way as neo-liberalism in disguise.332
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Some political economists assert that social investment state perspectives that are intended to
promote investment in human capital and which centre children in its economic policy, devalue children
who fail to accord with the state’s vision. This would include the severely disabled child. Worthiness
relates to a child’s projected place in the future economy.333 The investment state advances economic
agendas that Lister,334 Jenson335 and other academics show situate the normative child at their centre,
while marginalizing those children who are non-normative, and their mothers, too. The difficulty under
neo-liberalism is that the ideology fails to account for caregiving mother’s realities, as people whose lives
are heavily intertwined with health and other forms of care for non-normative children. The difficulty for
these mothers under the Social Investment State is that the children into whom mothers pour all of their
time and energy are unlikely to meet the state’s objectives of investing in children. Both neo-liberalism
and the social investment state ignore people whose lives cannot be lived in keeping with their societal
doctrines.
Moreover, investment state strategies are said to eclipse parents’ (in my project, mothers’)
interests. To support this, Lister notes that the British official who launched National Childcare Week
declared that “it is important for men to play a real part in raising children for the benefit of children,
fathers and society as a whole.”336 He omitted to mention mothers.
The omission of mothers from political discussions about their children is mentioned in diverse
critiques. The reasons for this may be complex. In the global economy, it is the individual who is
expected to responsibly manage her risks, and to do so with little state support. It is, I believe, unclear
even to policymakers whether or not mothers are “individuals,” and this is both good and bad.
Re-responsibilizing mothers for all forms of care has been seen throughout the West. Australia’s Toni
Delany claims this agenda is particularly directed at mothers with sick children. In the Canadian context,
McKeever described feminine caregiving as a discourse that undergirds expectations of maternal
performance of complex care. This approach holds that mothers are the natural and optimal caregivers for
children, no matter how severe their disabilities. This assumption is called into question in some of the
literature337 as this results in isolated338 mothers, tasked with bringing about good outcomes for children
333
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with severe impairments.339 Breen states that such approaches confuse parental involvement in care with
responsibility for that care,340 which is often health care, an important point. However, it appears that this
‘confusion’ (or conflation) is deliberate. In this way, the hard blow dealt to mothers in the retraction of
care by the state is shielded from plain view.
The approach of responsibilizing mothers for health and other care may seem, to many, to be nonpartisan, with elements of both the left and right finding it attractive.341 Perhaps this makes sense in light
of the fact that governments like to save money and must be accountable on that front. However, the
unjust aspect is that spending reductions are at the expense of the vulnerable. Lister discusses New
Labour’s approach to ‘citizenship’ stating that under New Labour, there are to be “no rights without
responsibilities”, with social justice being arrived at through the market.342 No one has explained how this
works in the setting of severely disabled people who are not financially or otherwise independent. Nor has
anyone delineated what the outer threshold of responsibilization is, or should be. Based on this approach,
caregiving mothers ought to be seen as exemplary citizens; yet they are viewed through a different lens,
that of sacrifice in the private sphere. The point here is that for many caregiving mothers, there are
significant and onerous responsibilities with few rights, as governments increasingly contend that the care
of disabled children, youth and adults is a private matter.343
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North American scholars have identified gender biases in privatizing policies, which they posit
harm women economically.344 Likewise, Britain’s Lister comments that “it is ‘implausible’ to treat
decisions as to who cares for children in the family as purely ‘private’ when the choice is almost always
that the mother is going to remain at home. It is a structural problem, and progressive politics has an
obligation to fight old-fashioned structures.”345
Lister, like Cossman above, describes the way UK politics and policy also treat maternal
decisions as being the result of personal choice. She notes that this implies autonomy, something alluded
to in her discussion of mother’s “choosing” to opt out of the labour market, discussed above.346
The reality is that severe disability poses problems for those who argue in favour of the privatized state. It
is not only mothers who have the right to support, but disabled persons, too. However, in Canadian
society, where children with disabilities are concerned, it is women who are assigned the role of their
care. The law reflects this assignment of care responsibility, thus legal rights to supports are weak, and
rights-claims beyond those repeatedly need to be made, as the below chapters show.
Canadian economist Isabella Bakker draws attention to the fact that it is primarily women who
are tasked with social provisioning as the state has withdrawn from this domain.347 She refers to this as a
‘re-privatization’ involving changes in “the household, the state and social institutions” and “governance
of the basic mechanisms of livelihood.”348 Bakker analyzes re-privatization as guided by the view that it
puts social reproduction back into its ‘natural’ place, within the ‘family’. This political approach is in
keeping with woman’s perceived ‘natural’ role as mothers as described by Rich. For example, there is
now the expectation that women will provide home care, once provided by the state,349 and now framed as
‘family’ care. There is a paradox to consider here. In spite of a history of institutional care for certain
kinds of children,350 Canada remains without national daycare. Daycare is a needed institution by women
generally, but one that Canadian politicians of all stripes have failed to implement.351 It is not that
institutional oversight for children per se is the issue, after all children are in state-run schools across
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Canada. It is care that is the point of contention and that needs to be borne in mind throughout this
dissertation.
This discussion is complicated by the fact social care, and health care, have been conflated, to
government advantage, as I noted.352 Thus, healthcare for severely disabled children has been the past
responsibility of the state, provided either through healthcare (hospitals) or public social care (other forms
of entrenched institutional care, such as children’s and infants homes, orphanages,353 foster care and large
institutions). Therefore, technically one can argue that withdrawal of care to medically disabled children
is simply privatization.
With the deinstitutionalization of disabled children in the 1980s and thereafter, the socially
conservative value of the essential private-ness of disability care has been bolstered. Yet, the literature
shows that it is to the economic detriment of women who bear children and who have inadequate
resources to leverage sufficient support to permit them a measure of real autonomy when those children
are or become severely disabled. This approach to care genders disability, lowering the status of disabled
persons, along with that of caregiving mothers. It also introduces the concept of extreme economic risk to
childbearing for women. This risk is tied to low levels of state support and weak enforcement of those
few avenues of private support made available through statutes.
Explanations of social provisioning as undertaken less often by the state, and more often in the
home, do not relay the full story where mothers with disabled children are concerned. The term, ‘social
provisioning,’ itself inadequately covers the special medical and health care required by these children, in
particular, those with medical complexity and/or who are technology-dependent. This is because medical
care falls outside the social provisioning that takes place in social reproduction.354
McKeever describes mothers as performing skilled health care for chronically ill and medically
disabled children.355 This situation has been described as posing ethical problems.356 There are a range of
troubling issues, for example, financial distress when a mother’s loss of income takes its toll on her ability
to support the family. Murphy notes that there has been a failure to attend to the issue that is the most
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powerful predictor of family stress, namely stressful challenging care at home.357 Another concern,
identified by Murphy, and also Woodgate et al, is the social isolation and lower participation in society by
caregiving mothers.358
There is also a literature contesting the rationale for the reprivatization of home care in the
1990s.359 It also asserts that there are ethical problems with privatization, in addition to noting flawed
rationales for it. The view that the market could guide this form of care justly was a political myth
contested by mothers in Ontario. In support of my comments regarding the failures of privatized complex
health care in particular, a study by Quebec’s Carnevale et al. quoted one mother as stating she
experienced an “injustice” occurring in the setting of “extraordinary” care provided by her to her
medically disabled child.360 This highlights that for some caregiving mothers, rights are implicated.
If Bakker intended to have complex forms of care subsumed under her definition of social provisioning,
then the fact is that the extraordinary care mothers of severely disabled children perform remains an
outlier in terms of its quantity, quality, and impact. In this case, present approaches to ‘social’
provisioning are all the more troubling because they fail to account for what is essentially health care.
Bakker also states “that women are called upon to become ‘genderless workers and rational economic
actors yet at the same time social supports for reproductive and caring work are being weakened and
privatized.”361 Foster care and poorly regulated homes for developmentally disabled individuals can be
added to this. Both of these have featured in media and in advocacy as being unsafe for disabled children
and youth due to lack of government oversight.
The privatization of disability care carries assumptions concerning maternal capabilities, as well
as assumptions about a caregiving mothers’ willingness and economic ability to perform care. The
literature on the privatization of disability care in Canada, once critically evaluated, is useful in
understanding why care breaks down, and children are placed into state care. For example, the policy that
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stipulates such care should take place “at home” presumes a lot, for example, the presence of paternal and
other supports that may or may not actually exist. This, in turn, exposes the “gender division of labour in
the care for children with disabilities [as] one mechanism for the reproduction of gender inequality …”362
Paradoxically, and unwittingly perhaps, the disability rights movement played a role in the push for
privatization where disabled children and youth are concerned, under the aegis of deinstitutionalization
and community living.363 Commenting on ideological differences between the Disabled Women’s
Network (DAWN) and the Council for Canadians with Disabilities (CCD), Vanhala writes that DAWN
viewed CCD as being “very patriarchal” and unaware of discrimination against women where disability
was concerned.364 It does not appear from what Vanhala says - that what CCD perceived to be a plausible
solution to social exclusion and abuse of disabled people who were financially supported in the public
sphere - might oppress women once that support was transferred to the community and to the private
sphere.365 An uncalculated risk at the expense of women (a percentage of whom would be disabled, poor,
single, or already heavily involved in complex caregiving for dependent others) was taken on trust that
state supports for community living arrangements would be both forthcoming and sufficient.366 In
hindsight this turned out not to be the case. This left the door wide open for child welfare (re)
involvement with disabled children, the very thing disability rights advocates did not want, and
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concomitantly, psychological oppression of caregiving mothers, through law, when their disabled children
had to be given up to the state to receive adequate care.
The child welfare literature offers insights on privatization as well. Hester Lessard, commenting
on Canada’s child welfare provisions, asserts that the ‘residual model’ approach is the naturalization of
privatized care of children.367 In earlier times, this approach applied only to ‘normal’ children.368 Now it
applies to all children, something that she states can be mistaken for child equality. Child welfare was
historically involved in placing disparately vulnerable children in institutions,369 but is more heavily
involved with disabled children than non-disabled children for whom at-home care breaks down at high
rates.370 Bridgeman refers to this as “the minimalist approach” which aims to “keep care in the private
sphere” and which “articulates public responsibilities towards care as a burden on the state and
society”.371 However, if the state itself perceives care as burdensome, why then is it perceived to be
acceptable that women shoulder it alone, as Bridgeman notes caregiving mothers do?372 Bakker points to
the trend of “the privatization of previously socialized institutions associated with provisioning social
reproduction,” and she refers to child welfare agencies as demonstrating but one example of that.373 Note
that the care of severely disabled children by the state has traversed from institutionalization to shared
care to hard-to-access or lack of care. The issues in this literature are central to mothers’ legal rights to
support, particularly where mothers seek to share care obligations imposed by provincial child welfare
jurisdictions, but in other areas also.
Privatizing policy approaches in Canada hold that good mothers care for their disabled children at
home. When mothers can no longer perform or afford to care for their severely disabled children, their
children may be placed in a residential treatment centre, or with “specialized” foster mothers.374 The
foster home is recognized by the state for its ‘specialness’. Yet, biological mothers who provide the same
expertise and care do not benefit from recognition. The child with a severe disability who legally transfers
from the charge of a mother to that of the state is a further reflection of the gendered political economy
367
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that Bakkar describes. Bakker also states that male gender bias is built into public policy and as such,
policy is formed “from the perspective of male work and life patterns.”375
Caregiving mothers exceed work ethic expectations, with personal costs, but are not remunerated
nor even recognized as workers. Health researchers point out “a social belief” that meeting the needs of
children is a parental obligation, a flawed belief in its failure to recognize ‘the special burden of complex
medical care” where there are severely disabled children.376 That social belief is itself reflective of bias.
Meanwhile, Manhas asserts that the continued “ideological distinction” of the public and private spheres
in the setting of mothers with children with complex care needs exploits mothers across numerous axes, at
the same time that it fails to receive legal attention.377
This situation brings us back to the issue of uncertain caregiver status. Caregiving mothers’
economic circumstances are but one axis of their continuing uncertain status. The literature concerning
the economics of caring for severely disabled children is not marginal to my thesis. Elsewhere in this
dissertation, I employ the metaphor of ‘trapped’ in relation to caregiving mothers and the law, and suggest
that this metaphor applies in a similar vein to their situation in relation to economic support.
Continuing with the issue of privatization, it must be considered in the context of women’s
already existing realities. In their discussion of “the relentless attack on federal social programs,” Brodie
and Bakker reference former Minister of Canadian Heritage and the Status of Women, Beverley Oda, of
the Conservative government as stating that her government “does fundamentally believe that all women
are equal.”378 This statement raises the question of what the Conservative government meant by the word
‘equal’. As The Harper Record policy paper shows, almost 40% of single mothers in Canada in 2004
lived below Statistic Canada’s low-income cut-off, thus formal economic equality has not been achieved.
This data is not able to address the specific situation of mothers with severely disabled children, whom
Petrenchik points out often struggle financially in Canada.379 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has commented
that the term equality is “notoriously indeterminate”,380 however the term does appear in the Charter of
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Rights and Freedoms under s 15(1).381 In Generation Rx: Mothering Kids with Invisible Disabilities in an
Age of Inequality, Blum draws attention to the inequality experienced.382
The economic inequality that results from an inability of caregiving mothers to work outside the
home and have support for care creates problems. For example, remaining at home to perform care for
technology-dependent or medically fragile children has been shown to have negative health impacts on
mothers.383 A Canadian report cited by Carly Weeks revealed that mothers who care for disabled children
are sick more often than mothers who do not.384 A caregiving mother’s need to take time off to recover
from illness impacts employment prospects, particularly if illness becomes chronic, should the
opportunity arise for them to re-enter the labour market. This is further evidence of gender inequality, and
also has legal ramifications. Re-privatization of maternally complex care has imposed human costs
beyond the economic ones that are most obvious to government. It is overall inequality that more often
accords with complex care.385 In fact, (former) Minister Oda’s comment spoke more to the liberal notion
of autonomy than it did to substantive equality. Perhaps Oda meant to say that women are now
fundamentally autonomous, although that, too, is problematic.
A space has opened up for politicians to assert that the mothers of disabled children are poor
because of choices they have made, of their own volition. This may especially be the case where
politicians seek to make an economic argument that it is individuals and families, and not the state, who
are obligated to protect themselves and their families against risk and “provide for their own futures.”386
Arguably this stands in some tension with the social investment state. However, according to Coulter the
rhetorical claims made in the Third Way to care about seniors, children and the vulnerable, future
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generations, our neighbours, and the environment.387 Coulter describes polite receipt of reports about such
groups, with little policy change taking place.388
As will be seen, the notion of personal choice is frequently raised in legal cases challenging a
caregiving mother’s right to support. The ‘personal choice’ argument has its uses, as it frees government
from the harmful consequences of privatization. Gazso and McDaniel point out that under neo-liberalism,
the ideology that informs much of the disability policy under discussion here, “risks” are understood
increasingly to be self-made, and furthermore “entrench individual responsibility.”389
As noted by Gilmour and Bakker respectively, Canada has been experiencing increasing levels of
privatization in healthcare 390 and other areas.391 It is apparent that in Canada caring for one’s disabled
child is economically risky. This is all the more true where the ideological expectation is that “a mother
must be self-reliant and care for children with minimal or no assistance.”392 Such expectations, Kline
notes, “submerge contradictions between the liberal framework of ‘choice’ and the coercive and
ideological forces in women’s lives that make ‘options,’ such as giving up one’s child for adoption,
appear viable”393, as it may do for mothers who can no longer cope on their own with the demands of
caring for a child with a severe disability. In fact, ‘coping’ and 'choice’ are key features of caregiving that
deeply trouble critical disability theory and support law, as will be seen.
As a result of privatization, provinces underfund existing supports such as homecare, even though
private care is cost-prohibitive for most mothers. Peter Coyte, who critiques homecare policy in Canada,
asserts that with increasing privatization, homecare has formed in “an informational vacuum,”394 a
phenomenon that was partially responsible for the care problems described in Ontario’s Special
Ombudsman Reports. In his report Between a Rock and a Hard Place, on the practice in Ontario requiring
child custody in order to provide complex care, Ombud Andre Marin expressed that in his opinion:
The Ministry of Children and Youth Services’ failure to ensure that parents of children with severe
disabilities are not forced to relinquish custody to Children’s Aid Societies in order to
receive necessary residential placements is unjust, oppressive and wrong.395
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Correspondence between the Ombuds and government1 revealed that government was aware of the
situation.396
There is ample scholarly literature to support the claim that privatizing complex disability care in
the manner that it was done negatively impacted women the most. In their analysis of the international
literature on parental experience caring for disabled children from 1960-2012,397 Green, Darling and
Wilbers found certain features have been constant in parental care of disabled children for over 50 years.
The pattern is that it is mothers who provide most of the care,398 something other research claims to be the
case approximately 96 percent of the time.399 Some authors refer to this situation as reflecting “a
neglected aspect of inequality in caring labour.”400 As this form of caregiving has been described as
extremely gendered,401 support law and policy must be formulated with this fact in mind.
Concerning Canada, and using the 2001 Participation and Action Limitation Survey (PALS),
Nova Scotian scholars Burton and Phipps examine the economic ramifications of caregiving. Disabled
children have been described as expensive,402 something that poses hardship on mothers with low
incomes. Burton and Phipps also report on explicit and implicit costs associated with caregiving. Implicit
costs include missed labour market opportunities, and loss of job benefits. However, any mother
experiences this in “staying home”.
In their review of the findings in the literature, Canadian economists Stabile and Allin point out
that it is a complicated endeavour to measure the cost of disability to families based on studies undertaken
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to date.403 This is the case because different studies use different definitions of disability, and cost features
are measured differently, in addition to other reasons they list.404 Stabile and Allin note that costs to
families fall “in a very wide range.”405 Their study would be useful to government as a starting point for
examining care costs in its many manifestations.
Borrowing from the language employed in some autism literature, which refers to non-autistic
children as neuro-typical children, I refer to mothers without disabled children as typical mothers. This is
a blunt instrument. Typical mothers forgo the same labour force opportunities as caregiving mothers do,
however those mothers with severely disabled children are more affected by their circumstances. Lifelong
maternally complex care may permanently prevent a mother’s entry and reentry into the labour market.
Ellen Scott has researched some of the hidden costs and consequences of performing care. Scott
points out that in the setting of “a neoliberal labor market and privatized systems of family care,” mothers
with disabled children struggle chronically with conflicting demands.406 Scott’s research also shows that
for mothers with disabled children, there is often weak attachment to the labour force, lower or no income
of their own over the long term, and accompanying forgone benefits and pensions. This situation
positions caregiving mothers as a group at risk of impoverishment, whether they are married or not.
Interestingly, no researcher has examined rates of remarriage of mothers with severely disabled children
versus mothers with non-disabled children. This is curious since many in family law tout remarriage as a
means to mitigate the now obvious risk of future poverty for mothers. Again, assumptions abound where
cost and support are concerned. Where the literature examining cost and support fails to fully explore this
issue, it is fortunate that many legal cases do.
Burton and Phipps suggest that where there are children with “very severe conditions,”
government should support mothers for their performance of a combination of paid work and care, as well
as provide income support for lost wages when care requires mothers to withdraw from paid labour.407
Their suggestion, while laudable for recommending remuneration, does not address assumptions that
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complex medical care408 and intensive disability support is women’s work. Nor does it address the ethical
difficulties this work poses for family members409, including to disabled children themselves and their
non-disabled siblings.
In considering the complexity of the lived circumstances of caregiving mothers, one is reminded
of the notorious case of Irene Murdoch concerning the issue of remuneration/support.410 My methodology
allows consideration of the text of cases as literature, and the Murdoch case spawned a feminist legal
discourse about the legal right of women to support, and it remains relevant. Murdoch is no longer law,
and one might assume that the attitudes about women’s labour evident in the majority decision have
disappeared.
Irene (Ginger) Murdoch co-ran a farm with her husband James (Alex) Murdoch, including when
he was away. In addition, she was a caregiver to her husband during his illnesses. The farm work included
branding, inoculating and driving cattle. When the Murdochs separated, Irene sought a share of the value
of the property. The Supreme Court of Canada found that at the time of their separation, Mrs. Murdoch
was not entitled to money from the enterprise, which was in the husband’s name, as she had not (they
held) made a direct financial contribution to the ranch.411 This finding was based on the opinion that
“what [she] had done, while living on the farm [with her husband], was the work done by any ranch
wife.”412 Mr. Justice Bora Laskin dissented, stating that denial of an interest in the farm to the wife
“would equate her strenuous labours with mere housekeeping chores.”413 The majority conclusion may be
compared to the caregiving labour of mothers of severely disabled children, who are, essentially seen in
many areas of law, to provide the same care as any typical mother would do.
Like the word “wife” in Murdoch, “mother” in my project is frozen with a socio-legally imbued
and historical meaning. The reality is that Mrs. Murdoch made a significant contribution to the family
enterprise, as a farmer, even though it was carried out under the legal status of wife.414 So too, do
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caregiving mothers engage in health care provisioning to children with severe medical and physical
conditions, even though undertaken under the legal status of mother. That there is no legal doctrine
available to remedy this situation (yet), as there was not one (yet) for Irene Murdoch, does not detract
from this fact. Certainly, Justice Laskin could see that legal doctrine at that time was unjust. It did not
support equality, but rather allowed for a gendered form of unjust enrichment for Mr. Murdoch. A similar
point may be made regarding the health care provided by caregiving mothers as required of them by the
state.
The caregiving support of severely disabled children has many features. For example, there is
emotional labour, the costs of which are omitted in policy and disability rights literature and from
mention in support law (although some judges comment on the emotional demands of care in decisions).
The “dual role of parenting and medical care provision is tiring and stressful”415 and the “blurring of
parenting” with this kind of caregiving416 is essentially the conflation of typical childcare with the
performance of tasks that fall within the scope of nursing or medicine.417 Carnevale et al note that “daily
life is extremely constrained by extraordinary physical, psychological, social and financial challenges” for
mothers of children with complex care needs.418
Cain has observed that “issues of affect, emotion and care occupy a rather confusing space within
the citizenship discourse.”419 Likewise, medical maternal tasks seem to occupy a rather confusing space in
disability rights advocacy.420 Economic costs cannot be separated from these other, less tangible kinds of
costs, such as the emotional cost of having to perform difficult medical care. Low socio-economic status
is understood to be a social determinant of health.421 It has been stated that the approach of the current
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welfare state in Canada prevents the alleviation of negative impacts of low economic status.422 We know
that mothers of children with disabilities risk psychosocial problems,423and can experience heavy
stressors,424 burnout, anxiety, as well as depression.425 It has been found that, “mothers of children with
chronic conditions provide a particularly striking example of how health problems experienced by a loved
one can ‘spill over.’”426
Thus, the health of caregiving mothers and other family members cannot be understood without
considering their ‘family contexts,’ of which low socio-economic status is but one427 and childhood with
disability is another. This literature reveals a serious situation. It is crucial that ideologies of ‘good
mothering,’ and the newer vision of mothering as healthcare, both of which insist that “capable” mothers
meet the many needs of severely disabled children “without assistance from the state”428 must be
overcome. There is literature that suggests these ought to de-linked. De-privatizing care supports in a
manner supportive of legal rights needs to be addressed.
The review next examines public policy for the presently predominantly private care to severely
disabled children. Note that this policy is directed to children, in isolation from their mothers. Caregiving
mothers, however, are hidden within government’s narrow eligibility criteria, criteria that fail to consider
the caregiving context., including type of housing, The scholarly and grey literature conveys a uniform
message, which is the need of reform.
Policy for Severely Disabled Children
Here, I review literature examining the complex arena of childhood disability policy that has arisen in the
political contexts of neo-liberalism and the investment state. Theresa Petrenchik states that “though
reliable prevalence data for childhood disability in low-income families is currently unavailable, an
estimated 30% of Canadian children and youth with disabilities live in poverty.”429 Petrenchik adds that
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the stress of poverty and exclusion, along with the expense of caring for a disabled child “creates chronic
and unnecessary hardship in families.”430 Her use of the term ‘hardship’ is key here. Referencing
Hanvey,431 she adds that “caring for a child with a disability can be overwhelming … particularly [for]
single mothers” and that government financial support may be the only realistic avenue.432 One can
conclude from Petrenchik that many mothers lack the supports to lift them out of poverty despite the fact
that there is a literature addressing the problems behind weak or absent support policies.433 Inadequate
supports are not a result of disabled children’s needs not having been made clear in the academic and grey
literatures about them, but rather are the result of societal features, such as medical advances.
Advances in medicine are such that severely disabled children are a growing segment of the child
population in Canada. There are greater numbers of children surviving trauma, illness, and prematurity,434
as well as congenital conditions. Children with severe medical conditions comprise a unique population,
with Peter et al referring to them as forming “a subpopulation.”435 Leiter also notes that “children with
disabilities and chronic illnesses are a steadily growing minority of children in the United States.”436 One
would expect a careful response from the state to this, especially in light of bold state rhetoric on
children’s rights and child anti-poverty strategies.
However, regardless of how disability in childhood is defined, counted, or spoken about publicly,
Canadian scholars conclude that supports for disabled children remain inadequate.437 Carnevale et al state
that “we know that these children commonly receive sub-optimal care because they ‘fall between the
cracks’ due to ambiguous categories, exclusionary criteria or service gaps.”438 In a similar vein,
Petrenchik observes that “it is challenging, if not impossible to develop population-based strategies and
measure their effectiveness in the absence of meaningful descriptions of the target populations” as well as
“in the absence of reliable surveillance and monitoring activities.”439 The CCD has also indicated a need
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for more data in its disability strategy.440 The support needs of severely disabled children have not
garnered much policy attention, like their mothers’ support needs, which are connected. Reasons for this
are multifactorial.
Some of the challenges severely disabled children face having their support needs recognized are
consistent with Canada’s lamentable history respecting marginalized children generally.441 Politically,
there has been little attention given to disability in general. Based on decades of work in the field,
disability scholar Michael Prince concludes that disabled children have been largely ignored in public
policy,442 offering his insight that their interests are poorly linked with the disability policy agenda and
children’s agendas.443 Prince notes that when Welfare was removed from Health and Welfare Canada in
1993 and became part of the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development, federal
government responsibility for disability went with it.444 At that time, Prince notes, the government’s focus
turned to ‘investing in people’ rather than supporting them, and this is partially why disabled children
“have been ignored or insufficiently linked with the wider disability and children’s agenda.”445
Prince’s observations suggest that space needs to be opened up for disabled children’s interests to be
made known and acted upon. However, there are other problems facing disabled children vis-à-vis
support. One of these is the struggle with definitions.446
A working definition for the disabled children under discussion in my project was provided in
Chapter Two. However, practically speaking, definitions of childhood disability vary. Statistics Canada
describes the severity of a disability according to the extent of difficulty a person has in performing
certain functions.447 This definition has been informed by the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health or ‘ICF,’ which describes ‘disability’ as
a complex interaction between individual impairments, activity limitations, participation restrictions and
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environmental factors which interact.448 Using this definition, Statistics Canada estimates that there were
over 74,000 children with severe disabilities in 2006.449
Within policy offerings though, definitions of disability vary. A federal government report, which
purports to define disability, concludes that recognizing disability actually depends on the goals of a
particular government program.450 As well, raw data can only tell us so much, however, the issue of
whether there is enough research of the right kind must be addressed because ultimately, being able to
identify maternal and disability support needs consistently will ensure that those in need of support can be
connected to them.
Currently, definitions of disability vary widely and research on what kinds of needs are associated
with various disabilities is lacking. For example, regarding children who are technology-dependent, Wang
and Barnard note that the “lack of research-based literature in this area has generated difficulty in gaining
insights into the issues and experiences of children with long-term technology dependence at home and in
their families.”451 As a result, support policy fails these mothers and children.
While a few studies do proceed by asking what supports should exist,452 these appear to emerge
from a health services perspective rather than from a social benefits services perspective. The latter is also
needed, as services and funding are key supports.453 Experts note that where severely disabled children
are concerned, fresh insights are required “to forge new lines of scholarship that will lead to innovative
practices and policies, in order to ensure that care-giving responsibilities and costs are distributed fairly
and that these children enjoy the rights of citizenship and the entitlements of contemporary childhood”.454
In contradistinction to the view that disability requires more research in order to better serve the needs of
disabled children, Britain’s Goodley and Runswicke-Cole state, “there has been a plethora of research
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studies that have theorized the lives of disabled children.”455 They assert that research focuses on barriers
that disabled children face. Findings from this review, though, would suggest that while there is a
growing literature on the needs of children with less severe disabilities, there remains little research into
the lives of children with severe disabilities. Such research will find it necessary to include mothers.
Scambler openly states that the needs of those with severe disabilities are inadequately presented in the
literature.456 If true, it is impossible know what supports their mothers require.457 All one can say for
certain is that presently, inadequate supports are based on inadequate research.
However, in Ontario, the aforementioned Ombudsman’s Report concluded that provincial
research has been undertaken to discern the needs of disabled children in need of care, stating, “It is not
the time for further study. This matter has been studied to death, so much so that the appearance is now
created that those studies were mere instruments for delay rather than the source of data for decision.”458
Notably, also in Ontario, the MCSS has collaborated with researchers to examine respite and residential
placements needs, but this was some time ago and was weakly acted upon.459 Given what Coulter460 and
others have stated, which is that there is a disconnection between reports provided to government and
government action, more such reports would not be helpful unless they tackled areas that have not been
researched, and many past findings still need to be addressed.
In order to grasp why severely disabled children face problems in support policy, attention must
also be paid to culture. Green has commented that disabled children fail to “conform to” societal
expectations of children per se.461 This may result in their not being fully perceived as being children. If
true, this troubling issue has policy ramifications, and may explain the point Sasha Scambler makes above
that there is little research about the lives of severely disabled children. More theory is needed on this
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point. It is possible that interlocking oppressions of patriarchy and ableism may combine with a unique
form of childism462 as an added feature of oppression. This is harder to address than are numbers.
The literature about oppression is not of mere theoretical relevance to severely disabled children: it has
bearing on the realization of their legal rights to support. Priestly asserts, “[w]ithin the contemporary
political discourse of children's rights there is scope for considering childhood disability as a form of
simultaneous oppression in its own right.”463 Priestly believes that the oppression of disabled children has
been left unexamined for too long. Goodley and Runswick-Cole suggest that a focus on disabled child
policy requires a concentration on the ways in which the ‘disabled child’ is constructed in and by policy,
noting that problematically, “developmentalism continues to underpin children’s policy” with its focus on
a “normal childhood,” adding that it does so unselfconsciously.464 By ‘developmentalism’ they refer to
the situation where children are seen to follow a set of predictable steps towards adulthood. Not to do so
is construed as being abnormal child development.465 This ties in with the comment on childism, above.
The important points Goodley and Runswick-Cole make466 are that the “impact of the hegemonic status of
developmentalism is clear, and policymakers should be cognizant of it. Likewise, Walkerdine suggests
that children who cannot meet certain developmental stages when expected to are ‘othered,’ and otherness
can only be understood as something ‘at a lower developmental level’.467 According to this logic, disabled
children may “fail to match” the developed child of child “policy discourse”.468 This mismatch has dire
consequences for severely disabled children and the mothers who provide their care. One of these is
social exclusion of both.
Societal exclusion of disabled people has been a longstanding issue where disability is concerned.
Where caregiving mothers are concerned, it leads to social isolation.469 This is another hardship faced by
disabled children and their mothers, particularly where sole-support, low-income mothers are concerned.
In Canada, child welfare systems at one time adopted the ideology of eugenics with the belief in the need
to institutionalize disabled children, separating them from society.470 Being dynamic, this ideology has
changed, and with it societal conceptualizations of disability, but segregation did not entirely vanish with
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the large institutions. Arguably severely disabled children are still largely segregated, in the care of their
mothers.
Presently, disabled children and their mothers are the subject/objects of a variety of discourses.
Some disability scholars argue that eugenics is still one of these discourses, noted elsewhere as public
health promotion aimed at curtailing disability.471 Health policy research is conducted separately from
social policy research, and at times, these areas of research have different or opposing orientations in their
discourses. This matters where mothers with disabled children are concerned, because their interests
simultaneously encompass both social and health policy domains, irrespective of the discourses. One
must consider how childhood disability policy can be coherent under such circumstances. For example,
surveillance of so-called congenital anomalies is carried out by the Public Health Agency of Canada.472
Their research offers data on childhood disability. However, its purpose is not to ameliorate support, but
rather to minimize or eradicate the anomalous births noted in the report that incur increased hospital costs.
Birth anomalies are described by the Agency as effectively the result of poor conduct,473 and the
Agency’s document indicates that such children are flawed, with mothers apparently responsible for this
outcome. In this discourse, disability is the result of pathology, one genetic and the other social (maternal
conduct474). The congenital anomaly registry was created by government after the exposure of pregnant
women to thalidomide between 1958-1962. Its purpose is stated to be to detect teratogens.475 Thus while
advances in pediatric subspecialties continue to extend the lives of children born with or who become
severely disabled, the state also demonstrates its interest in identifying ‘anomalous’ pregnancies.
Concern has been expressed that there appears to be little interest in the well-being of actual
disabled children by the federal government.476 If one couples the government’s goals of eradication of
471
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congenital anomalies through screening with what reports show, namely that government offerings cannot
meet the needs of children and their mothers, one sees a policy design, of sorts.477 It is not one based on
consensus.
In fact, the entire plethora of discourses on disabled children and their mothers, too many to
canvass here, are relevant to challenges mothers face accessing support. These play a role in how
caregiving mothers are situated by the state in law and policy. The terrain is crowded, and includes what
McKeever termed the feminine caregiving discourse, which arguably can be theoretically subsumed as a
group under Rich’s theory of motherhood as an institution. Indeed, McKeever refers to mothering
children with complex medical care needs as an extreme form of traditional motherhood.478
Other discourses include critical disability, socially conservative, political as well as
medical/technological discourses.479 In all of them, mothers are tightly bound to the care needs of their
severely disabled children. For example, technological discourses orient mothers towards healthcare and
simultaneously, privatization.480 Neoliberal discourses in current health policy implicitly promote home as
the ideal place for children to receive health and other forms of care.481 The health discourse noted above
supports the perspective that the severely disabled child is not the ideal child, in either the neo-liberal
state,482 nor in the social investment state. Such a child may then be deemed as less worthy of state
support.
Disabled children themselves have been subjected to discourses, and these likewise impact how
disabled children are situated by the state in policy. Goodley and Runswicke-Cole explain that “disabled
children occupy a complex and contested policy domain in which their status as both ‘child’ and
‘disabled’ has to be negotiated and explained (often separately) in the contexts of health, social care,
education and leisure.”483 Their contested status in areas of policy has further implications for their own
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and for their caregiving mother’s legal rights.484 It is worthwhile examining features of policy that reflects
many things, including mothers’ status misrecognition, and the harm wrought by non-consensual, fulltime, complex care provision, as well as the complex and contested policy Goodley and Runswicke-Cole
comment on. Together, these intangible features help to explain why legal rights to support for caregiving
mothers remain elusive.
Adding to the above complex features of childhood disability, in the Canadian context, such
policies have been described as being “in a constant state of flux,”485 and as a “hit and miss affair.”486
Disability policy for children has been variously defined as falling within child welfare, education, social
assistance, health, or combinations of these domains.
In fact, disability does fall across multiple sectors and across public and private supports.
Moreover, state responses to need reveal a back-and-forth process whereby the state redefines childhood
disability, frequently reallocating benefits. This, in turn, demonstrates the contested and fluctuating nature
of the disabled child in policy.487
This phenomenon demonstrates that in childhood, disability is more than a bodily feature but is
politically, and as Green488 suggests socially, constructed. The latter may include a maternal construction,
which in my view is one of relational value and related obligations. These disparate features make
childhood disability elusive to examine and may have contributed to this area of policy being studied by
only a few committed academics489 and think tanks490 with the result that severely disabled children are
notable for their absence in much of the literature. This, in turn, results in disabled children receiving less
attention than they might otherwise and fewer resources than do other children.
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As a group, children have been named as a priority on government agendas such as in National
Children’s Agenda (NCA), a cross-Canada initiative.491 In 1999-2000, the provinces and territories
(except Quebec) participated in formulating a national agenda to find ways to improve policy for
children.492 A number of different disability rights groups brought attention to the omission of disabled
children from these discussions.493 In response to a complaint by one of the groups, as well as input from
subcommittees on the status of persons with disabilities and children and youth at risk, an amended vision
statement was crafted to address the exclusion of disabled children.494 This initiative, ostensibly
undertaken on behalf of all Canadian children by the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers, was
described as a shared vision.495 However, the low visibility of disabled children and their mothers was
revealed in their original exclusion from policy discussions on improving the lives of children. This low
visibility manifests elsewhere, too. In the academic literature, the unique support needs of mothers of
severely disabled children are largely forgotten by experts critiquing existing Canadian policy.496
Worthy of note is that the thrust of social investment strategies, ostensibly directed towards atrisk children, is meager where all children are concerned and inimical to the needs of severely disabled
children. For example, McKeen states that among the goals of the NCA were the promotion of physical
health and “responsible” future citizenship, goals which she argues individualize pathology, rather than
seeing societal responsibility. She argues that these programs were not geared towards income
redistribution for those in need, and criticizes programs formulated under the NCA as based on moralistic
assumptions about poor, racialized or single parents.497 McKeen’s point harks back to the issue of culture,
and within that, class.
NCA drafters appear not to have engaged with the lived realities of mothers with disabled
children. McKeen describes the NCA as being a neo-liberal program dressed up to look like support. The
NCA ought to have tackled a range of policy issues, such as those identified by disability policy expert
Michael Prince. Prince points out that Canadian children with disabilities (i) live with inadequate services
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and inadequate access to appropriate supports, (ii) have to contend with appropriate services remaining
unavailable in many communities, and, where available, inadequate to meet the needs of children with
disabilities, (iii) must accept the discretionary funding of services, something he argues implies that
disabled children's rights are only privileges, and that (iv) a devolution of policy and services has resulted
in inconsistency and a lack of accountability overall in policy.498 Prince’s analysis makes it evident that
policy shortcomings for disabled children exist across the country. Addressing this nationally, however, is
challenging as a result of divided constitutional jurisdiction in Canada, as this section of my review has
described.499
A notable absence of mothers in childhood disability policy reflects the lack of recognition of the
centrality of their role in supporting disabled children in all areas, even as the previous omission of
consideration of disabled children in policy is pointed out by experts. In Changing Politics of Canadian
Social Policy, James Rice and Michael Prince state feminists assert that governments develop social
programs for women in marginalizing ways.500 While commendably, Rice and Prince do reference policy
that has targeted unmarried mothers, welfare mothers, divorced women, single women, and sole-support
mothers, somehow they fail to address policy pertaining to mothers with severely disabled children,
which is curious in light of the findings of Burton, Lethbridge and Phipps addressed in this thesis. This
omission lends credence to the view that this mothering population falls below policy radars, even among
those policy experts working in the field who are openly supportive of progressive policy agendas for
women.
Support-seeking mothers of disabled children, a group that falls within Prince’s area of expertise,
are in fact marginalized, indeed absent, based on the descriptions of policy agendas. For caregiving
mothers to be included in consideration of the right to support for disabled children, the bigger picture of
disabled child support policy needs must to be brought to light. Prince himself does point out that
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disabled children were not initially considered in the NCA,501 but does not take the further step, which is
the task of advancing a relational disability policy that includes the rights of caregiving mothers.
There are other problems with advancing childhood disability policy. Where there is an alert as to
a policy crisis in a given province, such as has occurred in Alberta in the Martin and Bostick cases, in
Ontario, with regard to disability care and child custody loss, in British Columbia with the “unnamed
disabled girl” scandal, as well as in the deaths of Angie and Robert Robertson in that province, inquiries
or investigations have led to policy recommendations. These are discussed later in the dissertation.
Although made public, these recommendations do not appear to benefit other provinces and territories, or
even prevent recurrences of tragedy in the same province. The extent to which such recommendations
keep disabled children and caregiving mothers safe and well in the province in which they are made and
disseminated is an important question. Those working on the ground rather than disability scholars in the
ivory tower understand that there was/is a close link between the wider circumstances surrounding harm
and deaths and weak or absent support. For example, in the case of the murder/suicide of the Robinsons,
Faith Bodnar of Inclusion B.C. described to media a “catastrophic systemic failure” as contributing to
their horrific circumstances.502 She did not blame the caregiving mother for the bad outcome. Rather, the
blame was settled on the Province of British Columbia. Bondar’s statement reveals that disability
advocates do not all think alike. Some other disability advocates fail to mention the context of the state
failures to support mothers when they report on murder suicide involving disabled children and their
mothers.503
The literature suggests that no province is adequately supporting severely disabled children, and
given that this is the case, one jurisdiction’s policy may offer insights into ways to improve upon another
province’s policy. For this to take place a national initiative, co-ordination and information sharing is
needed, instead of the present policy containment. In spite of problems respecting rights where these
children and parents are concerned, a legal remedy in the Canadian context is elusive.
Concerning the literature about this situation in Canada, the extent to which supports are available
equally across jurisdictions is a salient issue in the examination of supports. It is already known to be a
problem with Peter et al indicating that homecare is inequitably available across Canada and inadequately
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funded.504 Wait lists for respite and other forms of care and funding for disabled children support
comments made by Prince that alone, parents cannot meet the support needs of their disabled children.505
Child welfare authorities, having conducted small studies, state that their funding frameworks
cannot continue to meet the needs of a population of children not mandated in their funding.506 Yet, they
have been administering funding for severely disabled children through monies earmarked for children in
need of protection. Providing this form of ‘help’ to (primarily) mothers through the provincial child
protection legislation has been, and is still perceived by many, as being socially and legally scandalous.507
It is troubling that this scandalous policy remains.
This review has traversed a diverse literature that ties into varying aspects of problems of the
support needs of mothers with severely disabled children. The need to draw on such a broad literature was
the result of the low visibility and uncertain status of mothers with severely disabled children in Canadian
society, the politics of privatization, and the cross-disciplinary nature of my project.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Once Upon a Time: Representations of Care to Disabled Children
Introduction
This chapter title alludes to fairy tales. Fairy tales occupy the cultural realm, and in my view, they
contribute to caregiving mothers status misrecognition. Maternal care to severely disabled children is
frequently represented in fanciful ways, contrary to the gritty realities508 of much of its performance.509
This has arisen as tales get told about caregiving mothers, by the state, by socially conservative disability
rights advocates, and by fathers’ rights groups. This chapter examines such representations because they
contain harmful misinformation, and as such, are inimical to the realization of legal rights for mothers
with disabled children, which is my concern.
Arguably no other area of care in Canada is as culturally imbued with such powerful tales, or
myths, as is this area. That these fairy tales or myths run directly counter to the realities of maternally
complex care demands attention, especially since weak and often unenforceable claims to support and
missing legal rights to support are closely tied to cultural stories being told about mothers with severely
disabled children.
Caregiving mothers’ advocacy must grapple with the power of these tales, which are ideology. As
ideology they hide what is really taking place. One way that mothers resist this powerful ideological
construction of their care is by demystifying the highly political notions that abound about care burdens in
this particular setting. In so doing, they define what maternally complex care burdens actually are.
Demystifying ‘deideologizes’ the fairy tale activities (myths) of the noble and sacrificing special needs
mother. One way they do this is through their scholarship and through materials and submissions made in
their legal claims for various forms of support and replies to those who seek to end or reduce it.
Maternal disability rights scholars, and mothers’ own accounts of disability care, offer a different
image of what constitutes caregiving to a severely disabled child, than do fairy tale-like myths. In light of
this, I commence my discussion with the concept of ‘burdens of care’, which will provide a doorway into
an analysis of the ways care performed by mothers with disabled children has been represented by the
state and by theorists and by the culture.510 Next, I examine and critique the way mothers have been
situated in four conceptual models of disability.
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The chapter ends with an examination of E. (Mrs.) v Eve,511 the Supreme Court of Canada case
that illustrates how individual approaches to legal rights, along with certain representations of care, are
implicated in harming mothers with disabled children. In particular, I argue that state representations of
care draw heavily on the charity512 , medical,513 and also conservative threads from within the social model
of disability,514 and bolster an approach to care illustrated by Eve. The representations of maternal care for
the severely disabled widely shared in Canadian society suggest that such care is mothering and that
mothering of this sort is a lifelong obligation. I argue that it is through a process of critical consciousness
that mothers escape the shared vision515 that the extraordinary and under-supported care they provide is a
mere variant of typical mothering, and not politically, economically, and physically burdensome, or even
particularly important,516 or interesting.517
Eve demonstrates that support law has long been bound closely to gender and politics. Law itself
has moreover been described historically as injurious to mothers.518 In present day iterations, as it affects
mothers with severely disabled children, support law continues to be political, gendered, and injurious.
This is because myths operate to hold in place the view that it is mothers who should provide care,
irrespective of their circumstances or the circumstances of their children. Such myths shield the realities
of care assigned to women, and as such, they serve to oppress. In this chapter, I expose some of the myths
about caregiving mothers of the severely disabled that conceal lived realities of complex care
performance. Central to much of this discussion is the concept of ‘burden of care.’
Meanings Conveyed by “Burdens of Care”
The medical meaning of ‘burden of care’ provides that care of the sick or disabled is an economic burden
to society, and a social burden to family. As seen in the literature review, the belief that such care is a
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burden has been rejected by disability rights activists, who have challenged erroneous assumptions about
disabled people. However, I claim that this blanket rejection occurred without consideration of all that
care comprises, such as who is assigned to perform it, who funds its performance, as well as where and
under what conditions it is performed. As such, for those providing maternally complex care, there has
been an erasure of the costs of that care.
Saetersdal states that the parents and disabled people she interviewed find that they must live up
to norms and expectations if they want to have a voice in what happens to them. She adds that for
disabled people and families “… this becomes a further burden if they feel they are unable to live up to
what they themselves understand is the "right way" to function as a family.”519 Unfortunately, a result of
this is that any discussion of burdens is considered taboo in critical disability scholarship. So too, I add, is
reference to or discussion of disability-related grief.520 This is because both burdens of care and grief are
seen to have arisen from the medical model of disability, a model seen to pathologize and render tragic
both disability and disabled persons.
In mainstream critical disability studies, burdens of care and grief are dealt with as features of the
societal rejection of the disabled person;521 it somehow implies darkness. However, recent research on
mothers with children with a diagnosis of Monosomy IP36 Deletion Syndrome supports contrary
findings, namely, that caregiving mothers feel both joy and sorrow.522 However, the critical disability
studies approach has thus far failed to confront the multi-faceted features of being the mother of a
severely disabled child, including the legal ramifications of care that some scholars have begun to
uncover.523 Historically, mothers in Canada have, under duress, been expected to ‘agree’ to
institutionalize their disabled children and for many, this resulted in grief.524 In dismissing grief as a
credible issue, disability rights activists failed to distinguish between public expressions of disability as
tragedy versus intimate expressions of loss related to extraordinary maternal care. Risk of loss is an
ongoing feature of mothering severely disabled children for some. The horrific potential for disabled child
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loss, whether it be for legal or medical reasons, remains a heavy burden of care. There is therefore a need
to continue to theorize burdens of care and grief in conversations about disability rights.
There is now the view being expressed elsewhere that grief has been simplistically interpreted in
the past, with some bereavement experts reporting on the grief expressed by disabled children
themselves.525 Indeed, one could refer to a social model of grief, for example, where childhood disability
is seen through the lens of the disabling child protection law, and results in child loss.
Having declared my standpoint earlier, my starting point is my claim that heavy burdens of care
exist and how I characterize care burdens does not accord with how they have been described in the three
mainstream models of disability. In what follows, I will sketch how these different models of disability
conceptualize caregiving mothers’ burdens. I will argue that a newer characterization of the burdens of
care on mothers with severely disabled children will be important to considerations in advancing legal
rights to support. Moreover, as alluded to above, and as I explain further below, a maternal process of
problematizing the complexities of skilled care, including medical tasks, night work, expensive care and
so on, represents first a rejection of how such care is represented in major models of disability, and
second, an expression of evolved critical consciousness under circumstances of oppression.
Introduction: Models of Disability in the Context of Disabled Children’s Care
As noted in Chapter One, context is crucial to the analysis I undertake. In light of context, I argue that
neither the charity nor the social models of disability have accounted for the constraints placed on
mothers of severely disabled children. Caregiving mothers of severely disabled children face the prospect
of a loss of career and income opportunities, a loss of social networks526, and long-term impacts on health
that fail to show up in charity and social models of disability.527 These models are alike in the sense that
both ignore the particularity of the caregiving mother-disabled child relationship as a pivotal factor in the
recognition and assertion of support rights. This omission has implications where the realization of rights
may be challenged by their weak development in disability jurisprudence. Frances Olsen describes
feminist thought concerning the rights of children as complex and ambiguous, and this is the case
respecting the legal rights of disabled children.528

525

Elizabeth J. Bruce, “Grief Trauma and Parenting Children with Disability” (2000) 3:2 Grief Matters: The
Australian J Grief & Bereavement 27 at abstract and at 31.
526
See Woodgate, Edwards & Ripat, supra note 358.
527
See G. Thomas, supra note 43. He argued with foresight that there were insufficient supports in place for families
with disabled children.
528
Olsen, “Market”, supra note134 at 1556. I mentioned her observation in the review as it is an important one.

95
In reality, disabled children are largely enabled to realize their legal rights with, through, and by
actions taken by their mothers.529 In this sense, mothers are their disabled children’s primary advocates.
As the literature shows, there has been valuable policy research examining the support needs of mothers
with disabled children.530 This research reveals that many caregiving mothers require higher levels of
support than is presently provided by government. This finding stands in contradistinction to research
which either represents care differently, or overlooks important features of it.
Canadian critical disability research that specifically addresses burdens that arise in the setting of
care provision to disabled children has been undertaken largely in Alberta. Unfortunately, this strand of
research appears to be most interested in children with intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, autism, and
Down Syndrome, with a focus on intellectually disabled and autistic children.531 While this research
claims that it examines a diverse spectrum of childhood conditions, its omissions have significant
implications with respect to the generalizability of its findings. Not included in this research are those
children who are severely medically, psychiatrically, or neuro-developmentally disabled, but not
intellectually disabled, those who have acquired brain injury, those who have survived severe physical
trauma or have rare and/or severe genetic or orphan conditions, or any combination of these.532 The
research also omits children with complex immune conditions who are medication-emergency room- and
technology-dependent.533 Above all, paradoxically, this research is socially conservative - often lacking a
gender perspective, which in my view, is a significant research design flaw considering who in families it
is doing the primary care provision.534 This research characterizes admitted to burdens as blessings.
While researchers at the University of Alberta examining care issues exclude severely medically
disabled children535 , medical model research in a medical science paradigm conducted at the University of
Calgary has factored gender into its analyses of care burdens borne by mothers with children with medical
disabilities.536 Rather than shining a critical disability rights lens on policy, they shine a feminist and
529

As unpalatable as it may be to some strands of the disability rights movement in Canada. Qualitative research
conducted by Denise Frankoff, Katherine Runswike-Cole, Patricia McKeever and others has demonstrated this
clearly.
530
The Caledon Institute, the Roeher Institute, CanChild, the Bloorview Research Institute, and others.
531
See David McConnell et al, “Children with Disabilities and the Fabric of Everyday Life” (Edmonton: University
of Alberta, Faculty of Rehab Medicine, Family and Disability Studies Initiative, 2013) online: U of A
<http://www.fdsa.ualberta.ca/~/media/Family%20and%20Disability%20Studies%20Initiatives/Documents/FamilyLi
feReportrevised.pdf> at 7 [McConnell et al, “Fabric of Everyday Life”].
532
Orphan diseases are those that are rare, affecting very few children.
533
Such as my son has. Immune system impairments may be tied to other impairments, difficult to categorize. This
has implications for accessing state support to caregiving mothers.
534
Adding female researchers to research teams does of itself not make it feminist or even female friendly research.
535
Within critical disability studies there is tension between those of us with moderately severe or severe chronic
illnesses and those otherwise healthy disabled people. In my view, medically disabled (chronically ill or otherwise
‘sick’) children challenge the social model of childhood with disabilities.
536
See Manhas & Mitchell, “Extremes, Uncertainty, and Responsibility”, supra note199; and Kiran Manhas, The
Ethics of Transition: Human, Ethical and Legal Perspectives on Responsibility in the Move to Pediatric Home Care

96
ethics lens on support needs, along the lines of McKeever’s pioneering work.537 Consequently, their
findings are at odds with those I mention from the University of Alberta, as they identify extreme burdens
of care on mothers. The University of Calgary research points to inordinate responsibilization of
caregiving mothers and high expectations of extraordinariness in the care of children whose lives medical
research and practice has worked to save.
I argue that socially conservative, and arguably anti-feminist, strands from critical disability
advocacy advance interpretations of problems with care as though such interpretations emanate from the
social model of disability, when what they arise from is an unwitting combination of the medical and the
charity models of disability.538 For example, the views in the socially conservative Alberta research539 that
it is not primarily services that are needed, and the view that caregivers do not experience significant
stressors misconstrue reality. The view that services are not crucial, or that caregiver stress is a mere
“artifact”540 is quintessentially a charity model perspective. The charity model of disability relegates
support of disabled people to philanthropic endeavors. It raises the key question of support: if not the
state, then who? Their answer is ‘families’, when in fact, it is largely mothers. Rather than opting for the
benevolent characterizations of mothers of severely disabled children classically seen in the charity
model, more conservative critical disability theorists have engaged instead with a discredited discourse
previously emanating from the medical model of disability (psychiatry in particular). That model viewed
disability as pathology, and the child’s medical pathology was at times linked to the kind of mothering
experienced, thus mother-shaming takes place. This approach runs counter to other research from
sociology of medicine.541 These realities point to the need for a coherent and comprehensive theory of
care.
It is not only caregiving mothers who are subjected to responsibilizing caregiving discourses and
the myths that accompany them. The fact that it happens more widely reveals that it is part of a larger
political approach towards care. I argue it is particularly harsh discourse in the setting of disability. For
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ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database]; Manhas, “Sufficiency of Home-Care”, supra note 182.
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example, Janice Haaken provides a critical analysis of the supports groups Al-Anon and ACOA (Adult
Children of Alcoholics), both of which grew out of the Alcoholics Anonymous movement.542 Pointing
out that Al-Anon and ACOA were founded in the 1980’s, she adds that critical theorist Linda Gordon
observed that during politically conservative periods, familial abuse becomes couched in psychological
language, focusing on individuals as having pathology, while during times of political challenge,
structural forms of domination in society are confronted. Her point is that the contemporary codependence movement and its literature pathologizes women in relationships with alcoholics, and at the
same time fails to address women’s oppression as the socially assigned caregivers of alcoholic men, who
are, I note, disabled. Such a discourse I note creates “caregiving wives”, another group of women
relationally responsibilized for the care of disabled others.
Haaken states that the co-dependence literature depoliticizes being partnered with or raised by an
alcoholic. It is apparent that some of the bases upon which views about co-dependency fall are in the
realm of mythology, as such doing ideological work. Part of that work is the responsibilizing of wives and
mothers for something that has little or nothing to do with them, but which they are called upon socially
to support, and then criticized and constructed as dysfunctional for how they do so. Haaken further claims
that pathologizing the female psyche in the manner undertaken in the Al-Anon approach is consistent
with conservativism, and that feminists have perceived this approach to be “a retreat from feminist
consciousness”.543 Such an approach forms part of the larger project concerning the privatization of care
under neo-liberalism and I use this example because it shines a light on the process by which an
individual woman can become a caregiver through societal expectation alone. The question of rights does
not enter into it, care is assumed.
Returning to caregiving mothers, sociological research has concluded that mothers with severely
disabled children who perform complex care for them are trapped in an invisible welfare system that
involves unpaid, privatized, skilled health care.544 This clearly comprises ‘burden’ at the societal level.
This has come about, in part, because where children are concerned, overarching both the medical model
of disability and socially conservative strands of the Canadian version of the social model of disability are
a set of shared understandings about mothers, disability and care. These understandings emanate from the
same ideology in whose service these understandings take effect.545 What is in the interests of the state in
advancing the charity model is also seen in the expressed interests of some mainstream disability rights
542
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advocates who have historically argued in favour of a gender-neutral “community living” arrangement,
without adequate regard to the implications for caregiving mothers. Consequently, extraordinary burdens
of care continue to oppress those tasked with shouldering it – caregiving mothers. To better explain, I
now examine these models to show how each constructs mothers, disabled children, and responsibility for
care.
The Charity Model of Disability – Constructing Motherhood
Ecceshall states that “conservatism”546 is characterized by ‘a persistent tendency to glamourize social and
political inequalities by endowing them with an aura of righteousness.”547 In addition, conservatism
sentimentalizes inequality. Above, I commented on the social conservative tendency within disability
rights strands to deny that maternal care burdens even exist. The conservative state’s aim is likewise to
privatize health and other forms of care that are crucial to disabled children. This aim is facilitated by
patriarchy’s charitization548 of the notion of care and the passing of the burden of extraordinary care into
the hands of mothers.549 This is achieved in part by fostering a feminine caregiving ethos comprised of
religious devotion, sentimentality, romanticization and personal sacrifice, rather than focusing on the
issue of legal rights.550 I suggest that mothers internalize these oppressive ideals which form part of a
shared consciousness.551 Mothers support children with complex health care needs and take on complex
health care, in what has become an oppressive form of motherhood. It is important not to remain in the
realm of abstract theory or fairy tales. If one has been splashed with the puss and blood of one’s wheezing
and screaming child on a regular basis, one comes to understand the responsibilities very practically.
Along with that, one develops consciousness of having silently acquired carriage of such care.
The charitization of mothers by the state includes symbolic representations that serve to further
maintain the status misrecognition of mothers with severely disabled children as a legitimate source of
lifelong, free, heavy caregiving labour. British disability rights scholar, Colin Barnes, states that charities
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often fail to mention the absence of disabled people's rights in their campaigns, but he refers to one that
did in the form of a poster. The poster, from the (then) Spastics Society, bears the images of two infants,
with the wording “One has Cerebral Palsy the Other has Full Human Rights.”552 Below these words is a
description of the impairments associated with cerebral palsy, which are stated to be the reason why the
child will be treated differently, accompanied by the statement: “In an Ideal World She'd Turn to the Law.
In Reality She'll Turn to the Spastics Society.” The poster lists the areas in which the Spastics Society
provided support to the severely disabled child. Barnes’s critique rightfully draws attention to ableism,
which permits the support needs of children with severe disabilities to fall outside law. However, Barnes
neglects to mention that the caregiving work and advocacy of mothers who provide their continual
support is also omitted in the poster he describes. Nor does he mention mothers in his critique of the
charity model of disability, as it is applied to children with cerebral palsy in Britain. In fact, it is mothers
who have most often sought to advance their own and other people’s disabled children’s rights.553 The
marching mothers’ campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s provide an example of this.554 This activity has
been described as being in “the true spirit of volunteerism,” which is a gross mischaracterization because
it was rights activism and not community service the women were engaged in when marching.555 It seems
ironic that Barnes, a prominent critical disability theorist who bemoans the charity model, is himself
implicated in charitizing the care provided to disabled children. On their own, neither the medical nor the
social models have the capacity to “get at” the support rights of caregiving mothers nor as a result,
disabled children. Alternatives must be found.
In law, charity is defined as a gift given to the public for general public use.556 Legal decisions I
present show mothers protesting and contesting their roles as defined by the state through law, which is
best characterized as falling under their willing charity.557 The continued idealization and romanticization
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of the care mothers provide is characterized in the culture as both a gift bestowed upon her and a gift
given by her.558 An exemplification of this may be seen in the numerous references to a poem written by
American newspaper columnist, Erma Bombeck.559 In referring to a mother of a disabled child the author
writes: “Her patron saint will be the person looking back at her when she gazes into a mirror.”560 In this
representation the mother is heroic.561 Such representations of caregiving mothers construct the burdens
of caregiving as blessings and mothers with ‘special children’ as self-sacrificing. Many online groups
display sections of the Bombeck poem, some referring to the mother of a disabled child as Une Mère
Spéciale and La Maman Spéciale.562 Bombeck’s poem, which describes the virtuous characteristics of
mothers of disabled children, relays these traits as being the result of chosen women rising to the noble
challenge set for them by God. Surmising what God would say when allotting a disabled child to an
unsuspecting mother, Bombeck wrote, “I will permit her to see clearly the things I see - ignorance,
cruelty, prejudice - and allow her to rise above them…I will be at her side every minute of every day of
her life, because she is doing my work as surely as she is here by My side.”563 According to this narrative,
God’s work is what mothers of children with disabilities are performing, whether they want to or not.564
The Canadian institution of motherhood has also been shaped by Christian values and cultural
expectations that women devote themselves to motherhood,565 no matter the long-term personal costs.566
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Passive acceptance is apparent in Bombeck’s narrative, as is the idea that mothers have the help they need
(from God’s benevolent gaze rather than from the support of the state). This ‘feminine’ passivity is far
from the counternarrative provided by caregiving mothers in academic research and in their litigation for
support, where they state they require both support and recognition.567
The vaunted ideal of the special mother is used by Bombeck to explain the extraordinary
demands placed on and met largely by mothers as a holy assignment, and she is not alone in this
approach.568 In a discussion about Franco Carnavale’s research in the Montreal Children’s Hospital Study,
in which she was a participant, Carol Levine contests being “lauded as saintly,” stating that she equates
this with sacrifice and suffering.569 Jonathan Herring affirms that, “mothers are glorified”, noting that
“there are serious dangers with the glorification of motherhood.”570 One of these, he states, is that anyone
who does not meet the standard is seen to be a failure. He also notes that caregiving by mothers is
assumed. His insights are particularly on point in a consideration of those mothers who perform
extremely challenging forms of complex care, and who are judged harshly for all outcomes of its
performance.571
Mothers and the Medical Model of Disability
In the medical model, the person with the disability is viewed through a scientific lens and identified as
having pathology.572 Illness and disability are both seen as features that medicine ought to fix. There was
at one time a conflation of the medical meaning of the burden of disease with the notion that an ill person
is herself a burden, and those with disabilities were seen to impose burdens on their families and upon the
state. ‘Burden’ also became a term that was used in public policy. The provision of care to persons with
566
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medical conditions by family has also been referred to as a burden in the medical literature. This approach
essentialized disabled persons as being their disability. At the same time, in medicine, as in wider society
“there is a social belief that children’s needs should be met by parents, not recognizing the special burden
of complex medical care.573 However, more recently, medicine has become increasingly aware of
disability rights and some health professionals engage with disability rights discourses, including in
pediatric medicine. Furthermore, more health care professionals appear to be taking a more holistic
approach to burdens of care. Thus, I argue there are signs of a more nuanced meaning of burden of care
arriving in medicine.574 What is still missing, however, is a medical model analysis of the need for
support once disabled children leave the hospital. In neglecting to perform and act upon this analysis,
medicine implicitly depends on the care needs of the severely disabled and their caregiving mothers being
met through models of care promoted by a charity model, a model that is consistent with conservative and
patriarchal strands within disability rights.
Some medical research has examined what may be burdens to disabled children and their mothers
in the context of health care, including with respect to the burden imposed in medicine by ideas about the
normative body.575 The research team involved in the study Stress and the burden of care in families with
children commencing renal transplant therapy found their burden of care assessment to be useful in
identifying family members’ need of support in caring for their sick child.576 The researchers examined a
range of issues to find out what resources parents of medically disabled children lacked. In this care
setting, burdens related to the demands of the child’s treatment included poor housing, low income,
transportation, as well as the demands of medication administration, the requirements of the dialysis and
supplementary feeding of the child. The environment was perceived as creating potential burdens of care,
in other words, and so, burden was positioned socially.
This study included mothers in the United States and Great Britain demonstrating high levels of
stress, anxiety, and depression. Their levels were higher than those of fathers, with many mothers
exhibiting anxiety disorder. Mothers also reported higher ‘intrusion of illness’ scores than did fathers,

573

Peter et al, supra note 46 at 1635.
I would add also that medicine and public health were at the forefront of pointing the role of poverty in childhood
medical disability. For example, physicians publicly point out the role that mould in low-income housing plays in
severe chronic respiratory illnesses such as asthma, of poor people’s children. See Robin L. Nobleman, “Addressing
Access to Justice as a Social Determinant of Health” (2014) 21 Health LJ 49 at 65.
575
See Barbara Gibson & Gail Teachman, “Critical Approaches in Physical Therapy Research: Investigating the
Symbolic Value of Walking” (2012) 28:6 Physiotherapy Theory & Practice 474; and Peter Rosenbaum & J.W.
Gorter, “The Five “F” Words in Childhood Disability: I Swear This Is How We Should Think!” (2012) 38:4 Child
Care Health and Development 457.
576
Alan R. Watson, “Stress and the Burden of Care in Families with Children Commencing Renal Transplant
Therapy” (1997) 13 Advances in Peritoneal Dialysis 300, online:
<http://www.advancesinpd.com/adv97/pt5stress64-97.html>.
574

103
which the researchers found made sense, with their being the primary caregivers in most cases. Those
with a higher burden of care had higher levels of stress, anxiety, and depression.577
The drawback typically cited respecting the medical approach is that in seeking to alleviate
burdens of care, the focus tends to be on the child’s “pathology” rather than on the lack of family
supports. However, I suggest that this study, in which criteria for burdens of care were expanded beyond
those of the child’s medical condition, as is typical in the medical literature, demonstrates that some
medical research now uses wider criteria. In this research, the BCA assessment arose out of
multidisciplinary team conversations about families whose children were being admitted to the facility.
Thus I argue medical approaches may be shifting in part due to the influence of disability rights and
sociological discourses having drawn medicine’s attention to the impact of environment on health, as well
as to social determinants of health.578
Mothers and the Social Model of Disability: Contested Space
In this section, I address the social model of disability and the tensions between this model and the lived
realities of maternal care and support of severely disabled children. I hone in on a particular thread within
disability rights scholarship that is advanced through the social model, and expose gender biases apparent
within that approach. For example, to the extent that disability rights advocates have been critical of child
welfare services for disabled children, without also factoring in caregiving mothers’ need of support, the
social model becomes problematic for mothers and for their disabled children.579 In the social model,
disability is seen through the lens of a disabling social environment with little reference to medical
impairments. This model claims burden of care as a concept refutes the autonomy of disabled people.580
Critiques from the social model have shown this to be true for disabled children, whose presence has, in
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addition, been traditionally interpreted as a family tragedy.581 Few theorists researching within the social
model of disability examine care of severely disabled children in Canada. A well-known theorist who
does has argued “There is Too Much Stress on Stress.”582 In other words, the assertion is that too much
emphasis is placed on care burden in mainstream consideration of the lives of disabled children. This
point I contest. For if it is to be believed, it holds negative implications for caregiving mothers and their
disabled children. Moreover, I do not share the views of these scholars as to what does and does not
comprise caregiver burden, nor do I agree that mothers are simply ‘caregivers’. The public domain in
which “care” for children and mothers is provided is that of provincial child welfare jurisdiction, and it is
to that domain that I now turn.
Support Domain of Child Welfare
Whether one employs the social or the medical model, one cannot discuss burden and care without also
discussing the law and policy domain of child welfare. The field of child welfare also relies on
scholarship, including human rights scholarship, to theorize how disabled children are situated. Such
scholarship, to which child welfare scholars defer, stated some time ago that, “the pervasive nature of the
medical model within disability services” isolates disabled children, and that “at many levels the
awareness of children’s rights does not penetrate the world of disabled children.”583
Where coming to the attention of child welfare authorities is concerned, disabled children do
share some similarities with non-disabled children. The non-disabled children with whom they share
similarities are those described by Strong Boag, as children living with ‘adversity’.584 Their mothers as a
group are usually grossly under-resourced. The problem is that a child’s severe medical condition ought
not to be constituted as an adverse child welfare concern. It is a long-term health care issue. Related to
this, mothers’ inability to provide long term medical care ought not to be construed as her being under
resourced.
The differences that disabled children have as compared to non-disabled children in terms of
coming to the attention of authorities are manifold. One is that their caregiving mothers actively seek out
care from child welfare. Another is that disabled children are taken into care more often than are non-
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disabled children.585 Related to that, as I discuss later, disabled childrens’ entitlement to remain in the
custody of their mothers is more tenuous than for many other children (an exception to this is when their
mothers are marginalized by extreme poverty, Indigeneity, or have psychiatric586 or other disabilities).587
Child welfare services are intended to be for the dual and related purposes of support of
(primarily) mothers and for the protection of children. However, mothers who seek health care from child
welfare jurisdictions are placed under the child protection gaze. The very act of a caregiving mother
seeking care and support leads to the application of little discussed lens of health care neglect, which is
misplaced in this context (as I discuss elsewhere). This practice fits with what Melinda Giles describes as
“the social production of risk”. She states that risk has been more heavily embedded in child welfare since
1997,588 and she points out that risk-management has become the primary focus in child welfare.589 This
may help us to understand in part why the focus in disability rights has centered on risk of abuse.
Meanwhile the scholarly focus in child welfare590 has been on trying to understand the societal and
familial factors that result in “the over-representation of children with disabilities” in the child welfare
system”.591
It has been documented that in Canada disabled children are taken into state care more often than
are non-disabled children.592 A prominent researcher in the United States found that disabled children
were more often found to be neglected and abused (maltreated) by child welfare authorities.593 Some
social model theorists claim that child welfare professionals have, in an ableist manner, “constructed the
disabled child as stress”594 and this is the reason why they are more often involved in child welfare. This
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construction, it is argued by such theorists, places the blame for abuse on the disabled child, as according
to this theory, it impacts child welfare authority evaluations of maternal capacity to parent the disabled
child who has come to their attention. However, this is an inaccurate characterization of what takes place
in child welfare interventions.595 In fact, the medical model, which I argue includes child welfare, also
accounts for disabled child abuse and neglect by examining factors widely understood to lower parental
capacity to provide care.596 This is not at all the same thing as blaming the child. This is not to say that
child welfare workers are never ableist. I argue where severely disabled children are concerned it is not as
black and white as these two differing approaches would suggest.
Disability is one among the many features of family life that may be evaluated in a child
protection investigation. Parent capacity is another.597 Child welfare professionals take the position that
parents (mothers most often) must have a ‘good-enough’ ability to meet the additional needs of a disabled
child.598 What proponents of the social model consider is taking place in child welfare investigations into
‘not good enough’ care, is that disabled children considered by social workers to be ‘abuse-prone’599 are
essentially held accountable for their own abuse.600 This purported ‘cause and effect’ approach to disabled
child abuse is referred to in the social model of disability as the “dependency-stress model” of abuse,601
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seen to be an ableist fallacy. According to this model, “[c]hildren with disabilities often are considered to
be sources of family stress” and this belief is purportedly the foundation for the dependency-stress model
of abuse.602 Manders and Stoneman, referring to a proponent of this model, Alberta advocate Dick
Sobsey, state that after reviewing the literature, “Sobsey concluded that caregiver stress may have a role
in triggering discrete outbursts of abuse but is not a significant cause of maltreatment…many CPS
workers still focus on parent stress and burden.”603 If Sobsey concluded that parental stress triggers abuse,
however discretely,604 then that feature needs attention paid to it on that basis. However, the conclusion
above implies that any focus by child welfare professionals on burdens of care is misplaced, since stress
has been found not to be a significant cause of disabled child maltreatment.605 Never mind that expert
evidence on child maltreatment from child welfare would disagree with Sobsey’s conclusion.606 The way
that stress is defined, what the context is, and who is under discussion, are all relevant to care.
Maternal distress and care stressors are not a tangential issue of rights to support of caregiving
mothers with disabled children., they are central to it. If those in the field of child welfare can be
convinced that caregiving mothers exaggerate or misconstrue the nature of the stressors they report607 ,
then it is the mothers who are to be pathologized, in one manner or another. It may then be transformed
1994). Caution must be exercised in not transplanting critical disability theory about structural violence towards
disabled persons in society to the mother-child relationship.
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into an issue of whether or not she is coping and she may be served with a child protection application as
a result.
Such mothers may be seen to have internalized ableism, or to have other ‘deficits’. Either way,
mothers become the focus of attention, rather than the need to better support complex care. I argue that
this myopic approach places disabled children at risk, for example of becoming state wards.
Looking more closely at the backdrop to the debate on burdens of care, which has to do with
whether disabled children place stressors on the parent (mother), different views have been held.
According to Dick Sobsey, American authors William Friedrich and Jerry Boriskin advanced the
dependency-stress hypothesis in relation to the care of disabled children. However, what these two
graduate students state in their 1978 article is that, “[w]e are not suggesting that children with defects and
disabilities necessarily provoke abuse.” 608 What they said, as they note, was not initially articulated by
them, but by Green609 earlier in 1975, and that was that “there are four conditions necessary for abuse: a
special parent, a special child, a crisis and cultural tolerance for violence.”610 Enumerating four conditions
that can precede abuse of a disabled child by a caregiving parent is not the same thing as stating that there
is a straightforward unidirectional cause and effect process respecting maltreatment of children with
disabilities by caregiving parents.611 This is an important misconception and misarticulation transposed
from child welfare/psychology into critical disability theory. Sobsey states that the dependency/stress
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model “was based on assumption and when it was tested, it was not empirically supported. Stress and
dependency levels turned out to have little value in predicting abuse.”612
Thus, claims have been made that maternal stressors do not matter and claims have been made
that care burdens do not exist by conservative strands within critical disability theory. This is so, even in
the setting of disabled child maltreatment, where the stakes for disabled children and their mothers are
high. Advocates, such as Sobsey and some commentators writing for CCD, see instead eugenic impulses,
with the identified cultural tolerance of violence towards disabled children being expressed in private
homes at the hands of failed mothers. They do not focus on the broader issue of cultural tolerance of
violence, noted by Boriskin and Friedrich as an important feature which some disabled and indeed nondisabled mothers live with as well. A gendered lens on care would have included male violence, which I
argue includes the reframing of caregiving mother’s care burdens as personal pathology.
The literature review reveals ideological blind spots in some critical disability research. For
example, McConnell et al. 613 (with researchers Sobsey and Udistsky) report that where the care of
disabled children is concerned “heightened levels of maternal and familial distress might be expected”
and they refer to maternal depression, anxiety and stress.614 They conclude “however the absolute risk of
such negative psychological conditions may not be as high as many people think: a large majority of
mothers and families bringing up children with disabilities appear to ‘do well.’”615 Even though they
acknowledge that caregiving mothers are significantly more often depressed and anxious, they do not
consider risks for caregiving mothers. That is the blind spot. I suggest the reason for it is that they see
childhood disability care as unidirectional, rather than relational.616 In terms of the issue of whether
mothers ‘do well’, an article by Carnevale, Alexander, Davis, Rennick and Troni, appears in their end
references.617 This research however found that the lives of parents of children in their study were highly
complicated, overwhelming, involved the daily threat of death, and were characterized by financial and
other unpredictability as well as instability. This suggests that absolute risks of all kinds are high to
children and parents. To state they ‘do well’ is inaccurate.
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The fear of socially conservative child disability rights advocates appears to be that
acknowledging heavy burdens involved in caring for severely disabled children condones disability
discrimination, or that it will condone and perpetuate negative conceptions of disabled people. It does not.
Rationalizing care stressors and heavy care costs through the blanket denial of burdens, minimizing their
import and silencing overextended support-seeking caregiving mothers are attempts to downplay very
serious concerns. To do this is to engage intellectually in what psychoanalysts refer to as splitting. Having
self-consciously deployed my own reflexivity on this deeply troubling issue, I note that the word
‘splitting’ has been applied to describe an inability to assimilate positive and negative aspects into a single
coherent perspective.618 Splitting has also been explained as a psychological defense mechanism, and as
such, something that takes place unconsciously.
Mothers of all stripes have been subjected to a great deal of “all or nothing” thinking by others,
and are being subjected to it by socially conservative strands in critical disability theory as well. In
denouncing the dependency-stress model of abuse, Sobsey619 and Scorgie and Sobsey620 set up a straw
man I assume so that they can knock it down, in a manner they believe will serve the advancement of
disability rights.
Further on the subject of splitting, social model of disability research from the University of
Alberta over the past 15 years has devoted itself to pathologizing heavy burdens of care as comprising
individual caregiver failure.621 This research uses the term ‘good copers’ to describe mothers primarily.
These are mothers who meet the criteria of appropriate ‘family adjustment’ and child well-being by
referring agencies. 622 By inference there are likewise bad copers. The other framing that appears in this
research is caregiver incompetency.623 An isolated, lonely caregiving mother with a severely disabled
child is described as an example of a parent having allowed disability to take over her life, and as such,
lacking in resilience.624 It is curious that some of the same disability theorists who criticize child welfare
for constructing the disabled child as “stress”625 construct caregiving mothers in exactly the same manner.
Some disability theorists inadvertently join ranks with child welfare in placing responsibility for the
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challenges posed by support of disabled children at their mother’s feet.626 It is time to move beyond
demonizing caregiving mothers to embrace the realities of maternally complex care, which has as its
focus best interests of the disabled child.
Some researchers adopting the social model of disability in their research characterize parents of
disabled children as “predisposed” to report care burdens.627 They add that the difficulties parents report
are inappropriately emphasized in literature and research. Thus, those writing the research reports are also
faulted for reporting what they hear from caregiving parents. The socially conservative social model
proponents argue that any focus on challenges experienced by those parents providing care is unhelpful,
stating, “some researchers have suggested that a negative emphasis is misleading, not factually supported
and is even potentially dangerous.”628
To reiterate, the aim of social model of disability proponents appears directed at shutting down
the conversation respecting burdens encountered in (primarily) maternal care. In this way, some
proponents dangerously undermine the aims of disabled children’s mothers. It is also apparent that the
aim of these advocates is to redirect the discussion towards the benefits of parenting a disabled child,
which is an entirely different conversation and not the one that advocating mothers seek to remedy.
Socially conservative strands in disability rights are fond of claiming that the experience of having a
disabled child leads to a positive personal transformation in parents, as something that makes them better
people.629 Thus the primary focus of their research is on the benefits that disabled children confer on
parents. However, I agree with Knight, an Australian academic and mother of a child with an intellectual
disability, who asserts that the view “that higher psychic rewards are delivered to mothers whose
experiences are the most difficult has a disturbingly patronizing edge.”630 Harold Kushner agrees, stating,
“I am offended by those who suggest that God creates retarded children so that those around them will
learn compassion and gratitude.”631 These conversations must not be permitted to redirect a line of inquiry
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that caregiving mothers pose, which is what should the support rights of mothers with severely disabled
children be?
On the positive side, initiatives in the social model of disability scholarship generally (regardless
of political leanings - which I believe are at the heart of this discussion) are geared towards bringing about
attitudinal changes in society towards disabled children, to end stigmatizing practices and to further
inclusion. In keeping with this, the claim is made that having a disabled child is good for one’s health and
spirit, and impacts one’s quality of life favourably.632 Such approaches assert the innate positive value of
the disabled child.633
Nevertheless, the notion that emanates from critical disability discourse that carers and therefore
caregiving parents are “predisposed” to report burdens can be seen as an attempt to take agency away
from those who make claims that they experience burdens, namely caregiving mothers.634 The suggestion
is that these mothers’ claims to need support lack authenticity, or are otherwise suspect. In fact, parents
report burdens of care at different points in time, regardless of disability/non-disabled status of their
children. This is a transplantation of long-standing social model critiques of public arms-length
(institutional) caregiving relationships as oppressive into what are fundamentally private and intimate
supportive maternal-child relationships. For mothers this can be interpreted as an attempt to end the
discussion of burdens, which is a line of inquiry that is seen to threaten the hard won autonomy of
disabled people. However, no comparisons can realistically be drawn between care providers in
institutional settings, where there were profound structural forms of institutional oppression, and mothers
who perform care in the private sphere. The argument that there are power inequities between mothers
and their disabled children is likewise not applicable, because there are power differentials between all
parents and all children.635 If properly exercised, this power is used to advance children’s best interests.636
This is all the more the case with respect to a severely disabled child, heavily reliant on his or her
mother’s care, in ways a typical child is not. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s discussion of the debates
within the disability community pertaining to the asymmetry in carer and care-receiver relationships, and
the problematic implications of that in terms of power dynamics likewise has no application to mothers.
Garland Thomson comments that circumstances of disability itself require interdependency, not
asymmetry, and she explains that the need of assistance must be included in conversations about rights. I
632
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agree. However, where caregiving mothers are concerned, asymmetry is, as noted already, built into the
relationship. For example, children are not legally independent.637 Where there are children with severe
disabilities, that asymmetry may be extreme.638
Interestingly, Martha Fineman639 has argued that in present legal conceptualizations, mothers are
assumed to be in an adversarial position to their children, something that may also cast a shadow over
how mothers’ complaints about burdens are viewed.640 The presumption of an adversarial relationship
existing between caregiving mother and severely disabled child is highly prejudicial. Research finding
that caring for disabled children confers benefits on caregiver (parent) needs to be examined closely.641
Mothers know intimately what the benefits of mothering disabled children are. Why must we keep
funding research to examine what is already a given? That such research gets funded should be no
surprise; idealization of maternally complex care fits neatly with the state’s own representations of care
for the disabled and those who are to provide it. This idealization or myth has to do with mothers,
ableism, and gender.
Conceptions of ideal motherhood and disability
American feminist legal scholar Dorothy Roberts, alternately theorizing mothers, racism, and gender,
argues that since the ideal mother is white, the black mother is devalued. She is thus perceived as
undeserving.642 In a similar vein, since the ideal mother has non-disabled children, socially conservative
approaches to disability care, meshing as they do with the interests of the privatizing state, seek to
construct the ideal mother as one willing to collapse her identity into that of the generic caregiver. When
she refuses, such as when she makes demands for support upon the state, she is seen to exaggerate her
needs. On that basis, she must be ignored or pathologized. However, the Canadian legal databases reveal
that caregiving mothers are unwilling to accept this construction of who they are and what they do. Rather
than accepting it, they have chosen to litigate to try to get the support they and their disabled children
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need. However, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, the idealization of mothers with disabled children
makes its way into the text of legal decisions, and it is for this reason that such myths must be exposed.
Confronting the Uncomfortable Truths
It is a difficult reality that the care required for severely disabled children is not only onerous, but that is
can also be costly. This truth must be confronted before mothers and their severely disabled children’s
legal rights to support can be met. Social workers in child welfare jurisdictions are faced with these
realities, however critical disability theorists writing on social work have tended to focus on disabled
child maltreatment.643 That is one uncomfortable truth, but only one of many.
Those who claim that there are not significant burdens of care in respect of children with severe
disabilities fail to appreciate the extent to which gender discrimination is bound to disability
discrimination.644 This failure to appreciate is an enactment of Freire’s culture of silence. Historically,
many disability rights advocates advising on childhood disability policy across Canada have been white,
middle-class career-men. Where this is the case advice on care policy has been given by those with ‘careprivilege’.645 That is to say by individuals who have not had primary responsibility for complex forms of
care in the conglomerate assigned to them socially.646 Meanwhile legal advocacy concerning policy in
this area is largely undertaken mostly by women (mothers). And although Canadian society, like many
other societies, deems the care of severely disabled children to be women’s work,647 mothers have been
reprimanded for providing their opinions. At least as far back as 1973, female disability advocates who
were also mothers complained about male disability advocates’ efforts to censure their views.648 Audrey
Cole, who last year on behalf of her son brought an important disability case at the Ontario Human Rights
Commission, reported to a disability studies professor, Melanie Panitch, that in the early days of the
movement, male leaders in the Association for the Mentally Retarded told her she was obsessed with law
and order, as if that was a bad thing. Apparently, for the mother of a severely disabled child, it was. In her
presentation on litigating against “the Deaf Irish State”, Anna Kingston argues that what litigating
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caregiving mothers say is filtered through ears deaf to mothers. The night-watchman state649 also silences
mothers of disabled children, refusing to hear their demands. One example of this can be heard in Ontario
former MPP, mother of a disabled son, Ontario’s first patient ombudsman, and now Provincial Minister
of Health Christine Elliot’s past many demands of the province to strike a select committee to examine
supports for parents caring for disabled adult children at home. In her plea to parliament to get on with the
business of striking this committee, Elliot said “Mr. Speaker, The Minister and members of this
government cannot continue to hide behind this charade.” 650
The caregiver critique emanating from critical disability studies and the state’s refusal to “hear”
about burdens of care and need of support compound the burdens that caregiving mothers already
shoulder. The culture of silence and censure adds to the challenges mothers face when trying to advance
their right to support. However, as I argue, caregiving mothers, immersed as they are in complex forms of
oppression “can identify the special garb worn by cultural silence in society, to use Freire’s own
language.651 The garb is denial of the work complex forms of care entails.
As noted above, prior to the advent of the social model of disability, the medical model held
sway, characterizing the disabled child as being a burden. Although the notion of the disabled child as a
burden has been largely eroded652 for a quarter of a century,653 and although it has been made clear in the
literature from the early 1990s onwards that what actually burdens mothers is a lack of support, some
disability scholars persist in portraying mothers and the professionals who work with them who also
claim there are burdens, as blaming the child for their disability and the care the child requires.654
Labeling mothers as ableist actors is another silencing tactic. I argue that this is partially the strategy of a
political agenda which aims to make disability and medical care, no matter how onerous or how
distressing, something to be provided by mothers. It has been pointed out that advancing the rights of the
649

See Sawer, supra note 278.
Christine Elliott, “Christine Elliott Demands Answers for Select Committee Delay” (19 September 2013) online:
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFD4-szRW34>. She later posted the ensuing Select Committee on
Developmental Services Interim Report (Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Toronto, 2014) online:
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/committee-proceedings/committee-reports/files_html/INTERIMREPORTENG-Final.htm>
[Select Committee, Interim Report], to her website.
651
Freire [Education] supra note 133 at ix.
652
The notion of the disabled child as a burden has been retained in immigration policy in Canada however. It has
long been a basis upon which Citizenship and Immigration could refuse admissibility of disabled children, with the
government view being that disabled children’s needs place excessive demand of the health and social service
system. See the newsreport “Disabled Child Immigration Decision Reserved” CBC News (23 Feb 2010) online:
CBC News, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/disabled-child-immigration-decision-reserved-1.901172>.
Since I stopped conducting research, I have learned that this issue is now being reviewed.
653
See Maureen O. Marcenko & Judith C. Meyers, “Mothers of Children with Developmental Disabilities: Who
Shares the Burden?” (1991) 40:2 Family Relations 186, stated that it was not realistic to expect women continue in
the role of primary caregivers to disabled children as a direct result of the inevitable ‘personal sacrifice’ this would
entail without their obtaining services and supports. See also the work of Sarah Green, supra note 461, which
likewise addresses “burdens’ to mothers as not being the child or the child’s disability.
654
For discussions of this phenomenon see McLaughlin, supra note 246; and Priestly, supra note 443.
650

116
child has been done at the expense of their mothers.655 It also has to be pointed out that mothers of
disabled children experience forms of maternal oppression in different ways than do the mothers of
children who do not have disabilities.656 Thus it is not simply “mother’s rights” that are the problem. The
situation is more complex than that alone would suggest.
The failure to recognize unique burdens of care and address them openly in the above-noted
research places disabled children at risk of harm inside families and moreover, at risk of
institutionalization.657 These are the very things those enamoured of the social model of disability claim to
be concerned about.658 For example, the answer to the research question posed by McConnell et al, “What
factors influence family attitudes towards out of home placement?” was in part, “Parents are unlikely ever
to consider placement as an option for their disabled child if their daily routine is fitted to the local
ecology and family resource-base, and congruent with their values and goals, and with the needs, interests
and competences of individual family members.”659 This statement flies directly in the face of what
family law litigation, social benefit litigation and child welfare litigation cases tell us, which is that even
well-resourced, dedicated and highly competent mothers require more support than they get. This
statement also flies in the face of what the Ontario Ombudsman found in his investigations into custody
loss and placement of children with disabilities in Ontario.
The situation of Kristine Gravel McKeague in Ottawa also illustrates the error in the McConnell
et al research finding. McKeague was a well-resourced infant massage therapist, social service worker,
home birth advocate, disability advocate and experienced mother, in an intact middle-class marriage with
an involved spouse. She sought out-of-home placement for her severely disabled daughter and had to go
to the press to get it because Ontario refused to provide it unless she relinquished custody of her baby girl.
Many caregiving mothers have no resource base whatsoever, or have only a narrow one. For these
mothers, the reality is that out-of-home placement remains their only option unless services and supports
are made available to prevent it. Burdens of care cannot be explained away or silenced through womenblaming discourses or general references to a mother’s ecology and resource bases.
Conclusions such as the one that ‘parents’ will not consider placement for disabled children if
their daily routine is fitted to the local ecology and family resource-base, and congruent with their values
and goals, and with the needs, interests and competences of individual family members, qualifies by
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definition as ‘conservative pressure’. After all, whose “daily routine” are they referring to? Not a single
or divorced mother surely. On a positive note, conservative pressure, such as the above comments, can be
seen as forming part of a dialect in tension with the process of consciousness-raising, as described by
Montero.660
To close the discussion of caregiving mothers in the social model of disability, attention must be
drawn to a final irony. It is that the disability rights movement chose the slogan “Nothing about us
without us” but seems not to appreciate, when dealing with caregiving mothers’ claims to support, that
“Nothing about us without us” is a two-way street. The interests and perspectives of caregiving mothers
matter a great deal in policy discussions because it is they who perform the majority of care. The social
model is limited because it seeks primarily to articulate avenues to autonomy of disabled persons.
Considering the support needs of caregiving mothers as integral to improving the lives of disabled
persons troubles this endeavour, an endeavour founded on a masculine ideal of autonomy, itself an
unsuitable vehicle for the advancement of the rights of the severely disabled child. More than merely
limited however, the social model of disability is violent in its articulation and expression. It is to the
issue of violence that this review now turns. This is particularly poignant in that disability rights advocacy
has likewise focused on institutional violence in the past.
Violence in Models of Disability
Above, I have argued that the medical model of disability, against which the social model came into
being, has started to evolve and transform. I have described too the charity model of disability, as one
relying on the philanthropic private support of disability, and a problem for caregiving mothers
themselves in need of support. I also critiqued the social model of disability in the context of maternally
complex burdens of care. In this section, I ready the reader for a fourth approach, which is a model of care
capable of accounting for burdens borne by mothers with severely disabled children in domains where
they lack rights to support. Here, I argue that expectations placed on mothers that arise in the charity
model and conservative threads in the social model share a socially violent streak, in particular for
modest, low or no income families, and sole-support mothers with disabled children. It is violent to place
social expectations on mothers to provide onerous forms of care without also providing a salary, pension,
time off, the ability to save money, and health benefits. It is emotionally and socially violent to siblings of
severely disabled children, who are deprived of adequate time and attention from their caregiving mother
or who may worry constantly about their family members. These latter features are the underbelly of care.
Iris Young and Paolo Freire both describe violence as an aspect of oppression. Freire believed all
relationships of exploitation, domination, oppression, “whether or not violence is expressed by drastic
660
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means” to be violent.661 In this vein, it is apparent that violence against mothers with disabled children
takes many forms, and I have already mentioned some of them. Another form may be witnessed where
mothers seek support through public and private law, as I describe below. I have already addressed that
when mothers do not live up to extraordinary expectations, mother-blame takes place, which is a form of
social violence.662
Violence has been conceptualized in a variety of different ways and occurs in a various ways. If
the lens through which a disability advocate views the world is a eugenic one, centered on the belief that
non-disabled people want disabled people dead, that belief colours their interpretation of events
respecting mothers with disabled children.663 It is violent to accuse a sole-support mother of wanting her
disabled child dead. If beliefs are socially conservative, such that mothers must be the ones to provide
full-time care, that, too, colours interpretation of expectations of support and interpretations of tragic
outcomes involving mothers with disabled children. Requiring one gender to provide all of the disability
care is oppressive, and oppression is a form of violence. The mix of these two belief systems, eugenicism
and social conservatism, creates a hostile environment for women who have severely disabled children
and who have unmet requirements for state supports.
In discussing the 1999 death of an autistic child in his under-resourced, overwhelmed, and
depressed lone mother’s full-time care, a commentator writing for the Council of Canadians with
Disabilities (CCD) accused Danielle Blais of wanting her six-year old son, Charles, dead.664 This
subjective view then becomes conflated with criminal standards having been satisfied, when they have
not. In writing about the Blais case, Joe Woodward concluded that, “The Canadian legal
establishment…has apparently given up on Aristotelian theories of justice.”665 Upon killing her disabled
son Charles, and slashing both of her wrists in a suicide attempt, Blais was charged with first-degree
murder, arrested, and put in prison, pending her trial. Initially, the Crown sought a three-year term of
661
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incarceration, to “indicate the lives of the handicapped are just as valuable as the lives of others.”666 The
issue of disability rights was not ignored in the proceedings. Blais was evaluated by three psychiatrists,
who decided that she was psychiatrically disabled. The court ordered that after her suspended sentence
ended, Blais was to attend at a treatment centre to be followed by three years of probation during which
she had to meet with psychiatrists and a psychologist on a regular basis.667 Nevertheless, some members
of the disability community perceived Blais to have “gotten away with” killing her young son and were
angry that she was not found guilty of murder. No one talked about Blais’s lack of support. The salient
point is that without the required support that both mother and son needed and that no one wanted to
know about, their relationship ended, and it did so tragically.
Disability advocates who argue that caregiving mothers wish their children dead, do so echoing
the thought of Bruno Bettleheim, whose discredited interpretations of mothering disabled children still
cast a dark shadow in discussions of mothers of disabled children. Bettleheim held bizarre beliefs
respecting the “mother’s wish that her child did not exist.”668 In the aftermath of the drowning of six yearold Charles by his mother, Danielle Blais, a CCD advocate wrote that the unmet service needs of disabled
people were always an issue, “a very important issue for the living. However, we must be very vigilant
when we relate that issue to the murder of people with disabilities, such as Latimer, Wilkieson, Blais, or
Baker, that we do not allow the possibility of anyone misunderstanding the need for services as justifying
the murder in any way or degree.669 A more useful approach is to examine cases where care has broken
down, rather than at the point where parent capacity has sunk too low, and then determine what supports
would have made a difference. In the Blais’ case, the Catholic ‘special needs’ school Charles attended,
the Quebec social service system (on whom public criticism also fell) and the Quebec Autism Society
were aware that Danielle needed much higher levels of support. A comment incongruent with the tenor of
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the rest of this damning piece by CCD is that “CCD’s member organization COPHAN670 informed the
Quebec government a year ago that it was putting children with disabilities at risk.”671
Quebec disability advocates seemed to have had no difficulty connecting the dots between
supports and maternal-disabled-child wellbeing. However, little seems to have changed. In 2003, four
years after the death of Charles Blais and his mother’s attempted suicide, a Montreal newspaper reported
on Michele Drapeau, another desperate caregiving mother. She was interviewed about the two-year wait
for her severely disabled son to receive provincial care. His physicians agreed he was too disabled to be
cared for by her at home, and that his being placed in a hospital was an unacceptable alternative, but
necessary under the circumstances. Drapeau is quoted as stating, “We don’t know where to turn …Did
they think it was humanly possible to stay up all day and all night caring for someone?” adding that
Quebec paid out $300 for her son’s homecare.672 Her case stands as an example of a woman’s life without
a right to disability care and support.
In CCD online discussions concerning the death of Charles Blais, there was no focus on the fact
that his father had abandoned him. There is no corresponding discourse of father-blame in the setting of
childhood disability care, except in the notorious Latimer case, in which Robert Latimer killed his
disabled daughter, Tracy.673 The missing father played a role in Charles Blais’s death that ultra
conservative organizations such as Fathers For Life chose not to explore with the same vitriol in their
condemnation of Danielle Blais.674
Psychiatrist and neurologist Mark Palermo states that in the setting of the murders of children
with autism, what he calls the “normal” stress in looking after a child is enhanced knowing that there may
be little change in behaviours and by the difficulties of raising a disabled child, and, he asserts “by the not
insignificant fact that child care personnel willing to care for an autistic child are hard to find.”675 For
many mothers costs of care are a significant issue. Palermo’s views do not accord with those of socially
conservative disability rights advocates. Regarding CCD, which is the voice of Canadian disability rights
advocate, the Disabled Women’s Network of Canada once stated, “we find ourselves at odds with this
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very patriarchal model of a group … Discrimination against and ignorance of feminist principles is
systemic and I think we must continue to fight where it is necessary.”676
Clearly the intersection of gender and disability demands greater attention. The ground on which
to fight is that of interpretation of what is clearly being understood outside and inside the disability
community as being women’s work.
I conclude this section with the comment that the charity and social model approaches to care
support for disabled children do the same thing, but in different ways. In keeping with what Knight
insightfully articulated, both models represent disabled children as “intrinsically more valuable” than nondisabled children and do so in “a self-conscious conversation of socio-cultural messages to the
contrary.”677 However, where the charity model places mothers with disabled children on a pedestal, the
social model shoves these mothers off it. Both approaches are emblematic of status misrecognition. In
order to move past misrecognition to recognition, there needs to be a fulsome comprehension in law and
policy of the entire range of care burdens. This can only be arrived at through a model of childhood
disability that is fully inclusive of mothers, with a view to their co-existing legal right to support. It is to
this model, which is a model of maternally complex care, which I now turn.
The Combined Approach – A Relational and Non-Adversarial Model of Care
The combined approach to understanding care in the setting of severe disability in childhood is both
contextual and relational. The relational aspect distinguishes it from other approaches. It includes aspects
of the social and medical models of disability, but also accounts for mothers’ embodied and other
experiences of providing care.678
After discussing the combined approach, I examine the Supreme Court of Canada litigation in
Eve, which sheds light on reasons why a new approach is required to situate the support needs of mothers
with severely disabled children who state they do not want to provide care beyond a certain point.
Critiques of Eve include the absence of a relational approach in the application of law to the support needs
of Mrs. E. and Eve. Examining disability through intersecting statuses and reviewing qualitative research
676
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from over the past fifty years, Green, Darling & Wilbers suggest that a combined approach is required to
fully account for the needs of mothers with disabled children. Mothers, they point out, especially those
whose children have complex health care needs, do not reside in the realm of theory, but rather in medical
and other milieus. In their research, mothers were found to draw on the medical and social models in their
development of ‘counternarratives’ to societies’ perceptions of them and their children.679 These
counternarratives have been in existence for some time. Margaret Newman, mentioned previously, quotes
from an interview with the mother of a disabled child who died, who reported that the death was a “very
profound experience and changed my life dramatically.”680 The mother stated that this experience
changed how she related to others and her understanding of the world. She says it best when she remarks,
“what happened to me was a very deep, very intimate, very powerful experience” 681 This remark
challenges the tragedy presentation critical disability theorists state has dominated discussions during the
period that the interview occurred. It does so by introducing the as yet under-examined existential aspect
to maternally complex care, which is much more powerful than a narrow “tragedy” lens. The practice of
drawing on established models of disability by offering different explanations in their development of
counternarratives is indicative of mothers problematizing their experiences in relation to medicine,
culture, and disability theory based on experience.682 In so doing, they arrive at new narratives, based on
their knowledge, something that also supports standpoint theory’s claim that a feminist epistemology
comes from somewhere specific.
Green points out that historically, mainstream scholarship has focused on emotional burdens,
observing that it has disregarded “burdens imposed by negative public attitudes toward disability and
inadequate support for the expensive and time-consuming task of caring for a child with special needs.”683
To deal with the complexities presented by care, in her combined approach Green breaks burdens down
into those subjective and objective. Objective burdens include stress that is related to the care of the child,
as well as financial problems, the lower ability to pursue friendships, and high energy spent seeking
services.684 A major finding in joint research by Green, Darling & Wilbers was that mothers state they are
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burdened by “daily hassles of caregiving” as opposed to emotional distress.685 The latter falls under the
category of subjective burden in Green’s own typology.686
Sabzevari et al studied burden of care in mothers with children with congenital heart disease in
687

Iran.

They describe children with serious health conditions, with medical complications, such as

frequent hospitalizations, infections, dental problems and surgeries, similar to children elsewhere
requiring complex forms of care. Their research found that mothers carry “catastrophic” burdens of care,
and largely do so alone. Mothers devoted themselves to care, but relayed the difficult realities of such
care.688
Green, Darling & Wilber’s research is a major contribution to the examination of such burdens of
care for mothers. Burdens of care are complex, and may vary from one mother to another, depending on a
variety of factors, and many burdens of care have both subjective and objective features. Building on their
insights, I suggest that there is a range of political, legal, and social burdens of care. These impact
mothers and disabled children differently, depending on a combination of different variables, like class
and marital status. An example of a political burden of care is loss experienced through policy leading to
state custody of one’s disabled child. As a burden, loss has profound objective and subjective aspects.689
Saetersdal, an academic and mother of a severely disabled child, complains that the discourse of
normalization disallows the expression of suffering regarding having a disabled child.690 Her criticism
might equally be levelled at critical disability discourses, which insist that expressions of maternal
suffering per se are a reflection of ableism.691
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A little- addressed burden of care is the context where a child is violent. Stacey Clifford
Simplican describes mothers’ experiences with violent children as silenced in the field of disability
caregiving. Quoting another mother, Anne Bauer, Simplican states, “[w]e cannot solve this problem [of
violence] by hiding it, the way handicapped children themselves used to be tucked away in cellars.”692
Bauer’s comment underscores the point that the circumstances of mothers with disabled children may be
medically complex, physically challenging, dangerous, and emotionally difficult. It also points to the
presence of forms of care that are “conflictual”.693 Simplican states that a feminist disability theory should
respond to violence endured by caregiving mothers, while also resisting ableist norms.694 What has not
been addressed, that I will get to, is that these circumstances (burdens), to the extent that they are borne
by primarily mothers, are legally problematic.
Should a mother seek state support, there is also a burden of regulation, and this may lead to the
burden of legal disputes in both public and private law. Being surveilled and needing to engage in a
dispute respecting support is both subjectively and objectively burdensome. Yet another burden is that of
invisibility, as mothers are often invisible in discussions about childhood disability.695
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The study of burdens of care is immensely useful because it shows us where mothers and disabled
children require support. Green’s approach is relevant to any discussion of legal rights to support for
mothers with severely disabled children.696 Importantly, Green, Darling & Wilbers comment on
paradoxes that exist in mothering disabled children, where heavy care burdens may coexist with positive
features of relationships with disabled children.697 Neither the charity nor the social model is capable of
accommodating these paradoxes. The combined approach, as a model of care, accounts for the realities of
severe impairments and maternal love and appreciation of one’s child, making clear that the presence of
one in no way precludes recognition of the other. Those researching in this area must be able to hold these
features simultaneously, without fear of conflating the need for vastly higher levels of state support with
rejection of the disabled child or a failed mother. These conflations are oppressive and wrongheaded. In
their articulation, they have been violent.
Green and Green et al’s approaches do not focus on what benefits disabled children confer on
caregiving mothers, rather they ask how the relationship of severely disabled children and their mothers
can best be supported. The combined approach to disability care is the only one that moves beyond the
charitized approach, where mothers provide complex, often medically-oriented care, at great personal
cost. In order to illustrate the point of a charitized mother and private care burden, I now discuss a
Supreme Court of Canada disability rights case wherein the court’s vision of disability support
completely lost sight of the caregiving mother’s rights and personhood and an aspect of the disabled girl’s
humanity.
Going Judicial – The Legal Turn Among Caregiving Mothers
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E. (Mrs.) v Eve is a well-known disability rights case that illustrates law’s coercive arm ensuring mothers
assume care, even when it is inappropriate for them to do so, and even where a mother initiated the action
to avoid having to assume care for an additional generation. Eve699 thus exposes problems with
responsibilization that mothers700 with disabled children share when they come before courts in matters
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concerning their disabled children. The facts of this case are as follows. The late Mrs. E. objected to the
possibility of becoming a custodial grandmother during the last years of her life, in spite of the benefits
she had enjoyed caring for her adult daughter Eve, who had an intellectual disability and who was not
decisionally capable.701 Once when Eve had expressed interest in a young man, the then almost 60-yearold Mrs. E became concerned about Eve becoming pregnant, becoming a mother and of she (Mrs. E.),
having to raise Eve’s child. As a result of these concerns, Mrs. E. asked a doctor to perform a tubal
ligation on Eve. A referral was made by the family doctor to a surgeon, with the surgeon stating he could
not perform the procedure without a court order giving him the authority to do so. Mrs. E subsequently
sought an order to declare Eve incompetent pursuant to the Mental Health Act, so that she, Mrs. E. could
be the decision maker respecting Eve and be permitted to consent on Eve’s behalf. 702 The judge rejected
Mrs. E’s request to become a substitute decision maker for Eve, and Mrs. E appealed to the Prince
Edward Island Court of Appeal.703 There, the ruling in the Family Division was overturned. The appellate
judges concluded that enough evidence had been adduced to allow the court, exercising its parens patriae
jurisdiction, to consent to the procedure on behalf on Eve. The court determined it to be in Eve’s best
interests to be sterilized.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada did not agree.704 The Court, opining that a surgical
procedure without consent constituted battery, held that sterilization ought not to be authorized for nontherapeutic purposes under the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, as it was not in Eve’s best interests.
The court found that the fact that others may suffer inconvenience or hardship should Eve have a child
cannot be considered in such a determination.705
This finding sits at the heart of the conundrum of Eve. The Supreme Court of Canada grappled
with the best interests test, stating that its duty to protect the vulnerable must not become a duty to choose
between two rights at the behest of a third party.706 The court seemed not to appreciate the degree to
which Mrs. E was also vulnerable as an older single widow unable to provide further care and being
denied the choice to protect herself against that possibility. It is unclear whether Mrs. E truly was a “third
party” in the sense that word is ordinarily used in law. If Eve had a child, child welfare authorities would
be looking to Mrs. E to put forward a plan of care. In such a case, Mrs. E would be a legal party to such
an arrangement.
701
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Although expressing sympathy for Mrs. E.’s position (something previously expressed in the
lower court) that the operation being performed would reduce her “anxiety that Eve might become
pregnant, and give birth to a child, the responsibility for whom would probably fall on Mrs. E.”, the Court
opined that the procedure was for non-therapeutic reasons.707 It is interesting that the Supreme Court
chose to use the word “anxiety” when setting out the potential grandmother’s largely excluded position.
Anxiety is an emotional state of unease, and the courts’ stated sympathy for her was an expression of an
emotional position (sympathy). Caregiving mothers’ burdens of care are not only emotional (or
subjective), as social model advocates suggest in dismissing their concerns as reflective of ableism. Mrs.
E. may or may not have had anxiety, but her legal position was founded in rational concerns about the
threat of further care obligations, which for her, would comprise coercive care. She was also concerned
about her newly sexually aware daughter in a very ordinary way.708
There were three intervenors in Eve, one was the Consumer Advisory Committee of the Canadian
Association for the Mentally Retarded.709 The stated goal of the Advisory Committee in advancing Eve’s
legal rights was to protect Eve from “the biased interests of care-givers.”710 As noted previously, this
language respecting a caregiving mother reflects the transplantation to caregiving mothers of critiques
from disability rights respecting public caregiver failures to act in the interests of those with disabilities.
Ultimately, Mrs. E. found herself in the position of litigating against her own daughter, having realized
that society was content to have her bear the risk of (harm) having to care for Eve as well as any child
Eve might have until her (Mrs. E.’s) death (unless she was prepared to allow child welfare to take Eve’s
child into state care).711 She was not free to plan for retirement. Mrs. E. did not want the responsibility of
a baby and she cannot be faulted for that, although apparently she was.712
The disability rights community chose not to address the risks of adoption or institutionalization
of Eve’s potential child. Olesen observes that law is not responsive to the needs of ‘families’ (mothers,
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primarily) with whom intellectually disabled persons most often reside.713 In denying Mrs. E’s application
to allow her to consent on Eve’s behalf, the trial judge failed to support Mrs. E.’s autonomy by
responsibilizing her for the care of another adult’s child, even as an unwilling senior.
The court also, one assumes, inadvertently failed to support one of Eve’s other interests, that of
her mother’s economic and physical well-being, especially considering the level of Eve’s dependency on
her mother and her mother’s advancing age. 714 Eve’s interests as framed by disability advocates
jeopardized Eve’s significant interest in having her mother stay well and capable of playing a role in her
life. A full contextual analysis is missing in the Supreme Court of Canada decision and my comments are
designed to fill this omission.
The appellate court, which had overturned Justice McQuaid’s family division decision, gave
weight to the mother’s affidavit evidence that it would be in both her and her daughter’s interests for Eve
to have the procedure. There, relational interests prevailed. That court stated succinctly, “She is a widow,
approaching sixty years of age, and would inevitably be left with the care of any child which might be
born. She feels that, at her age, this would be a responsibility with which she would have great difficulty
coping, and quite understandably so.”715
Interestingly, the Eve case has been seen and taught as a “win” for disability rights.716 The right of
60 year-old Mrs. E. not to be put in loco parentis, at a time when she would be an older adult still
713
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caregiving for her daughter on weekends and holidays as it was, was simply not recognized by the court.
Some years after the decision however, former Supreme Court of Canada Justice, Bertha Wilson, stated in
a paper on the constitutional protection of privacy in regards to the finding in Eve that, “the finding that
the interests of care-givers are to be disregarded obviously has problematic consequences for women.
Since it is primarily women who carry the burden in our society of child rearing, it would likely be a
woman and not a man who would be responsible for rearing the child of a woman like Eve.”717
Eve’s mother’s rights ought to include the right not be forced unwillingly into lifetime maternal
caregiving to another person’s child (regardless of her relationship to that child). The absence of a legal
term for the expectation that a woman must do so can be easily remedied. It is a form of involuntary
domestic servitude. The servitude aspect of it is hidden within the word “mother”, where it has no place.
In keeping with the former Justice Wilson’s viewpoint expressed in this same paper, we must adapt
doctrine to accord with contemporary reality.
Vanhala states that Eve was part of a larger shift towards a disability rights model,718 a model that
evidently does not serve single mothers.719 Mrs. E. had become conscious of the legal complexity in her
and her daughters’ joint circumstances. She was strong enough to see her claim through and to endure
vilification. Eve teaches us that, in law, mothers with disabled children forgo full legal personhood, even
mother. It concerned therefore a senior who had cared for a much-loved disabled daughter and who was alert to the
fact that she could not care for another child. Whether she ‘could’ do so was one issue. The other salient issue was
that she did not want to. The section in which Rioux and Patton’s essay appears called “Ensuring Equality” omits an
analysis that equality and the autonomy it promises, is for all, including women with adult disabled children. The
case of Eve provides an example of the disappearing of women’s rights in some disability advocacy and it is sexist
in its basic assumptions about the legal rights of Mrs. E. Eve challenges us to consider that the realization of
disability rights involves more theorization where women and children and care are concerned.
717
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as others are publicly asserting their related rights. In this context, problems with maternal personhood
occur not only in civil litigation about decisional capacity, but also in family and child welfare law, as
well as in social benefits litigation.720 Nisrine Mansour states that “at the judicial level women’s legal
personhood is blurred in both legal texts and judicial practice”, and the Eve decision supports her
insight.721 This is because the disability rights model, like that of law in general, struggles with justice
concerns where there are mothers and children with what are fundamentally relational rights. The
relational nature of these rights was captured in a narrative published in 1994 by an Alberta mother,
Donna Haslam, in an account of how her burdens of care were impacting on her. In “Public Policy that is
hazardous to women’s health: Privatization and long term care,” she was not extolling the joys of
mothering, features that are private and to which she alludes. Rather, she wrote to expose the oppression
that she experienced. I argue that she did so to break the culture of silence, which Freire states cements
social myths.
Haslam wrote about the difficulty in finding residential care while providing care at home. She
described her decision to find state care during the late 1960s as being “painful.” She described long wait
lists and a lawyer’s letter to Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed to access a placement. She describes herself
as someone “teetering on the edge of emotional exhaustion.” The latter was due to the lack of services for
her daughter’s care.
Haslam, whose ponderings suggest transformed awareness of her circumstances, stated, “I’ve also
been haunted by the phantoms of motherhood and of community living. It’s time to let go of these
illusions. Giving birth does not chain me to lifelong responsibility for my beautiful daughter and there is
no existing community that can provide the care that Karen requires.”722 Her statement likewise suggests
new found critical conscious insight which she felt compelled to share publicly. She added that women
are pushed to the limits of endurance and cannot “be expected to carry excessive burdens of responsibility
in caring for loved ones in our homes. We need to move toward social care and shared responsibility.
Neither can we be expected to place them in large crowded institutions nor in private homes and agencies
with public funds.”723
Haslam’s narrative speaks of love and excessive responsibility. She refers to the experience of
social abuse, which corresponds to the social violence against mothers and their severely disabled
720
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children. I include her story because it was written over twenty years ago, yet situations remain dire for
many caregiving mothers whose children require a range of such supports. Haslam moves on to address
shared responsibility for providing care to severely disabled children, something a mixed model of
childhood disability supports. That responsibility must be found in law. Yet, when one looks to the
current law, one sees it is ill-suited to the task of supporting caregiving mothers with severely disabled
children.
My various discussions in this chapter concerning the characterization of care by the state and
others and the different ideological orientations towards it are central to my dissertation. They illustrate
the many ways in which mothers of all ages have been heavily responsibilized for many forms of
disability care from different quarters, with no regard paid to the impacts of that on their and their
disabled children’s social or economic survival. However as seen in the scholarly writing of Green and
Haslam as well as the legal case brought by Mrs. E, caregiving mothers over a lengthy period have not
accepted the political and legal status quo, which assigns mothers risky forms of long-term care.
In Chapters Six and Seven, I illustrate how mothers have tried, in their use of law, to shake off
their having been thus responsibilized. Before I do that, I set out the law and policy landscape they must
struggle with in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Legal Landscape
Introduction
Support law does not exist in a vacuum, but rather in historical, political, and cultural contexts. Dominant
representations of care discussed in the previous chapter are translated into law through mechanisms of
governance.724 How dominant representations are translated into law is complex, much analysis of which
is beyond the scope of my project. Here, I aim simply to provide a backdrop to Canadian policy and its
adjudication sufficient to give context to legal analyses that follow.
Given the complex features of the disability policy involved, it is apt that presenting policy in a
coherent manner proves to be a challenge. It is not only that Canadian childhood disability policy is
complex; it is also difficult to access and not easy to understand. In addition, there are perplexing features
to such policy with no means to address them. Thus, disability support policy is shrouded in mystery. In
order to present a picture of the kind of supports on offer, first, I describe the federal/provincial division
of powers and constitutional jurisdiction as it pertains to disability, and move on from there to critique
approaches to it. Subsequently, I describe the system that deals with legal issues that arise in these areas.
After this, I discuss two benefits the state provides: homecare and respite. I present Ontario as a case
study, filtered through the lens of my own standpoint. I end this chapter with a description of private
support. This is important because private supports interact with public supports and because law and
cases in this area are informative on the matter of support overall.
First though, a comment on where childhood disability policy rests in terms of ‘importance’ in the
overall policy landscape. My review described how disability policy concerning disabled children lacks
national focus or, indeed, interest.725 It also showed that policy has kept pace neither with developments
in medicine nor in society. Yet child medical disability policy is on national radars elsewhere.
In the US in 2000, funding was made available for a National Survey of Children with Special Health
Care Needs in order to evaluate the prevalence and effects of conditions on children and their families.726
The goal was to improve their circumstances.727 In the same timeframe, the Ontario government stopped
entering into special need agreements (SNAs) for severely disabled children. Neither Ontario government
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research nor the legislature supported this,728 suggesting that Ontario is not in step with this area of health
policy for example, seen in the USA.
Van Dyck et al. comment that the US Federal and State maternal and child health provisioning
has a century long history of together governing “a foundation and structure to ensure maternal child
health.”729 In 2006, there was another National Survey of Children with Special Health Care Needs
conducted in the US. In Canada, on the other hand, federal efforts were in the opposite direction, aimed at
terminating the federal disability survey, which provided information to government about disabled
children.730
Children who are severely disabled are not a Canadian phenomenon, and their support needs are
internationally understood. Indeed, in 2003, the Institute of Medicine in the United States named children
with special health care needs as a priority area in health policy.731 It is unclear to what extent our
provincial policymakers are aware of what is taking place elsewhere, but our policy regime is outdated, a
feature with implications in international human rights law. The literature review described support needs
in the setting of medical disabilities that would be similar across jurisdictions.732 Canada has not kept up
with need, which, in turn, means that needs are difficult to meet. Another problem is that the provinces
and territories determine the delivery of these programs individually. Our constitutional division of
powers may be considered one of the factors that hampers the realization of support rights to caregiving
mothers.
Provincial Jurisdiction over Disabled Children and Caregiving Mothers
Section 92 of The Constitution Act grants the provinces powers over property and civil rights.733 While
matters such as child welfare, social assistance and healthcare fall within these heads of provincial
jurisdiction, the federal government nonetheless plays a significant role through the transfer of funds to
the provinces.734 Mothers with disabled children look to these domains for state support. Provinces have
relative autonomy to make decisions about how these areas are dealt with. There is a broad structural
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similarity in the bureaucratic system of governance of such policy across Canada.735 Offerings across the
country, too, are broadly similar. For example, all provinces provide funding for respite care to parents.736
The background to the federal cost-sharing in the funding of such programs for the provision of assistance
and welfare began with the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). CAP was in place from 1966-1965. Through
CAP the federal government shared eligible costs 50-50 with the provinces for social services, although it
later introduced a “cap on CAP”for the provinces of Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. In 1995 the
Liberal federal government cancelled CAP and implemented the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(CHST). This was block-funding transfer that combined CAP with several other transfers. Unlike CAP,
which attached significant conditions to the federal payments and earmarked funding for social assistance,
the CHST was an unconditional block grant to cover health care, post secondary education, social
assistance and social services and provinces were free to decide how to apportion funds as between these
broad policy domains.737 However it did retain conditions as to what provincial public health plans had to
be like as seen in ss 7 -12 of the Canada Health Act. Federal funding to the provinces was again
restructured with the introduction of the Canada social transfer and the Canada Health Transfer (CHT)
with 62% of federal funds under CHST being allocated to the CHT, and only 38% for everything else.
Since the mid 1990’s therefore the federal government has provided largely unconditional transfers of
money to the provinces and territories towards post-secondary education, social assistance and social
services.738 Thus, in any given province or territory, respite may be available to eligible children through
different Ministries simultaneously, and with different regulations governing funding in each. This is
735
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reflective of the overlapping that occurs in disability policy for children. All provinces likewise provide
disability income to disabled people, as well as supports to mothers (parents). Support is structured as a
benefit for the disabled child, and for an adult disabled ‘child’ living at home.739 To qualify, there are
income criteria, and stipulations as to how the money is to be spent. Provincial government policymakers
determine what supports will be made available and define their scope.740 The Federal disability tax
credit741 is not an impactful disability benefit for all caregiving mothers, both because it is meager in
relation to the costs of disability and because is unavailable to mothers living on social assistance. Its
stated aim is greater tax equity.
Critique of Policy Approaches
If state supports to disabled children and their mothers were ever adequate (something that no one has
shown), it was readily apparent by the mid-1990s that they had failed to keep pace with needs. In the
context of medical advances, political changes (the political turn to the right and the changes in Federal
funding arrangement to the provinces), and social change (the disability rights movement, many more
women in the labour force), the issue of support for disabled children came to a head in cross-provincial
litigation in a variety of ill-defined areas vis-à-vis childhood disability. Notably, Auton (Guardian ad
Litem) v British Columbia742 was brought under British Columbia’s Class Proceedings Act, with parents
and their children challenging provincial refusal to fund an autism therapy.743 This litigation was
commenced against a Ministry of Health and was terminated with a Ministry of Education as the
opposing party. In Ontario, the issue became politicized and later litigated in Ann Larcade’s litigation
concerning Special Needs Agreements (SNA) in roughly the same time frame.744 Primarily, caregiving
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mothers’ advocacy made it apparent that as stakeholders, they held different understandings than did the
state as to responsibility for such support.745
In 2002, in the midst of legal activity and advocacy, Canadian disability policy expert Michael
Prince commented that until the 1980s, little attention was paid to Canadian disability policy. He noted
then that it is “only in the last five years that the federal government in concert with provinces and
territories has articulated a family policy under the National Children’s Agenda, and one that initially
made no direct reference to children and disabilities.”746 In the government’s favour, Prince pointed to the
development of increased use of public policy consultations where families with disabled children are
concerned.747 In spite of this, as discussed, little is known about the numbers of children with severe
disabilities in Canada for whom policy still must be tailored. Nor is there adequate information as to how
mothers meet their needs, even in realms where there has been consultation.748
The tendency is to house disability benefits within programs other than social assistance.749
However, where mothers and disabled children are concerned, social benefits are contained in ‘programs’
that have retained features of social assistance.750 As well, many caregiving mothers live on social
assistance themselves.751 This may help to explain why little is known about how caregiving mothers
manage, since in such a begrudging environment little concern has been shown for how caregiving
mothers cope. Scholars outside Canada have tackled policy problems in the area of social benefits to
severely disabled children. Blum in the United States has done so, for example.752 My review alluded to
other research on this from the US, and that literature may be referred to for information as to what is
problematic for poor caregiving mothers being “supported” by “welfare”.753
In the Canadian context, in spite of noted structural similarities among provincial benefit
governance, it is difficult to make generalizations about specific supports at any given time, as programs

745

In fact, there was a great deal of litigation in this time frame, as I discuss elsewhere.
Prince, “Governance”, supra note 437 at 390.
747
Ibid at 393. However, anecdotally mixed experiences have been reported with such public consultations.
748
The mere fact of public consultation does not mean policy-makers adopt the perspectives advanced in such
consultation. Moreover, mothers with chronically ill children are often too exhausted and too busy to participate in
consultations, even if we are invited to do so. Among women who do so, how many are single mothers with children
with multiple disabilities or who have multiple children with disabilities?
749
See ibid at 398.
750
For example, stringent eligibility criteria requiring collateral evidence reluctantly with an undercurrent of
guarding against “welfare” fraud See Dorothy Chunn & Shelley Gavigan, “From Welfare Fraud to Welfare as
Fraud: The Criminalization of Poverty” in Gillian Balfour & Elizabeth Comack eds, Criminalizing Women: Gender
and (In)Justice in Neoliberal Times (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2006) 217.
751
See Roeher, Finding a Way in, supra note 24 at 7.
752
Blum frames one problem as mother’s having to manage dense bureaucracies, medication and stigma, at once.
Linda M. Blum, Raising Generation RX: Mothering Kids with Invisible Disabilities in an Age of Inequality (New
York: New York University Press, 2015) at 35.
753
See e.g. Doolittle, supra note 446 and Litt supra note 446 at 78.
746

137
change frequently.754 The stated aim in all programs is that of assistance. The 1991 issue of the Ontario
Special Services At Home (SSAH) policy guideline that I was provided as a caregiving mother states:
“Government has a commitment to assist with the costs and required services by supporting a range of
family support services.”755 Remaining stable however, are the strict eligibility requirements to be met by
applicants to prove need. These raise doubts about the government’s commitment even to assist with
costs, never mind to “share” in them more broadly as it claims to be doing.756
Another problem is inconsistency in programming inter- and intra- provincially. These are
additional features that make it challenging to provide a coherent sketch of policy offerings.757 The extent
to which jurisdictions compare their initiatives is unclear to government outsiders.758 However, the scope
of services provided under a given program clearly varies between provinces. In order to access supports,
there are different application processes and eligibility requirements.759 Support, moreover, is not
presented neutrally in policy, and the way language is deployed is informative, particularly in the current
legal contexts. For example, in Ontario, one website states that when applications are submitted for
funding for disabled children, a “special agreements officer” will contact the applicant by letter.760
However, there are no longer special needs “agreements” made between the Minister or child welfare
agencies and the parents of disabled children, and there have not been for well over fifteen years. Until
very recently, this is a discretionary decision made by an “officer” and in fact, is not an agreement at
all.761 This hints at disingenuous features underlying some provincial policy.762
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Another feature of policy is that Ministries may take on child disability support provisioning in
areas not within their official mandate or funding frameworks. For example, provincial child welfare
ministries may employ the legal fiction of “abandonment” from child protection legislation to provide
placements to disabled children otherwise not provided provincially. Offerings may also change with each
incoming administration, which may formulate new programs or change program criteria. They may even
change the ministry in which programs are housed. Alternatively, policy may not formally change, but
does so informally and without notice. In some cases, a new administration may come in and make
sweeping changes without consultations, and this may result in long-term bureaucratic turmoil.763
Pinpointing what choices or information instigated the formation of new child disability policy may be a
challenge. It is evident however, that one pathway to policy is a crisis. Provincial fatality and other
inquiries have spurred review of policy towards support for severely disabled children.764 Litigation has
also moved provinces to change their childhood disability support policy765 or court orders have required
them to do so.766
There is overlap in support provisions intra-provincially. In Ontario, for example, the Ministry of
Health and Long Term Care (MOHLTC) provides Home Care Services. A memorandum from the Deputy
Minister of Education767 provides for the coordination of health-related services for children with
disabilities through ministries of Health, Education, Community and Social Services, and Long-Term
Care.768Also in Ontario, supports may be sought through the Ministry of Community and Social Services
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and through the Ministry of Children and Youth Services. The Assistance for Children with Severe
Disabilities Program (ACSD) is mentioned on the website of the Ministry of Children and Youth
Services, and is purportedly a program of the Ministry of Children and Youth Services.769 However, it is
governed under the aegis of the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) of the Ministry of
Community and Social Services (MCSS).770 The same legislation that governs income support for adults
with disabilities also governs disability support funding for severely disabled children.771
Since policy formation falls within provincial/territorial jurisdiction, it is difficult to imagine how
systems of supports can be strengthened nationally.772 Although fiscally the federal government has
enormous influence, it cannot be held accountable on its own, as it lacks jurisdiction to remedy nonfederal problems. However, it has played a role in the existence of some problems. One of them already
mentioned is insufficient national data about needs.773 One may conjecture as to why this is, although it
has been stated that, “debates on understandings of disability and of childhood have persisted in
compartmentalizing ‘children’ and ‘disabled people.’”774 This may be part of the explanation for the
presence of the hodgepodge of child disability policies across Canada.
Prince’s remark that disability policy is generally uneven and fragmented,775 corresponds with
what Goodley and Runswicke-Cole have asserted in England, that “disabled children occupy a complex
and contested policy domain in which their status as both ‘child’ and ‘disabled’ has to be negotiated and
explained in the contexts of health, social care, education and leisure”.776 The comments of these experts
give us insight into the challenging situation that caregiving mothers face when seeking support and
perhaps also, the state’s challenges in providing them.
In Canadian support domains, mothers must provide ‘evidence’, advance positions and negotiate
in attempting to get what they need. Given that child disability and maternal support policy emerge as

769

Information on social benefit programs subject to regulations under other Ministries is shown on the MCYS
website.
770
A letter I received from an official with the Ministry of Community, Family and Children’s Services, Toronto
Regional Office, dated 16 October 2002, notified me of the decision to award me $5,500.00 in funding for that year.
It showed SSAH and ACSD as both being on the same letterhead and under this same Ministry at that time.
771
The Daily Bread Food Bank has published a brochure entitled “Overview of Benefits: Understanding OW, ODSP
and other Government Benefits” (June 2015) online: Daily Bread Food Bank <http://www.dailybread.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/OverviewOfBenefits-June2015.pdf>.
772
Some policy scholars have suggested a national policy for children with disabilities and recently there has been
suggested a federal equivalent to ADA.
773
One cannot point to negligence in federal oversight because it is not the role of the Federal government of
Canada to oversee the sorts of policies that are under discussion here. However, they could provide much more
detailed information with a focus on mother’s support needs nationally to provide to the provinces and territories.
774
Bronagh Byrne, “Minding the Gap? Children with Disabilities and the United Nations Convention of the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities” in Michael Freeman ed, Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues, vol 14
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 419 at 421.
775
Prince, “Governance”, supra note 437. See also discussions in Prince, “Hit and Miss”, supra note 442.
776
Goodley & Runswick-Cole, “Celebrating Cyborgs”, supra note 117 at 1.

140
complex and changeable networks of minimal supports, this is no easy task. Given that severely disabled
children have a multitude of complex care requirements, clarification of governments’ obligations to them
is needed.
As stated, severely disabled children’s needs fall across service mandates of different provincial
ministries. Characterizing a particular “need’ as either educational or health can create service difficulties
for mothers whose children may need many forms of service simultaneously.
As a result of the ways in which ‘care’ is characterized in policy, other divides emerge. For
example, complex care777 is characterized as either public or private care, as either healthcare or
homecare, and/or as either formal care or informal care, respectively. Moreover, the care of children
deemed by provincial policy to be medically complex is clearly also maternally complex, as I have
described. The medically complex care label is typically attached to the child, a convention that
disappears maternal complexity in policy altogether. To provide medically complex care also carries a
different social status than does the provision of maternally complex care, so there are high status and low
status types of care as an added duality.
This returns us to the issue of the importance of language in support policy provision. The
naming of services in policies of care for disabled children (mothering, disability support, homecare,
nursing, personal support or respite) have a bearing on whether that care is remunerated, at what rate it is
remunerated, by whom and of course, where it is performed. Consequently, one sees that ‘care’ is a word
subjected to multiple interpretations, in keeping with what Fraser and Gordon have discussed respecting
the word ‘dependency.’ As Fraser and Gordon noted, the word ‘care’ also does ‘ideological work’.778 The
reality is that caregiving, like dependency, carries a stigmatized status. Jennifer Nedelsky goes so far as to
state that “[t]he dominant culture of North America treats virtually all forms of physical caretaking with
contempt.”779 Being devalued, its value need not be appropriately recognized or recompensed. In fact, I
would argue that care of disabled children, rather than being seen by the state and thus, in policy, as
invaluable, is treated as though it has no value. This is reflected in legal cases I examine and is a feature
that gets in the way of rights assertion. There is an inherent contradiction between the devaluing of care
on the one hand and the placing of caregiving mothers on a pedestal, on the other. Although it may be
perplexing to mothers early on and challenges them to be heard legally, caregiving mothers nevertheless
call attention of the courts to their view of support arrangements in a manner that suggests critical
awareness of the counterfactuals in the law and in how their claims are countered.
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Returning to the issue of how policy operates, the practice of shuffling policies from one ministry
to another makes it challenging at times to state what a given policy is. Ministries themselves may change
their names or be newly created. In Ontario, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MCYS) was
created in 2003. This Ministry’s mandate is clear, but what is not clear is the extent of control this
ministry has over the childhood disability programs that appear on its website, some of which are legal
entities under legislation based in other ministries.
For example, the Ontario MCYS website states that the ministry administers the Ministry of
Community and Social Services Act780 “insofar as it relates to activities and programs respecting children
and youth services.”781 Yet, claims brought against the Ontario government respecting decisions under
that Act are brought against the MCSS.
Who is legally responsible for what is not always clear, certainly not to many mothers. Thus, one
may see that it is not only definitions and labels that pose challenges. So too, do the indeterminate and
arbitrary aspects of the ministerial location and delivery of policy and programs as well as their legal
underpinnings. This suggests that in Canada, policy for disabled children is understood to constitute
health and social policy simultaneously, and, as a result of that, is treated as capable of being administered
equally well in either domain. Yet, simultaneously, health, education, and social support are each housed
in policy silos, a feature that calls upon one to question why. Location does not appear to be related to
particular ministerial expertise or approach. In any event, ministers are moved around often782 and
ministerial expertise is not fostered, which reflects the bureaucratic model adopted across Canada. While
bureaucrats, such as policy advisors, may remain in one area of government, they, too, may be moved
around and are not placed in positions in which they are seen to have expert knowledge.783
These phenomena have bearing on the issue of transparency, which I address elsewhere.
However, I note that much policy is not only dense and balkanized, as noted by Prince,784 it is also
administered in ways unseen. This latter aspect is a flawed feature of child disability provisioning that has
not gone without challenge. For example, lack of government transparency regarding an allocation of
funding was the issue in the Nieberg litigation, the facts of which I discuss in Chapter Six. In Neiberg, the
government did not provide reasons for its determination of low levels of support to two disabled children
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and their parents in need of it.785 Judicial review of provincial support determinations is not common, but
the issues these reviews deal with may be.
The discussion thus far offers a brief critique of problems inherent in the present governance of
supports to mothers with disabled children. It is understandable that under their weight, legal disputes
arise. I now turn to discuss the provincial justice system, which many caregiving mothers ultimately
engage with as they seek support.
Provincial Justice System
Forming part of Canada’s system of justice, each province and territory has its own tribunals, boards and
court system. Appeals from tribunals and boards dealing with the support issues of mothers with disabled
children are heard in provincial, divisional, and appellate courts.786 However, prior to reaching that stage,
each form of support has its own appeal process for decisions to be reviewed through the applicable
provincial ministry.787 These are effectively “in-house” reviews of decisions by other bureaucrats.788
Although in the past, certain decisions could only be appealed internally, today, parents can appeal
ministerial decisions respecting supports to provincial tribunals or boards.789 Examples would be the
Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal (OSBT) and the Ontario Health Services Appeal and Review Board
(OHSARB). Child protection applications in public law, private family law and in other civil matters are
heard in the superior and provincial courts. Therefore, benefits such as provincial disability support for
minors and age of majority disabled children, homecare determinations, and disputes relating to other
support for children and their mothers may come before provincial tribunals, boards and courts for
judicial review. Or, mothers may also sue in tort, or bring Charter claims, or they may sue for private
support.
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This situation presents as being far from a legally tidy or contained body of disputes.790 I turn
now to describe three public support domains (homecare, provincial supports, and child welfare) and
explain how each resolves legal disputes. I end with a description of a private avenue for support, family
law. These examples illustrate what provincial disability support policy “looks like” in Ontario, Canada’s
most populous province.
Provincial Support Offerings
Homecare
Homecare does not fall within “insured services” as defined in the Canada Health Act (CHA)791 and the
provisioning of homecare for children with complex medical care needs is dealt with provincially and
territorially. Given the advent of a radically new form of childhood792 experienced with severe
impairments, it seems self-evident that a robust home healthcare system would be essential to mothers.793
Kiran Manhas has observed that there is no single definition for ‘homecare’ in Canada794 and that the
fuzzy boundary around homecare makes describing or comparatively evaluating policy offerings across
Canada very difficult. This difficulty is compounded when different terms for diverse forms of care are
used interchangeably, when they may mean different things in government ministries. Another confusing
example of this is that respite is often used as an adjective for a form of care but it is also to describe the
break from care that the caregiver requires from provding continual home or complex care. Caregivers
need respite from homecare provision, while those with complex care needs require respite care. Writing
on the federal Health Canada website respecting care in the home, Janet Dunback states:
Home care is an increasingly important component of the health care system in Canada. As
family caregivers play a growing role in providing care, their need for respite, or time off, is
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also growing. The purpose of respite is to give the caregiver a break in order to avoid burnout
or crisis, to enable the caregiver to take care of necessary activities outside the home, and to
support a healthy relationship between the person receiving care and the caregiver. Respite can
also provide a break for the person receiving care.795
This description refers to respite as both a break for the caregiver and a break for the cared for. It also
notes that respite is provided in the service of crisis management. Thus, Health Canada acknowledges the
reality of crises for caregivers who do not receive relief. Writing in the United Kingdom, Clare Burns
describes respite for severely disabled children as the provision of relief and support.796 Her definition is
more encompassing than is Health Canada’s, and includes longer stays in hospitals, temporary foster care,
family-based short breaks, and residential care as needed. Mary Mather refers to British research
demonstrating that sixty percent of families with severely disabled children spend over ten hours daily
providing essential care, and fifty percent as providing twenty-four hours a day of care.797 This
information shows that different forms of care fall under the label of ‘homecare’ and that such care ought
to be measured consistently in order to be properly provided for in public policy.
I next provide the example of Ontario to illustrate one provincial circumstance of support policy
to disabled children cared for at home.
Ontario Homecare Provisioning
In Ontario, mothers may apply for medically-oriented care to be provided at home through The Ministry
of Health and Long Term Care (MOHLTC). In 1996, this Ministry delegated its control over homecare
management and allocation to Community Care Access Centres (CCACs).798 The purpose of the CCACs
was to assist people with their applications for and allocation/arrangement of home care for homecare
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services and with independent living.799 This included mothers requiring nursing care for children,
including their adult severely disabled children over age 18.
In 2016, a new approach was implemented to oversee the delivery of healthcare, one that
included homecare to disabled children and their mothers. The Local Health System Integration Network
(LHIN) purports to improve patient access.800 For example, there are patient and family advisory
committees to improve community engagement.801 It aims to integrate all CCAC’s into one organization
with the stated aim to meet the objectives of new legislation.802 Like the CCAC system, there is a Patients
Bill of Rights. It remains to be seen how it will perform in the case of medically disabled children and
youth and whether it is more or less accountable to caregiving mothers.
In addition to homecare, in the case where a child needs a very high level of care, the regionally
relevant CCAC provided care through its Enhanced Respite for Families Caring for Medically Fragile
and/or Technology Dependent Children at Home.803 At the time of writing, the MOHLTC website had a
table showing which sorts of childhood conditions may qualify to receive the grant of $3,500 a year for
this so-called enhanced respite for children under eighteen who require twenty-four hour a day care in
order to survive.804 Examining the mathematics, $3,500 divided by $30 (roughly the hourly rate for a
personal support worker) offers about 116 hours of enhanced respite a year, which is less than the 168
hours in one week, all of which hours must be covered vigilantly, primarily by mothers, in such cases.805
As Health Canada notes,806 and as the case law I examine brings to light, even if enhanced respite services
were available in a greater number of client hours (which is unlikely in current approaches to support
policy), there are not enough qualified healthcare personnel to meet needs. At least, there are not enough
qualified homecare nurses who were given contracts by CCAC’s.
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It remains to be seen whether this feature will improve under the new LHIN. This situation
translates into substantial unmet need. The CCAC website I examined prior to the commencement of the
LHIN system did not offer complete information, stating (as it has for the past several years) that, “[t]he
addition of a fifth category of care [medically fragile children who do not use technological devices] was
made in a February 15, 1999 memorandum sent to CCACs from the Office of the ADM, Office of
Integrated Services for Children (OISC).”807 It also provides:
It is recognized that aspects of the eligibility criteria for Enhanced Respite funding would
benefit from additional clarification. Such requests most often are related to the Group V
category, children who are medically fragile according to the care requirements but who do
not use a technological device.808
This long-acknowledged (by the MOHLTC itself) incomplete information is indicative of the unfinished
nature of such policy offerings.809 An example of this is offered by the section of the MOHLTC CCAC
website for parents that did not clearly state what is to take place when a child turns 19, or why the needs
of a 19 year-old who is severely disabled and requiring enhanced respite care at home are any different
from an 18 year-old in this same situation (in provinces where the service cut off is 18).810 Complicating
matters, there is more than one form of ‘home’ care offered throughout the provinces. There are several
forms of respite care for example, some of which are to be provided in the child’s home and some in
another person’s home, which, in Ontario, are dealt with as a social benefit provided under a different
Ministry (MCYS). Respite care is dealt with more as social care than medically-oriented care, but in
reality, the line may be blurred.811 Where mothers require more homecare than the state presently
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provides, they must pay for it. Respite for a severely disabled child in Ontario can cost upwards of $2000
a week.812 Like lawyer-mothers in BC protesting the lack of affordable daycare spaces, I suggest that this
is a human rights issue.813
Social Benefits
Mary Jane Mossman and Morag MacLean note the relatively recent arrival of social assistance programs
in Canada. In addition to other social welfare schemes, in 1966, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was
put into place wherein the federal government funded half of the costs of social welfare programs across
Canada.814 Later, as noted above, the federal government placed a cap on the CAP. And thirty years later,
the federal government changed this scheme, also noted above, and provinces responded by making deep
cuts to social programs, funding and benefits previously in place to support marginalized and at-risk
groups of people.815
Social programs are typically described as benefits. Each province and territory offers support to
severely disabled children and their mothers through a range of these. Some of those I researched in 2013
are undergoing change. However, the fundamental thrust of the policy has not changed. The 1991 Ontario
Special Services At Home respite policy guidelines that I was provided by the Ontario government, when
it approved my application in 2002, stated that respite was “initiated in 1982 to help CHILDREN with
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILTIES to live at home with their families and to prevent their
institutionalization.”816 The program was not initiated such that the previously available around-the-clock
care provided and funded by large state institutions to those under-resourced mothers would be provided
at least 18 and the funding is discertionary, by way of an agreement. This Act permits the Ministry to put in place
policy Directives and rules in respect of how services and supports are delivered. The Ontario website provides that
policy guidelines are available to all, see Ontario Ministry for Community and Social Services, “Policy Directives
for Application Entities” online:
<http://www.mcss.gov.on.ca/en/mcss/publications/developmentalServices/policy_application/toc_directives.aspx>.
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at home.817 Rather, “individualized consumer-directed funding” would “modify” “mainstream services”
to assist “families.” The statement made was that “Special Services at Home has successfully supported
children to live as independently as possible with their own families in their own communities.”818
In Ontario, as noted above, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MCYS), Ministry of
Community and Social Services (MCSS), Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC), and the
Ministry of Education are the government bodies dealing with the provision of disability support
programs and funding, health, home care, child welfare.819 The MCYS website explains that access to
programs and services for children with “special needs” is through regional offices. The website at the
time of writing has divided services and funding information into four areas: autism, developmental
disabilities, disabilities, and mental health. These divisions are somewhat confusing, in part, because they
do not correspond with diagnostic measures or the “special” needs of these children. Moreover, many
children have dual or multiple diagnoses.
The website has three portals for the areas of Rehabilitation, Respite, and Special Services at
Home (SSAH).820 By Respite the MCYS refers to two programs. One is for out-of-home overnight care
for children who require twenty-four hour a day care and supervision for children with multiple
disabilities or developmental disabilities, and the other is for enhanced respite with eligibility restricted to
children with severe medical conditions that also require 365 day a year care and who may use
technology in order to survive.821
SSAH was, in the current era, stated to exist to fund a caregiver to provide Respite for a child
with a disability or developmental disability whose parents “need more support than most families can
provide,” and set up to “enhance” the capacity of the caregiver.822 SSAH assistance allows a child to
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remain in a program, provides care, guidance and personal safety, and supports the child in learning
activities.823
Regardless of changes in program names, there are waiting lists in Ontario for respite, and a child
may ‘age-out’ of eligibility while on the list. One reason for this may be that the MCYS remains
underfunded.824 In 2000, a paper was published by the Ontario Ministry and others interested in seeing
higher levels of respite, entitled Increasing Planned Out of Home Care For High Needs Multiple Special
Needs Children with Developmental And/Or Physical Disabilities Living At Home. The context of this
paper was “problems with the current status of respite care for children with disabilities in general as well
for children with specific disability related needs including medically fragile and technology dependent
825

children with complex medical needs and children with Acquired Brain Injury.”

This document was

written with the forgone conclusion that the respite needs of children with multiple special needs were not
being met. Its stated aim was to assist government and regional respite stakeholders to put in place
funding to increase out of home respite.826
Government is aware of the shortfalls. Some provincial programs provide small amounts of
funding at intervals to parents with severely disabled children up to age 18. The Assistance for Children
with Severe Disabilities Program (ACSD) in Ontario is one example. Section 40 of the Ontario Disability
823
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Support Program Act 1997 allows for support to children who have disabilities and whose parents incur
unusual costs. The program provides from $25 to $430827 a month to help cover costs.828 In April 2011,
24,849 children in Ontario were receiving ACSD.829 Eligibility and support are dependent on such things
as family income and the child’s disability. It is unclear how the quantum of support is arrived at. It is not
a transparent system and it sometimes awards ridiculously low amounts,830 including as little as $25 a
month state support for a girl with Di Georges Syndrome.831 One disability advocate advised that quanta
of support for funding amounts on offer through this program are likely a “back of the envelope”
determination that policymakers decided was suitable.832 Caregiving mothers whose economic viability
depends on state supports require much more accountability than this.
Each province has disability income support for adult disabled children. In Ontario, those over
age 18 can seek income support through the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) on their own, or
with help. Other provinces offer income support, and amounts vary. In Alberta, the amount is higher than
in Ontario. In fact, media has reported on discrepancies in disability supports across Canada.833 Also, in
relation to older teenagers with disabilities and adults, until recently, Developmental Services of Ontario
(DSO) agencies served adults with developmental disabilities over the age of 18. Its stated aim is to help
caregivers of developmentally disabled persons have respite from care.834 This support provision has been
silent on the issue of income support to caregivers.835 The DSO website had a notice in February 2014 that
funding was under review, which, as noted, is a continual feature of such policy.
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The Ontario government also funds agencies that offer people with developmental disabilities
housing, including to disabled teenagers.836 Options listed are group homes, host-family homes,
specialized accommodation, supported independent living and individualized residences.
There is some overlap between DSO and SSAH in Ontario, for example, the Host Family Respite
Program was featured under both DSO and SSAH. DSO reported two years ago that “funding entities”
are being created. In addition to allocating funds, these programs manage referral for supports and
provide “support and assistance”837 to those on government wait lists.838
In spite of what the government websites offer, the situation for disabled youth in Ontario remains
dire.839 They are also very complex to negotiate. This means that many caregiving mothers in serious
need of supports for disabled children or youth struggle. Some of these eventually resort to child welfare
agencies for care supports.
Child Welfare
Child welfare refers to provincial and territorial services for children and families. Child welfare has
historically been heavily involved in providing services to disabled children,840 and every province and
territory has its own child welfare regime and accompanying legislation. The mandates of agencies are to
support family stability through consensual measures, and to protect children at risk of maltreatment.
Agencies can bring applications to court to apprehend children, and may ask a judge to make them
temporary or crown wards of the state. Even though services may be provided voluntarily, the focus in
child welfare is on child protection, which is a legal domain. When agencies bring child protection
applications to court, applications fall under provincial, and judicial parens patria, jurisdiction. Parens
patriae doctrine has to do with the state’s obligation to ensure the welfare of children. It requires that
child welfare agencies and courts consider the needs of the minor or vulnerable persons before the court.
Courts will either employ substitute decision-making or consider the best interests of the child
respectively. In the child welfare context parens patriae usually applies to the state stepping in where
parents have abandoned, been negligent, or who have been abusive to a child.
However, the ability of a child welfare court to make a decision that is in the best interests of the
severely disabled child in the current approach to state funded out of home care has not been closely
836
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examined. I argue that some provincial court judges have been constrained by what they believe they
should be able to do (Justice Anne Molloy in JMS, for example)841 or are unwilling to decide in the best
interests of the disabled child, due to fears about interfering in the policy role of government (Ontario
Court of Appeal in Larcade).842 Obiter dicta in some decisions, suggests that judges are being required to
adjudicate medical/health cases, as though they are child protection or domestic cases. In such cases,
child welfare might learn from the health law literature.843 A point to consider is whether “under the aegis
of parens patriae, actions which may be sanctioned as parental in purpose are in reality, less wholesome
in effect.”844 To be ‘wholesome’ severely disabled children’s needs have to be the priority in child welfare
decisions.
Deborah Weimer, examining best interests of children with HIV unable to access certain
treatments because of American foster care laws, argues that Best Interests of the Child is a vague
standard. Although she is arguing specifically in relation to consent to medical treatment, the factors she
suggests need to be taken into consideration in the determination of best interests of a severely ill child
should be of interest, These are: priority given to the person most likely to advance the child’s interests;
those intimately involved with the day-to-day care of the child to have a major role in decision making;
someone knowledgeable about the child’s condition to be involved in the decision making; and
involvement of someone who can comprehensively and impartially look at all the facts.845 The caregiving
mother would fall into three of the four areas, yet in current practice she is positioned as adverse and as a
non-expert.
The institutional belief in child welfare systems has been that disabled children burden parental
capacity.846 The institutional response to this is the perceived need of increased supports, particularly to
mothers. Where severely disabled children are concerned, one of these, in Ontario, was the Special Need
Agreement (SNA). The SNA allowed shared care between the province and a parent of a severely
disabled child. The SNA allowed the parents to have continued involvement in their disabled children’s
841
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lives and they remained the legal parents. A child could be placed into state care (specialized foster care
or other care arrangement). Agreements for care were time limited, but could be renewed at the
discretion of the government or director of the child welfare society. The SNA was supportive of the child
welfare agency mandate, to keep families intact, something that is in the best interests of the child, which
is itself the paramount purpose of the governing legislation.847
Another voluntary support option to families with non-disabled and disabled children alike is a
voluntary agreement, in which agencies monitor the child at home, and offer targeted community
supports. Supports however are often extremely limited. This agreement is often arranged through a
family lawyer and is time-limited. Such agreements are not uncommon in cases where an agency has
some concerns, but where concerns do not rise to the level of a perceived need to take the disabled child
into care.
As noted with respect to other provincial support offerings, there is variability as to how
provinces provide child welfare services to those requiring help. For example, at one time, Alberta
provided services to families with severely disabled children through that province’s child welfare
system. This involved having parents consenting to place their disabled child in specialized foster care. In
2004, Alberta’s Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act848 came into force, replacing the law under the
Alberta Child Welfare Act and regulations. Also in 2004, the Family Support for Children with
Disabilities Act became law, with Alberta being the first province to enact childhood disability legislation
that, on its own, provided support to families with disabled children, and was legally separate from the
former child welfare legislation.849 Alberta also has programs for disabled children in Health and
Wellness (MHW) and Children and Youth Services ministries. It is notable that the preamble to the 2004
Alberta Family Support for Children with Disabilities Act promotes disability rights in keeping with the
CRPD and CRC.850 I mention these to draw attention to the awareness of international law of some
provinces’ lawmakers.851 With the exception of Quebec, and more recently Alberta, statutes providing
847

Ontario mother Anne Larcade entered into a special needs agreement with the Ontario government for her son
Alexandre. When the government ended the agreement she sued. A.L. supra note 207.
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RSA 2000, c C-12.
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See Milena Christopher, “Family Law: Children, Families and the Law” (2005) 29:5 LawNow
45.
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Samantha’s Law. See Alberta legislation at Appendix G. Family Support for Children with Disabilities Act, RSA
2003, c F-5 3.
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There is also in Manitoba, the Child and Family Services Authorities Act, RSM 2008, CCSM c C90. This
legislation is administered by the Ministry of Manitoba Family Services. This Act oversees the services of First
Nations child welfare agencies with a stated goal to provide services consistent with the Child and Family Services
Act, RSM 2015, CCSM c 80 [Manitoba, CFSA]. Nova Scotia has a Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c
5 through its Ministry of Community Services. British Columbia has its Child, Family and Community Services
Amendment Act, RSBC 1996, c 46, in the Ministry of Children and Family Development. The Ontario CFSA
governs programs and services in the Ministry of Children and Youth Services. Quebec has its Youth Protection Act,
RSQ 2015, c P-34.1, under the Code Civile in the Quebec Ministry of Health and Social Services.
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services to disabled children are much the same in terms of title of Act, child welfare society organization,
structure and mandates.852 For example, Manitoba has a Voluntary Placement Agreement not unlike that
of Ontario’s SNAs. Section 14(1) of Manitoba’s Child and Family Services Act853 has a provision for
voluntary placement of a child with an illness, mental disability or “with a chronic medical disability
requiring treatment which cannot be provided if the child lives at home.”854 In this case, support is offered
through a twelve-month agreement for care to be provided in foster homes and other residential settings.
Nova Scotia also offers service agreements through similar legislation.
Provinces and territories also have limited residential care offerings, some defined as treatment.855
Residential offerings do exist for children found in need of protection. For disabled children, there is
specialized foster care, and institutional care. Disabled children are represented in state care at
significantly higher rates than non-disabled children.856 There were reportedly 9,199 disabled child wards
in the care of Ontario’s Children’s Aid Societies in 2007-2008, which translates as sixty-eight percent of
Crown wards having “special needs, for example, learning disabilities, attention deficit and/or
hyperactivity disorder, psychiatric, developmental disability.”857
In Ontario, government-funded children's treatment centres have lengthy wait lists and some have
faced closures.858 Other provinces and territories also run “homes” for treatment or care as well. All
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Saskatchewan offers services to children with disabilities through their Child and Family Services Act, RSS
2014, c C-7.2.
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Manitoba, CFSA, supra note 851 s 14(1).
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In Manitoba “Children's Programs is responsible for the administration of the sections of The Child and Family
Services Act that address the needs and rights of children with disabilities in care. A broad range of high-quality
social services is available which are designed to strengthen and support families of children with disabilities”.
Manitoba Family Services, “Children in Care with Disabilities”, online:
<http://www.gov.mb.ca/fs/pwd/children_in_care.html>. Pursuant to Manitoba, CFSA, supra note 851, s 14(1),
which provides for voluntary placement: “An agency may enter into an agreement with a parent, guardian or other
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place which provides child care where that person is unable to make adequate provision for the care of that child
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child (i) is a child with a mental disability as defined in The Vulnerable Persons Living with a Mental Disability Act,
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See Ontario Ombudsman, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 187.
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Information provided by Cameron Crawford, accessed from Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies,
2010 – 11 pre-budget consultation: Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs
(Toronto: Author, 2010).
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Personal knowledge gained from my own child welfare practice. Thistletown Regional Centre serves, amongst
others, individuals with severe PDD and autism. In the Ontario Ministry for Children and Youth Services, News
Release, “Improving Mental Health Services for Children and Youth” (19 March 2012), the Ministry stated that
services were being taken over by community based mental health services as this was closer to the homes of clients
and better served their needs. These provide services to over 58,000 children and youth per year who have moderate
to severe disabilities (and other needs). With the threatened closure of Thistletown, parents of individuals with
autism and PDD stated to media that they would complain to the Ombudsman. See Valerie Hauch, “Thistletown’s
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provincial and territorial legislation has provisions permitting a court to find a child in need of protection.
Grounds for such findings include children at risk of abuse or neglect. However, they also operate as a
result of legal findings of abandonment, where no abandonment exists.859 The conflation of need of
disability supports in childhood with child maltreatment in child protection schemes is addressed below
as a central feature of mother’s legal right to support.
State Custody as Support
It is unclear to what extent mothers in provinces and territories across Canada are relinquishing custody of
their severely disabled children in exchange for care. This is an under-researched area, lacking data. As a
matter of legal practice, this phenomenon has been subjected to a closer legal examination in the
American literature than it has in Canadian literature. Indeed, in a Canadian publication, legal scholar
Gwen Goodman states that “the problem of custody relinquishment is difficult to address because there
has been little litigation on the issue”, and she suggests that it might be challenged as an unconstitutional
or discriminatory practice.860 Goodman’s statement is relevant to several cases discussed in my thesis.
Concerns in respect of custody loss of disabled children were brought to light by the Ontario Ombudsman
and in media in an Ontario provincial court case in the late 1990s. At that time, Ontario861 is alleged to
have sent a directive to provincial child welfare agencies to cease entering into SNAs pursuant to s 30 of
the CFSA, which used to allow shared care between the province and the parent862 of a severely disabled
child.863 Section 30 has since been repealed, and is no longer used by Ontario.864 But prior to its repeal, a
policy void came into being when Ontario decided not to engage with the section. The provision of this
form of voluntary support for care by the state is thus no longer an option. In its place, privatizing
measures, like the ACSD through the MCSS, the Enhanced Respite program through MOHLTC and other
Scheduled Closure Stressful Tine for Parents” The Star (15 October 2012) online: The Star
<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/10/15/thistletowns_scheduled_closure_stressful_time_for_parents.html>.
There was also a petition circulated and media coverage of the controversial closure. The MCYS website for 2013
reported increased funding to children’s treatments centres in Northern Ontario to fund information networks and
more access to IBI therapy. Services at such centres also may include physiotherapy, occupational therapy and
speech and language therapy.
859
See s 37 of the prior Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11, for the example of Ontario. I address
why the finding of abandonment is problematic later in the dissertation.
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Gwen Goodman, supra at note 184, at 303.
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The Ontario government admits there was a Directive, but was unable to produce the Directive itself in the
Larcade (2003), litigation, as noted at para 22 of the 2003 decision. L (A.) v Ontario (Ministry of Community and
Social Services) 65 O.R. (3d) 289 (2003). This Directive is widely referred to in the literature. See See for example,
Contact Hamilton, Community Plan, supra note 459 at 5, which says “In January 2001, the child welfare agencies
received a directive from the Ministry not to initiate any new Special Needs Agreements.”
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See Ontario CFSA .s 30, Special Needs Agreements in former Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11
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Residential respite and short breaks had been available to parents through s 30 of the CFSA, supra note 762,
through individualized agreements.
864
The new statute, renamed as the Child, Youth and Family Services Act came into force April 30, 2018. It is not
the subject of discussion in this thesis beyond saying that it does not provide the care that s 30 made discretionarily
available who caregiving mothers who required it, at least on paper.
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respite programs, which “assist” with or “enhance” what is primarily care provided by mothers at home,
were put on offer through a tightly means-tested policy.865
Instead, children have had to be found to be in need of protection in order for state provision of
disability-related care. Under ordinary circumstances, a child who is made a society or Crown ward,
which consists of being court ordered into in the permanent legal care of the government, the reason is
related to some named form of significant incapacity to parent their child. The incapacity has to be proven
in court with evidence that satisfies a court that it is necessary to terminate the parent child relationship.
Dedicated, high-functioning parents with intact parenting capacity who want to keep their children do not
find their children made wards of the state under this provision, unless their child has a severe
disability.866 Then they may find themselves consenting to temporary or permanent wardship in order to
access needed complex care. By default, this has been an Ontario support policy.
Next, I describe an avenue of private support which I suggest has taken on increasing levels of
importance as the state continues to abandon its role in support provisioning to caregiving mothers with
disabled children.
The Family Law Arena
Although not technically a provincial support offering, I nevertheless include family law policy here.
Provincial provisions for homecare and social benefits described above comprise public support to
children with disabilities and their mothers. Family law, on the other hand, results in a private and
privatized form of support to children primarily, but also to former partners, most often mothers. While
the support itself is private, the structuring of family law (legislation, and procedures and practice) is
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An example of a modest award through ACSD would be the afore alluded to award to appellant John Wood by
the Director of the ASCD program in 2009 of $25 a month plus a health benefits card (which he did not need as he
had coverage through his employment). See OMCSS, Statisical Report, supra note 829. This amount was awarded
after he internally appealed the denial of any support through the ministry. See Wood v Ontario (Director of
Children with Severe Disabilities) (2009), Decision 0908-07140 (OSBT) [Wood]. The last time quanta of support for
eligible children and parents was adjusted for inflation was in 1998 and it was at 5.4%. John Wood was disqualified
for a larger amount of support by the Director of the ACSD program based on the decision that his income was too
high. He sought support to defray the costs of air travel to Alberta for Grace, his severely disabled daughter’s heart
surgery. The OSBT hearing officer held that pursuant to s 3(1) that household income was one factor to be
considered by the Director but so too were other expenses, and that $25 was not consistent with the purpose of the
ACSD program. The ACSD program had what the Tribunal member described as a “self-imposed” guideline and
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discretion so that the flights could be paid for. The Tribunal member stated that in being bound by the law, the
Director must consider all of the issues and determined that the Wood family ought to receive $430 a month, the
maximum amount under the program.
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Child protection legislation is not something they would encounter. It is “against stated government policy; no
parent should have to give up their children in order to secure residential placement for them.” Ontario Ombudsman,
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 187 at para 157. Yet, as the Report states, the practice of Ontario has
been to inform the Ombudsman in writing in regular six-month intervals that “we are studying the matter”, ibid at
para 135.
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public. However, with regard to the family law support itself being “private’, the state itself does not
always deal with it as if it were actually private support in nature. This is because, as I discuss later,
private support attracts public attention, and has been subject to clawbacks and scrutiny. Mothers who are
seeking state support, or who have state supports already, may be required to interact with welfare
officials about their non-public support. This is true whether the parties have privately ordered their
support away from court, through mediation for example, or where the courts have ordered that support
be paid. I shall return to this issue.
Family law is described on the Government of Canada Department of Justice website as a
government justice service.867 The website provides a basis upon which to describe family law as, at least
partially, public law, although in the setting of support for mothers with disabled children, it is a domain
that aims to privatize support, paid primarily by fathers. There is information on this website for supportseeking payees, who are primarily mothers. This information is largely in respect of inter-jurisdictional
support and support enforcement, which would require recourse to the courts. Notably, the onus is on
mothers to get those processes underway in respect of potential and delinquent payors.
In Canada, there is divided jurisdiction when it comes to family law. The federal Divorce Act
governs the granting of divorces, and ancillary matters of custody, access and support, including child,
and spousal support. Each province and territory has its own family law legislation868 to deal with
separation, custody and access, and child support.
Although there are Federal Child Support Guidelines (FCSG) in place for children whose parents
are separating or divorcing, there is some variation in how they are calculated by individual provinces.869
This discrepancy is in keeping with the overall nature of support policy for mothers with disabled
children in Canada, in that it is not dealt with identically across jurisdictions, or always in the same way
in a given province. For example, the federal law, divorce support regime is not identical to provincial
family law support regimes. This feature has been challenging where mothers of age of majority disabled
children seek support through provincial legislation. The latter is not a straightforward support seeking
867

See Department of Justice Canada, “Inventory of Government-Based Family Justice Services”, online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fl-df/fjs-sjf/brows-fure.asp>.
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In Ontario, it is the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 [Family Law Act], in British Columbia is the Family Law
Act, SBC 2011, in the Northwest Territories it is the Family Law Act, SNWT 1997, and so on.
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For example, both the Federal and Ontario versions of the child support guidelines contain a provision that
provide for a potentially higher calculation of child support for payors with incomes over $150,000. See Section 4 of
the Child Support Guidelines provides: Incomes over $150,000: S. 4 Where the income of the spouse against whom
a child support order is sought is over $150,000, the amount of a child support order is (a) the amount determined
under section 3; or (b) if the court considers that amount to be inappropriate, (i) in respect of the first $150,000 of
the spouse’s income, the amount set out in the applicable table for the number of children under the age of majority
to whom the order relates; (ii) in respect of the balance of the spouse’s income, the amount that the court considers
appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children who are entitled to
support and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the children; and (iii) the amount, if
any, determined under section 7. The SCC interpreted this provision in Francis v Baker, [1999] 3 SCR 250.
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process, as it may be in the case of a minor disabled child, and is more often litigated with difficulty and
expense.
The provisions under the Divorce Act are clear: a mother may bring a claim for disabled adult
child support in the event that such a child is unable to support him or herself, provided the mother was at
one time married to the payor.870 Under Ontario law, until July 2017, 871 unmarried mothers lacked the
ability to bring the same claim as married or formerly married mothers do under federal divorce
legislation. This has to do with the fact that regulation of family law falls within both federal and
provincial jurisdiction. Ontario did not choose to provide the same adult disabled child support in its
provincial statute.872 There is also no accommodation in the family law legislation (provincial or federal)
of the need of some severely disabled children to attend education programs part-time and also to receive
adult child support in this endeavor.
On a separate but related point, although not a direct form of support, provinces do provide legal
aid certificates to low-income or unemployed mothers who are seeking support through family law
legislation, or who seek to obtain or retain custody of their children. However, legal aid in family law, is
for low-income mothers, and many mothers self-represent when they would rather not.
In spite of its many constraints, which will become apparent in my examination of private support
litigation, family law nevertheless plays an important supporting role in obtaining financial and tangible
forms of support for mothers with severely disabled children, especially because rather than stepping up
to provide them, the state has increasingly cut back supports.873 Family law support has been critiqued as
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The Federal Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 2 (1) provides:
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(b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or
other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessities of life;
Where parties are unmarried, to provide a provincial example, the Ontario Family Law Act, s 31 (1)-(2), sets out:
(1) Obligation of Parent to Support Child – Every parent has an obligation to provide support for his
or her unmarried child who is a minor or is enrolled in a full time program of education, to the extent
that the parent is capable of doing so.
(2) Idem – the obligation under subsection (1) does not extend to a child who is sixteen years of age or
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Mary Jane Mossman, Natasha Bakht, Vanessa Gruben and Karen Pearlston. Families and The Law.Cases and
Commentary. 2nd ed. (Concord: Captus Press, Inc. 2015) at 47.
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However, case law shows that family law frequently intersects with “public law”, and to a greater extent for adult
disabled children. One can see why Frances Olsen includes in her definition, the relations of those outside the family
to those inside the family, “The Politics of Family Law” (1984) 2:1 Law & Inequality 1 [Olsen, “Politics”]. A recent
example of this is the family law case, Senos v Karcz, 2014 ONCA 459, 120 OR (3d) 321, which addressed OSDP
income support to an adult child in a very expensive and protracted child support dispute, involving a father who
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fee. Today, based on Senos, child support payments are exempt if paid pursuant to a court order and are applied to
disability-related costs, services, education, or training and approved by the Director. This approach does not
address care or services provided by the caregiving mother (in this case of a “child” (who was over 18) who lived
with his mother and who had a very serious mental illness).
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a form of support set up in the service of the state to ensure the state pays less than it would otherwise.874
Feminist legal scholar Frances Olsen defines family law more expansively as referring to legislation,
regulations and court decisions involving: family formulation; rights and duties of family members to one
another; the relations of those outside the family to those inside the family; and, the dissolution of the
family.
A Discussion Concerning Policy Approaches
As a mother accessing government disability supports in Ontario, I did not give much thought to the ways
in which supports were formulated, or described. Years later, I am aware that policy critics claim that the
government’s aim is to ensure that state support remains obscure and uncertain.875 Now, after several
years of examining support issues, I continue to come across mention of benefits I have not previously
encountered.876
Features of elusiveness, uncertainty, and obscurity in the availability of state supports relate to
societal expectations placed on mothers to provide care. If mothers are responsible, then what the state
offers is treated as though it is of secondary importance. Such expectations were expressed federally in
2000 in the National Children’s Agenda: Developing a Shared Vision.877 Despite the title of this report,
shared visions mean different things to different groups and moreover, such visions cease to be those of
many mothers who seek support in the setting of severe disability, who come to realize that the supports
they envision and need differ from those being offered.
As noted above, public supports for disabled children and their mothers under provincial
authority are decentralized. Although the federal government has been involved in child disability
support, initiatives have been limited. Notable are the inclusion of disability under s 15 of the Charter,
and the aforementioned National Children’s Agenda: Developing a Shared Vision document.878 As well,
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there are Senate committee hearings, federal income tax initiatives,879 periodic reports to the United
Nations respecting Canada’s compliance with international law, Public Health Agency initiatives,880 the
1993 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review of Services Affecting Canadians with Disabilities, the 1996
Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, and the 2002 Commission on the Future of Health Care in
Canada.
However, of these last three initiatives, none had disabled children/childhood disability as their
major focus.881 The National Children’s Agenda: Developing a Shared Vision discussion paper, published
in 2000, has been described as geared towards income support for families with modest means882 and
touted the formulation of cross-Canada comprehensive policy for children. One of its aims was to
promote inter-provincial communication about successful practices concerning policy for children. The
shared vision was predicated on “the critical and primary role that parents, families and communities”
play in children’s lives.883 Silent in this aim are reference to mothers specifically, whose care labour is
subsumed under the gender-neutral term “parents”. As noted previously, in its initial iteration, this
document was also silent on the issue of disabled children.884 These silences are together worthy of note,
for they translate into mothers providing disability care without recognition.
In support of my claim, in 2007, there were Senate hearings in respect of Canada’s compliance
with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC has relevance to mothers
with disabled children. The primary aim of the Senate hearings was an inquiry into the extent to which the
CRC has been implemented in Canada, and whether it is used as a tool to address problems children
experience. Another stated aim was to examine the role of parliament vis-à-vis the CRC framework.
These hearings were published in the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights,
Children: The Silenced Citizens.885 In this 283-page document, just seven pages were devoted specifically
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resources” and rely upon parents showing hardship to access supports.
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to disabled children.886 However disability is referenced in the context of very important issues in a few
other sections of the Report. For example, it states that 75-80% of Saskatchewan youth in detention have
disabilities.887 The report did underscore that there is a great deal of work to be done for marginalized
children from different groups, but disabled children were not a focus. Thus, as with The National
Children’s Agenda, disabled children were marginalized in this document as well.888
The Senate Report points to inconsistent access to programs between provinces and between
regions within a given province.889 Recommendation 15 called for the federal, provincial and territorial
governments of Canada “to implement an improved process to improve services to special needs children
by July 2008.”890 This is a similar issue to the one governments addressed in the National Children’s
Agenda several years earlier.891 Importantly, this Report describes the policy situation for disabled
children in Canada as a crisis requiring consultation “with advocacy groups, service providers, health
professionals and special needs children to resolve.”892 However, mothers are not targeted or even
commented on as a group in this section of the Report.893 This is ironic, given that the Report’s title refers
to silenced citizens. One way to silence the voicing of disabled children’s needs is to marginalize their
mothers.
There is reference in the Senate Report to the eagerness of the Federal Government of Canada to
ratify and implement the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
While Canada ratified the CRPD in 2010, it remains far from implementation.894 In any event, the CRC
has long included provisions in respect of support and rights for disabled children and their caregivers.895
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Article 23 provides that states are to provide special care to and available resources to disabled children
and the person responsible for their care, for example. It also provides that states are to have regard to
income of parents in allocating supports in diverse areas.896 The section in the Senate Report on Child
Protection Issues noted legal concerns that are particularly relevant to severely disabled children who are
before the courts.897 In the general section on “Children’s Health”, under “Special Needs”, the Senate
Standing Committee document Pay Now or Pay Later: Autism Families in Crisis is mentioned.898 The
latter title demonstrates government interest in what autism costs society, and is derived from a discourse
other than that of disability rights.899 Closer attention should have been paid to Recommendation 15 noted
above, as calling for the federal, provincial and territorial governments “to implement an improved
process to improve services to special needs children by July 2008”900, which is ten years ago now. It is
challenging to understand what has occurred to prevent this. However, whether to even collect data on
disabled children has been politicized in Canada. Prior to 2006, the Participation, Activity Limitation
Survey (PALS) portion of census data collection for children was a federal government initiative in the
area of childhood disability. Reflecting the already low interest of the federal government in researchbased policy, the census was terminated by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper. However, it
has been reinstated by the newly-elected Liberal government.
This situation highlights the vulnerability of disabled children and their mothers to political
swings. Not having responsibility under the Constitution for the support of mothers with disabled
children, the federal government is largely uninvolved and does not engage in oversight or even social
policy commentary.901 The Federal government has sought to deepen its low level of involvement in the
past. For example, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper defended its decision not to fund
health care for all refugee children. This meant certain refugee children with medical disabilities would be
without medical care. 902
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Federal presence is felt by the provinces, but not in a public support capacity. An example of how
the federal government sees its role is evident in the statement made by a spokesperson directly after
B.C.’s Angie Robinson killed her severely disabled son Robert, and herself, after being unable to access
needed state care. The disembodied statement made to media by the federal government was that “[t]he
Public Health Agency of Canada is working with its partners in the provinces and territories to develop
the infrastructure necessary for a national autism spectrum disorder surveillance system.”903 What could
they say? Not only is such support to caregiving mothers not within federal jurisdiction, autism is not
something the federal government is interested in supporting.
In this chapter, I have shown ways in which state representations of care are manifested through
provincial choices regarding relevant law and policy. The information I have provided demonstrates that
support policy is inadequate across numerous parameters. Policy has been shown to be balkanized,
disorganized, weak, confusing and elusive. Moreover, there are barriers to access that stand in the way of
the few supports that are available. Aspects of disability support legislation, both public and private, have
likewise been identified as problematic and in need of reform. It should be no surprise that supportseeking mothers with disabled children are engaged in litigation in respect of laws and policies with these
flaws.
In the next chapter, I continue with a discussion of a major flaw, that of weak support law and
policy accountability and flowing from this discussion, I move into an examination of mothers and their
disabled children’s disputes with the state.
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CHAPTER SIX: Disputes With The State
Introduction
In this chapter, I first address the problem of weak accountability, a term I explain below, to caregiving
mothers in public support law and policy. This discussion is important because it sets the stage for my
examination of mothers’ political activities and public litigation, much of which is situated in social
benefit law.
I also provide examples of lawsuits brought by mothers with disabled children that uncover the
social, legal, and political myths that undergird the system of public support. I argue that in exposing and
contesting these myths, which exist to maintain a societal vision of disability care and women’s role in
relation to it, some caregiving mothers’ activities indicate their acquiring a critical consciousness about
their political circumstances.904
According to Freire, myths are “lies” that have been “knowingly imposed” on oppressed people
without regard to the circumstances of their reality.905 Myths that support-seeking mothers encounter, or
live with, and which prevent many from acquiring recognition in the political economic order, fall under
the microscope of legal analysis in decisions that demolish mothers’ claims.906
I start from the position that it is through their own praxis involving what they have learned while
caring, that some litigating mothers appear to have come to understand that the Canadian state provides
only meagre support in limited settings, based not on maternal-disabled child realities, but based on state
interests instead. The case law examined reveals that mothers with disabled children have difficulty
realizing their rights to support in public law for many reasons. These include deferential courts, the
exercise of discretion granted in legislative provisions, and problems with the law itself. These issues coexist and interact with myths that are either embedded in law itself, or are brought into play in legal
proceedings.
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After addressing weak state accountability, and the implications of it, I discuss mothers’ efforts to
contest the myths surrounding disability care and support of it, through litigation. I begin with the central
myth of maternal autonomy, and follow this with an analysis of the myths of abandonment and
protection. From this, I turn to the myth of extraordinary mothering, which dominates private and public
law. I go on to address political myths, the myth of equality for caregiving mothers generally, and then I
zero in on the myth of accessible healthcare.
My analysis of these myths along with mothers’ efforts to reveal the truth in the face of them,
serves to illustrate how public law corrals mothers’ claims for support in the setting of childhood
disability, rather than facilitating them. The overarching difficulty however, is that of mothers’ inability to
hold the state accountable for their ongoing support, the very thing to which, I argue, they have a right.
The Main Complaint: Lack of Accountability
The disputes that caregiving mothers most often have with government concern government benefits in
the form of services, funding, and supports that are made available on a discretionary basis. An example
would be the allocation of home nursing care hours for a severely disabled child requiring 24 hour a day
enhanced ‘respite” care. Before providing examples of lack of government accountability seen in the lives
of caregiving mothers in need of support, I first address what I mean by the term “accountability”. In fact,
I mean two things. I use the term in the sense that administrative and Charter rights law scholar Lorne
Sossin does in one of his articles in which he calls for government accountability in legislation,
regulation, rules, guidelines, and established government practices which would be reflected in
“meaningful standards for public scrutiny of Ministerial discretion.” 907 This would include review of
decisions involving discretion as to their constitutionality, as Sossin discusses. Not only are there not
meaningful standards in many areas of discretionary supports to mothers, there are also occasions where
there are no standards at all. For example, as seen in Ontario homecare case I discuss in this chapter
involving a mother with a child with Progeria receiving too few pediatric nursing hours from a CCAC,
which left her scrambling and desperate and with no recourse.908 That is the legal meaning of
accountability that I have in mind. However, I also have in mind the notion that certain groups of people,
which would include less affluent mothers with severely disabled children who rely on social benefits, are
treated as less worthy of reasons, rights to appeal, and so on than are other sectors of the population. This
too is a form of lack of accountability, a disability and gendered one.
A consideration of accountability involves analysis of both the political forces that shape relevant
support programs, as well as analysis of the nature of programs themselves. It also involves discussion of
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the bureaucratic culture in which such support is denied or awarded. I have already introduced a sketch of
the kinds of provincial supports on offer. In service of a politically conservative approach to state
supports for those in need of them, bureaucratic practices that arose after the withdrawal of much of the
welfare state’s supports in the 1990’s involve intensive gatekeeping, and zealous means-testing,
functionally designed to provide support to those who are of low or modest income. The bureaucratization
of policy delivery, moreover, involves bureaucratic norms that favour high levels of discretion being
wielded by protectionist and officious bureaucratic decision makers, many of whom lack expertise in
childhood disability or caregiving. On the rare occasion when they are knowledgeable, that expertise is
not employed to the benefit of mothers in need of support, because systemic barriers and the policy
culture stand in the way.
To illustrate this concretely, former Minister of Children and Youth Services, the Honourable
Marie Bountrogianni, with whom the Ombudsman communicated concerning Ontario’s practice of
requiring parents to relinquish custody of their children before disability care would be provided, had
experience working with families. She has a doctorate in psychology, which she put to use as a child
psychologist for the Toronto District Board of Education, and also as the chief psychologist at the
Hamilton Board of Education. Her Ministry’s response to Mr. Marin, discussed above, in which
government reassured the Ombudsman that issues he raised were important and had been taken into
consideration,909 speaks to the issue of weak accountability. Then Minister Bountrogianni stated to the
media, “[t]he children’s aid societies are there for protection… They are not there to take parental rights
away from parents of severely disabled children.”910 In this same interview, she stated that she had given
a re-directive to child welfare not to require the relinquishment of custody. However, one advocate is
quoted in this same article as stating that “Bountrogianni's directive is toothless because it has been issued
before by this government and the previous government.”911 Media reports indicate that there was
unevenness across regions and lack of coherence between what was reported in the media, by the
Ombudsman, and by those agencies governed by her Ministry. Bountrogianni stated that the issue was “a
real issue” in southern Ontario” but that it was not an issue in her riding of Hamilton.912
Note that in this same time frame, the regional offices of the MCSS and MCYS asked CONTACT
Hamilton to facililtate development of a plan regarding the ongoing unmet needs of children and youth
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with complex developmental or mental health needs.913 While the state’s supports of children (and
families) targeted in the CONTACT Report are amongst those included in my dissertation, they represent
only a segment of those under discussion. Children and youth with complex mental health disabilities
(addiction suicidal ideation or attempts, criminalized youth on the one hand, and those with
developmental disabilities (autism spectrum primarily) on the other, do not represent the full spectrum of
severely disabled children. They do not share identical care needs with children with severe medical
complexity or children with medical complexity and also co-morbid mental health and developmental
disabilities. So in spite of this effort, children in need of support, and their mothers would be left out of
policy consideration. Next, I provide other examples of weak state accountability in the area of support to
show that mothers are without recourse to ameliorate their circumstances, which lends support to my later
argument that they should have special treatment in law.
Prince has stated that “charting the public sector reveals a complex, dense, and often overlapping
policy sphere” with “weak accountability mechanisms.”914 Weak accountability poses a problem not only
provincially. The federal government has a direct role to play in some policy domains, and an example of
that is the income tax regime. The federal government also indirectly plays a role through the federal
funding of areas of provincial jurisdiction. A range of necessary childhood disability expenses are not
deemed legitimate under the Income Tax Act and thus, are not permitted as tax deductions. This is so even
though the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) has long been alerted to the high costs of disability care.
In Henschel v The Queen915 an appellant father, with the mother acting as his agent, claimed as
deductions the following goods and services: caregiver training, therapy, travel expenses for medical
treatment, equipment, mattresses and mattress covers and other items. The federal government rejected
these expense claims as not included as deductible under the Act. Mr. Justice Bédard opined that the
Appellant's case had merit, but held that he should seek legislative change, not judicial review. Justice
Bedard added that it was beyond the power of the judiciary to award such deductions. The court further
opined that “one can only hope that Parliament will take into consideration the astronomic economic
burden borne by parents of autistic children and that the Act will ultimately be amended to broaden the
definition of ‘medical expenses.’”916
The Federal government does provide a child disability benefit (CDB) in the amount of up to
$2,730 per year for families caring for a child under age 18 with a severe and prolonged impairment in
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physical or mental functions. The child’s condition must be certified by a physician on the Disability Tax
Credit Certificate form and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) must approve the form. Of note, the
amount of the benefit is adjusted for those with net income over $65,000.917 Although the aim of the
credit is to support those with severely disabled children, it would barely cover the annual cost of one full
day of respite per week.
Henschel points to the failure to include the manifold and actual costs of care to disabled children
under the income tax scheme in Canada. This omission with regard to deductions continues to pose
barriers to support through the tax regime. This, I argue, is part of the larger state vision of care of
disabled children as private, rather than public, and comprising social, rather than medical care. This issue
is appropriately seen as the under-inclusiveness of disability in support law, a feature which makes it
challenging for mothers to realize their rights to support, short of convincing CRA to make an exception
in their case, or hoping that a judge will venture outside the expected constraints of his or her role, which
ought not be their burden to shoulder.918
Henschel reveals that at the federal level, government is not sensitive enough to the undue
burdens of the cost of caring for severely disabled children. Allowing the deduction of a few such
expenses against income tax, along with a meagre monthly benefit offers only partial support to strapped
caregiving parents, and reflects weak government accountability to parents paying the costs of such care.
Above all, it reveals that private care provision is not rewarded with fair taxation.
Weak accountability may also be seen to occur where mothers’ circumstances are not considered.
This may take place in seemingly unlikely areas. In A.B. v City of Toronto two poor single mothers and
their children, one of whom had autism, brought an action against the City of Toronto with respect to a
strike, during which city services, including those for special needs children, were cancelled. The mothers
alleged the section of the Labour Relations Act permitting strikes by indoor employees infringed their
rights under s 7 of the Charter in not providing alternative placements for their children.919 The situation
was particularly difficult for the mother with the child with autism.920 She alleged the strike was having a
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“severe impact upon the welfare of our autistic children.”921 The impugned legislation in A.B., regarding a
city wide strike by Toronto municipal workers, failed to consider mothers’ needs to access city services
which impacts mothers with disabled children more than it did the average person.922 This can also be
seen simply as a failure to accommodate caregiving mothers. Suitable alternative programming ought to
have been made available.
Weak accountability is likewise reflected in other legal disputes, such as those regarding the
obligation of the provincial government to fund programs for severely disabled children. Such disputes
may include the feature of lack of inter-governmental agreement. G.E. v Alberta (Child Welfare Appeal
Panel) is a case in which a parent of two autistic children sought funding for services from the Alberta
child welfare system and was denied it by the Director.923 G.E. appealed the refusal, but the Appeal Panel
dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and referring to another statute
as governing the concern. G.E. subsequently brought a claim in the Court of Queen’s Bench. The court
framed the issue as whether the sought-after funding was properly within the jurisdiction of the Alberta
child welfare legislation. Determining that it was, Justice Rowbotham commented that ultimately, this
case involved a dispute between two Alberta governmental departments as to which one ought to bear the
cost of the “the provision of services to handicapped children.”924 If it is possible for different branches of
government to refuse carriage of childhood disability files, where does that leave mothers? It leaves them
stuck in the middle of a dispute that is not their own, without needed support. In his ruling, Judge
Rowbotham referenced another case in which governmental departments “engaged in a war”925 respecting
their budgets and obligations.926 The situation she alluded to was when, during the early days of the Auton
litigation, the British Columbia government strategically moved its disability provisioning from one
ministry to another in an effort to escape incurring a possible finding of a state obligation to fund services
for some autistic children.
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The message is that no one wants to pay for disability care, not the child welfare system, and not
Ministries of Health.927 Governments cannot (and will not) agree even among and within themselves as to
whose obligation it is to support disabled children. As a result, the political landscape around childhood
disability support is a contested one, with mothers being caught in an environment inhospitable to their
claims.928
Weak accountability arises in other ways. Decisions may be made by bureaucrats with
insufficient understanding of levels of support required.929 For example, a problem faced by support
applicants is that the exercise of discretion by bureaucrats may result in mothers with similar
circumstances receiving dramatically different levels of support. Further, some decision-makers may fail
to use their discretion to make awards of support where warranted that do not accord with the schedules
ordinarily followed by decision makers in their determinations.930
Decisional unevenness arising out of uninformed bureaucratic discretion results in haphazardly
offered disability support. Pottie and Sossin state that the institutional culture, as well as the political
environment in which decision makers operate, comprise another source of unevenness pertaining to
discretionary decision making concerning social benefits.931 They argue that there has been an underexamination of the administrative procedures and structures that support the making of the administrative
decisions themselves.932 Such processes are not neutral, but rather are embedded in a set of values
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inimical to generous awards of support.933 Important to my project is the fact that it is clear from decided
cases that bureaucratic decisions are based on a combination of assumptions about the role of mothers and
weak understandings of the real-life needs of severely disabled children. This is compounded by
conservative fiscal policy, which seeks to spend less. This combination can be risky (and has been deadly)
for caregiving mothers in Canada and elsewhere.
Bureaucrats making decisions about support need to understand the nature of care burdens that
prompt mothers to apply for benefits in the first place. And once they acquire that knowledge, they need
to have the clear authority to deploy adequate resources. In order to ensure this, a different approach
needs to be taken. Such an approach would presuppose the political will to put into place robust, multifaceted oversight of all support programming. Presently, across Canada, (and as Jane Raca noted
regarding such policy in Great Britain), each policy domain functions like its own little fiefdom934 and
political will appears to be either missing or unable to express itself.
The policy fiefdoms described often appear to be in the service of the state and not in the service
of mothers and their disabled children. For example, when a decision is made in respect of support, it is
not a simple matter to have it reviewed. Nor is it a speedy or pleasant process. First, where disability
benefits are concerned, there may be an internal ministry review. If that is not satisfactory, then there is an
appeal to a provincial tribunal, and from there, to a provincial court. Judges may be unfamiliar with littleknown childhood disability policy regulations, directives, policy manuals or other facets of disability
support policy.935 Moreover, judges have concerns that policy is a political matter and not a judicial one,
and that reviewing it may be beyond their court’s jurisdiction. More so than other benefits, support for
disabled children is often perceived as a private matter by many in the legal profession, and the act of
considering it appears by some judges a task charged with adjudicating public law disputes. In addition,
judges often have no line of cases on point to refer to when dealing with contested decisions and may feel
uncertain as to the correct course of action.936 That said, in cases where the conduct of government veers
far from what is required for administrative fairness, courts seem to have no difficulty quashing or
sending decisions back to the originating ministerial authority on procedural grounds.937 One must note,
however, that it is in no way easy to get to court. That is something that requires knowledge, energy, and
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resources that many mothers may not possess.938 This situation permits inappropriate administrative
practices to go unchecked. Without recognition of government’s legal obligation to provide support, there
need not be an account-giving to mothers with disabled children. If there was recognition of a positive
constitutional obligation owing on governments to implement supports that ensure the needs of mothers
with severely disabled children are met, then the system would have to be accountable. But such an
obligation has not been recognized. Without this recognition, provincial support law needs to have teeth
to ensure support is enforced. Social policy needs to have a much different bureaucratic approach. It
would include clear regulations and provisions and speedy reviews of negative decisions.
Pottie and Sossin echo Prince’s opinion as to challenges posed by weak government
accountability939 to social benefit applicants. It is in the setting of administrative discretion, where
provincial programs stipulate that a decision-maker may provide support that serious problems for
support-seeking mothers often arise. For those applicants the state refuses or gives low levels of support
to, redress is not a simple matter.
Next, I discuss cases where mothers have sued government in the face of denials of needed
support. I argue that in so doing, mothers confront myths that uphold the rationales for denials of needed
support. While contemplating the facts and the claims in the cases examined, one must consider the
psychological costs of litigating, what Chesler refers to in the setting of mothers as “the price of battle”.940
Chesler characterizes this price as constituting a victimization of embattled mothers,941 in the process of
confronting patriarchal law. One can draw from her statement that patriarchal, as well as ableist law, have
not supported the notion “that each child’s life is equal”, particularly in the case of severely disabled
children requiring maternally complex care, where it is often a challenge to formulate a claim even if
mothers have the wherewithal to bring one.942
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Litigating the Myths
Myths as Barriers to Support
As noted previously, legal, political, and social myths work to maintain the status quo, whereby care
burdens for mothers are represented as positive. Myths, embedded as they are in law, thus conceal
mothers’ social and political realities, and may render it impossible for them to name an identifiable legal
issue in order to assert legal rights through a sound claim.943 Among the legal myths that arise in the
setting of care for severely disabled children are those of maternal autonomy, child abandonment and
child protection. Within these areas are cultural tropes concerning extraordinary mothers and failed
mothers. In the political-economic domain, myths include that of a benevolent welfare state, adequately
supporting those in need. The myth of a benevolent welfare state includes the myth of a state-family
partnership in the areas of disability income support and respite. Both of these are discussed as though
they are included under universal health care.
The myth of state-family partnership itself contains the secondary myth that it is “family” with
whom the state partners, when it is primarily mothers with whom the state interacts on issues of child
disability support. However, even where it is fathers who (rarely) do so, this particular myth remains in
place. I have discussed this issue with a father who was involved in care of a child with a rare condition,
who relayed that he challenged the myth of “family care” with a bureaucrat, informing the individual that
he and his wife had no family in the province.
Myths do not have tidy boundaries; in reality, many of those I address weave together. I argue
that myths combine and collude to serve the interests of those who seek to avoid obligations to provide
support. In the next chapter, these evaders will be identified as potential payors of disabled child and
caregiving mother support. In this chapter, the evaders are identified as instruments of the state.
Remarkably, it is widely accepted that government and a percentage of fathers do not like paying
support. The low level of stigma attached to the expression of this sentiment in either case is astonishing.
In the following section, to demonstrate my claim that myths are at play in public support law, I show
how they appear, are used, or challenged, and by whom. I do so by referring to a variety of legal cases
where mothers have litigated for support. I begin with the troublesome myth of autonomy.
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The Myth of Maternal Autonomy
Herring succinctly states that “one of the central rights in the liberal world is autonomy.”944 He also relays
that liberal autonomy relates directly to choice and to the ability to shape one’s path in life.945 Herring’s
iteration must be borne in mind in considering the situation of mothers with severely disabled children.
Liberal autonomy is to be distinguished from other forms or understandings of autonomy, such as
relational autonomy, which accounts for the influences of relational interests on the self as less bounded,
and decision-making as necessarily involving others’ needs. As seen throughout the dissertation, mothers
support their severely disabled children unto the point of breakdown (physical, mental, emotional). This
signals their not having acted in the interest of the autonomous individual woman. She has prioritized
someone else, her child(ren). Like Freire, Nedelsky refers to the presence of myths, theorizing the
existence of mythical legal structures premised on liberalism. She articulates that in the myth of the
bounded legal self, rights delineate and protect the legal self, and the boundaries of the state.946 This
articulation of rights is seen to create and to support a notion of autonomy that Nedelsky asserts is not
attainable for many, including, I add, caregiving mothers. Thus liberal notions of autonomy cannot
comprise a foundation on which to build a feminist legal theory of support for mothers with severely
disabled children.947 Nor does such a notion “fit” with the support needs of severely disabled children and
their mothers.
Maternal support claims run into conceptual difficulty because the support being sought is in
relation to care, which is not to do with a bounded self, but to do with selves, plural and inter-connected.
Nedelsky asserts that in actuality, autonomy is only made possible by relationships, including institutional
ones. Moreover, she points out that the autonomy attributed to the self as bounded runs into difficulty in
precisely those areas where women’s needs are being adjudicated by the state. She illustrates this in
examples involving mothers and disabled children, referring to legislation and Court cases.
Earlier I noted the problem with the liberal conceptualization of autonomy as expressed in law. It
is a form of autonomy that assigns right to individuals. These rights confer varying abilities, such at the
right to enter into contracts, and to further individual interests. I also discussed an alternate
conceptualization of autonomy, namely relational autonomy. As theorized by Nedelsky, autonomy is a
capacity that is not bounded in the individual, rather it is situated and supported in relationships. I have
not used relational autonomy as a conceptual framework, although I agree with its premises. In this
section, I refer to both classic liberal autonomy (CLA) and relational autonomy (RA), as I have not been
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able to ‘do away with’ mention of CLA entirely, as it is the concept that undergirds rights in the various
legal cases I discuss.
I first mention the case of an Ontario mother and physician, Nicole Desmarais. She requested a
voluntary special need agreement under Part II of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA), for her
severely disabled son, and her request was denied.948 She subsequently brought an application to be
permitted to access one through a court order.949 She also went to the media with her complaint as to lack
of support in her case.950 This case can assist with understanding the problems with CLA. Desmarais
sought a shared care agreement with the state. Thus, it was a relational provision she was relying on, and
granting it would have supported not only Desmarais, but all of her children, as well. In refusing to
provide it to the mother, who was the assumed CLA legal subject, the state reneged on its responsibility
for a form of relational support.
Nedelsky points out that the law constitutes relations in society, but the Desmarais case (like the
earlier litigation of Anne Larcade) showed that some relations in society (mothers like Desmarais and
Larcade) are left out of law. This is so even where the law has included them, since the government was
choosing not to provide special needs agreements to anyone. In terms of enacting CLA, Desmarais was
struggling with that, because she and her other children could not care for her severely disabled son. We
do not know whether (like Larcade before her) Ontario made an offer, out of court, to provide care in
settlement of her claim. Such settlements are concerning, as they contradict the assertion that the state is
not funding/providing such care. In some assumedly only unusual cases the state does in fact provide care
in this case to certain mothers who decide to sue.
Another point I want to make is that even extreme outlier, financially autonomous mothers (in the
CLA sense) run into difficulty with the unjust way in which their achieved CLA is dealt with in disability
support policy. Tali Lalkin v Director, Ontario Disability Support Program is instructive.951 Lalkin found
herself embroiled in disputes with the province. Lalkin, who argued that the Director had failed to take
into account her unique circumstances in 2013, won her appeal to be granted a higher amount of support
than the suggested guideline ceiling set by the Ministry’s policy, which was an income of $63,100.952 Her
gross annual income in 2012 was $101,734. She had previously had the same battle with the Assistance
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for Children with Severe Disabilities Program Director four years earlier. The Tribunal Member at the
2008 hearing of a similar appeal, decided Lalkin was entitled to a higher than guideline amount of
funding. The evidence Lalkin presented in 2013 showed that her expenses in caring for her son cost her
$40,000 a year.953 The 2013 Tribunal member, Brian Brown, commented on the fact that after taxes, 50%
of her income was spent on meeting her disabled son’s needs, and that in spite of a higher income, she
struggled to make ends meet. It was held, twice, that on the balance of probabilities, she had established
the decision of the Director was wrong. One can see that as a successful lone mother with a six-figure
income, an income level double what most men in Canada earn on average, she alone is expected by the
government to absorb the exorbitant costs of disability care. Lalkin is a useful myth challenger. Ms.
Lalkin had a healthy income, thus she cannot be portrayed as a financially incompetent mother. Nor can
she be faulted for a failure to be independent and autonomous. She has a career. She is also on-task with
regards to her disabled child’s needs.
Again and again, Directors insist that a cap exists on funding. Section 49 of the ODSP Act
provides that the Director may provide financial assistance in accordance with the regulations to a person
who meets the prescribed criteria to assist with extraordinary costs related to a child with a severe
disability. It is set at an annual income of $63,000 approximately, a cap that in instances is seen to
‘prevent’ bureaucrats from meeting their mandate. Yet, as the tribunal member in Lalkin noted, it is not
binding, as it is only policy. 954 Lalkin reveals that disputes comprise an additional burden that mothers
carry while they perform maternally complex care, which is that they may be required to prove their need
of high levels of support for very disabled children, repeatedly. The Lalkin Tribunal commented that the
ACSD program guidelines ought not to be applied arbitrarily without due consideration of factors
provided in the legislation, and held her circumstances warranted support.955 Thus Lalkin had battled for
and ‘won’ a $5,400 state contribution towards the 50% reduction of her six-figure income, with the
financial burden discussed comprising only one of many that she bore.956 This case shows that even if a
mother earns income that would otherwise permit her to meet the ideal of CLA, she cannot live out the
ideal so long as she is in relationship with her severely disabled child(ren) in today’s legal arrangements.
This is because it is mothers, and not the state, who have been responsibilized for care. Were the state
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supporting the relationship of this single divorced mother with her three children, one of whom has severe
cerebral palsy,957 they would all have realizable legal entitlements to support, and Ms. Lalkin would not
find herself (self-represented) in a dispute with the province regarding money.
In order to illustrate this point further in the Canadian context, I next examine two Canadian cases
that provide information about how the state sees mothers with disabled dependents requiring care.
In Ontario Disability Support Program v Favrod, the parents had an agreement whereby the
father paid the mother “child support”, with which he complied.958 When the child turned 18, the adult
‘child’ applied for ODSP. The Director of the program sought to have the father’s payment to the mother
be treated as income paid to or on behalf of the child, and therefore to have it deducted from the
provincial disability support payment. The father’s view was that mother and daughter required support
beyond what ODSP paid.959 The daughter appealed to the Ontario Social Benefit Tribunal, which held
that payments made to the mother were the mother’s income under the provisions, and not income to be
attributed to the young woman. The Director appealed but the appeal was denied. The Favrod court held
that “The circumstances here are important in that the parents have endeavoured, through their actions
and agreement, to share in the responsibilities involved in providing quality care for their daughter.”960
The court opined that the mother used the money “to assist her in meeting the exceptional needs of caring
for a person with a disability.”961 The judge observed that the father’s obligation to pay ended with the
mother’s death, and incurred no tax consequence. The judge called this payment a spousal support-like
provision.962 The term “income support” that was being paid to or on behalf of the daughter makes it
sound as though the disabled 18 year-old was living independently on her state support of $13, 392
annually. Obviously, this amount could not support someone in need of full-time and intensive disabilityrelated care. Ontario Disability Support practice at the time of the decision was that child support was
subject to state clawback. However, this payment to the mother was decided by the tribunal to be
compensation for the monies paid for her assisting in caring for the adult disabled child.963 Within the
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confines of the state clawing back meager amounts of money that a father willingly paid to a caregiving
mother, who did not herself receive social benefits, the court made a just decision. However, the court’s
statement lauding that the parents “shared” responsibilities for care of their severely disabled adult child
(which looks like support of their relationship) may not have been reflective of who did the lion’s share of
care work. Michelle Favrod had custody and the father had access, he was able to be in paid employment,
the mother was not. The practice of looking at the mother’s income as separate from the severely disabled
daughter she cares for and supports lacks credible basis. This mother in the result lacked CLA and
Relational Autonomy.
Favrod is important because it underscores that the issues are greater than merely that of the state
requiring mothers to pursue private avenues of support before public support will be provided. This
mother had already done that, and that support came under siege, with Ontario conflating the child
support to the mother with the disabled adult’s support from the state. It is as if the state views caregiving
mothers as “getting away with” accessing money, to which they are not entitled. However, another way of
looking at it is to note that the state is getting away with unremunerated care, to which it is not entitled.
The myth of the autonomous so-called adult severely disabled child, an issue I later address, feeds
state policy that denies severely disabled children support when they reach legal adulthood, in this
situation a legal status with ableist assumptions informing it, which are used against support seeking
mothers, as will also be seen in the next chapter.
Another Ontario case dealing with a disability income support program trying to reduce disability
support to an adult child with a disability is Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Ansell.964 This case
involved a young woman, Jocelyn Ansell, who also lived with her single mother. The mother received
$800 a month in child support from the father.965 At age 18, Jocelyn applied for provincial disability
support. The program Director determined that child support payments were income attributable to
Jocelyn. As the facts state, Jocelyn’s father’s obligation terminated if Jocelyn stopped being a full-time
student, stopped living with her mother, or if her mother died. The court noted that the Director had
assessed Jocelyn as independent and not as a dependent. “However, under s 37(1) of the Regulation – the
key provision on this appeal – any payments to her or on her behalf or for her benefit constitute income
and so, under s 29(1), they must be deducted from the income support otherwise payable to her.”966
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Jocelyn’s argument was that the position of the Director was unfair to single mothers, and undermined the
idea of shared responsibility, a stated feature of the ODSP provisions. The Ontario Court of Appeal found
that the focus of the Director ought to have been on exemptions under s 43. Section 43(1) exempts gifts or
other voluntary payments of an unlimited amount as long as they are applied to expenses for disabilityrelated items and are approved by the Director of the program.
The Court agreed with the position taken by Jocelyn-- that the child support order stipulated the
support is paid to the mother, and that as the order did not specify how the mother was to use the money,
she was not obligated to use the money on disability expenses. Jocelyn’s mother was thus not required to
account for how she spent it; moreover, the mother had to report the support on her income tax return, not
on Jocelyn’s return. The court added that the child support payments were tied to the mother, ending if
she died. It stated that Jocelyn was not a party to the court order and had no legal right to enforce it.
Therefore, the Ontario government program could not ask the mother to account for her use of the support
paid to her by the father.
In both Favrod and Ansell, caregiving mothers are put on the defensive, needing to defend against
the state taking away their child support, because the state is paying meagre disability income support to
their adult disabled children. It is possible that the state views these two things as mutually exclusive. If
bureaucrats insist on ignoring that care is being provided to legal adults, as well as income support from
the state, it may appear that way.
Mothers have described the situation in Ontario vis- à-vis ODSP and their private support
provisions as oppressive.967 Ontario provides a pittance to disabled adults, having taken steps to ensure
that the costs of care are privatized to the greatest extent possible, without regard to hardship, or its role in
diminishing women’s equality.968 Tolmie and Bachmeier’s submission to their MPP entitled Increasing
the Burden Instead of Lightening the Load: The Impact of Current ODSP Policies and Practices on
Single Parents Caring for Adult Children with Disabilities, reflects an acquired awareness that
government policy makes things less, not more, equitable, for mothers. There is a curious inconsistency in
caregiving mothers’ dealings with state support. Mothers must choose to pursue their individual support
claims through public or private law. Once in these areas, however, their and their children’s support is
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not dealt with as though each is legally autonomous. This is both vexatious,969 and also a legal vestige of
an era when women and children were together considered dependents.
If Herring is correct, and autonomy is a core “right” in our society, clearly it is one being denied
to mothers providing this form of disability care in current policy settings. In being tasked with providing
life-long disability support, such as the situation described in Favrod, the version of autonomy our legal
system purports to uphold is being denied to mothers with severely disabled children, who are denied the
right to exercise choices in order to shape their own lives. A looming question is whether Michelle Favrod
would like to have done something other than to provide sole-support care and remain poor.
Finally, in this section I examine examples of harsh expectations of the state that caregivers
exhibit CLA, when the legal trouble they are in has to do with support. I turn first to an older criminal law
case, concerning a mother with medically disabled children also having to deal with complications of
receiving state support. This case shows that the pursuit of a scintilla of CLA independence on behalf of a
welfare recipient’s medically disabled children is viewed as suspect by the state. In R v Bond 970 one can
see that CLA is not something the state fosters for caregiving mothers. Bond illustrates the complex crosscutting nature of problems mothers deal with legally. 971 Single mother, Donna Bond, was charged with
‘welfare fraud’ for allegedly defrauding the province of Ontario.972 The basis for the allegation was that
she had a bank account she had not reported on required government documents. She testified that she
had saved money from ‘piece-work’, from her ‘baby bonus,’ and her tax refunds, and that she had
formally informed officials. She also gave testimony that the serious health problems of her children
caused her to realize that they “will require financial assistance to deal with these problems in the years
ahead.”973 As a result, she created a fund for them.
When her fund was ‘discovered’, Bond stated she had ‘honestly believed that she did not have to
report the savings because they were for the children’.974 In Bond it can be seen that the mother was
constructed as a criminal.975 She struggled to care with forethought, by saving to provide as security for
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children with health problems. What little security she built, the state took away, and then punished her
for it. In Bond the mother was trapped by her legally constructed circumstances, and by the
characterization of her as a law-breaker. Bond’s efforts had been directed towards acquiring a low level of
autonomy and independence, to be provided to her children, something not possible within the legal
framework she was forced to operate within.
Bond was reported to media at the time it was decided and she had to endure public notoriety, too.976
Her situation could have been an instructive one that educated government about the plight of poor,
caregiving mothers, but instead, that feature of her life was treated as an accessory to the main issue,
which was that she was legally deceitful. A different reading of the case would be that caregiving mothers
live with extreme concern about the future welfare of their medically disabled children, and that what the
state provides is grossly inadequate to address their legitimate concerns. Janet Mosher has argued that the
treatment of Donna Bond is consistent with the state’s approach to welfare fraud generally. She argues
that in the criminal proceedings against Bond, the law of fraud was inappropriately applied.977
Myth of Deinstitutionalization
In the aftermath of the disability rights movement to ensure the deinstitutionalization of disabled children,
institutionalization is widely considered to be a thing of the past in Canada. Although it is no longer a
common practice to place disabled children in large institutions as matter of course, severely disabled
children are still placed into state care. This occurs through law in three distinct ways. One is where there
have been allegations by the state of child abuse or neglect (a large category). Another is when often
competent but exhausted mothers agree to “abandon” their children, and I address this legal practice in
the next section, under the myth of abandonment.
Here I address a third pathway to institutionalization of disabled children that may be thought of
as a form of disability ‘double jeopardy’. This situation has to do with child protection applications
brought in relation to disabled children whose mothers are intellectually or psychiatrically disabled. This
situation has to do with disabled and otherwise ‘high needs’ children.978 I note here that there will be at
times, a disability ‘triple jeopardy’ within this group. The BC Report, Broken Promises, revealed that
Donna Bond and Debbie Peliti was that ‘good’ caregiving mothers, however impoversished, do not take money. See
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some mothers involved with child protection were themselves raised in state homes designated as ‘special
needs’.979 This means that some mentally disabled mothers were raised in institutional settings.
Legal cases show that intellectually or psychiatrically disabled mothers are at increased risk of
losing their children. Children are found to be in need of protection because of the view that mothers with
mental disabilities are unable to meet the needs of their child. In some of these cases as Grant et al show,
a judge may find that the mother is ‘unfit’ where the child also has a disability in fact situations where, in
the absence of a special need in the child, the child would be returned to his or her mother.980 This
situation reveals that although adult disabled women are no longer being routinely institutionalized
themselves their disabled children are. Based on findings in legal cases, and scholarly work, mentally
disabled mothers are excluded from the normative institution of motherhood, not unlike other mothers
with non-normative children.
Twenty years ago Judith Mosoff (mentioned in a prior discussion on child welfare supports),
pioneered legal analysis at the intersection of child protection and psychiatrically disabled mothers. The
issues that arose then arise now. Isabel Grant, Judith Mosoff, Susan B. Boyd and Ruben Lindy,981 in more
recent research, examine British Columbia decisions that provide examples of mothers with intellectual
and psychiatric disabilities coming to the attention of child welfare because they are disabled, and being
legally challenged to retain custody of their children. In particular they describe how courts adjudicate the
child protection litigation these disabled mothers are trapped in.
As stated, Grant et al’s examination reveals judges who state they would return a child to a
disabled mother, were the child not special needs or high needs.982 Since the mother is disabled they
conclude the also disabled child is in need of protection. Decisions they examined reveal that this
approach is based on the belief that mothers with disabled children require better than average skills to
provide the care needed to meet the best interests of the disabled child. Grant et al. refer to this as the
requirement of “exceptional parenting.”983 This judicial discourse represents cloaked status recognition by
child protection courts. They appear to recognize mothering and caregiving are two separate things.
In CAS v L.T. and R.S, a mildly intellectually impaired mother, sought to have her disabled child
returned to her and the father of the child. The court opined that the multiply disabled child required high
quality parenting, and caregivers who would be capable of advocating for community resources long
term.984 In this case the child was found to be in need of protection, and returned to the mother subject to
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a stringent society supervision order. Although some of the terms of the order can be construed as a form
of support, court orders carry the taint of domestic policing. This case also relays that having a
disabled/high needs child places mentally disabled mothers at increased risk of disabled child loss to the
state or to what courts perceives to be a better arrangement.
Grant et al.985 state that a central question in child protection at the intersection of disability, and
mothering, is the extent to which the province is responsible for providing supports that would enable
intellectually or psychiatrically disabled mothers to parent children with “special needs”. My project has
not focused on child welfare support to disabled mothers, but in the context of child welfare and disabled
children, disabled mothers’ legal rights to support become relevant. If a disabled mother does not realize
her right to support, then her disabled child will not be able to realize his or her best interests. The best
interests of the child is a foundational principle in Canadian child welfare law.986 Moreover, Article 3(1)
of the CRC provides that in all actions concerning children undertaken, whether by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law or administrative authorities, best interests of the child must be a
primary consideration.987 What is at stake is a child being taken into state care, to live in the shadow of
state watchdogs, which is institutional living, not community living. For mentally disabled mothers to be
able to provide care, the CFSA ought to be fulfilling its mandate to find the least intrusive means to
support mentally disabled mothers with disabled children, but is not, based on findings of British
Columbia legal research by Grant et al.988 Their findings should inform Ontario legal practice and
jurisprudence, given that best interest of the child is a legal tenet and not a provincial expression of law. It
should do so likewise given that disabled people have the right to equal treatment in law. Disabled
mothers ought to be accommodated, something that is legally recognized in United States child welfare
law.989
There is stigma associated with being a mother with mental disabilities, in conjunction with the
stigma of having a disabled child, and the stigma of having been served with a child protection
application is considerable. Yet these mothers have been responsibilized with care without regard to their
circumstances. This problem also attaches to non-mentally disabled mothers with severely disabled
children. The stigma is an outcome of how ordinary motherhood is constructed. It is such that mothers
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ought not to require state support. If she does, then, to use Freire’s words, she is crushed, diminished, and
maneuvered by myths.990
Yet, in terms of being maneuvered by myths, some intellectually and psychiatrically disabled
mothers serve a reply to a child protection application, they attend court, and they do put themselves
through a harrowing legal process that constructs them as unsuited to caring for their children. Moreover,
in spite of the well-known involvement of child welfare in the lives of mentally disabled mothers,
research involving intellectually disabled mothers being conducted in Toronto found mothers do not agree
with how social workers characterize their capacity or skills. They state they are misjudged and overly
criticized and are that they are perceived as less competent than they are. Although they are being legally
maneuvered by powerful myths, they appear to be cognizant of that and they resist.991
Interacting Myths of Abandonment and Child Protection
The myth of abandonment and the myth that the severely disabled child is in need for protection loom
large in the area of care for disabled children. These are sustained in law by how it deals with mothers
with disabled children. Legal terms reinforce the myth of the need for protection where severely disabled
children are concerned. For example, being in the charge of an adult is a fundamental feature of being a
child, or being deemed incapable of self-support in law. Moreover, a child is by definition in the “charge”
of either the state or a private party. State child protection law was created to provide for children who
have no parents or whose parents are “bad”. In Canada, provincial child protection legislation contains
grounds for involuntary state intervention in families in order to protect children at risk of neglect or
abuse. Pursuant to s15(2) of the CFSA992 , child welfare societies which are agencies designated by the
Minister, may proceed by way of immediate apprehension or by bringing an application to court seeking
interventions and/or a parenting plan to ensure the safety and well-being of a child alleged to be at-risk.
These powers are set out in s 37(2) (a) and (b) of the CFSA. These sections specify in subsections (a)
through (m) the grounds upon which a child may be found in need of protection. These include if a child
has suffered, or if a child is at risk of suffering, physical harm, where the individual having charge of the
child has failed to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child or there is a pattern of
neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child. These are itemized as where a
child has or is at risk of: sexual exploitation; unmet need of medical treatment; emotional harms that a
parent or individual with charge of the child has not sought to remedy, a mental or developmental
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condition that if not remedied could impair the child’s development: has been abandoned where the
parent has died, is unavailable, unable or unwilling to exercise custodial rights and is over age 12 and
being encouraged by a parent or person with charge has encouraged or failed to supervise a child who has
injured someone. Section 37(3) lists the circumstances to be taken into account by the decision maker in
making a determination regarding state care.
It is to be noted that women in poverty are caught in the net of government child protection
proceedings. Features of life in poverty overlap with the framing of maternal neglect in child welfare. As
a result there is disproportionate representation in care of First Nations children.993 Those at risk of
homelessness or who are homeless also come to the attention of child welfare agencies.994 As do mothers
with disabled children, as I have stated.
One might argue that state law has focused on child maltreatment, and this is why child welfare
law did not anticipate the kinds of support that severely disabled children need. However, there was once
another set of laws pertaining to children provided for by the state: laws governing the large institutions to
which disabled children were at one time committed. Once those laws were repealed, child welfare
legislation remained. At the time when deinstitutionalization was taking place, provisions were put into
child welfare statutes pertaining to the provision of disability care.995 However this took place at a time
when thinking of medically disabled children as a new form of childhood had not yet come fully into
being. So, in a sense, the state’s child welfare amendments may not have anticipated this group, even as it
did consider other severely disabled children. In fact, a child is defined differently in different statutes, in
keeping with the purposes of the legislation.996 I argue that present-day legal definitions of the ‘child’
present problems to mothers with disabled children in public and private law. For example, some such
legal definitions bar them from obtaining needed support in private law, as in the Vivian and in J.M.S.
cases discussed below.
Mothers who cannot obtain adequate support from the state or from another parent may ‘agree’
that their child is in need of ‘protection’ when in fact, their child or they, themselves, are only in need of
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support.997 The myth of protection hides what is taking place with respect to disabled children and how
money can be made available to them. Likewise, mothers may ‘agree’ with the state that their child is “in
need of protection” even though everyone concerned knows that the child is in need of a residential
placement, either short-term or longer term.
Where women and law are concerned, the use of the concept of ‘protection’ has historical
relevance. Kalsem states that the rhetoric of protection was central to the doctrine of couverture, asserting
that in law, protection ultimately refers to “misery and oppression.”998 Although this reference is drawn
from a different historical context, and that of matrimonial law, the use of law to ‘protect’ articulated in
other legal domains has been historically problematic for poor woman and disabled people. Certainly, the
Ontario Ombudsman’s Report, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Parents Forced to Place their
Children with Severe Disabilities in the Custody of Children’s Aid Societies to Obtain Necessary Care,
would indicate that this is still the case, in at least this circumstance. In his report, mothers’ despair is
exposed in every case where child protection was offered to caregiving mothers, who sought only
support.
Accompanying the evocative myth of protection is the equally powerful corresponding myth of
the failed mother, to which I have referred previously. This myth may be theorized to have arisen as an
ableist invasion into the patriarchal institution of motherhood, a notion that corresponds with Freire’s
colonial “cultural invasions”, which introduce myths to produce a particular form of consciousness.999 In
the setting of my project, failed mothers are those deemed unable to provide the level of care for disabled
children set by the state. Mothers placing children into state care are seen legally (and often, socially) to
have failed as mothers. The aim of the myth of protection is to present the state’s version of protection,
and to ensure mothers remain reluctant to seek it as a form of support.
Child protection has a punitive edge to it, a feature so integral to it that one barely thinks to
question it. Mothers of disabled children in need of placements, but faced with the myth of a need for
state protection, will have internalized the shame of failure. This myth is so powerful that I suggest
mothers will risk other personal and professional losses in order not to be cloaked with it.
I now move on from the point made above that it is the state that constructs disabled children in
need of care as children in need of protection, to a related point. It is that once the protection finding
process is underway, or has been accomplished, serious legal conundrums arise, and these conundrums
have been pointed out by litigating mothers themselves. I interpret this as a move by them towards critical
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consciousness. Thus I posit that mothers in the two cases I examine below may be seen to have moved
out of magical consciousness, a mental state reflecting a sense of powerlessness, to one where mothers
understand that contradictions in law are mechanisms that serve to oppress.1000
As noted previously in Chapter Two, under the heading of Methodology, Freire posited that
oppressed persons had to leave this mental state in order to enter the state of critical consciousness in
which change could be sought. Interestingly, judges in both cases I discuss below were confronted with
“good” mothers whose demands for support challenged the firm boundaries of child protection law, but
who claimed their legal right to support (by way of care in both instances) anyway. In a sense the judges
in these cases had to grapple with the myths apparent in these two cases. Justice Ann Molloy in the first
case, J.M.S.1001 , challenges, in her dissenting judgment, a legal myth in the CFSA, which requires a child
to be in one of two legal statuses (child of the marriage or crown ward). Justice Sheilagh O’Connell in the
second case, J.A.1 and J.A.21002 , grapples with the CFSA as well, resisting a simple reading of what order
she can make for care.
J.M.S. v F.J.M. involved a separated mother with two children who sought child support for her
disabled son. He had a severe disability and had been made a temporary ward of the province for periods
of time in 1996 and again 1997. In 1998, he was made a crown ward.1003 A crown ward is a child whose
parents, by order of the court, no longer provide care or make custodial decisions for the child.1004 An
agreement between the mother and the child welfare agency was appended to the 1998 order for Crown
Wardship. It set out that the mother was to provide $80 of her Federal Child Tax Credit to the Children’s
Aid Society, which she did. This is the Provincial government clawing back a Federal benefit to a single
mother with a severely disabled child. The access agreement with the child welfare society stipulated that
the mother would have her son home with her and with his non-disabled brother every other weekend, at
Christmas, for March break and for half of the summer vacations. The legal arrangement made was access
at the discretion of the Society pursuant to s 61(5) of the CFSA.1005
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The evidence showed the mother incurred child related costs of about $550 a month. There was
no contribution from the child’s father, who argued it was the state’s obligation to support his son (he did
not see a reason to support his child). The mother’s position was that their sons should not be treated
differently from one another. I note that her view is in accordance with family law policy, which
purportedly has child support set at a quantum to ensure that children with separated parents can maintain
the standard of living they had prior to separation, and not have one well-off parent and one poor parent
and so too for children. I analogize this ideal in matrimonial law to what occurred in J.M.S, where there
was a poor disabled brother in state care and a better off non-disabled brother at home living with his
mother. This was not the analogy the court chose to employ however.
The majority in J.M.S., in making its decision not to order the father to pay child support for his
disabled son, reminded the mother that she was in the position of a non-custodial parent in a typical
separation. She has access to her son. The court did not therefore perceive any support obligations owing
from the father to the mother. In practice, even though the state took over as “the mother” (if we use the
analogy of the majority), the fact remains that the biological mother continued to provide significant
unremunerated maternal care, housing, disability support and financial support. The reasoning in this
case, based on the legislation which I argue likens the mother to a matrimonial law access parent in
relation to the state as custodial parent blurs the public-private divide in a judicially unorthodox way.
Perhaps this is because there is no legal way to consider the needs of this group of mothers and children.
Moreover, the question that arises is if the state is the custodial parent, and the biological mother is the
access parent, where then does the biological father fit in this scenario? If the mother is described as a
parent with access rights to the crown ward, how ought one to legally describe the relationship of the
father to the crown ward? The fact is that the caregiving mother and the father do not share the same
relationship to their child in care. She is still caregiving and doing so unremunerated. There is no legal
term for what she is in law. The experience of the mother in J.M.S., and the facts of her case, “are not
subsumed within the traditional boundaries” of the law.1006 Indeed, they are not subsumed by law at all,
for its provisions do not anticipate mothers like her, which is the larger point being made here.
Respectfully, the majority decision reflects an ongoing problem for caregiving mothers, which is
that facts (in this case caregiving and support related) must “fit” within legal boxes. The order for
wardship issued several years previous to this hearing was in regards to disability care, although it had the
trappings of a child protection case. Having been deployed, I argue that the protection myth caused the
court to misapprehend the nature of the mother’s relationship with the ward in state care. For example,
Justice Meehan opined that “[e]xercising access to the child, no matter how laudable, is not having
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custody and control of the child.”1007 The mother’s actions to remain active in her disabled son’s life are
framed as “good behaviour,” conduct that is to be praised, but that is clearly divorced from caregiving
mothers’ rights to support.
In family and child welfare law, there are different support-of-child regimes. Where a child is
made a ward of the state his or her support falls within the (public) purview of the province. Where a
child’s parents are separated, and the child is legally “a child of the marriage,” child support is usually
payable (privately) to the parent with whom the child is primarily resident.1008 Although J.M.S. was heard
towards the end of the era of SNAs in Ontario, it was not a SNA case, because, pursuant to those
agreements, parents could retain custody of their disabled child, and that was not the situation in J.M.S.
This case challenges us to consider the myths at play.
The J.M.S. court stated that in law there is an entitlement to support from either the state or the
father, but there was no entitlement to support from both, which was what this mother and others like her,
require.1009 This case centred on the issue of in whose legal charge was the disabled child; he was held not
to be in the charge of his parents.
The claim for child support in J.M.S. brought by the mother of a disabled crown ward, existed at
the intersection of child welfare and family law.
This case lends itself to an application of Crenshaw’s1010 intersectional legal lens, although not in
the same sense of the examples Crenshaw provides. Crenshaw examined the judicial treatment of the
intersection of specific kinds of claims pursuant to Title VII cases under the American Federal Civil
Rights Act.1011 In so doing, she was able to demonstrate that the refusal of those adjudicating rights
claims to recognize that black women experienced combined sex and race discrimination. In her analysis
of such cases, Crenshaw showed that it was possible for courts to adjudicate cases where women were a
special class and cases where black men were a special class, but that they were unable to recognize civil
rights discrimination at the intersection of the two, where the plaintiffs were black women. She posited
that the approach taken vis-à-vis the class of women was based on white women’s experiences and the
class of Black litigants, redress was based on the experience of black men. She claimed that such an
approach obscured the intersection where black women claimants were situated.1012 Crenshaw’s theory
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brilliantly showed that a ‘one size’ fits all in the law (women, blacks) was itself vulnerable to racism and
sexism and as a result certain women were left unprotected under the Act.
Although the circumstances of caregiving mothers and the courts they bring their claims to are
different from American Title VII cases, I argue that there is likewise an invisible intersection with legal
implications that need to be recognized so that caregiving mothers can recognize their right to support.
This issue was illustrated well in J.M.S. where the claim for child support brought by the mother of a
disabled crown ward resided at the intersection of two distinct areas of law and two distinct pieces of
legislation, child welfare and family law. The issue on appeal was whether a parent who does not have
custody or charge of the child is entitled to guideline child support.1013 In this case, the mother sought
child support from the father, but he claimed his son was ineligible for it, because he was a ward of the
state. What was learned in this case is that is the claim to support for a child, a disabled one, was simply
unobtainable under the particular facts of the case. Neither family law nor child welfare law is set up to
meet the support needs of mothers like the one in J.M.S. who continue to provide care.
Notably, Justice Molloy, in her dissenting judgement, stated that she did not agree that a child
found to be in need of protection and care from a Children’s Aid Society is not necessarily also a child of
the marriage pursuant to the Divorce Act. She stated that in situations such as the case at bar, courts must
look “at the particular context” of the child in order to determine whether the child’s support-seeking
parent can be seen as retaining her charge of the child, even though the child has been made a ward of the
state. She opined that the reason for this was that wardship was based on need for treatment and care by
reason of the child’s severe disability and not because of any child protection needs.1014 Madam Justice
Molloy may not be technically correct based on prior understandings of the meaning of “charge,”1015 but
she is thinking outside the box in opining that a contextual analysis was called for, and that such an
analysis would lead to the very conclusion at which she arrived. One could say that the majority relied
upon a legal fiction to adjudicate J.M.S.
Legal fictions also arise in the setting of child welfare legislation, which defines the child in need
of protection. One protection finding a court may make is on the basis that the child has been
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abandoned.1016 In the setting of disability, the abandoning mother is a powerful myth, and indeed, it is
counterfactual in child welfare law, where the abandoning mother is constructed in non-abandoning
settings. It arises where severely disabled children require residential placements, while also having
caring and highly committed mothers. The abandoning mother myth (and its accompanying legal
practice) arose, I argue, in direct response to women violating the ableist and patriarchal norms set for
caregiving mothers by privatizing neo-liberal administrations in the second half of the 1990s. Expected to
provide long-term heavy care, largely alone, caregiving mothers of severely disabled children have since
persistently demanded care supports from the state. In Ontario, the “support” offered to them has come in
the form of a legal finding of child abandonment through child protection legislation. The myth of the
need for state protection and its corollary, the myth of maternal abandonment, have great significance for
disabled children and their caregiving mothers alike. It is one in which the state’s “contempt” for mothers
who claim they can no longer provide care to their severely disabled child is made plain. Freire states that
emergence into a state of critical consciousness brings about the discovery that the oppressors are
contemptuous of the one emerging.1017 I suggest that the way in which mothers have been treated by
provincial governments who used this avenue to provide care has played a role in furthering changes in
how caregiving mothers view their circumstances.
Drawing again from the notion of critical consciousness, I suggest that a caregiving mother may
leave what was formerly shared consciousness; that is to say, a structure of consciousness described by
Olsen as comprising a ‘shared vision’ of the social universe as one that shapes the view of what
relationships are natural and what reforms may be achieved.1018 The mother in this case was aware of the
legislation, had problematized it in relation to her circumstances, and then rejected it.
In The Children’s Aid Society of Halton v J.A.1 and J.A.2, the mother moved into a different legal
awareness of her circumstances.1019 In this case, the mother of two engineered her own disabled child’s
apprehension, and then she engaged with the myth of protection in her court materials.1020 She did so,
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even though it appears she did not agree with the child welfare practice of requiring caregiving mothers to
consent to a child protection finding in order to access care.
The facts of J.A.1 are that both of the parties’ children had been in the primary care of their
mother from the date of separation. During 2009, the father had been exercising access to both of his
children at a supervised access centre, on a family law court order issued on consent. In 2010, the child
was “apprehended” by the regional children’s aid society because the mother could not care for their
disabled child, M.A., at which point the parents consented to undergo a custody and access evaluation.1021
The circumstances of the mother at the time of the staged (by the mother) apprehension are set
out in the case as being in the setting of the deterioration of the child’s behaviour, believed to have
occurred with the end of his behavioural therapy and the start of a new program. The decision states the
mother had funding for two respite workers “to assist” with treatment and with care of her child. At the
time of the apprehension, the mother was working with one respite worker and with her own mother in
caring for the child. In spite of having three other adults to assist with care, the evidence of the
pediatrician1022 was that in the setting of behaviour becoming increasingly difficult to manage, the mother
was exhausted, frequently breaking down in his office. The physician’s evidence was that the care needs
would not be solved with week or weekend respite, and that the family had exhausted all of its resources.
He recommended placement, given the lack of adequate state supports.
The child (M.A) was “apprehended” after his mother brought him to a hospital emergency room
and informed a physician there that she could no longer care for him, leaving him there so that child
welfare authorities would be alerted. He was placed in a residential treatment program and a child
protection application was brought against the parents. The affidavit the mother provided in response
stated that the principal of the school, the IBI therapist, and the primary respite worker all supported the
plan of care she put forward, which advocated for a residential placement. The mother’s materials
explained that the school board had consulted its autism expert and had repeatedly called the mother to
collect the child from the school because of difficulties. The materials also set out that the grandmother,
the mother herself and two respite workers had been caring for the child.
In the initial motion to apprehend, the Society agreed with the mother’s position that the child be
placed in a residential program for seven months as a ward of the Society. As the decision notes, on return
of that motion, the Society had changed its position, seeking instead to place the child in temporary
custodial care with the father, with the supervision both of the father’s parents and subject to society
custodial domain that involves being a health care provider to ones very sick child. As such that reality remains
unadressed.
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supervision1023 The mother did not agree to this newly proposed plan of care. In the end, the court held
that as the child’s “primary caregiver was unable to care for him, even with the assistance of two primary
respite workers, and at the time of the apprehension, the assistance of one full-time respite worker and her
mother” and given that “professionals involved in M.A.’s care have recommended that he be placed in a
permanent residential treatment home that will meet the special needs of a child with severe autism that is
where he should be placed.1024
A finding was made under s 37(2)(b)(i), which is Part III of the Ontario CFSA dealing with child
protection. Subsection (i) is for a finding of abandonment. Demanding and reframing the nature of the
support she sought, the mother brought attention to what she submitted was the mischaracterization of the
reasons for the placement of her son into a residential facility. Her position in this matter is in the court
record and was reflected in the decision. The Judge’s Endorsement in this matter states:
In its protection application dated November 29, 2010, the Society seeks a finding that M.A.
has been “abandoned” by his mother… It is not in dispute that M.A. was in the Respondent
mother’s care and charge at the time of the Society’s apprehension of the child. The
Respondent mother does not agree that she has abandoned M.A., but rather that she was no
longer able to care for him.1025
This mother had recently left a violent relationship, she had health problems, and she had a job that she
needed in order to support herself as a sole-support mother with another child to care for. She was also in
the stressful process of placing her child in residential care, and being forced to do so through a combined
domestic and child welfare court proceeding. Yet, the legal finding of abandonment of a child, whom she
was in the active process of supporting in a great many domains, troubled her enough to raise it in her
Reply to the Child Protection Application served on her.
This mother makes it clear in her submissions that she was not abandoning her child. This is
significant as she was asserting that the use of a legal fiction to describe her actions was unacceptable to
her. It is also significant that the Judge included her perspective on this point in his decision and I argue
that this inclusion was purposeful. This mother was an excellent coper who found herself in an untenable
set of circumstances where her child required care she did not have the expertise or resources to obtain or
provide. While I do not have her Reply, or her accompanying affidavit, the text of the decision suggests
1023

J.A.1. supra note 1019 at para 21
J.A.1, supra note 1019 at para 44, The child’s disability is described thus in the Endorsement, relying on the
father’s Affidavit this time and it states that the child was severely autistic only able to communicate by pointing,
using gestures and sounds and as having violent behavior.
1025
Ibid at para 2. My emphasis.
1024

194
that this mother, through her legal counsel, both problematized and resisted the myth of her alleged
‘abandonment’. Where Scorgie and Sobsey’s1026 approach might label this mother “a bad coper,” the facts
of the case indicate otherwise. Since she had developed the ability to discern the legal counterfactual that
named the inability of four adults and a teacher to cope with the required level of care as ‘abandonment’,
she was able to understand that her deep commitment to her child was being framed legally as just the
opposite of that. She understood, however, that she had to be complicit in the legal fiction of her alleged
abandonment in this policy setting, in order to gain access to services. She determined that it was in her
child’s best interests for her to engage in this disturbing process.
This oppressive pathway to accessing state care (in the setting of a state that does not want to
provide it) corresponds with Freire’s observation respecting duplicitous aspects of oppression. The
abandoning mother forms part of an ideology, one that undergirds motherhood in general, but which is
more pernicious towards mothers in its ableist manifestations. Failed, bad, and non-coping mothers
abandon; coping, successful, and good mothers do not. In comparison, the abandoning state does not
receive such a harsh condemnation. Where caregiving mothers are concerned, their competence and value
appears to be constructed through binary opposites, with (bad) abandoners as one construction and
exemplary mothers as the other. Both are oppressive, with maternal deprivation and maternal exploitation
taking place respectively.
Having reviewed the myth of abandonment, I now turn to examine its counterpart, maternal
exploitation.
Myths of Equality
I mention McCrea v The Attorney General of Canada and The Canada Employment Insurance
Commission1027 here because until the need was perceived by mothers to bring this lawsuit many of them
may have seen themselves as “equal” to other federal employees. McCrea involves Canadian mothers
who brought a class proceeding against the federal government in 2015 concerning state support
(monetary benefits) to mothers with infants on care leave. This case has something important to say about
how mothers involved in intensive caregiving are sidelined in support law having to do with medical
disability. It also has information to share, which is that leave to care for children who have become
“disabled” must be for children who are temporarily so.
I have addressed the literature about motherhood as an institution in earlier chapters and this
literature should be borne in mind in the case of McCrea. This is because the facts of McCrea and how
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government has responded to them, underscore the point that the care mothers provide, and the support
they need, continues to trouble law, including law put in place by government to provide support. McCrea
is useful because it calls on us to consider mothers may not be able to care, for a variety of reasons. And
law should be responsive to that.
The facts of McCrea are that mothers on maternity leave who became sick, some lifethreateningly so, applied for Federal disability benefits, which were denied. The reason provided was that
they were receiving maternity leave benefits.1028 This disentitled them to sick leave benefits. The aim of
the mothers was to certify a class action proceeding against the Canada Employment Insurance
Commission. Although based on several claims, only one claim was certified and that was for negligent
implementation of the Act in question. One aspect of the negligence they claimed took place was the
pattern of denials of sickness claims by very ill mothers on maternity leave;1029 this pattern of denials
continues.1030 Early on, the government settled with some employees in the dispute, and it removed a
clause in the benefit scheme that was problematic.1031 This case has correspondence with some others
cases I discuss in this thesis in that supports mothers who provide care continue to remain invisible in
law.
McCrea had contributed to the EI program, had a baby, and received maternity leave payments.
However, she became ill while on maternity leave, and applied for sick benefits, but her request was
denied. She brought a claim arguing that the strict interpretation of the Act, which required that a sick
benefit-recipient be available for work during coverage, was restrictive and that government was
negligent in its refusal to allow the sick benefits to sick new mothers. She pointed out that sick pregnant
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workers could access the 15 weeks of sick leave followed by maternity leave under the legislation, but
that statutes excluded new mothers with medical disabilities/illnesses.1032
Some other problems arise as well. Since McCrea was certified as a class action, the federal
government has passed the Helping Families in Need Act.1033 This Act contains provisions based on
compassionate grounds and critical illness, a positive addition in the area of support. In this regard, it
offers a maximum of 52 weeks leave for care of a critically ill child. However, this is not the same thing
as a provision concerning care for a chronically ill or severely disabled child.
A point made in the literature review (with reference to the work of Cheryl Gibson) is that critical
care may be accommodated by society, but chronic care presents a problem. In this benefit scheme, the
definition of critically ill child provided by government excludes a child who is always severely disabled.
A critically ill child is defined as “a child who has a life-threatening illness or injury, that can include
various acute phases of illness and for which continued parental care or support is required. This does not
include a child with a chronic illness or condition that is their normal state of health. There must be a
significant change from the child’s normal or baseline state of health at the time they are assessed by a
specialist medical doctor.”1034 This support policy to mothers sidesteps the issue of what happens when a
worker gives birth to a severely disabled infant. If she had a critically ill baby, one wonders if she would
have difficulty accessing the additional benefit. Either way it may not be easy to access support.Tellingly,
the name of this Act is more evocative of charity than it is of maternal entitlement. In terms of federal
government opposition to the caregiving mother’s negligence claims, Stephen Moreau, legal counsel to
McCrea, has stated, “We are talking about individuals who were ill, sometimes quite seriously, while
trying to take care of their children…It’s quite shocking.”1035
McCrea (like the case of Cynthia Harris discussed elsewhere) offers an example of how working
mothers’ state supports fail in the setting of severe illness or disability. It is an example that invites one to
consider government’s rejection of the claims to support in the convergence of disability, mothers, infants
and care.
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The Myth of Ordinary Mothers
A feature of oppressive structures is that they hide the very features that oppress. In the setting of mothers
with severely disabled children, state policy hides extraordinary disability-related and medical care
mothers of severely disabled children provide.1036 It presents such maternally complex care as an
extension of ordinary mothering. The responsibilities of extraordinary “mothering” set unreasonable
expectations on mothers’ performance of complex care and set the bar unattainably high for mothers with
severely disabled children, irrespective of circumstances. Making such structures visible is one aspect of
mothers’ legal activism.
The myth of ordinariness arises in the workplace in the sense that the failure to properly
accommodate caregiving assumes extremes of maternal extraordinariness. Many mothers and their
advocates are conscious of the fact that women’s rights in the workplace have advanced such that
childcare obligations must be accommodated as a matter of provincial and federal human rights law.1037
Decision-makers are called upon to protect caregiving mothers from discrimination in this domain.1038
The Ontario Human Rights Commission has published a manual with its policy and guidelines on
discrimination due to family status. This publication provides an example of a working caregiving mother
requiring accommodations in relation to her disabled child.1039 Yet, in the setting of severe disability in
childhood, the mechanisms of oppression mothers experience remain firmly in place.
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This is evident in Cindy Moore’s case, Siemens Milltronics Process Instruments Inc v Employees
Association of Milltronics,1040 as one exposing the power of the myth of maternal extraordinariness and
tied to that, the myth of the failed mother.1041 In her case, societal myths proved too strong to overcome
the workplace guidelines pertaining to mothers with severely disabled children, even though the right of
caregiving mothers to accommodations in the work place is included in the Ontario Human Rights
Commission policy manual. These guidelines and the mother’s own litigation materials ought to have
together persuaded the Arbitrator that Ms. Moore ought to have been accommodated, but she was not.
The Arbitration decision solidified Moore’s inability to realize her legal right to support.
Turning to the facts of this case, two claims were brought by Moore in Siemens Milltronics, and
heard in arbitration. Moore alleged that her employer had breached the Collective Agreement and the
Human Rights Code when it refused to pay her for days missed while caring for her severely disabled
daughter. Her human rights complaint was for discrimination on the basis of family status.1042 The
company’s position was that because Moore had failed to work the regular, scheduled days preceding
holidays, and because the reason for her absences (emergency child disability care) was unsatisfactory,
she was not entitled to be paid for those days.
By way of explanation, Moore submitted that her husband had left that year and she was a solesupport parent. She stated that she had two daughters living with her, a 17 year-old in high school and
another daughter whose age is not provided, but who is noted to have severe medical disabilities. This
daughter attended a school full-time in what is described as a “special program”. Moore stated that she
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engaged a personal support worker (PSW) provided by her local Community Care Access Centre (CCAC)
who attended every weekday morning Monday through Friday for 1.5 hours to assist her daughter in
getting to school. After school, a different PSW was employed privately by Moore, and paid for with
external funding she received for her daughter from the province. When this PSW was not available to
work (the evidence showed she also worked at a nursing home and therefore had to juggle schedules),
then Moore’s own mother provided the care. Moore’s 17-year-old daughter also provided care. In short,
five women provided care to the disabled girl. The father did not provide care, nor had he been involved
with his disabled daughter since he left the family.
Turning to the workplace, Moore was a long-time employee who had worked for the company for
twenty years. She missed work because, according to her evidence, the school had called her December
22, 2011 to advise her that her disabled daughter was vomiting mucus and blood. Moore submitted that
these signs signaled that her daughter needed heightened care to avoid hospitalization. On December 22,
Moore asked both her mother and the PSW to care for her daughter, but neither one was available. She
advised her employer of this situation in advance of her missed shifts, making calls to her workplace,
where HR was informed. Moore cared for her sick disabled daughter including on December 24th. The
business was closed for holidays from December 24 to January 2. In response to her missed days, the
company did not pay Moore for December 25 and 26, 2011 and January 1, 2012 as a result of her having
missed days of work during the vacation period. In the decision, it is noted that Moore had been absent
19% of the year rather than the 14% of the time allowed in the collective agreement. The decision states
that the company was understaffed during the holiday season due to employees taking pre-approved
vacation leave. This was found by the adjudicator to be an “important consideration with respect to the
company exercising its discretion to accept additional reasons for employees to be absent on qualifying
days.”1043
Arbitrator Stout, having jurisdiction over the human rights claim as well, reviewed what he
referred to as new and evolving case law on family status and concluded: “accepting the proposition that
any employer action, which has a negative impact on a family or parental obligation, is prima facie
discriminatory is untenable.” He commented that attendance at work interferes with family
responsibilities, but that “requiring work in exchange for compensation is a reasonable and bona fide
requirement.”1044 This statement may be vaguely sarcastic, but it also ignored that Moore was working at
home providing complex care to her ill disabled daughter without compensation, a feature that on the
facts of this case, placed her livelihood in jeopardy.
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Mr. Stout’s next opinion was that it is not the mother who was ill, but rather her disabled
daughter, stating the mother was medically able to attend work, but did not do so because she did not
have child care. He concluded that the reason for the mother’s absence was not linked to her inability to
work, but due to her inability to obtain care for her disabled child. He stated the mother had “some
control” over finding care for her disabled daughter, but added, “Unfortunately, no one was available...”
More importantly, he states, she had already exhausted her leave entitlements, including those of
emergency leave.1045 The result was that this arbitrator found there was no discrimination in response to
her allegations that the company breached the collective agreement and the allegation that the company
breached the Ontario Human Rights Code family status provision.
The Moore case presents a number of problems. One is that the arbitrator contradicts himself in
his reasoning. The fact that Moore was vulnerable to having no childcare meant that she had no control
over arranging her affairs to obtain assistance in providing for her disabled daughter, at least on these
occasions. He further stated that he saw Moore was in a difficult situation as a single mother with a
severely disabled child, and was sympathetic “with her predicament” (author emphasis). Another is the
normative opinion rendered by the Arbitrator. He stated that all children become foreseeably sick and that
the difficult choice faced by Moore was no different than those that other parents face where there is a
conflict between work and family obligations, adding “That is why parents must plan for such situations
and why emergency leave provisions exist.”1046 The arbitrator was focused on her leave entitlements, and
could not envisage her as entitled beyond them. The comment made that the attendance policy of the
company was “important” around the holidays with respect to the company exercising its discretion is an
interesting one in light of the fact that the company chose to do so in the direction of punishing the
mother of a child with a severe disability, by withholding pay.
The issue of what is the best approach for adjudicators to take in family status cases was
addressed in an Ontario Bar Association employment law publication subsequent to the Siemen’s
Milltronics decision. The author of it states that the test seen to be most suitable is whether there has been
serious interference with a substantial parent/child obligation such that that protection under the
provisions is engaged. There must be a “substantial obligation” with respect to the care requirement.1047
An important issue that remains unaddressed however is whether health care for a severely disabled child
will fall easily under what the author calls an amalgamated approach. In such an approach, protections
under family status are engaged where a 'substantial obligation' must be in the nature of a care
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requirement, and not the employee’s preference on how such care should be provided.1048 Arbitrator Stout
did not appreciate this distinction, and he is not alone. Moreover, where a non-disabled child vomiting
mucus and blood at school is framed in the workplace as an excusable parenting emergency, for Moore
and others like her, it is a common concern.
In Siemens Milltronics, the arbitrator sympathized with the employer, “read in” Moore’s
circumstances as comprising undue hardship to the employer and therefore beyond the extent to which
accommodations to a parent legally must be made. The implication to be drawn is that Moore failed to
manage her circumstances well enough, and the message that this case sends is that employers can punish
mothers with severely disabled children who miss work because of a risk of a child’s hospitalization
and/or lack of disability care. In fact, Moore’s daughter has cerebral palsy and hypomyelination, the latter
described in the case as akin to Multiple Sclerosis. This care situation is far from what other parents
typically plan for in relation to their work. Thus, once again, one can see the challenges posed by the
myth of extraordinariness (other mothers do it) and the myth of the failed mother (she planned poorly)
applied in this decision to a caregiving mother trying to realize her legal right to workplace support.
Siemens Milltronics is not that different than the case involving Cynthia Harris, which I discuss in
detail elsewhere.1049 Briefly, Harris, a newly disabled mother with a severely disabled son, found herself
outside the recency requirement of the federal disability benefit scheme by virtue of having had to care
for her son longer than anticipated. She was unable to satisfactorily show that she had been discriminated
against in the recency requirements as they were applied to her, a situation Hansen and Turnbull1050
describe as adjudicators just not “getting it” where motherhood and disability intersect.1051 This “not
getting it” can make caregiving mothers’ lives impossible, as the next example reveals.
In Chapters Three and Four I referred to maternally complex care and the requirement placed on
caregiving mothers to perform extraordinariness and later I discuss the myth of the extraordinary mother.
Joyce Dassonville litigated for additional provincial disability support in Dassonville-Trudel (Guardian
ad litem) v Halifax Regional School Board litigation.1052 I suggest that Dassonville emerged into a state of
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heightened awareness when she subsequently commenced a proceeding for judicial review in the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court when she recognized that the way the government was dealing with her need of
support was unreasonable. The facts of her case are that she had three children: two with disabilities, with
her daughter, Dominique, being severely disabled. Dassonville initially applied for funding in 1998 when
Dominique was three years-old. At that time, she was advised by the program-administrator that her
income as a lawyer disqualified her from receiving such benefits. In 2000, Dassonville left her law
practice when Dominique was five years old, which is when non-disabled children start kindergarten.
When Dassonville left her career to provide care, she became eligible for provincial funding, to be
facilitated through a SNA with the Nova Scotia government. This is because the agreement was subjected
to means testing and guidelines for allocation of funds. In June 2000 Dassonville was awarded $300 per
month for respite care and diapers. Dassonville believed that the support she received from the Ministry
was insufficient. She thus in July 2000 she requested additional funds, and itemized for the department
her daughter’s annual needs. These needs included a speech pathology report ($4,000), respite care
($47,000), travel and accommodation expenses to attend autism information events ($3,600),
modification to the home to ensure the daughter’s safety ($6,250), additional money for her special diet,
and so on.1053 Dassonville claimed she needed $71,000 a year for the itemized respite care alone.1054 In
response to her itemized request, in August 2000, her funding under her agreement was raised to $600.1055
The case does not opine on what that $600 was intended to cover. That is roughly one-eighth of the cost
of the speech pathology report, which is a medical report. It is obvious that this allocation is not a
“sharing” of the costs of complex care between a mother and the province. The discrepancy in these
numbers provides evidence of the struggle respecting needs interpretation within the domain of disability
that takes place between support-seeking mothers and the state.1056
Dassonville’s application for increased respite care was denied. Disagreeing with that
determination, she appealed internally through the Ministerial Appeal Panel, but the denial of an increase
was upheld. She sought writs of certiorari and mandamus respecting the process involved in the denial of
her application for increased levels of funding by the ministry.1057 She knew that the government was not
providing her with something to which she believed she was entitled.
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On review, the court found the bureaucratic decision-maker with carriage of her file had
incorrectly treated the policy guidelines as representing a barrier to a higher award of support, when in
fact they did not.1058 Indeed, the court held that there had been an “irrational application” of the guidelines
by government.1059
Notably, Dassonville had added constitutional claims to her application for judicial review,
alleging that the province’s refusal to provide her with adequate funding for Dominique was contrary to
her both her and her daughter’s rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1060 In the judicial
review proceeding, the appellant mother and child were awarded costs and the decision was quashed and
sent back to the government for a redetermination.
Respecting Dassonville’s inability to practice law when confronted with weak state support,
Kiran Manhas comments: “Ms. Dassonville continued to have to forgo a skilled career outside the home
to facilitate the family’s eligibility.”1061 Manhas also observes that the government’s calculations of
entitlements in Dassonville represent a “gendered devaluation of care,” which was visible in that
province’s responses to this mother’s urgent requests for support.1062 It also reflects a devaluing of her
need to earn money to ensure her future economic security. In fact, Joyce Dassonville was an
extraordinary and highly competent lawyer, managing to engage in protracted litigation on her own
against government lawyers, while caring for three children, two of whom were disabled.1063 She was not
in possession, however, of the ability to do what the province expected of her, which was to fund and care
for Dominique on her own.
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Dassonville, and others bringing claims like hers, may be challenging newer myths, as well as
established ones. A discourse that emanates from disability rights about community living is that it not as
expensive as the alternatives. Certainly, community living arrangements may not be as expensive to the
state as are the known alternatives, but this is not true for caregiving mothers. The high dollar amounts
for disability-related care needs tallied by mothers in their legal submissions are disturbing to those
advocates aware that the government is already reluctant to support persons with disabilities. Those
advocates who downplay the real costs of disability care at home seem to want parents to assume that
responsibility.1064 However, I argue that approach demonstrates reliance on a middle-class, male
breadwinner, heterosexual family model, and I do so without suggesting that it is suitable for caregiving
mothers even in that ostensibly more stable family context to be responsibilized as they are. It is less
messy for the disability rights community, already struggling for meagre supports amid dwindling
interest, to remain silent respecting the state’s approach to caregiving mothers, which is to expect that
mothers will do the heavy lifting and bear the economic burdens of care in respect of their/our severely
disabled children.1065 In shying away from the fact that the heavy lifting I refer to may include forms of
extremely costly care that, when performed in the home, to quote Laura Rosen-Cohen, “crush” caregiving
mothers,1066 government and advocates do not advance the rights of children with severe disabilities.1067
It is significant that Dassonville did not agree with the only other option the state presented to her,
which was to place Dominique in state care.1068 It is the mother in this case who shielded her child from
the state’s suggestion that Dominique give up her right to live in a family environment, and she did so at
great personal and professional cost to herself.1069 Thus, mothers are put in the position of having to
choose between their own support and the broader support needs of their disabled children, and in so
doing, may relinquish their right to support themselves.
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Dassonville sought to uncover the legal “truth” as to her purported ineligibility for a greater
award of support for Dominique. She had an appreciation that her rights under the Charter were infringed
by government conduct in her case.1070 The reality, regardless of rationale, is that state gatekeepers try to
deny higher levels of support.1071 Thus the so-called irrational feature of government decision-making
noted by the appellate court in this case was not entirely irrational. It was, however, unjust. Part of the
reason why this policy approach may not appear unjust or harsh to many is because it is presumed all
along that mothers will take on the burden of care, in the way Bombeck celebrates, as a form of sacrifice
(charity). Bombeck’s writing about the qualities of mothers with disabled children described earlier reads
like a fable in fact.1072 Fables are fictional stories, but caregiving mothers who require support live in the
real world.
Myth of Political Leadership
In many cases where courts find they ought not to provide a remedy for what is determined to be
decision-making of the executive branch (policy-making), litigants are reminded that the legislature is the
place where a mother’s focus should be directed. Experiencing Canada differently, mothers with severely
disabled children have made complaints to their MPPs and their Ombuds about the many problems with
which they live.1073 Dissatisfied with their inability to acquire appropriate levels of service or funding
through public policy, mothers have taken political avenues to bring about change. An example of this
was seen in the efforts of Miriam Edelson.
Edelson was a union representative for the Public Service Alliance of Canada, the union
representing federal public service workers.1074 She used her skills to protest government cutbacks and
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closures respecting services for disabled children in the mid-1990s. According to Edelson, she did so as a
matter of justice.1075 She states she was assured by government that adequacy of community services was
an important consideration in decisions respecting closures.1076
Edelson queried whether it was best to lobby the then Minister of the MCSS, Tony Silipo, or the
NDP Caucus. She stated at one point that “fighting for our kid’s rights to services is a way of life.”1077
Released from what Freire calls shared consciousness, one myth Edeslon appears to have recognized is
that of purported state largesse. She chose to go public, by contacting her member of parliament to
support her in having the Toronto Star publish government plans to cut back funding of supports to
disabled children and youth. She also attended the provincial legislature. When former NDP leader, Bob
Rae, put questions about disability supports to (then) Conservative Cabinet Minister, Dave Tsuboushi,
and he would not answer them directly, Edelson stood up in the gallery and shouted “You’re going to kill
my child!” and was subsequently removed from the legislature by a security personnel.1078
Edelson’s actions were reminiscent of those of the suffragettes who preceded her, who likewise
sought to politicize what the state sought to keep in the domestic sphere, where the scope of women’s
legal interests could be better constrained.
My purpose in summarizing mothers’ past claims is to convey the breadth of maternal litigation
for support, as well as to underscore the point that the problem is political in origin and must be political
in its resolution. Moreover, the law can be part of the solution. Issues arise in areas of private and public
support and in a mixture of the two, in the areas of healthcare, funding, placements, respite, and other
areas. This summary is not exhaustive. Mothers have asserted the right to: a fair procedure;1079 support
and review of a decision;1080 accountability in the provision of nursing care and reimbursement for
payment for private home nursing care;1081 a shared care agreement with the state;1082 no discrimination in
employment based on Family Status;1083 no denial of a disability benefit as a result of caring for a child
with a disability;1084 entitlement to a tax deduction or tax credit;1085 insurance of an existing obligation on
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the state to support their disabled child will be in existence in the future.1086 In pursuit of their rights,
mothers have sued the state when promised existing support is not available in the future;1087 sued for
increased levels of and to reinstate former levels of funding for respite care;1088 refuted a finding of
abandonment;1089 sued for a higher quantum of spousal support in the setting of mothering a disabled
child;1090 sued for spousal support while also working full-time and able to self-support when caring for a
disabled child;1091 sued for spousal support as a result of being the sole caregiver to a disabled child;1092
sued the estate of a deceased mother to defend against the claim of a father who sought not to have to pay
extraordinary expenses as disabled child support;1093 sued for entitlement to receive both adult child
support and state income supports simultaneously;1094 sued for an entitlement to receive child support for
a disabled child who is also a Crown ward;1095 sued to have a court prevent government from clawing
back private avenues of support when also in receipt of state support;1096 and sued for never married
mothers’ ability to make the same claim for adult disabled child support as do married and divorced
mothers.1097 I note that not all of these legal actions were of the same ilk. Some were made pursuant to
statutes and some were not. Sometimes claims were properly brought or defended under the statutory
support provision, while other times it was a case of the mother trying to make her facts fit the legal
provisions for support. Other claims challenged statutory support provisions that excluded certain
caregiving mothers. In other of the examples cited above, rights-claims were made where mothers
perceived a support right was denied them, but was accorded to others as being unjust. Again, at times
they struggled to make their facts fit the provisions in question. This accords with what was described in
the introduction, which is that mothers with severely disabled children seek support via rights available
under statutes, benefits and those they believe ought to be accounted for in law, but are not.
The presence of such diverse litigation points to oppressive structures, which are set up to
discourage caregiving mothers from fighting for any support they need beyond the meagre quantum the
state may discretionarily provide under uniformly oppressive policy regimes. These cases highlight the
point that even when they are eligible for support, mothers may be denied it. In such cases, mothers battle
for support one woman at a time.
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It has been pointed out that “individual gain does not change the structure of the system itself, nor
underlying attitudes…”1098 and as such, these “wins” have limited value. The reality is that the social and
legal expectations placed on mothers to provide a range of health care services, disability support, and
other forms of care to sick or disabled children, no matter how onerous or costly, cannot be changed one
legal dispute at a time.
Although on the surface it may appear that the main thrust of cases brought across domains in
public law has to do with a range of issues, what is at the heart of them is the degree to which caregiving
mothers have been responsibilized for care by the state. This is particularly challenging when another
prevailing myth is that the Canadian welfare state offers more than sufficient to support those in need of
it. These cases also give lie to the presentation of the benevolent state, a powerful myth exposed in the
litigation of mothers with disabled children as untrue. This myth requires that mothers disprove
something that is not the case. In the next section, I address the myth of state largesse to illustrate some
the problems in this area as well.
Myth of State Largesse
Many still think of Canada as a generous welfare state, with conservatives believing it to be overly so.
Here, I introduce cases showing that mothers, and sometimes, even disabled children themselves, must
fight for even meagre levels of support. In our system of disability supports, caregiving mothers may need
to attend court to contest decisions concerning even minor forms of support they require.
In Brazeau v Canada, a Tax Court of Canada case heard in Quebec in 2010, the mother appealed
an assessment of her return under the Income Tax Act. 1099 She was assessed as ineligible for the child
disability benefit for her son. At the time, the government had decided that the time spent caring for the
(medically) disabled boy was less than the required threshold of 15 hours per week in order to be eligible
for the tax credit.1100 Acting on her own behalf, the mother explained the care requirements of her son as a
result of his medical condition, which was Type 1diabetes. By providing a summary of the time she spent
maintaining a balance between her son’s hypoglycemia and hyperglycemia using insulin injections, she
argued that his care requirement was considerable and met the established threshold to qualify for the
benefit. Maintaining the balance was challenging because her son was involved in sports, which affects
blood sugar levels.
The dispute concerned the exact amount of time spent daily on care, with two healthcare workers
giving evidence and providing slightly different estimates. The court opined that the calculations used
were arbitrary. Although the court appeared to be satisfied with the mother’s evidence, the government
1098

Gilmour & Martin, supra note 933 at 372.
Brazeau v Canada, 2010 TCC 546, 2010 DTC 1377, [Brazeau].
1100
Ibid at para 4.
1099

209
asked the boy to testify himself as to the amount of time spent on his condition-related activities. In his
decision, Justice Tardif remarked “I have no reason to dismiss the testimony of the appellant's son; he
seemed very credible to me, and moreover, the respondent likely granted the same quality to the young
man, as he testified at the respondent's request.”1101 The court held that that the appellant was eligible for
the child disability benefit for the months claimed by the mother and ordered her not to have to pay costs.
There is something inherently distasteful about this case. The credit is only available to parents with
children under age 18, thus, a medically disabled minor was called to testify in a proceeding by a party
adverse to his mother, who is the very person who provided and oversaw his care. It is also a case that
underscores the quintessentially relational aspects of caregiving mothers and their disabled children in
support law. Mothers have to be prepared to “do battle” with government lawyers. It is widely understood
that caregiving mothers advocate. What is not always appreciated is that doing so in legal settings actually
comprises a part of their burden of care.
Some disputes, like Brazeau and the case below, reveal the zealousness of the opposing party to
prevent litigants from getting the support they seek. A government that purports to support the rights of
disabled children, and to be concerned about maternal poverty, must question why cases like Brazeau
arise. Such cases provide evidence of wrongful and aggressive refusal of entitlements to state support,
which is not state largesse.
There are other examples of government putting obstacles in the way of mothers with severely
disabled children in need of support. In response to a provincial government decision, the mother of a
disabled child was put through a protracted and complicated legal dispute in her quest to obtain increased
state support in N.S. (Community Services) v E.M. Determined to access greater than six hours of respite
every two weeks from the Nova Scotia Department of Community Services for Persons with Disabilities
Program (the SPD Program), she sought additional funding through a provincial respite program.
To appreciate the particulars of this case fully, consider this: there are 168 hours in a week, and
many caregiving mothers are on call for all of them. In this case, the government was willing to provide
coverage for three out of every 168 hours, and would not waver from this determination. On the mother’s
internal appeal (ministerial review), the decision to deny respite funding was affirmed. Respite was
denied on the basis that the child already received above the maximum amount of time permitted under a
departmental Ministerial policy directive. The court decision relates that “she” sought respite funds under
the Employment Support and Income Assistance Act, also unsuccessfully. ‘She’ is presumably the mother,
and not the child client. This is not a minor point, for it begs the policy question of what respite is, and for
whom it is offered. Technically, the respondent child was the client of the SPD Program, not the mother.
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The mother appealed that decision to the Assistance Appeal Board (AAB). When the AAB
awarded the mother a modicum of additional funding for respite, the province brought an application for
judicial review of that decision on four different grounds. The state was determined to cover every
possible avenue to prevent paying additional support. At the appellate court, Mr. Justice Murphy
summarized in respect of the appellant mother as the mother having only limited respite of a maximum
six hours every two weeks. The judge noted the letter from the physician indicating potential health
problems for the mother if she did not get sufficient respite and mentioned also an affidavit expressing
this. He noted also that the evidence indicated that there was no alternative care facility1102 available in
this area at that time.1103 Of the Province’s position, Mr. Justice Murphy summarized that the Department
stated that they had reviewed the application under the wrong program, and were now asserting that
respite is defined as time away from providing care, meaning the caregiving mother’s time at paid work
qualified as respite.1104 The implications of this are that mothers must deal with a legal institution (the
Ministry and its governing legislation and policy) that will not stop short of making unfounded arguments
in order to deny litigants support.
The affidavits of mothers who bring claims to court do not directly form part of the sources
drawn upon in this project, however portions of their affidavit evidence appear reproduced by judges in
their decisions.1105 In its reasons for dismissing the application for judicial review brought by the
Department of Community Services of a decision of the AAB,1106 the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia held
that the government’s application for judicial review should be dismissed. The court examined several
issues closely,1107 and concluded that the government department had erred in how it had assessed the
mother’s application, as well as in its characterization of the policies available to support persons with
disabilities. The court held that the policy was specific in allowing additional respite and support, and it
pointed to a 2006 directive, which stated that policies and regulations were not to be overridden. The
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court also noted that the directive was advertised, commenting the mother had relied on it to increase her
respite. The Court added that the AAB decision not to admit new evidence should not be disturbed.
The situation in this case demonstrates that even though there was a new policy, the provincial
bureaucracy continued to try to subvert the mother’s legal claim, which is an important broader point.
Given its mandate to provide support, why it engaged in this litigation ought to be critically queried. The
tricks and traps commonly used in litigation were brought to bear, as seen with the province’s allegation
that the AAB had misinterpreted the meaning of respite in its decision to increase funding.1108 The
government’s audacious assertion that respite time calculated under its program included when the
mother was away from her unpaid complex care and included the time she spent at her paid work reveals
a level of unreasonableness that is hard to fathom.1109 The government pursued this approach even though
respite is clearly defined otherwise in its own departmental Direct Family Support Policy.1110 A woman
faced with this situation could not but acquire a changed awareness of her position vis-à-vis the state.1111
To summarize, in an effort to prevent this mother from accessing a few more hours of respite, the
government: (i) attempted to alter the meaning of a legally defined word specific to the provisions in
question; (ii) tried to circumvent the government’s own respite policy directive respecting allowable
increases; (iii) reframed disability support as somehow welfare; (iv) presented its argument from a
hypothetical perspective of the applicant daughter residing in a home, rather than in the full-time care of
her mother; and (vi) acted against a mother in need who had health problems and who was seeking a
benefit to which she was entitled. In this type of setting, mothers learn to problematize how the law has
been applied to them and their disabled children. In so doing, they discredit government and uncover the
myth of state largesse, along with any notions of state benevolence they may have had.1112 In the present
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culture surrounding mothers who need support, the work is not to apply for support, but to figure out how
to wrest it from officials tasked with “protecting” the public purse.

Myth Surrounding Enforcement of Support
The purpose of this chapter is to expose a series of prominent myths in the area of public law as it affects
caregiving mothers. The rationale for doing so is to show that although supports may appear in statutes,
and may be widely assumed to exist in the culture, it does not necessarily flow from this that such support
will be realized by those in need of it. However, although private law support is legally separate from
public law support, there is interaction between them. An example of this is where mothers rely on the
state to enforce their private law support arrangements. I refer to separation agreements made by the
parties and court ordered child support or child support orders issued by the courts on consent of the
parties.
In Ontario, the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act1113 governs the
province’s collection of support from those payors in default and mothers who have made arrangements
with government to collect their support. Section 7 of the Act provides 11 circumstances in which
enforcement may not take place. The reasons provided overall appear reasonable. For example, where
enforcement is of a nominal amount, or deemed to be impractical, or where the payor is in prison for five
years or longer; where the recipient cannot be located, or where the payor is receiving Ontario Works or
ODSP benefits child support, enforcement is not required. The problem is that outside these particular
reasons that stand between mothers and child support there are others that defy satisfactory explanation.
Not mentioned is how much legal aid is willing to pay to chase an absconding or delinquent payor.
Based on the quantum of arrears across Canada, I argue that there is a lack of state resources put
into child support payment enforcement by the same governments who state they expect children to be
supported through private child support obligations. The failure of the provinces to comprehensively
enforce support represents a failure of public law support to mothers.1114 This is not only a failure
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domestically, but it also breaches international law. Art. 3.1 of the CRC stipulates that “In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.”1115 When considering what can only be called a myth in relation to comprehensive
enforcement (collection), one must question what happened to the disabled child’s best interests? As
noted in my literature review, disabled children are costly children. Art 2. 2 provides that States Parties
undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into
account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible
for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. One of
the duties of the other parent legally is payment of child support owing, in its different forms. A state
serious about support would do more. The problems associated with child support are particularly galling
in the setting of the medically disabled child, whose costs of care may range from high to astronomical.
Myth of Accessible Health Care
That government supports the healthcare needs of Canadian citizens as a matter of course is a view shared
by many. Yet, as noted, in the current era mothers with severely disabled children have been tasked with
the performance of challenging forms of health care. As noted in the methods section, legal cases provide
valuable information about disability care. Although core healthcare is to be funded by the state, in family
law cases, insights into the challenges in this area may be found.1116 I refer to the following case here as it
sets the stage for my discussion of another case, one concerning provincial homecare. These two cases
ought to be read together as they present a picture of how myths may interact. Remillard v Remillard
involved appeals from orders for child and spousal support related to the support of a severely disabled
child. In it, the child, “E.”, who had medical conditions such as chronic infections and seizures and had
been hospitalized many times, was described by the trial judge as requiring unique full-time care. Having
raised a child with chronic life-threatening infections myself, I can attest to the difficulties regarding
complex forms of care this mother encountered.1117 Of note, the parties’ second, also medically disabled
child, had died two years after the separation. While the case refers to the parents’ commitment to the care

arrears are attributed to fathers. If this is correct, then some mothers are in arrears, too. Yet, Premier Wynn is quoted
as stating the problem is not as grim as this statistic suggests. With respect, I disagree. This calculation of arrears is
taken from court orders that were filed with provincial child support enforcement agencies. These arrears represent
only a portion of child support payment arrangements made between parents. Therefore the $3.7 billion figure
actually represents only a portion of the arrears in child support owing today.
1115
CRC, supra note 880, art. 3.1.
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Discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
1117
See also Remillard v Remillard, 2014 MBCA 101 at para 33, 310 Man R (2d) 204 [Remillard]. E. required
pummeling on her chest and respiratory medication throughout the day. Her throat also needed to be suctioned
throughout the day and she required tube feeding four times a day.
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of E. during the marriage, the father qualified as an engineer during the marriage, while the mother had
not worked outside the home nor obtained further qualifications since E.’s birth. It is the mother who
provided extensive evidence about E.’s health needs. Remillard unveils legal and societal expectations
concerning all forms of care embedded in family law; it is that health care is maternally performed,
alongside the harsh and unrealistic expectation of maternal economic self-sufficiency, should the former
breadwinner object to support.
An issue addressed on appeal in this case was the trial judge’s statement that “[t]he Divorce Act
places the legal obligation on [the mother] to work towards self-sufficiency”. She held that “at some point
in accordance with this obligation, it was incumbent on [the mother] to begin the process of becoming
self-supporting.”1118 Even though there was ample evidence about the health care needs of E. before the
court, and even though this is not what another case, Moge v Moge,1119 stated regarding women from
longer-term marriages, (which the appellate court decided 16 years to be), I argue the presumption seen in
this 2014 case is rampant in many such cases.1120 Note however that Moge did not discount the idea of
striving for self-sufficiency but confirmed it as one element under the Act.1121 Moreover, interacting with
this mythical presumption are the forms of health care, as explored in Remillard, which support this myth.
With respect to the mother’s obligation to become self-sufficient the trial judge reviewed evidence given
by third parties1122 that E. was entitled to 50 hours of caregiver support a week given the nature of her
condition, and that she may be entitled to more. The conclusion drawn was that this caregiver support
would permit maternal economic self-sufficiency. The reality behind this and other such claims about
‘available’ care were that the mother only had at most 20 hours of care per week, and not reliably enough
to satisfy any employer she could work.1123 What is astonishing about this case is the trial judge’s
comment that since the mother “has a thing for clothes” she could work in retail and that since “she also
has first-hand knowledge of the care of the disabled” she could find work in that field.1124 Presumably she
meant working as a personal support worker for another disabled person, if she got the training, if
someone would hire her, if she could leave the house and do so reliably. The mother’s healthcare
activities for E. were seen by the trial judge as obligation-avoidance in the setting of separation but as
comprising suitable work in the setting of the public domain. Remillard serves as an example of the
fallacy of the private/public divide in the setting of a mythical accessible health oriented care. One ought
1118
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to bear Remillard in mind when considering the shortfalls and administrative problems in state provided
homecare care revealed in the next cases I examine.1125 They reveal that legal expectations that caregiving
mothers work to fully self-support must account for the realities of outside care provisions.
What is taking place in public law provisioning in the area of homecare in Ontario may be
described as politically volatile. As the literature showed, many mothers have brought their situations
forward to media. LS v Community Care Access Centre Perth County was a homecare case brought in
2004. LS is a valuable case in which the mother raises important issues. It concerns the homecare services
for a 14-year-old girl with a rare genetic condition, and her mother.1126 The facts are that the girl had been
approved to receive the then maximum number of nursing hours allowed under the Long Term Care Act
of 19941127 and Regulation 386/99. It was an agreed fact that the appellant had not received the number of
nursing hours to which she was entitled, eligible and approved for. In her 2002 appeal regarding her Plan
of Service the mother listed cutbacks to her daughter’s nursing care, and asked to have the hours restored.
The mother’s (daughter’s) revised grounds of appeal are illustrative of policy problems that create
hardship for mothers.1128 To summarize, on appeal, the mother sought: an increase of night shift hours to a
maximum of 7 nights of 9 hours per night (she stated she needed 63 hours a week which was more than
the 53 RPN hours per week the regulation permitted);1129 incentives to encourage nurses to take night
shifts and remain longer on a case; the implementation of a back-up plan with the hospital so that booked
CCAC nursing shifts for medically fragile children’s services need not be cancelled; case management for
both night shift and school coverage with greater expertise in these sorts of cases; reimbursement to the
mother of money she spent to pay for night shifts that were within the responsibility of her CCAC;
authorization to hire RPN’s in addition to the RN’s for 4 hours in evenings, as respite should the MCSS
continue with SSAH funding; hiring of more nurses by the CCAC in Perth so that her daughter’s nurses
were not so frequently reassigned and so frequently alternated with the cases of other medically fragile
children.
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See Marcy White’s article, “Lack of Accountability in the Health Care System” HER Magazine (3 November
2016) online: <http://hermagazine.ca/lack-accountability-healthcare>, is an example of the administrative
nightmares one Ontario mother is battling.
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Long Term Care Act, SO 1994, c 26, it has since been renamed the Home Care and Community Services Act, SO
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This case draws attention to shortages of nurses and therefore homecare services.1130 While
nursing hours are made available by the province in its policy for children with complex health care
needs, in practice there were insufficient nurses for eligible service-approved children. That policy and
practice do not match is important information, for it is here that another question of accountability and
state obligation arises. Of note over a decade after LS, this situation has not changed. What makes LS an
interesting case is that the appellant mother did not simply complain about low levels of service, poor
organization or weak coordination of services, she theorized as to reasons why her and her severely
disabled daughter’s needs were not being met by the provincial health care system. Furthermore, she
attempted to link services covered by the hospital, which she saw as more reliable, with unreliable nursing
services in the community. She offered ideas of how to improve services in the setting of what she
believed to be funding shortages. She had therefore extensively problematized the barriers she and her
daughter had faced and suggested alternatives to the CCAC. Problematization is part of praxis, which
may lead to critical consciousness. After a review of the mother’s revised ground of appeal, the Health
Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) dismissed the appeal, finding the CCAC did not treat the
Appellant as ineligible to receive service, nor decide that a service would be removed from her plan. The
HSARB also noted that no decision had been taken by the CCAC respecting the amount of service to be
included in her plan of service, nor to terminate the provision of service.1131 However, I note this is beside
the point as her/her daughter’s eligibility for service was not the issue, the failure of the CCAC to provide
the approved level of nursing care was the issue.
Other statements of the HSARB reiterate the problems identified by the mother at the policy
level. The Appeal Board acknowledged in its decision that the CCAC was not filling the at-home nursing
shifts, but it did not address the presence or absence of the CCAC’s legal obligations to do so, nor the
ramifications to the mother in its failure to do so. The Appeal Board accepted the submission of the
CCAC that it is “making every effort” to provide nurses under the care plan, and did not find CCAC
derelict in its duties towards the appellant. This begs the question as to what exactly those duties are. The
Board was legalistic in its explanation of the mother’s circumstances, an approach that allowed it to step
away from the facts, which provided evidence that the support needs were not being met, irrespective of
the intention of the CCAC to do so or not to do so.1132 This case makes clear that the administration of
nursing services are not structured to meet the mother’s or the child’s care needs, but rather to facilitate
1130
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and protect those administering them. It also points to the uncertainty mothers live with respecting
nursing care. Even though the Appeal Board accepted that this girl “requires a great deal of care and
support,” that issue was not the focus of the case; the technical aspects of what regulations do and do not
provide were the focus.1133 This is telling as these defenses to the allegations take precedence over other
features, such as how the girl’s health is or how the mother is managing this crisis.
There are indications in the reading of LS that this mother had been demanding, having made
suggestions, and having refused to receive personal support workers--whom she believed needed greater
expertise-- instead of nurses. Her position was understandable, given that even now, little is known about
Progeria, her daughter’s rare condition. This mother is a caregiving pioneer in a maternal wilderness.1134
In their research on complex paediatric homecare Manhas and Mitchell state: “Mothers were attributed
with extraordinariness given the range of burdensome responsibilities they completed as well as their
approach to such completion … occasionally extraordinariness was negatively viewed as aggressive.”1135
Maternal extraordinariness was indeed assumed by those professionals mentioned in the decision
(managers, nurses), as well as by the Appeal Board Members. The assertiveness of the mother in this case
may also be seen as evidence of a willingness to engage in conflict, which is something Montero states
those with acquired critical consciousness are prepared for as a result of the push provided by their
restructured consciousness.1136 In this dispute, the push came in the form of a mother fighting for
professional care for a medically fragile child for whom she was responsible in a system she perceived
and which this decision demonstrates, failed to fulfill its obligations to provide approved nursing care.1137
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Although I have made my point, which is that health care has been unavailable to caregiving mothers in
forms they articulate are needed, I nevertheless provide a final but important case to underscore the point
that government has not cooperated with mothers’ efforts to access care in the past.
Auton v British Columbia also illustrates an aspect of the myth of comprehensive health care.1138
In Auton, parents, along with their children with autism, sought to have the British Columbia Ministers of
Health, Children and Families, and Education, fund “treatment” for older autistic children. The first
named party was the Minister of Health. As noted in the later litigation, the province sought to “dehealth” the government’s benefit provisions to autistic children, by taking them out of the responsibility
of the provincial Ministry of Health and reassigning them to another Ministry. In spite of that, the Auton
litigation has retained its characterization as a healthcare lawsuit. In rejecting the claim, the Supreme
Court of Canada noted that the province did not hold out that it funded all medically necessary required
treatment, only those insured core services, limited to physicians and hospital care. The court also pointed
out that the province had discretion not to do more than that.1139 The difficulty is that the mothers of many
children with severe medical disabilities find that they are the ones responsibilized for medical care as a
result of how health care is now being defined and apportioned.
At the time that the Canada Health Act came into force in the 1980’s, there was legislation in
respect of the institutionalization of disabled children, and autistic children were routinely
institutionalized.1140 While the model of care has been shown not to have accorded with children’s rights,
the fact remains that state-funded care was the norm.1141 This is not the case now, with mothers largely
replacing the state in providing support to disabled children. This means that the state withdrew its
monetary support from these children, and the fact that the model of care the state funded was highly
unsuitable does not change the fact that expensive childhood disability support were once in place in
recent past. Tuohy, a health policy theorist, suggests that health policy changes when rare windows of
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opportunity manifest, but that often internal policy constrains states from making changes.1142 At the time
of the aforementioned Auton decision, cutbacks in social and health care spending and structural reform
between the federal and provincial governments resulted in privatized care. Meanwhile there was no
expansion of what the CHA requires provinces and territories to pay for, and which remains focused on
physicians and hospital services. Provinces have the discretion to decide to fund other types of health
services, or not. Arguably, the ideology of privatization, at the intersection of the influences on policy
Tuohy mentions, pulled the most weight.
Conclusion
My critique of public law supports for caregiving mothers with severely disabled children has shown that
a variety of factors prevent mothers with severely disabled children from advancing and securing legal
rights to support. These include the vast public monies dedicated to government litigation compared to the
meagre financial resources of litigating mothers, the presence of broad discretion in interpreting support
policies of the state, and the prevalence of conservative bureaucratic approaches to supports. It also
includes unequal power to bring and defend claims for support, and other extra-legal features such as the
impacts of myths that circulate about caregiving mothers, and that are embedded in law and in approaches
to resolving legal disputes.
In my next chapter, I address mothers’ efforts to assert claims to support through private law and
private law’s interplay with and co-dependence on public law. Not only does public law require mothers
to pursue private avenues of support, but government makes efforts to use that support to claw back what
the state provides. Therefore, caregiving mothers may find themselves in two or more contested
proceedings simultaneously in relation to support.

1142
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Private Lawsuits
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I examined caregiving mothers’ legal efforts to access support from government
and the obstacles they encountered. I presented as obstacles a series of myths that get put into play in
legal proceedings and that may stand in the way of mothers’ rights to public support being realized.
In this chapter, I examine mothers’ efforts to obtain support from private parties, rather than from
government, and I do so by examining cases from across provinces and jurisdictions, dating from the
1980s. I examine caregiving mothers’ family law claims to support, as well as support claims brought in
other areas of civil litigation. Again, I do this by critiquing as myths assumptions in law that get applied
to mothers with disabled children. These myths either play out implicitly, or they are explicitly deployed
by opposing parties.
In the previous chapter I named and examined myths encountered and resisted by caregiving
mothers in public law. These myths revolved around issues of maternal autonomy, child abandonment
and child protection, equality, ordinary motherhood, political leadership, state largesse, state enforcement
of support and in the area of health care. There is some overlapping of myths named in chapter six with
those named in this chapter, however some of the myths are unique to the private sphere. In this chapter I
address primary myths as follows: that caregiving mothers are like other mothers and should and can
become financially independent as quickly as possible; that the measure for support of the normative
child has applicability to all children; that security for sole-support caregiving mothers is possible without
robust state support because family law provides support; that actual co-parenting can occur in settings
where children have severe disabilities and that the other parent can be assumed to lessen the care burdens
of sole caregiving mothers; that caregiving per se is not materially different than mothering; that disabled
people are not fully adults; that disabled people ‘take it easy’; that the welfare state is robust and generous
towards caregiving mothers and disabled people in accordance with its obligations and as such, family
law support need not be paid.
None of these myths are grounded in reality. Yet, they get told by law and through law, about
those who are seeking support, over and over again, in the course of negotiations and litigation. The aim
of the myths seen in private law is to ensure that a version of care that responsibilizes mothers to the
greatest extent possible is upheld. That way, the realization of rights to support remains remote and it is
largely the mother who will bear the costs of such support.
Another part of my argument is that some mothers gain the awareness that their lives as
caregivers have been mythologized, and that myths are used against them to influence the course of
justice. Consider for example, the conservative value that support of children ought to be dealt with in the
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private sphere. In this context mothers naturally and self-sacrificingly provide care. When this value is
leveraged in law, care burdens may be rendered invisible. Myths, such as that it is natural for women to
mother under all circusmtances, do much ideological work in the support cases I examine involving
mothers with severely disabled children. The damage to caregiving mothers and their disabled children is
evident both from the inside, where such myths are embedded in legislation, and from the outside, as they
appear in the submissions made by payees and their legal counsel. Rather than it being a given that heavy
care burdens require extraordinary support, the onus of rendering burdens of care visible is on mothers
and their legal counsel. These myths, as I show, damage mother’s claims even before they are put in legal
documents, and they may continue to damage their claims to support throughout legal proceedings.
Feminist legal scholar Mary Jane Mossman points out that if social problems are characterized in
a manner that does not reflect reality, state policies will not solve them.1143 I have shown how the state
characterizes disability-related care as a benevolent and gendered responsibility. If state provisioning is
not likewise benevolent, as it purports to be, then its representations of care are inaccurate. Myths buttress
state positions as to whose obligation it is to provide disability care to children. Freirian theory holds that
myths are used to subordinate, and this, I argue, can be seen in private support law and policy. As this
chapter will show myths that appear in family law also corral maternal and child legal claims for support.
They also serve to mask truths about need of support, and as such they further allow untruths about need
to be deployed in submissions by those who seek not to support mothers with severely disabled children.
Mossman provides the example of government having determined the social problem of lone
mothers and their children living in poverty as best solved through private law. She states that the solution
to the problem of support of children was found in the creation of Federal Child Support Guidelines, a
government tabulation that, she argues, re-privatizes the social problem of child support as one of “deadbeat dads” (non-paying fathers). The myth is that if fathers would only pay, lone mothers and children
would not be poor. The cases I discuss below, weighed down by myths, show that private law is not an
answer to the poverty that may arise in the setting of disability.
The myth of the sacrificing mother is a harmful trope in the policy narrative of the burdens of
disability (discussed in Chapter Four). However it appears also in ordinary policy and in normative
mothering discourses as well, but not so blatantly. Child support purports to alleviate mother-child
poverty, which is seen as comprising private problem and which calls for private action to resolve. There
is a galling assumption that mothers do not object to this, when in fact we do. The reality is that nonsupport paying fathers are passively protected in their non-payment of state-imposed support obligations
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owed to mothers by weak state accountability mechanisms, and by a cultural tolerance for paternal
support-evasion. Non-paying fathers are tarred with the label of ‘deadbeat dad,’ something the state hopes
will shame them into paying support. However, statistics would suggest that the label has no such effect.
Mothers do not typically evade care obligations, which are an almost exclusively gendered form
of child support, although not seen nor tallied as such in law. As discussed in the literature review,
economists have found ways to measure the cost of support of a disabled child. These measurements need
to be incorporated into law, and valued.
Where family law support is concerned, I aim to show through an examination of the above-noted
myths, that caregiving mothers’ claims to support are ‘trapped’. This metaphor corresponds with Nancy
Fraser’s notion that structures of dependency are created by the capitalist welfare state, and are used to
contain the support needs of mothers as private.1144 This is in keeping with the political theory of the
welfare state of Nancy Fraser. She argues that struggles that take place over the denial of political status
of a need have validated as legitimate a political concern, so that it is not enclaved as non-political.
Arguably too, family law individualizes as financial pathology the support problems mothers with
disabled children bring to family court, and as such, family law bears similarities to the medical model of
disability, locating the problem in the persons to be “fixed”. In practice, some family lawyers encourage
support payor compassion, goodwill and guilt, not unlike the charity model.
Another aim is to show that family law offers a window into caregiving mothers’ lives. Counterintuitively, these cases are useful because they highlight vulnerability and dependency not only where
mothers have separated, but where they were partnered, as well. They reveal that some unions could not
survive the stressors imposed by situating complex care in the family. This challenges a position taken in
critical disability studies that refutes negative impacts of care provision to disabled children on parental
relationships. That view holds that having a child with severe disabilities has little or no effect on
relationship stability, or on rates of separation.1145 Family circumstances prior to separation vary, but
public supports remain consistently low, irrespective of that. This is true regardless of legal arrangements
between parents.1146 Disabled children live more often outside marriages, a fact also challenging the view
that unions are not affected.1147 Important information for policy is that what is already highly gendered
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care, may become exclusively so in the setting of separation. Those claiming that marriage is unaffected
by mothers’ unmet care needs ought to examine the literature that includes interviews in which caregiving
mothers recount information about their relationships with spouses, as well as the body of relevant family
law cases.
Family law cases also reveal why some caregiving mothers have involved child welfare agencies
in care. This addresses another debate within critical disability studies as to whether or not maternal
health is impacted by care in current policy settings. Family law cases can valuably reveal perspectives on
the obligation of the state or other parent to provide support.1148 Perspectives of those unwilling to pay, or
unwilling to pay more than they do pay, are fleshed out in legal proceedings.1149 Also exposed is that
some support payors rely on the inherent limitations in family law: for example, the ability to contest
quanta of extraordinary expenses, the ability to delay proceedings, and weak state enforcement of and
possible expungement of arrears as a means to avoid paying support that disabled children require.
Evidence given in such cases further demonstrates hardships mothers may encounter in such
proceedings.1150 Also relevant, in family court documents,1151 are claims made by payors as to the state’s
obligation to support their disabled child. These often omit the mother’s contributions, and on such
occasions, family court judges may usefully shine a light on mothers’ hidden care performance and the
implicit and explicit costs of the care they provide.1152 This is all ‘data’ that policy-makers ought to attend
to in considering support.
Fathers paying and not paying child support have been a focus of family law litigation generally.
Where for typical children, non-support paying fathers are seen to pose an obstacle to expressed state
interests in reducing child poverty, in the setting of disability, ways to privately shore up mothers’
capacity to provide complex care are looked to. Refreshingly, some family court judges have commented
on weak state supports and the ramifications of that on mothers rather than blaming mothers for ‘social
problems’ related to children having disabilities. In so doing, these judges play a crucial role in
confronting the deeply troubling myths that may otherwise block access to support, privately.
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Myths Encountered in Private Law Disputes
The aim in this section is to show what it is like for a sole mother to navigate the layers of complexity that
must be dealt with in order to access supports. At the heart of this complexity are the pervasive social
myths that circulate around mothers with severely disabled children. It is useful to examine the text of
legal cases to see who puts which myths into play, and why. This helps one to apprehend the work that
myths do and to see whether putting them into play in a court case has been successful or not. For
example, a party might rely on a myth as a vehicle to discredit the character of a support-seeking mother.
However in its decision, the court may be oblivious to the myth, play into it, or it may in fact challenge
the myth. Such an examination can aid in a better understanding of the harm caregiving mothers
encounter as a result of having to confront pernicious myths along the path to support. I now turn to
consider some examples of legal cases, which demonstrate the above noted myths, and how they are used
in litigation.
The Notion of ‘Private’ as Legal Myth
Family law, when described as ‘private’ law, presumes a civil law arrangement between individuals
dealing with a domestic matter away from the state. However, family law matters cease to be private
when child welfare becomes involved, or when the state is involved in collecting child support, or when
social assistance professionals are in court with mothers to ensure they are pursuing their child support
claims. Then, proceedings are subjected to state scrutiny and involvement. Thus, while the means of
support sought through family law are private, what takes place in family courts may be public.1153 Susan
Boyd and Claire Young state that, “the characterization of family law as purely private, or the notion that
family law exclusively regulates private relationships between individuals and families is out of date.”1154
Boyd and Young point out that its public aspect arises in that family law provides an arena for public
issues to be litigated. They refer to taxation,1155 child and spousal support, and constitutional law as
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examples of this.1156 As well, the legislative framework itself regulates families and in this sense it too is
public. The cases I examine below show that the boundary between private and public law is not only
blurred when caregiving mothers seek support, but traversed.
It has been stated that “[l]iberal theory has not traditionally acknowledged the extent to which
family policy and family law inevitably reflect political decisions and choices.”1157 Caregiving mothers
learn this through their involvement in family law. Through support claims, some caregiving mothers
challenge the political and even legal underpinnings of family law itself, consciously disrupting
definitions and legal terms of art, forcing courts to struggle with caregiving mother’s ill-fitting fact
patterns. Some seek to expand legal provisions that affect them, including in those domains overlapping
with family law, such as child welfare and social assistance.
Caregiving mothers have described the space where public support policy and private family law
support overlap as increasing their burdens.1158 This description points to a critical awareness on their
part, that the state does not recognize the value of disability care, and will battle not to have to provide or
support it. This framing also positions the state as hostile to caregiving mothers’ interests. Accordingly, I
argue that no family law case involving support for disabled people, age of majority or not, is truly
private. This myth must be borne in mind in the cases below.
The Masculine Myth of Independence
Another myth caregiving mothers confront in family law is that of independence following separation and
divorce. The majority of men are financially independent at separation. However, women who are also
mothers, and in particular, those with severely disabled children, are much less likely to be able to be or
become financially independent. Moreover, independence can mean different things, and the concept has
not been fleshed out in Canadian family law where caregiving mothers are concerned. The reality is that
rather than becoming financially independent after divorce, even many typical mothers go on to become
poor.
In addressing obstacles to a mother’s ability to become independent after separation, and referring
to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Moge v Moge, Turnbull states that excluding support
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payments, 74-percent of divorced women had incomes below poverty lines.1159 This reality is seen in case
after case, such as in the cases of high-functioning caregiving mothers like Diane King and Vivian
Courtney whose legal cases I address below.
Notably, as the literature review explored, disability adds to risk of impoverishment in ways
revealed in the cases I discuss. One of family law’s aims is to provide support, but it is not always able to
ensure that support is realized. This is its greatest failing where disabled children and their mothers are
concerned.
Regarding law’s failure towards women in general, the Hon. Bertha Wilson stated, “We have had
to face the fact that making women’s equality a reality, whether within the family or outside it, poses
complex issues incapable of a simple doctrinal resolution.”1160 Her statement is particularly apt where
caregiving and disability are concerned in family law settings. Family law was not enacted as a means to
support disabled children nor complex caregivers. It was designed with the normative family in mind. As
a result, caregiving mothers in making their claims for support, must try to ‘make do” with its underinclusive and absent provisions. The fact that this law is not “for” them, reflects their status
misrecognition. Family law is itself unjust in its omissions.
Much has been written about child and spousal support in the setting of the non-disabled child,
but very little has been written about support for severely disabled children and their mothers, other than
by family court judges in their decisions and a handful of lawyers.1161 For the severely disabled child,
family law disputes are largely about support, although disputes about medical treatment may take place
as well.1162 To varying degrees, it is disability support and healthcare that are in dispute in these cases,
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although this is not made manifest; consequently, care is treated as though it is ordinary mothering, and
therefore considered private in nature.
There is no family law doctrine in respect of mothers who provide health care, social care, and
disability support, often for their life or the life of their disabled child into adulthood. Since family law is
about parenting, and not about medical or disability care, medical care and disability support are
transformed into “parenting” in this area of the law. This feature ensures that caregiving mothers cannot
in fact achieve a measure of real independence at all. Thus, the autonomy rhetoric in family law is grossly
misplaced in relation to caregiving mothers’ family law claims.
Worthy of note amongst the words of mothers and judges in family law cases reviewed across
time and jurisdictions are those expressed in Dunham v Dunham.1163 Here the parties had two children, of
whom one had a severe disability. Dunham was a spousal/child support case. In it, the court held that “the
wife could not be faulted for not having implemented a plan for self-sufficiency. Moreover, to expect her
to handle more than she was presently handling might seriously impact on her ability to care for her
children.”1164
The Dunham court challenged the myth of independence, which relays the message that after
separation and/or divorce, men and women are economic equals, both able to continue into a new life,
unburdened by incurred responsibilities from the relationship. If this includes caregiving of, for example,
a chronically and severely ill child or youth, that ability to regain pre-marital independence is curtailed.
Buried within the independence myth is the derivative myth that care is an unimportant factor in whether
or not independence is reached by a given mother. Maternally complex care has no firm legal footing in
family law presently. According to the underlying myth supporting current family law, after separation,
women are emancipated and can continue to build their lives, unimpeded. This logic however fails to
accord with the realities of complex care or disability support caregiving women face after divorce. It is
fallacious to suggest that one can be emancipated as a lone female, under-supported, complex caregiver.
It is also to be remembered that family law support was put in place for among other things, to alleviate
child poverty. Child support is noted to have its own mythology associated with it. In fact, family law can
only be said to hope to alleviate family poverty, to some limited degree, in cases where fathers pay
consistent child support in amounts that make a difference. That is not a given, particularly in the setting
of severe disability. In fact, it may not even be a given in cases where there is a child with a mild
disability and the putative payor of support is wealthy. This information is relevant to a later discussion
about caregiving mother’s unique need of support.
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In the infamous Dickie v Dickie1165 case, the parties, who were married for thirteen years, had
three children. One child had a learning disability. The children lived with their stay-at-home mother,
formerly a nurse. At the date of separation, the father was earning $915,000 annually. Dr. Dickie decided
not to pay support, in spite of a family court order ordering him to do so. Lawyer Susan Heakes discusses
the prevalence of contempt of court in private support disputes and provides commentary on Dickie, In it,
a high income earning father was found in contempt of court for refusing to pay court ordered support.
Heakes states, “family lawyers see more contempt of court than others in the civil litigation bar. Spouses
who refuse to honour agreements and court orders are [she states] aggravating and expensive for clients
who respect the system.”1166
At some level, it is evident that family law operates in a culture that tolerates this. Caregiving
mothers have the right to bring a claim for support, however this right is qualified, as it can be realized
only where fathers are willing to pay1167 ; where they are not, the court and the state must be willing and
able to make them pay. Through lawyers, mothers can chase fathers, often at high cost and with dubious
success. Yet, where children are disabled, non-payment may be catastrophic.1168 Even with payment of
ordinary child support however, ‘independence’ remains in the realm of myth for many caregiving
mothers, unless they make their children wards.
Research findings indicate that all women experience major loss of income after separation.1169
Where women are caregivers this has enormous implications, particularly since spousal support is resisted
by support payors. Fortunately some courts, like Justice O’Connell in Dupius v Desrosiers1170 see with
clarity the concerns about caregiving mothers’ support. In Dupuis the father did not agree that he should
pay any spousal support. His position was that the mother was underemployed and fully capable of
finding employment. The court however included the following in its decision, “[t]he applicant has
primary care of a young severely disabled child with special needs which restricts her ability to find and
maintain employment at the current time”,1171 adding that this formed part of her strong claim for support.
1165

Dickie v Dickie, 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 SCR 346 [Dickie].
Susan Heakes, “Dickie v Dickie: Contempt in Family Law Proceedings” The Family Way (Canadian Bar
Association National Family Law Section Newsletter) (July 2007) online: CBA
<https://www.cba.org/CBA/newsletters/pdf/FAM-Dickie.pdf> at 1.
1167
“Ninety-seven percent of parents trying to avoid child support payments are men, and the problem of women
and children living in poverty following relationship breakdowns has been recognized by the Supreme Court.”
LEAF, “Dickie v Dickie”, online: <http://www.leaf.ca/dickie-v-dickie/>.
1168
Discourses of independence are placed on disabled children as well. At the same time, disabled children require
greater levels of supports to meet that expectation. Schools no longer provide all that disabled children require, and
mothers bring such issues to family lawyers to resolve.
1169
Celine Le Bourdais, Sung-Hee Jeon, Shelly Clark abd Evelyn Lapierre-Adamcyk. Impact of Conjugal
Separation on Women’s Income in Canada: Does the Type of Union Matter? 35 Demographic Research, Article 50,
1489 at 1489. Online< https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol35/50/35-50.pdf>
1170
Dupuis v Desrosiers 2012 ONCH CANLII 261 para 34
1171
Dupuis ibid at para 34
1166

229
Poverty is not emancipating, particularly for women with severely disabled children to support.
Even with this statistical knowledge, as Alison Didiuk points out, in making everyone ‘autonomous’ postseparation, actual interdependencies are forgotten or treated as though irrelevant in family law
determinations.1172 Such interdependencies should give rise to relational rights, but do not. This is
nowhere more true than where mothers with disabled children require support. Where the legislative
scheme views the caregiving mother as an autonomous agent and treats the child as normative, when he
or she is not, there is slippage between purported aims of the statute and what really happens.
The masculine myth of independence, which is that parties are independent after separation, hides
another reality that affects caregiving mothers child support entitlement. Some men lack the means to pay
child support. They may be recipients of state benefits such as Ontario Disability Support (ODSP) for
example. This benefit does not even provide a living income.
One can see here how myths interact, working together to prevent caregiving mothers from
realizing their right to support. It is to the myth of the assumed normative child that I now turn. This myth
remains pervasive in both public and private law, creating havoc with mothers’ claims.
The Ableist Myth of the Normative Child
For sole mothers with disabled children, there may be an opportunity to seek child support through family
law channels.1173 Where there is, it may be sought from the child’s father or from another man who has
been acting in loco parentis to the child. As well, privately ordered child support arrangements may end
up before a judge.1174
As alluded to already, child support is predicated upon the needs of the normative child. As a
technical matter, there are two aspects to support under the Federal Child Support Guidelines (FCSG).
There is the table amount of support, calculated based on the payor’s net income.1175 There are also addon support amount possible under s 7 of the FCSG. Table amounts of support are calculated without
reference to the needs of disabled children. Mossman, referencing Carol Rogerson’s review of decisions
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immediately following the Divorce Act, shows that table support fails to account even for the costs
incurred raising a normative child.1176
Another problem is the need for family lawyers and self-representing mothers to attend to s 7
expenses in the child support of severely disabled children.1177 This can be futile. Since the guidelines are
under-inclusive of the support needs of the severely disabled child, mothers may seek to have courts read
their additional needs of support into them or into the add-on support categories. As well “[t]he table
amount and sharing of s 7 expenses may not properly reflect the recipient spouse’s full costs of caring for
the high needs child.”1178 The Federal Department of Justice lists s 7 expenses on its website. It does not
include health-related care needs for a chronically severely ill or disabled child in this list.1179 As a result,
many of the costly health/care needs of severely disabled children are missing in add-on expenses.1180 As
such, s 7 often presents as legal loophole in the eyes of caregiving mothers.
Although section 7 of the Guidelines was amended in 2006 to provide clarification of how courts
and legal counsel are to deal with extraordinary expenses and special expenses,1181 there remains no
specific provision for severely disabled children and their mothers. Special expenses do relate to health
related costs, child care and medical expenses, but having to argue that the expenses of severely disabled
children or moderately disabled children ‘fit’ within categories is hugely burdensome and expensive if
payment is refused. It is laudable that under the new scheme the cumulative impact of extraordinary
expenses are to be considered and that special circumstances are structured to allow for courts to consider
each case on its particular circumstances, this does not translate into such health related costs being
ordered or being collectable. The norms in the FCSG are not easy to exceed and payors can simply state
they do not agree to the pay for s 7 expenses, even if they do not oppose the child receiving the service or
items for which the mother requests a contribution.1182 This amounts to an economic ‘free ride’ to use
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Nancy Fraser’s phrase.1183 The right to claim s 7 expenses is one of the weakest rights caregiving mothers
have and one of the most costly to get a contribution towards, so much so many caregiving mothers
simply do not bother.
There ought to be a section under the FCSG termed “the disability care contribution.” This
amount is neither ‘special’ and although ‘extraordinary’ in terms of their high cost, they ought not be
dealt with as though they fall into that category, as such costs are ordinary where disabled children are
concerned. Complex care is different from hockey equipment or ballet lessons.
In some jurisdictions, family courts have begun to acknowledge these shortcomings. In 2012, an
Alberta Bar Association paper revealed some courts opining that the child support needs of separated
mothers with disabled children exceed guideline amounts. This has been recognized in respect of spousal
support quanta too.1184 Having Bar Associations tackle the myths that surround caregiving mothers in this
way is helpful. This same paper observed that, “a child with special needs can affect the ability of the
primary parent to obtain or maintain full-time employment, meaning that the duration of support might be
extended beyond the time limits used by the With Child Support Formula (length of marriage/last child
finishing high school).1185
Such recognition from the Bar and in the case law presented by speakers at the Alberta Bar
conference, helps to undermine the myth of maternal independence in the private law setting as well as
that of the ever-present normative child. The point to be made is that problems in the difficult area of
family law supports are hugely magnified in the setting of support for the severely disabled child.
A final point in this section is on ablesit myths of the normative child in family support
provisions as has been noted in literature, that some payors cannot afford to pay support.1186 There is thus
the mythology concerning adequacy of child support to support mothers in need of it, however, the
implications of this myth amplifies where severe disability is present.
Myths of Security and Certainty in Law
The existence of family law litigation exposes the myth that family law will ensure the financial security
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of disabled children and their caregiving mothers. In fact, one of the reasons laws are enacted is to try to
ensure a measure of certainty in people’s financial affairs. Certainty is of interest to payors, and appears
to be a primary interest for many. It is also described as bringing finality to the pesky issue of monthly
payments. However, caregiving mothers seek security for their disabled children, over certainty or
finality.
The 2006 Ontario family law/estate case, McAdam Estate v McAdam demonstrates that s 7
expenses are important forms of private support. In McAdam, the parties were partially through their
divorce when Lynn McAdam, one of the parties, died. The parties had a 16 year-old daughter, Heather,
who had an intellectual disability. Heather’s legal guardians were her maternal uncle, Norman Willet, and
aunt, Sherri Willet, and not her father. A family court order required the father to pay for her
extraordinary expenses, which included her special needs worker, tutoring, summer camp fees, and a
LiveWorkPlay Program. The father was in receipt of a Canada Pension Plan survivor benefit as a result of
his wife’s death. He subsequently sought to have more than half of his disabled daughter’s s 7 expenses
be paid from his dead wife’s estate, which she had bequeathed to their daughter.1187
The court held that the $60,000 left to Heather was intended for her future care and ought not to
be depleted “in the face of Mr. McAdam’s ability, and primary obligation, to meet Heather’s
extraordinary expenses.”1188 The court held that to do otherwise would not be in her best interests. This
case shows that the mother was aware that Heather would require her support in the future. With her
mother’s death, Heather had an uncertain future. During her lifetime, Lynn McAdam argued that
programs for children with disabilities ought to be “special expenses” under s 7 of the FCSG. Although
she was successful in doing so, her estate faced a post mortem attempt by the father to unseat the court
order that the mother had put in place to protect their disabled daughter.
McAdam illustrates that even where private support has been legally arranged, disabled children
of caregiving mothers are at risk of challenges to it. The McAdam court agreed with the deceased
mother’s expressed wishes to provide security to her disabled daughter, to the extent that she could. The
myth of security is illustrated in this case as it shows how vulnerable to attack private support
arrangements are, particularly in the setting of childhood disability in cases where payors seek to reduce
or terminate support.
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The myth of security includes the idea that caregiving mothers can actually be secure under
present systems of supports and that family law is able to help ensure this.1189 One aspect of this myth is
the erroneous belief that once caregiving mothers have full-time employment, they will be able to selfsupport. As noted above, family law policy has yet to deal with employment expectations in the setting of
caregiving mothers.
The security myth is similar and tied to the myth of independence. It may be true that mothers can
find their footing in the labour market after their caregiving-influenced patterns of labour force
participation, but it is not a given, even with typical children. Where children do have less severe
disabilities, it may be the case that their mothers have managed to work and remain healthy while
performing maternally complex care. Whether or not this juggle is even possible depends on many
factors, some of which were explored in A.L.Y. v L.M.Y.1190
A.L.Y. is helpful because it shows that even where a caregiving mother has all that family support
anticipates -- her health, child support, a full-time job -- she still requires more support to function than do
others. To deny this is to deny the actual costs of disability and the effects of childhood disability on the
security of the mother. A.L.Y. was an application for spousal support brought by an Alberta caregiving
mother of a 13-year-old girl with multiple disabilities. She was employed full-time as a nurse and the
child’s father lived nearby. The child was in the interim custody of the mother with table amount of child
support being paid by the father. Although the mother worked full-time, and although she received child
support, she successfully obtained an order for spousal support.1191
In A.L.Y., the judge was willing to put disability support into court ordered support.1192 Ordinarily,
a mother working full-time with a well-paying position who is also receiving child support would not be
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able to show the requisite need of such support. This mother sought spousal support with the aim of
having it cover the cost of respite care she required. While the father submitted that he would exercise
access as respite for the mother, there were barriers to that. First, his new partner did not feel comfortable
around his disabled daughter, so access was being exercised in the home of his own father, who was ill.
Second, the father was an alcoholic who drank when his daughter was in his care. Although there was
child support being paid, a second parent on the scene, a potential stepmother figure and an incomeearning mother, this mother was effectively a single, working mother with a multiply disabled child in her
full-time care. Not everyone is fit to provide childhood disability care, but this does not mean the only
one who is should be responsibilized for all of it.
The court noted that the mother received some respite coverage for one weekend a month from
Handicapped Children Services, but that state respite was not available. The court held that when a place
did become available, the father was to pay the $200.00 per weekend and $40.00 charge for each
additional day of respite.1193 In reaching her finding, Justice Johnstone examined the respite care family
law cases.1194 In light of s 15(2) (6) (b) of the Divorce Act, which provides that the court may apportion
between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over
and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage, she determined self-sufficiency did
not preclude an award of spousal support on the facts of this case.
Her Honour’s interpretation in this case challenges mainstream understandings of maternal
autonomy, and does so in a way that supported this mother’s security and well-being, in a way usual
judicial interpretations have not. The quanta of support set out in support guidelines, as well as amounts
of support discussed in precedential and other family law cases, seems as though such amounts actually
do “support” and do not merely comprise a contribution to support in both normative child support and
where disability is a factor. In other words, she challenged the prevailing myth of security that I argue is
embedded in family law. The court opined that it is the wife who suffers economic disadvantage on
separation, based on the traditional division of labour in marriages, stating that the primary “economic
disadvantage generally arises from child care.” She added, “this is not the only vehicle by which a wife
may be disadvantaged financially” and in so doing, acknowledged that the care of a disabled child may be
another.
Finding that the aim of compensatory support was to compensate the disadvantaged spouse from
the effect that these sacrifices have had on his or her economic well-being, Justice Johnstone awarded
resulting from the marriage in Cosh. The Judge states “I recognize that Mrs. Cosh has assumed a loving and caring
role for Zachary. She is doing, and wants to do the best she can for him, to ensure that he receives the proper
treatment for his autism. She is to be commended for her hard work.” at para 151. Again we see mothers
responsibilized and the work of care unvalued beyond the value of praise.
1193
A.L.Y., supra note 1091 at para 21.
1194
Ibid at para 25.

235
spousal support.1195 She opined that child and spousal support are based on different principles, stating,
“Recognizing the financial consequences of the care of a child is not the equivalent of recognizing the
child’s own need for support, although the two concepts are obviously often closely related.”1196 She
added that child support is a mutual obligation of the parents that, like access, is owed to the child.
In awarding spousal support to a working mother in receipt of child support, Justice Johnstone stated that
the courts must examine the pattern of financial interdependence generated by each marriage relationship
“and devise a support order that minimizes as far as possible the economic consequences of the
relationship’s dissolution.”1197
In this case, then childhood disability then was seen to have significant consequences on mothers.
The court drew attention to a portion of the decision in Dickson v Dickson that, “[t]he provision of some
respite for Mrs. Dickson from the constant care of Christopher provides an example of financial
consequences to a spouse of caring for a child, over and above the direct costs attributable to the
child.”1198
This judge’s opinion should have far-reaching implications, as it addresses crucial issues taken up
in other important family law cases. In the literature review, it was shown that caring for a disabled child
is a social determinant of the mother’s health. In A.L.Y., we see it is also a social determinant of economic
survival. This challenges the myth of the lazy, unmotivated, or unambitious mother, and also the myth
that the costs of care of a disabled child can be easily absorbed with full-time work and modest state help.
Even in instances where separated fathers agree that a higher than table amount of child support
should be paid where there is a disabled child, this does not translate into security for caregiving mothers.
In Morrison v Morrison, a Yukon case, the father brought a variation proceeding to rescind his child
support arrears.1199 It was inferred by the court that he had agreed to pay a higher than table amount of
support because the parties’ children had disabilities. Other facts were that, as the court stated, the father
provided little respite even though the mother had a serious medical condition. The mother’s physician
had indicated that she ought not to work full-time but she worked three and a half days a week to support
her children. When she was not performing paid work, she was providing care.
Getting fathers “on board” with the realities of disability care through family law entitlement to
claim support is not a realistic solution. Mothers ought not to be expected to rely on the good will of men
they are no longer involved with, when research reveals gendered patterns of disability care that family
law cannot remedy. This leads us to the next myth.
1195
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The Co-Parenting Myth in Childhood Disability
There is debate in the literature on the challenges of shared custody, and feminist critiques of it, as well.
Such critiques focus on power and relationship issues that may make such arrangements unsuitable. Such
an arrangement requires the ability of parents who have not been able to remain together to find ways to
agree in the custodial domain of medical care, as well as parenting. It is also to be remembered that even
in the case of the normative child, joint custody does not mean shared parenting. Co-parenting, I argue, is
a myth perpetuated by an ideal of joint custody, and in the setting of the severely disabled child postseparation there are potentially safety concerns associated with it if parents cannot agree as to the child’s
medical care arrangements.1200 Conflict concerning complex care increases a mother’s care burdens.
It is not only custody arrangements that may pose a threat in cases where parents of severely
disabled children cannot agree, so too may access arrangements. Thus, lack of legal attention paid to
access for children with complex care needs after separation or divorce increases caregiving mothers’
burdens. This may not appear as significant a problem as non-payment of child support to disabled
children, but cases I examined did reveal that in some instances, for a variety of reasons, fathers did not
seek to exercise all of their access or wanted no access at all.1201 This may leave the lone mother
providing care continually.
Jans v Jans involved a 21-year marriage and claims by the mother for arrears in child support for
three children, aged 13, 20 and 23. In Jans, the mother also brought a claim for spousal support. She
stated that she cared for the parties’ 13-year-old child, a boy with Down Syndrome (Logan), who required
continual supervision, and that she did not work outside the home. The judge commented on the fact that
the father was to have exercised access to Logan once a month, but chose not to, and describes the father
as “abandoning” his son.1202 The judge found that where one parent is the primary or sole caregiver of a
severely disabled child, spousal support should be ordered at a slightly higher rate than the spousal
support guidelines (SSG) recommend.
Abandonment by a biological father in the setting of typical children in family law cases is not
unheard of. However, in the setting of disability, the ramifications of it are significant not only to the
child, but also to the mother. Jans is helpful in that Justice Kvill tabulates the disabled child’s
extraordinary expenses. In so doing, the judge determined that being a lone mother with a severely
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disabled child is an economic hardship. This is not to be confused with stating that a disabled child is
being constructed by the Jans’ court as being an economic hardship. The court stated, that “the mother’s
role as sole caregiver to a disable[d] child needed to be considered”1203 as she had full responsibility for
Logan. The judge also commented that the burden of caring for a disabled child had financial
consequences for the mother, such that she was unable to pursue education or work full-time. She opined
that the mother’s first obligation was “always to care for Logan”, who may require support for life.1204
Unfortunately, this is not a situation family law on its own can remedy. At best, a small portion of
someone else’s income may be transferred.
Jans found that support was needed to “relieve any economic hardship of the spouses or adult
interdependent partners arising from the breakdown of the relationship.”1205 The judge stated, “The
breadwinner father left this relationship with his income earning ability. The mother was left to continue
to care for the children and she struggled to financially support those children. Recently the father stopped
providing that… support.”1206 Further noting that s 60 (d) of the Act which sets out “Insofar as
practicable, promote the self-sufficiency of each spouse or adult interdependent partner within a
reasonable period of time,”1207 Jans found that it was “not satisfied that the Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines sufficiently takes into consideration the fact that the mother is solely responsible for the
financial effects of having to care for a disabled child.”1208
McAdam, A.L.Y. and Jans all reveal features of economic risk inherent in being a sole caregiving
mother. These cases reveal that after separation, even where the mother has died, fathers may not be
seeking involvement in care, even though in many family law cases, custody and access is hotly
contested. When contemplating levels of support to award where support is being litigated, family courts
need to recognize that actual shared caregiving --as opposed to ‘parenting,’ which is not the same thing -is not the norm where children are severely disabled, and that mothers are unlikely to find relief from the
other parent except in unusual circumstances.
Although fathers’ parental roles are represented in Canadian culture as changing, research shows
they remain the secondary parent.1209 Their parenting still fits around work schedules, unlike for mothers,
who remain primary parents with care responsibilities of a different order.1210 I argue there needs to be
caution vis-à-vis assumptions made about co-parenting applied to disabled children/disabled adult
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‘children’ that make it appear as though the caregiving mother would be well supported by the other
parent in a joint arrangement. Cases show a myth of co-parenting appearing in family law in different
ways. In Favrod, (discussed above) the court opined that the circumstances showed the parents
endeavoured to share in the responsibilities involved in providing quality care for their severely
physically and mentally disabled daughter.1211 The father however was able to both work and pay support.
It is unclear from the facts the extent to which they actually shared care. In another case, the myth is
exposed by the mothers’ evidence. In Madden the father sought termination of the order for joint custody
and an order for sole custody of the parties disabled child. The mother sought to maintain the joint
custody order, which had been made on consent. The child had learning difficulties, ADHD, asthma and
allergies. Justice Jones stated the parties had always had difficulties with childcare. She awarded sole
custody to the mother, finding the father was not accommodating the child’s special education or medical
needs. For a caregiving mother the opposite of support is the failure of a co-parent to provide needed
care.1212
This myth seems particularly troubling when we have federal public law cases like Canada AG) v
Johnstone, a family status case involving the allocation of shifts to a mother in the workplace, in which
the Federal Court (upheld on appeal) acknowledged the social role expectations on mothers to provide
care as different from fathers. These expectations must be accounted for in support law. Otherwise, even
in settings of joint custody or sole custody with some, little or no access in the setting of disability,
caregiving mothers are responsibilized for the costs of virtually all forms of care.
Caregiving mothers are conscious of this. For example, Ontario mother Robyn Coates sought to
have s. 31 of Ontario’s Family Law Act (FLA) declared unconstitutional as it did not address the child
support required by unmarried mothers and their severely disabled adult children who resided with them,
and not with their fathers.1213 This absent entitlement to bring a support claim made for contentious
situations. The title of a recent Law Times report on a case brought by Coates and her adult disabled child
support was entitled “Challenge Over Child Support Leads to Showdown. Judy Van Rhijn reported the
case was about “the last area in family law where there was abject discrimination against unmarried
parents.””1214 The reporter saw a battle concerning child support. Coates saw unjust support of disabled
adults and their mothers.
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Unlike Nicole Courtney, in her earlier claim in Vivain v Courtney (discussed infra),1215 the Coates
court agreed that Charter rights infringements of the mother, Robyn, and her son, Joshua, occurred as a
result of the fact that the federal statute has a provision for adult disabled child support under the Divorce
Act (in respect of married or previously married parties), versus the provincial statute under which Nicole
Courtney and Robyn Coates were claiming adult child support which did not provide for this same form
of support for unmarried parties, like them. Thus family law distinguished between disabled children of
unmarried relationships and their residential parents, usually their mothers and their married
counterparts.1216 This situation arose to begin with because legislative authority for divorce is a federal
matter, set out in the Constitutiona Act, 1867 but support and child custody issues have classically been
viewed as “within the competence of provincial legislatures before the federal government’s Divorce Act
of 1968.”1217
In pursuing this litigation, Coates signaled her awareness that lack of such disabled ‘child’
support is not only a legal problem for her, but a legal rights problem for other mothers, too. One of these
was the ideal of equality ‘for all’ in law versus the reality of their exclusion from a provincial private
support regime. Moreover, having perceived injustice in the law, she took action to deal with it. This
readiness to dispute the injustice once apprehended is a reflection of critical consciousness.
Justice Sullivan in his obiter dicta on the operation of s15 of the Charter in this case, stated that s.
31 of the FLA “shuts a door to Joshua/Robyn to have a court consider and have an opportunity to assess
his needs …”1218 Thus Coates shed light on the myth of shared “parenthood”. Joshua’s father had not
been involved with his son, and stated to media that he was throwing himself upon the mercy of the
court,1219 hoping to avoid sharing in the mother’s financial costs of his adult disability support.
In terms of the feminist standpoint and critical consciousness framework in this thesis, and in
keeping with legal ‘rights’ as I describe them, Coates believed that as a caregiving mother she was
entitled to support. What she experienced however was that there was no means in her and her disabled
son’s circumstances, to claim it. Their care circumstances were excluded and there was no entitlement to
bring the claim under the legislation. Coates did not accept this. At this point she asserted the other kind
of right I described, which is rights-claims for support where none exists. She was aware that in its silence
1215
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the law misrecognized her right to do so, something that came across in media interviews with her. Her
support rights-claim was based in constitutional law, as noted above. She stated that her aim in pursuing
the litigation was so that “no other single parent caring for a disabled child can be abandoned by an absent
parent when the child becomes an adult.”1220 Her legal advocacy expanded mothers’ legal right to support.
Her legal action signaled critical consciousness.
The Myth of Maternal Extraordinariness
The myth of extraordinariness has to do with societal expectations regarding a mother’s ability to provide
complex care, with minimal supports. This myth is, I argue, akin to the oppressive notion of the
‘supercrip’ that is applied to some disabled people. This is the idea that disabled people can overcome
their disability, and with effort and work, ultimately live in the world as though they are not disabled. The
myth of extraordinariness similarly anticipates that caregiving mothers can overcome the burdens of
complex care with diligence, effort and hard work, ignoring the fact that to do so is economically harmful
and unjust. Such expectations set different standards for women and disabled people than for those who
are not pushed to far exceed ordinary limits at tremendous personal expense. This myth is also a means
for government to divest itself of the costs of disability support.
Some family law decisions appear to be based on this myth, while others challenge it. Caldwell v
Caldwell, an Alberta appellate court case involving a claim for spousal support, addressed expectations of
extraordinariness.1221 In Caldwell, the extraordinariness myth was in play, even though the mother was
herself disabled. Mrs. Caldwell had serious illnesses, and had also provided full-time care to the parties’
disabled children.1222 The judge stated that in awarding longer than usual spousal support for a 12-year
marriage that “the mother has carried an extra burden as the sole caregiver for four children who have
learning, emotional and physical disabilities” and also found her sole care had impacted her ability to
work or retrain, issues that “directly affected her earning power.”1223 Notably, the court considered the
goal of self-sufficiency (one myth) in the context of extraordinary caregiving (another myth).
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Caldwell raises important questions, one of which is why a separated woman with serious health
problems was responsibilized by society with primary disability care and was required to absorb the
economic and other costs associated with it. Had support not been awarded, this would have comprised
hardship.
All of the cases discussed thus far provide evidence that the support needs of mothers with
disabled children are different from those of mothers with non-disabled children. While successes may be
forthcoming across Canada in respect of support awards in family law, it must be remembered that in
order to access this form of support, there must be a payor with means, and a payee with the emotional
and financial ability to pursue her claim. It is not, however, my position that caregiving mothers should
assume the risks associated with reliance on private support. Their doing so gives lie to the myth of
autonomy as well. This is illustrated in the next section, which deals exclusively with private support for
adult disabled children, where the myth of autonomy looms large in proceedings.
Adult Children with Disabilities
Where age of majority children are severely disabled, legal myths I rely upon to shed light on obstacles
and gaps in support provisions in this domain reflect and reify the oppression of both less well-off women
and disabled people. For example, as discussed, in family law there is a myth of (eventual) maternal
financial autonomy, which is imposed on mothers through law even where there are severely disabled
children whose care stands starkly in the way of that. The normative expectation in separation and divorce
is of the eventual autonomy of the child, along with that of his or her mother from the child. Here, the
myth presents the adult disabled child receiving financial state support as autonomous from his or her
caregiving mother.1224 The normative post-separation expectations of self-sufficiency and its
accompanying myths imply that an autonomous caregiving mother can get on with her life and career in
mid-age, free of care, worry, and related financial burdens and without need of support.1225
To the extent that these myths operate in family law, they suggest that mothers with severely
disabled children are not fully legal subjects. I say this because the care such mothers perform and the
and one soon will be. Whether they remain dependent upon Ms. F. appears to be a decision on their part and on their
mother’s part.” Ibid at para 32, my emphasis. This decision represented a failure of the court to “see” disability,
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impacts of it on their lives are unseen. As such, their circumstances are, at times, outside the law’s reach;
they require courts to expand legal meanings established in order to meet their needs.
In a now moot1226 Ontario provincial family court case,1227 a not-in-paid employment, lone, fulltime caregiving mother of a severely medically disabled youth over the age of 18 defended against a
motion to end child support for her now late daughter. In Courtney v Vivian, the provincial legislation was
largely silent on the support needs of mothers with severely disabled adults in their sole care. This
allowed payors to make besmirching claims in their submissions.1228 This meant that the circumstances of
the mother were not legally remediable on a facial reading of the statute in question. I discuss this case
with a view to critiquing some submissions made by the parties, below, because even though the law will
be changing, Vivian speaks powerfully to legal myths at issue.
The Mythical Adult Child in Divorce Law
In this section, I discuss the support of the so-called adult child in family law legislation. The myth of the
adult disabled child is problematic from the standpoint of the legally putative “child” and mother’s right
to support. Christine Dobby1229 points to the oddity of legislation that legally “childifies” adults as though
they are minor children, simply because they are disabled.1230 Had disability rights theorists examined
single mothers’ needs of support, as does Dobby, there might be a more robust rights perspective on this
issue.1231
Pursuant to the federal Divorce Act, mothers may seek child support for “a child of the marriage”,
who is, in fact, an adult.1232 Payment of child support to mothers of disabled adults poses troubling

1226

It was moot because the matter was relitigated in Coates supra note 871 in which the caregiving mother this
time prevailed in showing that her and her child’s charter rights has been infringed by the statutory provision, and
not moot because the disabled “child” Jamie Courtney had passed away, as was argued at the time the matter was
being appealed. I refer to the other reason it was deemed moot below.
1227
Vivian was similar to the Coates case (supra note 871) mentioned in Monsebraaten, “Brampton Mother”, supra
note 1219; see also J.M.S, supra note 15.
1228
The father, as referenced in the trial decision submitted that “it is not clear to me why Nicole (the mother) is not
working and not providing financial help to her own daughter. According to her financial statement she lives off
government hand- outs such as CCTB and social assistance. If Jamie’s circumstances could be better, it seems to me
that Nicole bears the burden of that responsibility, since she provides no independent financial assistance to Jamie.
Currently, the federal and provincial government, along with me, are the ones providing Jamie with the standard of
living she enjoys”. Vivian (2010) which is the trial decision. supra note1297.
1229
Whose publication on this topic has been referenced by courts. Dobby, supra note 1161 at 57.
1230
Childify is my own word. I do not feel infantilize is the correct word, though she uses the term. Dobby, supra
note 1161.
1231
Family Alliance Ontario, a community living family organization intervened in the Vivian litigation to provide
evidence in support of the claims for support. Their Intervenor’s Factum, (23 August 2013), at paragraph 7, states
that the financial support of both parents is integral to fostering the value of community-based supports.
1232
The Federal provision refers to teenagers over age 18 and older. Divorce Act, supra note ##, s 2(1).

243
questions about the autonomy of both single mothers and their dependent disabled adult offspring.1233 A
mother who seeks such support must demonstrate to the court that her “child” retains “child” status as
disabled and is incapable of withdrawing from her charge, therefore child support eligible.1234 It is
understood in these cases that “the nature and amount of evidence will vary with the case.”1235
Importantly, mothers must be prepared to deal with opposition to such claims, because fathers may
(understandably or not) not want to pay ‘child’ support to an adult. The fact of mothers not wanting to
perform care or needing to work is not a focus of such cases. Traditional male/female roles are at play,
caregiver and breadwinner. As well, in family law, adult child support is the exception. The expectation in
family law, as I note above, is that children will age out of child support, and that younger mothers will
eventually become self-supporting, and are more able to do so as their children age.
Spousal support may not be an option for many mothers, as men with low income can show that
they do not have the means to pay, while other men may litigate not to pay, or may choose not to pay
irrespective of a court order or agreement to do so. As such, adult child support may take on greater
significance to single sole supporting mothers with disabled children over age 18.
Case law reveals that some mothers are experiencing psychological violence as they battle myths
embedded in law, as well as battling the disabled adult’s father in legal proceedings. This situation may
be seen as an extension by reason of disability of Chesler’s notion that mothers are on trial in family law
proceedings.1236 This notion that mothers are harmed by extension should be borne in mind, for it is
pivotal in my later arguments.
A family law case exemplifying the mythical autonomous adult child is that of the above noted
Vivian v Courtney. This was an action brought under provincial family law legislation.1237 It is an
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interesting case that involved a Charter rights claim.1238 In it, the father brought a motion to end child
support for his daughter, Jamie, citing that she had turned 18 and was not in school full-time. He also
requested his “overpayments” in support be paid back.1239 The mother sought to have his motion
dismissed, arguing that Jamie was in school and was dependent due to her severe medical disabilities. The
mother also sought an updated calculation of child support at the table amount, a continuation of child
support and to have Jamie added to her father’s benefit plan.
The difficulty for the mother was that the Ontario Family Law Act, unlike the Federal Divorce
Act, did not have a provision respecting the support of adult children with disabilities, so the mother had
to hope the court would interpret her circumstances as fitting within the FLA provision for support. 1240
The father, opposing her claim, and relying on Wilson v Wilson, argued that his life-threateningly
ill daughter was not pursuing her educational program with diligence.1241 Aside from the fact that this is
an appalling argument, having examined the Wilson decision, which in turn, relied upon Giess v Upper
for the presence of the diligence requirement,1242 it is apparent that neither case involved the narrow issue
of time spent at school of an adult ‘child’ with a life-threatening illness such as Jamie Courtney had.
Therefore, neither case was on point.1243 This begs the question of why the father’s counsel tried to rely
upon these other cases to make his arguments. That he did so was ableist. He treated Jamie as though she
did not have a severe medical condition, and by extension, sought to undermine her caregiving mother’s
claim. That the ableism was not called out highlights another challenge with support-seeking for disabled
adults in family court files. Litigants can ‘get away with’ discriminatory tactics in the defense of claims,
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which is something that the family law bar ought to examine. Thus the focus of arguments centered on
evidence of Jamie’s diligence as a student, not on her life threatening condition.
However in addition to claiming support under s 31 of the FLA on the basis of Jamie’s student
status, the mother and child, with the participation of an intervenor,1244 argued that s 31 of the FLA
discriminates against adult disabled children of unmarried parents contrary to s 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that the provision does not offer the same bases for
bringing a claim for adult child support, as does the federal Divorce Act. Jamie1245 herself argued that s 31
of the FLA was contrary to s 7 of the Charter.1246
Justice Curtis was receptive to the presence of Charter concerns. Her Honour commented first on
the moral aspects of the FLA, that aimed to shame and blame ‘parents’ whose children were born outside
marriage,1247 then opined that, these laws while directed at and defined by the parents’ legal status,
functioned to disadvantage blameless children. These laws she noted, could not survive the equality
provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1248
Meanwhile, Jamie’s father argued that “it is part of the provincial government’s policy that the
social safety net, including social services, are intended to be the primary mode of financial support for
adult children that are disabled.”1249 Vivian v Courtney ended after the Attorney General argued that the
Charter issue was moot, because the father had decided to pay support. The mother sought to have the
issue of whether it was moot transferred to the Ontario Court of Appeal. However, Jamie, the adult child
whose support was the subject of the lawsuit, died from her medical disabilities during the proceeding.
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The father’s position too, was that his daughter’s medical issues were irrelevant to a
determination of child support, and that the only issue was whether Jamie was enrolled in school full-time
in accordance with the Act.1250 The medical issues, however, relate directly to Jamie’s educational status
and moreover to the ableist expectation of full-time study that exists in the legislative provision itself.1251
This feature has significance that reaches beyond the case.
Complex medical issues ought to feature prominently in support determinations, until the state
starts to fulfill its support obligations to disabled adults, irrespective of whom they live with. In seeking to
convince the court to terminate his support obligation, the father in Vivian agreed that the evidence
showed that “extra income would help Jamie,” but submitted that it was unclear to him why the mother
“was not working and not providing financial help to her own daughter. According to her financial
statement she lives off government hand-outs such as CCTB and social assistance.”1252 He further
submitted, “if Jamie’s circumstances could be better, it seems to me that Nicole bears the burden of that
responsibility, since she provides no independent financial assistance to Jamie,” adding that “[c]urrently,
the federal and provincial government, along with me, are the ones providing Jamie with the standard of
living she enjoys.”1253
The father’s submissions illustrate the astonishing characterization in court proceedings of
caregiving mothers as having failed to provide support. On the father’s appeal from Justice Curtis’s
enlightened order awarding ‘child’ support to the mother and Jamie, and contrary to the submissions
made by the father, Justice Penny in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice opined, with reference to
evidence of Jamie’s palliative care physician, “The fact that Ms. Courtney is alive and able to live at
home is a testament to her spirit, as well as the dedication, advocacy and hard work of her mother.”1254
Justice Penny added, “Parents of children of such chronic debilitating and ultimately fatal illnesses are
performing a job that would occupy four or five employees in a long-term care facility.”1255
How is it that this information has not galvanized policy makers? On the one hand the AttorneyGeneral in Vivian argued the Charter issue was moot when the father’s appeal was dismissed.1256 That
may have influenced policy options. Then Jamie Courtney died. As noted above, what government does
not do, is also policy. Not amending it during or immediately after Vivian was also policy. In not
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addressing it, it is de facto policy that caregiving mothers not only provide onerous care at onerous levels,
but may be denigrated as they do so. In her judgment on the motion, Justice Curtis opined as to hardship,
but the father, who had been absent from Jamie’s life for years, attacked the mother’s credibility.1257 In his
post-trial endorsement on where the matter of the case should be continued, Justice Herman stated that
Jamie had severe health problems and noted that according to the motion judge’s reasons, the “father was
not accepting the severity of (the child’s) illness and had requested additional information about her
health.”1258 The father was either in denial as to Jamie’s condition or he was denying it as a litigation
strategy.
This issue of medical support needs to be examined by the family law bar and by the state.1259
Michael Tweyman, one of the lawyers who acted for the father in Vivian, states regarding support “that at
a certain age, legal obligations ought to give way to moral ones.”1260 However, if a father is willing to
litigate at the appellate level in order to obtain a court order relieving him of his obligations, it is clear he
does not believe he has an obligation to support his disabled offspring, moral or legal.
Caregiving mothers seek to take the conversation about private disability support out of the moral
realm and bring it into the realm of a legal right, where it belongs. As noted, the Attorney-General for
Ontario in Vivian argued that the Charter issue raised by the mother, child, and intervenor became moot
when the father’s appeal of the award of child support made by Justice Curtis at trial had been abandoned.
Vivian became moot in the opinion of the government when Jamie died. Vivian v Courtney remains a
useful example of the fraught nature of caregiving mother litigation. One reason is it shows that
challenging support law can become legally very complex. In Vivian the parties were arguing not only
about the merits, but also about constitutionality and court jurisdiction.1261
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Vivian illustrates not only a severely disabled person as the mythical adult child in family law, but
it also challenges some of the mythology surrounding eventual financial independence of caregiving
mothers of adults.1262 It highlights hardship on caregiving mothers such a Nicole Courtney. State support
would alleviate hardship, however, as shown, such support lurks in its own realm of mythology revealed
as it intersects with family law support.
Myth of Ready State Support
The myth of ready state support is so entrenched that it might well be described as the classic defense to a
claim of private support for an adult disabled child. In Vivian, the father’s position was, “that it is part of
the provincial government’s policy that the social safety net, including social services, are intended to be
the primary mode of financial support for adult children that are disabled”.1263 This issue was also
illustrated in the older case, King v Sutherland, in which the parties separated months after their severely
disabled child was born.1264 The 1986 divorce judgment was issued, along with an order for child support.
In 1996, when support for the eldest child ended, the mother sought to vary the child support for their
daughter, Rochelle. The father consented, on the stipulation that her support would end at age 21.
Community Living Huronia (CLH) held out that a placement would be made available to Rochelle then,
and the mother relied on that in her legal negotiations.1265
However, the promised placement was not available when claimed. CLH had identified Rochelle
as having “unique and exceptional needs which have not allowed for her residential placement ... and
which continue to affect the ability to obtain community placement.”1266 When she turned 21, her father
ended his support and sought clarification of his obligations. He was ordered to continue paying.
Meanwhile, the Ministry’s motion to be removed as a party was dismissed and it was ordered to pay a
benefit to the mother. This was referred to by the judge as a “partnership approach” to support of adult
disabled children.1267 Subsequent motions were brought by the mother seeking support from the father,
and by the Ministry, seeking to be removed as a party in the proceeding.
The child support payments of the father were upheld, however, the court order respecting the
Ministry was overturned, with the determination that the court below lacked jurisdiction to make that
order under the Divorce Act. Justice Strong noted that the mother had no income and that caregiving made
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paid work impractical and further commented on her detachment from the labour force as factory worker,
a result of caregiving, putting his finger on a larger issue. In his endorsement, he opined critically that the
father saw his obligation as contractual only.1268 The problem is that family law permits this interpretation
by support payors1269 , and family law judges cannot bind government to their undertakings to provide
care.1270 In this case, the Judge, in his comments and in his effort to bind the province, challenged the
myth of ready state support and when it was later held that he could not do this, he underscored the failure
of state accountability to mothers and their severely disabled children. In so doing, Justice Strong exposed
the myth of ready state support.
State supports for disabled adults are difficult to access, and it is surprising that this defense,
based on a policy myth, is so routinely brought into play. It is also disturbing, as claimants must
repeatedly introduce evidence to show how, in fact, the state is not providing support adequate to keep
many mothers and disabled adults out of poverty. This is so, even though on their face, present levels of
state assistance are consistent with someone else already supporting their disabled adult child, usually the
mother.
My claim is illustrated in an Alberta case, J.R.B. v C.F.B. In this case, the father brought an
application to terminate his child support for his 18-year-old, disabled son. He also sought to expunge his
arrears in support for all his children. The mother’s order for child support and the arrears in child support
were dealt with in court by the Alberta Director of Maintenance and Enforcement.1271 The father argued
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that his son received income support from the province (Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped or
AISH) and thus, child support from him was not required.1272
In order to access some support for their disabled child, the mother dealt with two ministries, her
husband and his lawyer. She contributed her home for her son to live in full-time, her business income to
support him, and her physical and emotional support to ensure that his needs were met. She also provided
her time and her advocacy, including being a party in this case.
The ‘private’ nature of family law proceedings was brought into question in this case when the
judge addressed the standing of the Director of Enforcement as a “proper party” to the family law
application to terminate support for the disabled youth and to deal with the arrears that had accumulated.
The court held that the Director is “entitled to make any submissions available on the issue of entitlement
to child support and cancellation of arrears. However, the Director has no subrogation standing in relation
to AISH payments, and has no participation standing in relation to these payments.”1273 This finding, set
out under the subheading Effect of Government Support Programs on Parental Support Responsibilities,
is that the father has no obligation.
The court held that, “A government program of assistance to severely handicapped adults
although presumably providing for all basic needs - since some severely handicapped adults do not have
independent means and some do not have extensive family support - cannot be sensitive enough to
provide for legitimate extensions of basic needs.”1274
The judge added that in this case, “there is no evidence to support any financial need beyond the
amount paid by AISH,” concluding that “the AISH payment was …adequate to provide full financial
support in his mother's home.”1275
That heavy maternal support is assumed in support schemes themselves, and left unvalued
economically is legally problematic. It is a feature that undergirds unequal support obligations of men and
of the state vis-a-vis caregiving mothers.
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Reviewing other cases, the J.R.B. court raised a number of points. As just noted, the judge held
that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the FCSG1276 to reduce child support amounts where a child is in
receipt of his or her parent’s CPP disability pension child payments.1277 This is because these guidelines
do not provide for situations where a minor child has his own resources and are treated in family law as
more than simple guidelines in practical reality.
However, the court distinguished the adult child, whose own resources it stated must be
considered. The judge opined, “there comes a point when parents no longer have an obligation to support
their children”.1278 He added that when children become severely disabled adults, “society says … the
parents of these adults have already done so much, that we accept it as our obligation to take over the
main financial support of the handicapped adults in much the same way as we accept responsibility of
providing social services for adults who are unemployed.”1279 This court held that “Mr. C.F.B.'s adult
child receives a full AISH award. There is no evidence that the adult child requires additional financial
support beyond the AISH award. Therefore, the father is not required to contribute to the support of the
child of the marriage.”1280 Thus he was released from financial obligation towards his disabled child
pursuant to the myth that the welfare state had taken over that obligation for him.
Meanwhile, the mother’s forever and ongoing instrumental, social, economic and physical
disability support disappears in this judgement. One is reminded of Sawer’s statement, that the words
‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’ hide “relations of dependency and interdependency within the
family.”1281 Sawer referred to the state rendering care invisible in “a vanishing trick”, something she
perceived as an attack on mothers’ citizenship. The contributions of the mother in J.R.B. are disappeared
in just this manner. It is curious that the court’s opinion that by adulthood, “parents’ have done so much
already”, does seem to apply to caregiving mothers, who are the very ones who have done so much. This
is not uncommon, it would appear.1282
1276
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Jorgensen v Jorgensen is another case in which a mother sought support for an adult disabled
child.1283 Amy was a child from a prior marriage that took place in 1975. The natural father was deceased,
thus although the case does not provide Amy’s date of birth, she would have been in her late thirties at
least, at the time of the decision. She is described as being developmentally and mentally disabled, having
Angelman’s Syndrome. Amy’s stepfather agreed he had stood in loco parentis for 11 years. The judge
noted that the mother had received services since Amy’s birth and had required “considerable
assistance.”1284 The judge opined, “While there are certainly cases that extend to [the] right to receive
child support past the state of childhood where a dependency continues to exist, there are certain factors
worthy of consideration.”1285 This judge considered relevant the mother’s ability to work and her desired
“lifestyle” to stay at home to care for the disabled woman, as funding would allow.1286 We are not told
much else about Amy, however the decision states that the mother received respite care and benefits for
her, but that her benefits were reduced at the time of the case, which would be when Amy was becoming
middle aged.1287
Reviewing the mother’s employment history, and calling it impressive, this judge describes her as
cavalier about leaving paid work periodically, concluding that, “She is not unemployed as a result of her
marriage nor is she in a state of dependency because of any tacit encouragement by her marital
circumstances.”1288 Yet the facts of this case suggest the mother was under-employed because she had a
disabled child in her first marriage, and because, even though in the second marriage, her husband took on
the role of father, he did not take on the role of caregiver as did the mother. Justice Legere-Sers misses the
state of dependency brought on by Mrs. Jorgensen being in the role of life-long caregiver to a disabled
child.
In this case, one can see the charitization of Mrs. Jorgensen in family law.1289 This is similar to
what was seen in Vivian and in J.R.B. The legal treatment of mothers with disabled children as ordinary
mothers by family courts is but one example of status misrecognition.1290 Nancy Fraser states that
misrecognition is a driver of conflicts, and conflict is what is seen in legal disputes that come about as a
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result of the claims brought privately for support.1291 Until family law addresses the missing caregiving
mother, such disputes will continue.
Other arguments have arisen in the course of litigation tied to myths about the state’s role in
supporting disabled adults. In Steidinger v Morrell,1292 the father sought to vary an order for child support
and his support obligation to his 21-year-old severely disabled daughter, Christina, pursuant to the federal
Divorce Act. The father relied on authorities suggesting that the principles of universal health care and the
obligations of governments to provide social assistance meant that the obligation to support an adult
disabled child lies with the state. In the alternative, he sought to establish that the table amount of child
support was no longer “appropriate,” as that term is used in s 3(2)(b) of the Guidelines. He argued that his
support obligation should be reduced, commensurate with the amount that his daughter contributed to her
own support from various provincial disability benefits.1293 Not unlike the mother’s position in King, the
mother here claimed that the child support obligation should continue until their daughter was offered a
placement in an independent living program. The mother, with whom Christina lived full-time, opposed
his motion, arguing that her daughter was not self-sufficient, and would never be able to live
independently even when enrolled in a Supported Living Program.1294 The mother also put her own health
problems into evidence. Thus, one might also interrogate the meaning of “independent” in the term
independent living. The naming of such programs may place mothers at a disadvantage in family court
where judges may not appreciate what is meant by the term, which is supported community living. In
community living, mothers often still provide support, as seen in Eve and other legal cases I examine.
In making its deliberations, the court stated there was latitude for a range of child support awards.
The court’s disposition was that a material change in circumstances had occurred. However, the court
held that just because the court “may” vary the order, does not necessarily mean it should. The court had
found Christina turning 18 was a significant change in circumstances.1295 However, it was not significant
maternally.
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In fact, the materiality of this change in the setting of severe disability is contestable. The law
permits the material change in circumstances arguments to be made by payors, since technically, state
funding ‘options’ alter at this age and since it is the legal age of majority. However, although a modest
disability income is offered by provinces, mothers describe ages 18 through 21 as timeframes when their
children ‘fall off a cliff,’ in terms of support. There is little in the way of services in the community.1296
The Steidinger court considered two recent cases in its deliberations, Laing v Mahmoud and
Briard v Briard, and opted for the modified approach taken in the latter case, acknowledging that state
support was insufficient and that child support should be increased because Christina was not in a
position to withdraw from her mother’s charge.1297 If the father were able to withdraw child support for
his daughter, something the judge in this case stated would pose a hardship for the mother, then support
obligations and costs associated with care would remain with his former wife, irrespective of what the
state “ought” to do.
Again, a judge uses the word hardship and again, a judge challenged the myth of robust state
support, finding that the caregiving mother is entitled to private monetary support. Yet the mother is in
the position of having to rebut and defend against allegations by a parent who does not want to pay or pay
more, which means that her so-called right to support is contingent on overcoming opposition to paying
them. That is an onerous burden of care that mothers with disabled children should not have to endure.
The Steidinger decision focuses on the mother’s submissions that she “contributes
disproportionately to Christina's care and maintenance by contributing financially and by providing
essential services, including daily supervision.”1298 The court opined that in contrast, “Mr. Morrell spends
little time with Christina and his only tangible support is the current monthly child support payment.”1299
Steidinger is helpful, because in it, the court acknowledges the non-monetary support Ms. Steidinger
provides. Justice Clearwater stated that the mother is “doing her best to support herself and the child and
that she maintains the physical burden of Christina's necessary care and supervision when Christina is not
away from home and otherwise involved in the Program.1300 Justice Clearwater added, “As is the case

1296

Aleksandra Sagan. Special-Needs Youth Face ‘Big “Abyss” After Leaving School”. CBC News, June 02 2015.
Online< http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/special-needs-youth-face-big-abyss-after-leaving-school-1.3095279>.
1297
Laing v Mahmoud, 2011 ONSC 4047 [Laing]; and Briard v Briard, 2010 BCSC 65, 81 RFL (6th) 223 [Briard].
In Laing the court held that the disabled adult child who lived with the mother was entitled to the table amount of
support, even though in receipt of a provincial disability income support benefit. In Briard, the court found that a
twenty-two year old adult with Down Syndrome who lived with the mother could not withdraw from her charge,
based on $10,900 annual income provided by the disability income support and a larger sum of child support was
awarded. Judges in these cases found that the “society as a whole” notion of responsibility advanced in Krangle was
not realizable and that private avenues of support had to be found.
1298
Steidinger, supra note 1292 at para 4.
1299
Ibid. In some cases then, the adult child’s contributed income is viewed as income to the mother, while in other
cases, like Ansell, the court stated that the income is of/for the adult child and child support is to the mother.
1300
Steidinger, supra note 1292 at para 14.

255
with Mr. Morrell, she appears to be meeting her current needs and obligations.”1301 I include this
statement because submissions are made in such cases that mothers are shirking their obligations.1302
After reviewing the law, Justice Clearwater held that the father had an obligation to pay child
support stating, “which, in my opinion, should not obviate the importance of him doing his best to
maintain some contact with her”.1303 As noted in the literature, many mothers with severely disabled
children provide care on their own. In spite of the judge’s acknowledgments, child support was awarded
at less than half the table amount. The court did recognize that the amount of money the mother received
from her disabled daughter was not in any way reflective of the “true cost” of the young woman’s
support. However the judge also, rather curiously, opined that in her view the mother had “been able to
structure her affairs so that almost all of the income she receives was non-taxable.”1304 This implies that
the mother had gotten away with something that put her at an unfair advantage. She reviewed the cases on
point, one of which was Briard v Briard1305 in which the father sought leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada after he was ordered to pay child support, albeit slightly less than the table amount. That
Court reduced his support obligation from $578 plus his share of special expenses to $500 a month, Leave
was refused.1306 Justice Clearwater acknowledged that the FCSG contemplated the variation with a proven
material change in circumstances and she decided that Christina’s being in a support program comprised
such a change. Based on that decision, she held that the continued application of the Federal Child
Support Guideline amount was inequitable to the father, who ought not to have to pay the full amount for
child support.1307 The court stated it was “satisfied that the responsibility for Christina’s support should be
shared by the parents and the province.”1308
Halving the quantum of support calculated for a non-disabled child, and applying that to the
support calculation of a highly dependent adult makes no sense. It is troubling that the calculation lacked
crucial disability context, even as it purported to consider it. There is a gulf between the myth of robust
state support and the reality of economic hardship, which this case was explored, with the court seeing
past the myth to the harsh realities of under-supported care and a woman’s struggle to access money.
Nevertheless care was undervalued and under recompensed. This is wrongheaded. Care has an economic
value as well as a societal value.
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Above, I addressed the notion of co-parenting severely disabled children after separation as
largely a myth. This discussion was in regard to levels of child support. As noted, support is not the only
issue where the care of disabled children is involved. Where state supports are inadequate, caregiving
mothers may also seek to enforce access of adult disabled ‘children’.
In the Nova Scotia case of W.G.B. v C.D.R.1309 the mother applied to the court to vary access
between the ‘child’ (21-year-old “T”), and her father. The decision notes that at the time of divorce, “the
Court took into account the effect the burden of total child care placed on Mrs. W.G.B., including the fact
that T required supervision almost on a 24-hour basis.”1310 ‘T’ is stated as being fifty-seventh on a waiting
list for a space in a communal living residence,1311 which is reminiscent of the situation in King, in
Ontario.
The parents in W.G.B. did not want their daughter institutionalized, so they agreed with one
another as to her being wait-listed for a community placement, and living with the mother. The father,
however, was unwilling to provide care in the meantime.1312 The mother, conscious of this unfairness,
was not prepared to permit him to evade what she perceived as his care responsibilities. She sought to
have him be available for more access by taking him to court. In the event that he refused to consent to
this,1313 she sought an order that he pay the cost of respite. He refused to increase his access,1314 asking
that the cost of his daughter’s respite care be provided out of funding the mother received from
government. In other words, the father’s position was that the care for this child ought to be (i) subsidized
by the state (ii) provided by the mother (iii) and later provided by the state. He took himself out of the
caregiving/child support equation altogether. This is reflective of what I have referred to as ‘careprivilege’ in this setting. According to the facts, before separation the father “did not respond positively to
Mrs. W.G.B.’s request to assist her by providing respite care/access visits, in taking a month in the
summer, two weeks in the winter, and more extended contact with T in order to assist in and relieve the
costs of caring for her.”1315
Justice Legere-Sers stated that both parents love and supported T but that T’s care was
“emotionally and physically exhausting for both parents,” adding they did not find “the support they
thought existed in the community through government sponsored community-based housing,” and that
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this placed stress on them, pitting them against one another “to provide for T.’s extensive needs as she
enters her adult life, still unable to withdraw from depend[a]nce on her parents, community and
government support.1316 She also commented that the father was not emotionally equipped to provide care
and that “the mother has no option if she wants her child to stay out of the adult protection environment
with the current lack of placement options,” commenting that the mother was underemployed because of
her role as a caregiver.1317 Again a judge draws attention to the responsibilities of the woman with fulltime care and the economic ramifications of it. It is apparent in case after case that something is unjust
about this.
The outcome is a decision promoting a “reasonable or equitable sharing of the burdens these
parents face.”1318 The court did not seem to agree that it was fully the mother’s responsibility to provide
and arrange care for T, or that the father’s obligations were those of optional assistance only given the
context of the mutually agreed upon wait-list and avoidance of institutionalization. The myth of mothers
as the natural caregivers did not hold sway in the W.G.B court. The court ordered, (i) access costs to be
paid by the father in the event he did not make himself available for regular periodic increased block
access1319 ; (ii) if the father agrees to greater access, respite assistance will follow to his residence,
otherwise the father will pay for respite care to cover the balance of hours not covered by respite care.
Moreover, the father would be responsible for 4 weeks in the summer, one week in winter, and a week in
each of Easter and Christmas vacation periods; (iii) the father will continue with his access schedule and,
if unavailable, shall provide respite care also for this uncovered period.1320
W.G.B. is helpful because the judge describes the state’s contributions, the limitations placed on
the mother in terms of her ability to support herself while providing care, and further opines on the cost of
respite.1321 She (I believe) coins the term “access costs” in the setting of the at-home severely disabled
adult child. This importantly goes part of the way towards monetizing such care in family law. This in
turn may help to alleviate the father’s care privilege. The court acknowledged that the father was not
providing care at a fair level, and that neither was the state, with the end result that the mother was left to
shoulder the burden of care, unjustly.1322 I conclude my discussion of select family law cases by stating
that the term ‘child support’ itself contains myth. It provides the impression that children are actually
supported by quanta set out in FCSG. The table amount ought to be renamed the “obligation to contribute
to child support” to reflect more accurately what is taking place.
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Those who have practiced family law can attest that many payors’ table amount of support is the
equivalent of the cost of a transit pass, or a transit pass and a winter coat. In fact, what many mothers
receive is a meager contribution to the support that mothers actually provide. In the case of children with
severe disabilities, this means not only under supported children, but unsupported caregiving. In the
above discussions I have illustrated some myths that caregiving mothers confront when seeking support
through family law. These myths interact with one another, making it difficult for mothers to demonstrate
the support they provide and the support they require. It is apparent that at least some judges are aware of
the injustices that present in societal and legal norms, whereby mothers are held responsible for complex
care. Although family law all but ignores the high and varied cost of such care, such costs are addressed
other civil law proceedings as a matter of course. It is to these cases that I now turn.
Other Civil Litigation
In this section I briefly discuss implications of Canadian childhood disability-care tort litigation. My aim
is to demonstrate that courts have addressed costs in relation to complex care for severely disabled
children in the context of an unwilling payor who, unlike most fathers in family court, have deep pockets.
As noted in the methods section, I use case law as a source of information about disabled children and
their mothers. My overall argument is that mothers with severely disabled children are grossly undersupported in public law. The private law support cases support this assertion.
In Krangle, parents with a disabled child brought a claim for negligence against a physician who
failed to advise them about the availability of prenatal testing.1323 The damages they sought were for the
cost of future care. At trial, negligence was found and the damage award was made against the physician.
The damage award was to pay for the support of their disabled son up to the age of nineteen. The trial
judge determined it would be in the best interests of the child to live in a group home at his age of
majority, and all parties agreed.1324 The court further stated that the state support arrangement after the
age of 19 would be provincially funded.1325 However, the trial judge awarded the parents an additional
$80,000 in the event that the provincial scheme was not in place. Thus the trial judge’s ruling made it
clear that the court expected the state to provide adult disability support and residential community care,
not the parents.Subsequent to the decision by the trial judge, the provincial government amended that
1323
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province’s Family Relations Act (FLA), redefining the word “child”.1326 The amended section stated that
“[e]ach parent of a child is responsible and liable” for the child’s support. Section 87 defined “child” as
including an adult over age 19 who “is unable, because of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw
from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life” 1327 In so doing the province exposed the myth of the
state’s shared role in supporting disabled adults, discussed previously. It also demonstrated, I feel
importantly, that legislation can be changed readily when political will is there. This was an example of
state retrenchment from the funding and provision of disability care and support. The decision was
appealed by the physician. A legal question that arose was whether the above noted amendment of the
family law legislation rendered the parents liable for the support of their child under the new provision
after he reached age nineteen. Justice Mackenzie for the British Columbia Court of Appeal held “s.88 (1)
of the FRA imposed a parental obligation to care for disabled adult children. The philosophy underlying
the Act was that the parents’ obligation to support adult disabled children preceded that of the state.”1328
Thus the extent of support obligations was far from clear among the judiciary. The trial judge saw a clear
role for the state but the court of appeal judge saw the parents as primarily obligated in law. Given the
negligence claim of the parents was for the cost of disability care, the courts had to grapple with the
wobbly interplay between quantum of damages and the availability or unavailability of future state
support. The other issue was the pushing by the state of disability care into the private domain. In such
case the boy’s mother would most likely be the one to have to take on disability care. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, the issue was whether the parents could recover damages from the physician
for their disabled child’s adult care (after he turned 19) in light of the amendment to the family law
provision. The parents argued that if the amendment to that province’s family law legislation made them
responsible for the child’s support after age nineteen, and if the province made a claim against them
respecting the cost of his placement in a group home, then the award of damages for their adult child care
ought to be larger than was stipulated at trial. The physician appealed further, seeking to have the initial
award reinstated. He did this because the initial medical negligence award against him limited the amount
of damages to parents to cover the cost of future care.1329 He prevailed when the Supreme Court of
Canada restored the original award amount. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal
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had erred in finding that the change to the Family Relations Act would result in the imposition of an
obligation on the Krangles to support Mervyn when an adult, with its reasoning being that the costs of the
group home would be fully met the British Columbia government and that the family law amendement
thus did not change anything decided at trial.1330
A curious thing about the Krangle case is the trial judge’s conclusion that there was a 95 %
chance that the scheme would remain the same, thus justifying reducing the damages awarded by this
substantial contingency.1331 If ever there was something one ought not to take judicial notice of, it is the
inconsistency of child disability policy over the long or even short term, for it so frequently changes as
was discussed in Chapter five. This case tells us there exists a state obligation towards the support of
adults with disabilities. However, it also tells us that when parents succeed in bringing attention to the
state’s obligation to provide care, the state might legislate against that eventuality.1332 This private law
myth of ready state support is similar to the public law myth of state largesse. The political myth being
that the Canadian welfare state supports those in need of it, the reality however being that as soon as state
support appears on the horizon, steps are taken to pull it back.1333
Compensation for future care-performance, as a legal issue, has been raised by scholars. They
note that the law has yet to address the value of maternal care performance.1334 Feldthusen argues for
example that mothers ought to be able to get damage awards for care performance in certain negligence
cases that implicate care. He distinguishes between the ramifications of care performance on the one hand
1330
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and the existence of the child on the other. This way, the value and importance of care is not conflated
with the value and importance of the child (irrespective of disability status) who requires care. He
clarifies a crucial conflation in stating that, “What is in issue is the right to recover damages for the cost
raising a child. What is not in issue is the value of the child. The point is not whether the child was born
with a disability. The point is not whether the child has a formally recognized disability. The point is what
it will cost to provide the requisite level of care for the child.”1335 This strand of scholarship is here
mentioned because it calls attention to a problem in the area of family law too, as an under-examined
domain in civil law, where mothers with care of severely disabled children are concerned.
Conclusion
My critique of efforts undertaken in private law by mothers to access support reveals a number of
difficulties in this area, as well. I described how the policy approach that considers family law’s child
support provisions as being suitable or adequate support for the severely disabled child is untenable.1336
My critique further shows that private law does not and cannot ‘solve’ the support needs of mothers with
severely disabled children. On the contrary, it often adds to their burdens of care, as I have described that
term.1337 It does so in part through the use of a series of myths brought into play to unseat mother’s
claims. However, as cases reviewed suggest, caregiving mothers do not lack consciousness about these
points. On the contrary, the cases show that mothers with severely disabled children seek to challenge,
expose, resist and change the features of support law that denies them support. Their ongoing project
however is met with considerable state and private opposition, as seen in the civil litigation discussed in
this chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion - Towards Legal Rights to Support For Mothers with Severely
Disabled Children

Introduction
In this concluding chapter, I begin with a statement of my thesis. First I reiterate my research questions,
with a brief comment on what I mean when I refer to ‘rights.’ I then précis the methods I used in
examining caregiving mothers’ litigation, doing so in the context of the scholarly work that informed my
project. I follow with a discussion of conclusions to be drawn from my analysis when caregiving mothers
bring claims for support or defend against its termination. Finally I identify what I see as the most
promising approach that caregiving mothers might take to advance their legal right to support, given what
the research and legal cases reveal about their lives and the lives of their severely disabled children.
Statement of Thesis
My dissertation is an inquiry into the legal rights to support of Canadian mothers with severely disabled
children. I asked what their legal rights to support are and what they should they be. I further asked what
are the legal rights of children with disabilities to state support and what should they be. In addition, I
asked how the legal rights of the severely disabled child ‘fit’ with the legal rights of mothers to public
support within existing frameworks.
Approach Taken
To carry out my research I undertook a literature review examining scholarly work about
mothers. In addition, I examined critical disability literature, feminist legal literature, other critical theory
literature, literature on research methodology, as well as scholarly work in the area of care. I examined
political science and economic literature; and the doctoral work of others who had researched in the area
of mothers with disabled children. I reviewed media reports, statutes and legal cases. I reviewed
government policy reports and private sector policy publications, as well as support policy provisions.
Central to my research, I also examined legal cases in which mothers with disabled children sought
support, through private and public law.
The inclusion of a policy analysis in Chapter Five in my dissertation sheds additional light on
how mothers with severely disabled children are situated in support law. A great deal of disability support
is provided to mothers across Canada through policy mechanisms, such as directives or regulations. Some
of the litigation I examined involved discussions about support policy of different kinds.
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My project thus entailed a review of relevant literature and law, rather than an empirical
collection of data through personal interviews. My particular research focus was on what was taking place
when mothers brought legal claims or otherwise articulated rights claims. Mothers’ voices come through
in the litigation.
I recognized early in my research that interviewing government officials was unlikely to be
helpful. I met with a senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Children and Youth Services several years ago
for an informational interview. She advised me the areas I was inquiring about could not be discussed. In
fact, I was able to achieve my research aims without conducting any interviews, for the following reasons.
(1) I was provided with important and hard to access government policy documents and reports by a
policy advisor from the private sector that contained the information I required. (2) I could rely upon
government’s own published research. (3) I also sought out policy information both from legal cases and
the media, as well as government policy initiatives set up over a span of time showing the government’s
position on the issues of support. (4) Government positions and submissions in legal cases provided
information about policy. Together this policy information, along with the legal research, gave me the
needed background to address my research questions.
Nature of Rights Examined
At the outset of my thesis, I described what I mean by the basis for legal rights of caregiving mothers. In
summary these are, i) entitlements in statutes, ii) an ability to apply for discretionary benefits in public
law/policy iii) rights claims where no ‘caregiver-mother specific’ legal support right exists, iii)
international human rights law, and iv) theory of relational rights. I also discuss disabled children’s
rights.1338 Disabled children’s rights are expressed and realized differently than are their mothers’ support
rights. However, their legal rights to support are realized through their mothers, as it is their mothers who
advocate and litigate on their behalf. Their rights are also addressed in the dissertation in the context of
international human rights instruments.
My research into the various legal rights of mothers with severely disabled children was
conducted from within two connected conceptual frameworks, discussed next.
Theoretical and Methodological Approach
The conceptual frameworks I used were feminist standpoint theory and theory of critical consciousness.
These provided me with analytical tools within which to examine the legal cases, policy and scholarly
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literature as well as media reports. For example, I drew from the construct of societal myth proposed by
the theory of critical consciousness and used the notion of legal myth to analyze what was taking place in
legal cases. I found this to be a useful tool of analysis, and in fact one that helped me to identify subtle
features in policy, legislation and decisions. As noted in Chapter Two, feminist standpoint theory is also a
critical theory, one which concerns the production of knowledge and the workings of power. It advances
the view that one’s standpoint (or social location) provides a unique means to access insights in
knowledge and power relations. This theory is noted to work well in tandem with the theory of critical
consciousness, since one’s standpoint is considered to be a key aspect in the development of critical
consciousness.
These frameworks allowed me to see and show how caregiving mothers engaged in litigation
were seeking to meet personal support needs. In their litigation they were also geared towards bringing
about social and legal change for them and their children, yet they faced many and often unsurmountable
barriers in so doing. The literature I reviewed supported this line of inquiry, as did interviews caregiving
mothers gave to the press regarding the state supports they had received over a lengthy period of time.
Within this framework, I adopted feminist legal methods to analyze material. As described in
Chapter Two, feminist legal methodologist, Elizabeth Bartlett, advanced the uses of multiple approaches
in the analysis of law as a patriarchal institution. Her approach permits women’s lives to become visible
in law. In my research I paid attention to the text of cases. This method was shown to be effective in
analyzing the claims and submissions made in cases I reviewed, the opinions and obiter dicta of courts,
what was not said in cases, including in precedential cases to which courts referred, as well as the
decisions rendered. Omissions also provided valuable information about gender and care.
In addition to the evidence marshaled by various parties, I reviewed what else was and was not
going on in these support cases. This idea to look at what was not happening was drawn from a scholarly
article by Phinney. He critiqued the decision in a support claim about a mother’s missing rights in a case
ostensibly concerning them. I thus discussed erasures and omissions in the cases I used. Some of these I
characterized as legal myths, perpetuating legal fictions and unjust outcomes responsibilizing mothers for
care. It became apparent to me that these fictions and outcomes buttressed what was not only a patriarchal
version of motherhood, but also an ableist version of it. In terms of what else was taking place, the
litigation showed that childhood disability was not accommodated, and/or not adequately addressed in
support law.
The Prior Body of Literature and My Contributions to It
Since my project was interdisciplinary, I referred to scholars whose work was from diverse disciplines in
my literature review. Some of those who were influential were Adrienne Rich, Jonathan Herring, Nancy
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Fraser, Kiran Manhas, Sarah Green, Patricia McKeever, Joan Gilmour, Jo Bridgeman, and Maritza
Montera (whose work informed my conceptual framework). Also influential were Dick Sobsey and Colin
Barnes. Others not referred to in this reflection were important in analyzing the legal problems examined.
Scholarship in social reproduction, poverty, neo-liberalism and the political era that followed it, referred
to as The Third Way, all contributed.
I first mention Adrienne Rich. Her insight was a starting point in contemplating my research
questions. Rich wrote Of Woman Born, in 1976.1339 In it, she characterizes motherhood as a sociological
and historical construct and importantly, as an institution. Her idea was radical at the time it was
articulated, and stood in opposition to the entrenched notion that motherhood is a ‘natural’ state,
biologically defined as a woman having had a child and becoming a mother. Rich saw that the status of
mother is viewed by society as being a woman’s destiny. This she describes as patriarchal mythology.
Rich’s juxtaposition of institutional versus natural motherhood was useful. The present daunting
circumstances of caregiving mothers in no way appear ‘natural’ in the legal cases I examined. Rather,
their circumstances of grossly insufficient supports and needing to constantly contest meager support
offerings appear more as part of a highly gendered political-economic plan.
As seen in my thesis, severely disabled children have neither corresponded with the children
envisaged in patriarchal motherhood or in the dominant culture. Related to that, the demands of such care,
which comprise the subjective and objective burdens described by Green,1340 result in caregiving mothers
‘failing’ to meet the expectations of motherhood as an institution. Accepting Rich’s conceptualization of
motherhood as a patriarchal institution, the structures around it, such as law and policy, are also
patriarchal. Rarely can one claim that support-seeking caregiving mothers had power in the legal cases I
examined. And rarely were fathers seeking support. Only two cases involved fathers seeking support, one
in the context of child welfare disability support and the other in the context of a severely disabled mother
who could not provide care. Their claims were entirely atypical.
I showed through an analysis of a diverse body of litigation, that the structures reinforcing the
institutions of motherhood are also ableist. This legal analysis was bolstered by the opinions of both a
provincial and a federal court judge, who, in their dissenting judgments commented on the law’s failure to
account for the contribution of mothers with disabled children.
My thesis thus expands upon Rich’s insights regarding the institution of motherhood. The
difficulty and /or inability of caregiving mothers to access needed supports, as seen in the legal cases, and
reports about the cases I examine, reveal the inherent barriers, exclusions and omissions of caregiving
mothers’ circumstances within the structures that make up motherhood as an institution. These revelations
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show that supports needed are of a different order than the normative supports anticipated by patriarchal
motherhood. Worthy of note is that caregiving mothers are forced to answer to not one but two sets of
expectations in accessing supports, those of patriarchy and those of ableism.
These two ideologies interact to oppress caregiving mothers who assert a legal right to support.
The cases I examined also demonstrate that caregiving mothers resist and contest the power of this
“double-whammy” status quo. Cases also suggest that caregiving mothers who seek supports seek status
recognition as unique mothers, i.e., those who provide maternally complex forms (plural) of care. And
they strive to end their exclusion from an alternately unresponsive and/or punitive institution. One can see
then that Rich’s notion has both contributed to and been built upon in my work.
Patricia McKeever is another scholar whose work has been highlighted in my literature review, as
well as in other chapters. Her early work described feminine caregiving as a discourse that undergirds
societal expectations of maternal performance of complex care for children. The discourse posits that
mothers are the natural and optimal caregivers for children, and her work showed that to be true for even
children with severe medical disabilities who were medically complex and technology dependent. Her
work calls attention to the ways in which such mothers’ care is unique and also the ways they struggle
with it. As such, her research supports Rich’s observations, as it shows mothers performing the difficult
care for their medically complex children, and doing so within a powerful (then) male dominated
profession with strong expectations of maternal compliance. In co-authored work McKeever examines
shortfalls in state responses to the need for support in the areas of home nursing care to mothers with
medically complex children. These authors concluded there are ethical problems in the way government
provides home care for medically complex children in that responsibility for difficult medical care was
shifted from the state to the home, with the cost of this shift carried disproportionately by women.
The legal cases I examined, as well as descriptions of other kinds of advocacy for caregiving
mothers (such as reporting a care crisis to the provincial Ombudsman), support McKeever’s conclusions
in her early research1341 that they are a unique group of mothers. Her project allowed me to conceptualize
maternally complex care, as a label that helps to recognize medically complex caregiving mothers. While,
as McKeever describes, caregiving mothers orient themselves in particular ways to medical professionals
to obtain optimal care, I point out that caregiving mothers orient themselves to disputes to obtain basic
supports. I retained a curiosity in their orientation throughout my project, as it suggested their awareness
of support regimes as being oppositional rather than as supportive and cooperative.
My project continues with what McKeever observed, which is that mothers struggle, because they
require greater levels of publicly funded nursing and other care than is made available. Judges in several
legal cases I examined raise the issue of the impacts of care performance on mothers’ health, some relying
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on medical reports. Many mothers in the legal cases I examined describe health problems. Current care
policies are described as being ethically problematic by McKeever; my thesis draws attention to how the
ethical issues she and her co-authors raise, are also legally problematic.
I also reviewed Joan Gilmour’s work, which predicted problems would arise as the state
continued to redraw the line in its increasing privatization of healthcare. She also predicted that as it did
so, demands on women would increase. She commented that the state’s expectation that women will
provide care without pay would carry an onerous social and emotional toll. History has proven her right,
as the cases and research I undertook establish. Gilmour’s comments align with those of McKeever, as
well as those of Armstrong and Armstrong, whose work I do not reiterate here, but which likewise
expressed concern about provincial withdrawal from a variety of forms of care provision, including the
care that mothers now perform. The latter authors comment that state withdrawal from care poses
problems. These are significant for mothers with severely disabled children, who may end up with little in
the way of money, outside interests, social networks and resources, because their lives are dominated by
complex care, often in combination with the other ‘child care’ obligations they juggle. Unless these
mothers have significant other/outside financial supports, such as reliably paid, very long-term,
consistently high levels of child support or a partner with an extremely high income (both rare and
precarious) the Canadian state’s withdrawal from care is harmful to caregiving mothers.
My examinations of the literature, policy reports, and cases concerning care for severely disabled
children, together support Gilmour’s prediction. Caregiving mothers in their claims and in their media
interviews present not only gaps in care, but also evidence of the catastrophic personal impacts of the
demands of the forms of care they are engaged in when they are so inadequately supported.
I also highlighted the work of Sarah Green, in particular, her article challenging ideas about what
is burdensome to caregiving mothers, and what the impact of such burdens is.1342 Her work has
contributed greatly to my understanding of the gendered nature of care burdens in the setting of
maternally complex care for severely disabled children.
Green innovatively introduces the notion of subjective and objective burdens of care as a means
to distinguish between the kinds of care challenges caregiving mothers face. Objective burdens include
stress related to the care of the child, financial concerns in providing care, the lower ability of mothers to
pursue friendships, and the high energy that must be spent seeking services, amongst others. She points
out that other literature has focussed on maternal distress, which she classifies as subjective burden. The
distinctions she draws help to clarify some of the fault lines in state support.
Green’s work makes a significant contribution to our understanding, because it challenges claims
emanating from prominent critical disability theorists. Some of these theorists reject care burdens as
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artifacts of an ableist society. This eschewing of mothers’ burdens translates into the characterization of
caregiving mothers as people who ‘complain’ about care, and who narcissistically valorize their own
caregiving over those for whom they care, as I discussed earlier. Green’s theory challenges critical
disability theory further, by proposing some of these burdens as features of care that are injurious. One
aspect, as Green notes, is that caregiving mothers are ‘exhausted’, and she challenges the reader to accept
that as ‘normal’ or as being just.
My thesis extends Green’s thoughts on burdens of care and mothers with disabled children. Legal
cases I examine add to an understanding of an array of care burdens and their impact in diverse domains,
such that burdens of care seen in my legal research threaten the ability of a mother to retain custody of her
severely disabled child. Green’s idea of objective burdens allowed me to posit an extension of care
burdens to include a series of maternal losses incurred as a result of having been assigned the role of
‘caregiving mother’. These include pension loss, salary and other financial loss, child loss/loss of
maternal status, career loss, and other such features of complex care exposed in the legal cases mothers
bring to courts and tribunals.
Green’s ideas permitted me to challenge interpretations of care burdens in legal cases that were
hostile to caregiving mothers and dismissive and disparaging of care burdens as a concept when it is
applied to the care of severely disabled children.
Two prominent critical disability scholars whose work was influential in my thesis are Colin
Barnes and Dick Sobsey. Barnes has written an important text, along with Geoff Mercer, about how best
to conduct disability research. The text addressed issues about whose research disability research was, and
the need to involve disabled people in research about them. This text reminded me at all times to factor
my lived experience as a medically disabled mother in my research and my analyses. It also reminded me
to call upon my relational knowledge of mothering children with a range of mild, moderate and severe
disabilities.
In one of Barnes’ other works, he waded into the area of rights and the disabled child, while
critiquing a UK charity poster. Barnes’ critique draws attention to societal exclusion, which permits the
support of disabled children to fall outside the law. However, Barnes omits any mention of the care, work
and advocacy of mothers of children with severe disabilities. Nor does he consider mothers in his critique
of the charity model of disability. His commentary underscored for me that even when the rights of a
disabled baby are under discussion, its mother’s rights are erased.
My thesis further interrogates what Barnes describes, that disability care by mothers is largely
outside the law. The one in whose arms the disabled baby is sitting in the charity poster, and by whom the
baby is instrumentally supported, is the one who has problems realizing her rights and her child’s rights –
the mother. Although Barnes offers a critique of the charity model in the context of disability, he fails to
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see the charity-like status of the disability care-occupied mother. Her care is not remunerated, as Gilmour
describes in her work. And as Herring notes, it is assumed that she will provide it. In my thesis, this
reality was at the heart of caregiving mothers’ lack of status recognition, the latter being a concept drawn
from the work of a feminist critical theorist, Nancy Fraser whose work was also influential.
The social model of disability, first described in the literature by Mike Oliver, allowed Barnes to
articulate the lack of support rights of the child as a disabled person. The disabling social relations he
identifies failed, however, to provide him with insight into the caregiving mother’s related exclusion from
law. This is one of the issues I grapple with in my thesis. Barnes, like some other scholars in the field of
critical disability studies, does not appear to be aware of, or particularly concerned with, caregiving
mothers’ rights or the relationship of a mother and her disabled child. Thus my work pinpoints an
ideological gap, which is a contribution to our understanding of unrealized support rights. My legal
analyses reveal that the best interests of severely disabled children are not only linked to, but in many
respects are contingent upon their mothers’ legal right to support. Where mothers’ rights fail, so too may
those of their severely disabled children. Barnes’ critique of the poster provided me with a template on
which to sketch my ideas about maternal disability care being taken for granted in critical disability
discourse.
Turning to another influential critical disability scholar, I assess the contribution of Dick Sobsey.
His work has focused on the right of disabled children to be included, and their right to be safe. He is to
be lauded for his cataloging of violations against disabled children, and for raising awareness about the
important issue that they are bullied and murdered more often than non-disabled children.
Sobsey, however, is both critical and dismissive in his stance towards caregiving mothers in
crisis, and those caregiving mothers who have claimed that they require more state support. Their claims
are ideologically counter to how he envisions life with disability. Where desperate mothers have declared
they are in crisis, he has rejoined that there has been far ‘too much stress on stress.’
Sobsey’s work encouraged me to be careful to explain that the burdens of care that mothers
describe in legal cases do not confer a status of ‘burdensome’ on their disabled children. Thus I was
mindful to avoid this conflation when discussing burdens of care in the setting of support seeking
mothers. The burdens have to do with the care and not the disabled child. Recognizing the need to untie
this knot describes one of Sobsey’s larger contributions to my project. His denunciation1343 and/or
dismissal of struggles by mothers drew my attention to his work.1344 His strong positioning against robust
state supports is a diminution of its importance. One study I examined advances the position that ‘good
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copers’1345 are those who demonstrated “satisfactory family adjustment … and child wellbeing”. Goodcopers were pre-selected to participate in a study purporting to show the transformational benefits
disabled children confer on parents.1346 In describing a “divorced mother” with a severely disabled child
who lived alone and who stated she was lonely and had no life outside of care, she is labeled as having
diminished resilience.1347 Mothers like her are criticized as having “allowed” disability to “take over”
their lives.1348
The facts in the legal decisions I examine told a different story. They show highly competent
(coping and resilient) mothers objectively struggling with the balance between state versus mother’s care
provisioning, and fathers’ versus mothers’ contributions to care, across parameters. Rather than there
being too much stress on stress, as Sobsey alleges, my review showed there is too little focus on gender,
and in particular on the damaging impacts of the many gendered faces of disability care. Its absence has
caused several scholars, such as Hillary Stace, to name disability care as “women’s work”. As such it is
devalued. This devaluing was also reflected in a number of decisions I examined, and commented on by
some judges, who commended mothers in court for the onerous care work they undertook, some
describing their efforts as extraordinary.
I also referred to Franco Carnavale in my review. His work revealed grossly over-burdened
caregivers, who are utterly exhausted and desperate for supports of all kinds. My thesis emphasizes that it
does not make sense to be concerned about the severely disabled child in isolation from their mother. It
revealed that where disability care and support breaks down, foster care is one result. This is state care,
the very thing Sobsey fears for disabled children, since in his view public care has proven dangerous for
them.
The article written by Donna Haslam referenced in my project refers to community living
comprising a vision of care and support that never materialized. She describes the ghosts of that vision as
haunting her emotionally. Her words echoed in the cases, especially that of caregiving mother Anne
Larcade, who sued Ontario (unsuccessfully) for various kinds of psychological harms in the situation of
too little state support. This was the basis of her litigation against the government.
Other authors’ works that appear in my project, such as that of Miriam Edelman, Donna
Thomson, Mariane Loene, along with the legal claims of Ontario’s Anne Larcade and Nicole Desmarais,
both of whom brought lawsuits in respect of needed support, conclude that complex care requires much
greater support, and address mothers’ difficult situations. In the absence of adequate state supported
‘community’ living, it is mothers who have stepped into the yawning care gap. They have done so not
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because it is ‘natural’ to do so, but because political approaches that situate responsibility for care and
support with them made it necessary. In dismantling care and other supports, governments left caregiving
mothers to fend for themselves. My thesis has shown this to be hugely problematic and unjust for both
mothers and children.
The literature review (and legal cases) I examined, demonstrate that men are not the heavy lifters
in disability care of any kind. Instead, they have had what I earlier referred to as ‘care-privilege’, or what
critical theorist Nancy Fraser, whose work I reference, calls an economic “free ride.” As my project has
been filtered through my own standpoint as a caregiving mother who was under-supported, it is galling
that those who have had care-privilege should be dismissing our experience of inadequate support as
personal failure.
Colin Barnes’ observation noted above, was that disabled children fall outside the law. My
position is that so do their mothers, and this has been addressed by British legal scholar Jonathan Herring
(referred to above). Herring is an expert in care law, and he scrutinizes the unjust responsibilization of
mothers in law.
In his analyses, Herring raises the issue of autonomy and how it relates to law, referring to
autonomy in its classic liberal articulation. He states that the autonomous man is conceived as selfrealizing, self-sufficient, independent and self-reliant, and acts to further his own individual interests.
Herring explains that this form of autonomy relates directly to personal choice and the ability to shape
one’s life. In this sense, the businessman with rights of autonomy is fully recognized in law. However, he
also points out, exhausted mothers with disabled children (such as Green and McKeever described) have
little autonomy and are not recognized in law.
Herring also states that caregiving mothers are a legal anomaly. His insight, that caregiving
mothers are anomalous in law, impacted how I read the cases. It helped me to see where fact patterns
failed to ‘fit’ support law, and failed to fit available claims or the ability of mothers to defend against the
claims of others who seek not to pay support. His insight therefore was not merely theoretical. Their
anomalous situation has profound implications when it comes to the ability of mothers with severely
disabled children to realize rights to support as a dyad. By dyad I refer to them as a connected support
rights unit. Herring’s insight also in part explains their inability to realize rights as a dyad. As I later
show, their circumstances are either not accounted for, or not adequately accounted for, in support law.
Herring’s work also prompted me to think carefully about the issue of autonomy in the cases and
legislation I examined when considering the problems caregiving mothers have in accessing support
through law. My examination of legal cases, reports and literature about mothers reveal that caregiving
mothers are expected to be self-reliant, sooner or later. In this sense, my legal research supports what
Herring has observed in Britain, that (eventual) realization of liberal autonomy is expected of caregiving
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mothers. In some cases examined, the expectation of maternal financial self-reliance in the setting of
heavy caregiving was aggressively pursued in court. My examinations reveal that the classic liberal form
of autonomy that is exercised in law, allows for ruthless individualism to be unleashed in the setting of
mothers with severely disabled children seeking supports so that they need not continue to live in poverty.
In my thesis, I note that Herring observes that one of the core rights in the liberal world is
autonomy and that liberal autonomy relates directly to choice and to the ability to shape one’s path in
life.1349 In contradistinction, I provided the example of Mrs. E. who was opposed by disability rights
advocates in her plea to be autonomous, and the Supreme Court of Canada in the context of its judgment,
seemed to agree that she had no such right.1350
Returning to critical theorist Nancy Fraser, not only was her work influential in my literature
review but her theory accords with what Herring describes in care law. My legal research showed that
caregiving mothers are trapped inside what Fraser terms structures of dependency within the capitalist
welfare state. The descriptions of Herring and Fraser together helped me to explain what is taking place in
many of the legal cases I reviewed, and later discussed, whereby the reality of caregiving mothers’ lives
and their needs and claims do not “fit” supports as they do for others.
In keeping with what Fraser describes, Kiran Manhas’ article notes the continued “ideological
distinction” of the public and private spheres in the setting of mothers with children with complex care
needs is one that exploits mothers, and that fails to receive legal recognition. In examining a Nova Scotia
case, Manhas concluded that the government’s calculations of entitlements represent a “gendered
devaluation of care.” The legal cases I reviewed added to those few she examined, significantly
expanding the collection of cases about support of mothers with severely disabled children, and with
similar findings, as well as many additional ones.
In an article about their medical research Manhas, along with her colleague Ian Mitchell, describe
the requirements of extraordinariness of caregiving mothers, which as noted above, courts refer to when
adjudicating caregiving mothers’ claims for support. I next comment briefly on the influence of British
legal scholar Jo Bridgeman. She argues in her work on mothers with severely disabled children that the
view that care is private and that care is a private responsibility has become entrenched. That is a reality
that Canadian caregiving mothers also confront when they battle for state care. Although some fathers
argue in support cases that care is the state’s responsibility because Canada is a capitalist-welfare state, in
practice it is only weakly a state responsibility today. Bridgeman argues that the state aims to retain care
in the private domain, and will battle to do so. This, as she points out and as my research shows, includes
the care of children with extraordinary care needs. She argues this approach expresses the notion that
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public responsibilities towards care are a burden on the state and on society. Bridgeman also points out
that women more or less carry responsibility for care alone. I identified this too in cases I examined, and
thus her legal research assisted me in my own.
An inability on the part of mothers to provide expected levels of care, or the inability to
demonstrate required “extraordinariness” of responsibility as described by Manhas and Mitchell, and
Bridgeman, can carry harsh legal consequences for mothers. My thesis addressed the harsh legal
consequence of child loss to child protection authorities, in particular the characterization of their
circumstance as one of abandonment. This was in reality the result of some mothers’ inability to continue
on as extreme caregivers. In keeping with this, my thesis adds to their observations that mothers are
heavily burdened, sometimes to the point of giving up on what becomes apparent to them is an impossible
mission. This is not state support but rather the fracturing of family relationships.
Throughout my thesis, I have pointed out the relational nature of support needs of mothers with
severely disabled children, and the problems these relational needs pose to those seeking support in a
legal system that fails to recognize such claims. In that regard, I reviewed the work of relational rights
scholars, and, in particular, I refer to Jennifer Nedelsky, who, like Herring, is a care law scholar.
Nedelsky considers rights to be institutional means for implementing core values. She names a
few of these values, such as autonomy, security, liberty and equality. She also points out that rights
structure trust, responsibilities, power, and care. In her work, she asks how the way in which existing
rights have been structured helps address the problem; i.e., what are the patterns and structures of
relations that have shaped law, rights and the state? These questions were relevant to my thesis.
In discussing rights, Nedelsky also refers to the presence of myths in theorizing legal structures
premised on liberalism. She tackles the issue of autonomy in her research and theory, noting it is
conceived in law as a feature attributed to the self as bounded, and lived out by those who are bounded in
the way law anticipates. In the myth of the bounded legal self, rights delineate and protect the legal self,
and the boundaries of the state. This articulation of rights is seen to create and to support a notion of
autonomy that Nedelsky asserts is not attainable for many.
Nedelsky proposes a different version of autonomy, which is relational. She theorizes that
autonomy is a capacity that is developed in relationships, and argues that the state has a responsibility for
supporting these, essentially because the law constitutes relations in society. However, the state has not
lived up to its responsibility, according to Nedelsky. In my research, I identified strong statements from
judges about the legal plight of caregiving mothers vis-à-vis the state and also about the legal positions of
some fathers who actively sought to be legally let off the support hook. Justices Strong, Curtis and others
have commented on this, while also acknowledging judges’ ability to access proved legal remedies to
poverty and overwork were restricted. Justices Molloy and Linden went out of their way in dissenting
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judgments to point out that the relationships of mothers with disabled children trouble law, and that such
relationships ought to be supported.
My legal research findings overall accord with Nedelsky’s assertion, which is that a caregiving
mother’s ‘self,’ is conceived as bounded in law. Her metaphor of the bounded self refers to the solitary
and separate self that is envisioned in law. This version of the self runs into difficulty in precisely those
areas where caregiving mothers’ support needs are being adjudicated. As seen in the statutes and cases I
refer to, the state and other parties in support disputes rely on laws that treat caregiving mothers as though
their interests are bounded, or as though the support sought is for a single individual who is separate from
other individuals in law. This is in spite of the presence of a high needs, unusually vulnerable child in
need of extraordinary care, which provides evidence contrary to the bounded individual that the law
presumes.
Individual forms of support, like child support, are proven in my project to be a poor fit for
mothers with severely disabled children. My project can thus be used to enhance an understanding of
reasons why relational envisioning of support rights makes more sense. Nedelsky’s work also helped me
to examine rights in the ways I describe.
Turning to other academic work in my literature review and employed in my thesis, it highlighted
scholars whose work provides analyses of critical consciousness, with two of those considering this
concept in the context of caregiving mothers (Melanie Panitch and Elena Mustakova-Possardt). Although
I draw from the work of Paolo Freire, renowned for his work in this area, it is primarily the concepts of
social psychologist and critical consciousness theorist Maritza Montero, which I rely on in discussing
legal cases and their implications.
In Methods for Liberation: Critical Consciousness in Action Montero posits general principles for
critical consciousness. These include the presence of actions, reflections and dialogue. She describes the
praxis-based approach (action-reflection-action) as a practice within which social conditions of oppressed
persons may be changed.
The reflection piece problematizes what has been presented to the individual. There is in this
activity a conscious construction and reconstruction of the world. Montero asserts that problematization
leads to a process of de-naturalizing, that is to say, it entails breaking deeply entrenched beliefs, ideas,
and thinking about societal circumstances as being natural the way they are. She posits this is useful in
settings where people’s lives are difficult, painful, hard and unfair.
The result of these practices is a mobilization of consciousness from the uncritically accepted
vision of reality to a different one, where life is transformed. In this process, new knowledge is generated
and there is heightened awareness of social relations that cause people to question the hegemony of
certain ideas. Montero states that problematization may begin with a doubt or a question, and can foster
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the development of political understanding. And she describes a ‘trigger’ effect as starting the critical
process of analysis. My thesis uses these ideas.
For example, Montero explains that individuals become adept at “learning” from external
constructions of their experiences, stating that one response to the force of restructured consciousness is a
willingness to engage in conflict and to make use of available resources to change society. It is the force
of this restructured consciousness which enables individuals to set out their demands.
In my thesis, problematization is seen as a process leading caregiving mothers to acquire the
ability to claim rights, contest law, and a willingness to dispute how law is applied to them. Justice
O’Connell in an endorsement of a child protection matter chose to include the information that “[t]he
respondent mother does not agree that she has abandoned M.A., but rather that she was no longer able to
care for him.”1351 This reflects a mother’s counter-framing of her legal circumstances, which in this case
fell outside the ideology of the “failed mother” in child welfare.
I suggested in my project that what the present institution of patriarchal and ableist motherhood
presents to caregiving mothers with severely disabled children is everything mothers with non-disabled
children must deal with (intensive selfless mothering, being responsibilized for children, being blamed
and judged when things do not go according to society’s plan for a child). Then in addition to that, there
is the devaluation of the severely disabled child, the continued normative expectations, the blaming of
caregiving mothers for not being more like mothers who have non-disabled children and the higher
financial costs to be incurred by caregiving mothers.
A mother who is not critically conscious may realize she needs some support and may ask around
and learn about her right to claim child support. When she becomes aware of her entitlement to bring a
claim, and how to go about doing so, she will have a new rights consciousness that she previously lacked.
However, if she has a severely disabled child and attends court and finds her application is met with
vehement and unyielding opposition and allegations that do not match her reality, she may begin the
process of praxis (or she may give in and go home). If she engages in problematization, as I suggested in
my project many caregiving mothers do, then she may become one of the caregiving mothers who
recognize they need to educate themselves about the law, and the assumptions undergirding it, to allow
her pursue a particular claim or bring an appeal and perhaps do more than that.
In critical consciousness the goal shifts so that it also entails changing legal practice or changing
the law or policy because now she wants more than just child support, she also wants a particular form of
justice, which includes recognition of the legal plight of mothers and their severely disabled children. My
thesis described mothers who sought to change the status quo. My analyses, as described, built on the
ideas of Panitch as well as Mustakova-Possardt. For example, Panitch described Audrey Cole as a
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critically conscious activist mother.1352 Panitch noted in a 2006 document that Cole (and others) had
moved beyond personal grievances in her advocacy, to become politicized in her ideas about
motherhood.1353 Ten years later, Cole’s middle-aged son’s lawsuit, directly facilitated by his mother as
his litigation guardian and analyzed in my thesis, frames Cole as a critically conscious litigating
mother.1354 The decision in Cole ‘shapes consciousness”1355 concerning health care rights of severely
disabled people and in so doing helps others to consider similar litigation to advance a shared goal.1356
My work adds to theirs, showing mothers making legal demands on the state, and who do not in
their claims to support accept the “compartmentalization of public and private”, as described by
Mustakova-Possardt in discussing her interview with a caregiving mother. 1357
Having further regard to their legal demands, I next point to conclusions that can be drawn from
their litigation.
Conclusions Drawn From The Legal Research
In this section I provide conclusions from my legal research. As seen, the thesis is comprised of
eight chapters. In Chapter Two I provided my research pathway and included an explanation of my
conceptual frameworks, which drew from feminist standpoint and critical consciousness theory. In
Chapter Three I provided an interdisciplinary review of the literature in areas addressing aspects related to
support to mothers with disabled children.
Moving ahead to Chapter Five, in it I sketch the support law and policy landscape as it pertains to
mothers with disabled children. This chapter painted a picture of support offered by government as being
in silos, with multiple ports of entry to support offerings. Thus the state has structured support such that
mothers cannot get support they need in one place. They must apply for it in many different places, in
different Ministries, with different definitions of disability and different eligibility requirements. This
carries with it numerous problems and barriers and adds an administrative and time burden to those other
burdens mothers already shoulder.
An additional problem noted in Chapter Five is that cases, legislation and policy rest on shifting
sands. If they are changed or removed, government cannot be held accountable to mothers. This adds a
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layer of complexity and stress for mothers in an already complex ‘system.’ Policy is also balkanized; I
provide the example of respite, which in Ontario is accessed through different Ministries and for which
there have been extensive wait lists.
In Chapter Four I examined features of disability care. Importantly the ideology of care that
surrounds mothers with severely disabled children was discussed as oppressive. In this chapter I
introduced four models of disability: social model; medical model; charity model and what I name the
combined approach– a relational and non-adversarial model of care.
My analysis revealed that caregiving mothers resist the characterizations in different models of
disability that have been applied to them and their children, and which have been oppressive, each in their
own way. The charity model masks mothers’ burdens of care, the social model pathologizes mothers’ care
burdens, while the medical model holds that it is the disabled child who is a burden on the family and on
the state. I went on to describe a re-theorization of mothers’ burdens of care, and reformulate that into a
new combined model. The work of caregiving mother and scholar Sarah Green was instrumental to this
endeavor. The combined model deals openly with maternal burdens of care and does so in a manner that
allows their alleviation to be considered. I posited a number of as yet unidentified (by the state or social
model proponents) burdens of care on mothers. One, for example, is the need to engage in and pay for
legal battles while caregiving. Burdens of care as I noted, vary in nature, degree and impact. For example,
some of the research described ‘catastrophic’ burdens of care, while others referred to requirements of
‘extraordinary’ care.
In Chapter Four I applied insights from these models of disability to my critique of the above
mentioned celebrated 1981 disability rights case (Eve) that was heard at the Supreme Court of Canada. I
examined various stages of this litigation, which was brought by a caregiving mother. This case
underscored that caregiving has been socially assigned as a lifelong obligation, without that reality having
been overtly acknowledged, including in law. As such, I commented on the coercive elements of law
when it comes to mothers and disability care.
Chapter Four concluded that assumed care by mothers, no matter their personal circumstances, is
oppressive. And I argued that it is through a process of critical consciousness, such as one may presume
Mrs. E acquired when society and the Court would not allow what she requested, that permits mothers to
escape the shared societal vision imposed (even if they must continue to provide most or all of the care).
The models of disability examined in this chapter, along with my analysis of Mrs. E’s situation,
informed my examination of legal cases in subsequent chapters, to which I now turn.
Chapter Six dealt with disputes with the state. Although those cases that come to court do not
represent all circumstances, in cases I examine, both private parties and government battled not to have to
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support mothers with severely disabled children. In some cases government and fathers asserted that the
other should have responsibility for such support.
The cases suggest it is important to government to set precedents with caregiving mothers. A
strong state stand is taken against the interests of mother and disabled child where public support is at
issue. This has been witnessed in respite, disability pension eligibility and other public law cases brought
by caregiving mothers. In one case, with a child disability tax credit at issue, the government put a
disabled child on the stand to question him about the level of care he received from his mother. This
practice contradicts the ideology of the noble caregiving mothering that is described in Chapter Four, and
it exploits the notion of the self-sacrificing special needs mother. It is also not in the best interests of the
child to be treated in this manner. My research showed that caregiving mothers often could not ‘win,’ i.e.,
they were unable to obtain adequate support.
Part of the legal analysis resulted in findings concerning the place of liberal notions of autonomy
upon which support law for mothers with severely disabled children is premised, and contrasting that with
relational autonomy. Caregiving mothers simply cannot inhabit the bounded form of autonomy liberal
law presumes. In relation to Nedelsky’s ideas, the example in Chapter Six is provided by caregiving
mother, Tali Lalkin. She was ‘autonomous’ in the classical liberal sense (i.e., she was single and selfsupporting with a six figure income). Her ‘autonomy’ did not remedy the issue she encountered in
relation to a state support benefit she applied for. Her income level was held to be too high and thus she
was denied her support. The problem was half her income went on disability costs for her disabled
children. In alignment with Nedelsky’s theory, the law constitutes Lalkin as the custodial mother and
assigns her the relational complex care of her children, but then rather than supporting this assigned
relational care, the government strives not to support it or her in the amount needed.
On the other hand, where caregiving mothers have been legally accorded discretionary state
support in relationship with their disabled children, one sees government rejecting shared support, in
favour of child loss and disabled child wardship. This rejection includes a legislative return to
individualistic forms of support when shared forms of support are repealed.
Other cases concerning government benefits cases revealed that the ‘back of the envelope’
calculations of needed support to be made discretionarily available ignore what government’s own
research and the research of others has shown, which is that care of severely disabled children is
expensive, effortful, and energy and time consuming. Such categories of support likewise treat the
disabled child as a unit of support unto him or herself, even though this is completely divorced from the
realities of his or her care.
The public law cases also revealed that when there are problems with support (inadequacy, errors,
material changes and so on) this can result in time-consuming complications and disputes. There may be
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battles for caregiving mothers to show their and their child’s eligibility, and to show their continued
eligibility. There are battles to show that more support is needed than was awarded. The issue of material
change in circumstance is a critical area in support litigation, both in public law and private law support.
While it is necessary to permit changes in means to be demonstrated, challenges to needs are often
vexatious and introduce precarity into mothers’ lives and budgets.
As seen in some of the other benefit cases, caregiving mothers cannot enjoy any economic
certainty from one year to the next. Continued eligibility must be shown. Even where support has been
awarded in the past, cases reveal the very same roadblocks may appear year after year, even after the
same issue has already been litigated.
The public law cases reveal a lack of acknowledgment of the problems with quanta of support
and the weak delivery of critical health services. Although the examples reveal caregiving mothers badly
need nursing care relief, supports are structured so that there is no government accountability when nurses
fail to show up for a shift. There is some discourse around the emotional costs of all this to mothers, but
no legal discourse.
Cases revealed mothers’ desperation in the area of respite. Yet, respite care funding, although
absolutely essential, appeared in cases (both public and private) to be a point of contestation. Cases I
discussed show that even those mothers with high social capital, high education and large incomes cannot
do what the state expects them to do. This includes caregiving mothers who are lawyers who understand
the court system, and a physician who was accustomed to providing health care.
Together the cases I examined reveal barriers to accessing adequate support. I provided an
example of a case that straddled public (child welfare) and private (family) support law. Both the state
and the father left court without having to offset the mother’s costs of care. Such barriers are built into the
legislation, which, as Nancy Fraser describes ‘contains’ their so-called ‘domestic’ claims.
As demonstrated in the facts of case after case, across provinces and territories, the need for
support of mothers with severely disabled children is a shared need. Conceiving of support as individual
has resulted in complex disputes where courts at times have struggled to find just solutions. This
complexity is further reflected in private support law.
Moving on to discussion of the conclusions from my legal analyses in Chapter Seven, which
examined private lawsuits (i.e. disputes between private parties), I also described private law as being
much less private than one might assume, since government can and does become involved. It does so for
example, if private decisions threaten to cement government support obligations (King1358 ). Government
has also amended a private support statute in another case as well (Krangle1359 ).
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Another finding is that government can be seen to be in favour of disability rights to support
when it is to be realized (theoretically anyway) through private support law. Thus government may not as
vociferously oppose a caregiving mother’s claim, or it may not even take a position (Coates1360 ). Note that
a private party claim to change family law support to allow for support claims to be brought against other
private parties (Vivian1361 , Coates1362 , M v H1363 ) results in less financial ‘burden’ on the state. For
example, the maternal ‘win’ in the Coates case, was that the court held the FLA was discriminatory in its
barring unmarried women from claiming child support for their age of majority disabled children unless
they were in school full time. Although this ruling is an improvement over what was in place, more
avenues to private law support such as the ability to claim child support is not what is most required. State
support is. Simply put, family law, as the legal cases reveal in chapter six, is inadequate to the task of
ensuring needed levels of support or security of support. Moreover it usually involves a fight on an
uneven playing field.
My project critiqued government data collection in the area of child support arrears. I argued that
the data that is collected misrepresents both typical mothers and caregiving mother’s realities, in ways I
discussed. Even though all children are entitled to child support in the support framework, it is tailored for
non-disabled children, and fails to address support needs of severely disabled children, whose mothers are
already out of pocket. What is seen is that the needs of the severely disabled child must be fought for as
extraordinary expenses under s 7 of the FCSG. This is the only legal avenue available to caregiving
mothers to claim what are for them the usual costs of care.
In addition the family law cases highlight that care support is not synonymous with child support.
But family law cannot distinguish. This is similar to the unjust conflation of wardship with care (Chapter
6). The support provisions as presently enacted are blunt instruments not up to the task of helping
caregiving mothers to realize their legal rights to support.
Another important issue made apparent in cases examined is that ableism manifests in some
family law practice. For example, it is seen in cases where one parent minimizes or denies the severe
disabilities in submissions crafted by their legal counsel. This undermines mothers’ claims.
As cases showed, although there is a support provision for all minor children in family law, it
does not always translate into money in the bank, for the reasons I discussed. Moreover there is no
‘freestanding’ complex care support claim in family law provisions. And even if there were, it would
predictably be highly contested, likely in a manner seen in Vivian.1364
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Once a severely disabled child turns 18, caregiving mothers must provide proof of why they need
continued child support, as if the disabled child’s support circumstances have suddenly changed. For a
severely disabled child, need of support remains high. Age is often not a change of the ‘child’s’ care
circumstances (recalling that material change of circumstances is a legal basis for review of support). All
caregiving mothers are aware of this, but the law does not account for it. Even though there are provisions
in family law permitting mothers to bring claims for support for age of majority disabled children, for
many mothers they are not a realistic option. Such provisions require mothers to advance claims. That
alone has a deterrent effect of letting some fathers off the support hook.
Spousal support provisions are another avenue of support. Yet, in the family law context, there is
no category within spousal support for the caregiving mother, i.e with a child with severely disabilities.
Thus normative spousal expectations can be placed on caregiving mothers. Moreover, claims for spousal
support may be bitterly opposed. They require a payor with means to pay, but as cases reveal, it does not
mean they will. Spousal support is also an uncertain remedy, with contempt of court, material change in
circumstances of the payor, and a payor’s death being reasons for this uncertainty. The cases do not lead
to the conclusion that spousal support is a feature caregiving mothers should be expected to rely upon. To
act as though it is an acceptable route to support, is to have mothers assume all of the risks associated
with this form of support, in addition to the risks associated with the caregiving itself. The fact is most
men cannot afford to pay or will fight not to have to.
There are other conclusions that can be drawn from a comprehensive consideration of the public
and private law cases together. For example, cases show that caregiving mothers perform the lion’s share
of care, and that it is primarily mothers who pay the financial, social and health costs for so doing. Cases
also reveal that although some courts laud mothers for this, in other cases mothers are attacked in the
submissions made by parties, and at times their circumstances are not factored into decisions, in spite of
the fact that the care work they do is without remuneration. This suggests in some cases the impacts of
heavy care performance have not been understood by courts.
However even where mothers are lauded by courts for essential care performance, there is still
status misrecognition. My research revealed that this is compounded by the additional features of the
exclusion of mothers with severely disabled children from a variety of other needed forms of support, not
provided for in law (i.e. caregiving mother’s pensions, relief when they themselves become ill, financial
support after a severely disabled child dies and others).
The plight of caregiving mothers vis-à-vis support was addressed in a variety of cases. Notably,
the late Federal Court Judge Alan Linden recognized the sacrifices that caregiving mothers make in
providing care for which they are not rewarded by society or served by law; in one case he referred to
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law’s unjust normative expectations. He also brought attention to the relational nature of mothers’ care for
their severely disabled children and the challenges in related legal doctrine.1365
As in public law, cases I examined in private law reveal that the circumstances of mothers with
severely disabled children do not fit within existing legal frameworks. This resulted in no suitable
remedy, although some judges seemed eager to creatively find one.
The existence of two support domains (public and private) itself fomented disputes in family law,
while also setting the stage for harsh government policy that included clawbacks in the money needed by
less well-off caregiving mothers. Some mothers found themselves having to defend against government
to retain the private disability support payments made willingly by fathers. They fight for private support,
and then must fend off government. In private support disputes some payors argue mothers are
freeloaders and should seek payment from the state instead. It may be the case some judges believe that is
a viable option, where it is not.1366 Legal cases further showed that family law support claims shared
space with child welfare claims. Together these cases reveal that caregiving mothers have significant
responsibilities without the needed legal rights to support.
There are a number of legal tools available to mothers denied their rights. Below I examine
these, and their potential to redress the situation of mothers and their children with severe disabilities.
Legal Remedies for Mothers with Severely Disabled Children
Existing legal remedies, which have been examined throughout my thesis, were seen to present, overall,
substantial barriers. Moreover an individual “win” on a case-by-case fact-specific basis often only helped
the litigant, and not others. In light of this, something else is needed to remedy the problems caregiving
mothers face accessing supports. Different types of legal remedies can be employed to address the
situation described in the preceding chapters. In this next section I discuss five areas of law that
caregiving mothers might consider as strategies for realizing legal changes. In this order, I address
administrative law, tort law, human rights codes, international law and constitutional law. I end this
section by focusing on the most promising avenue amongst these, and that is a possible claim under s12
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Administrative Law
Administrative law is public law that defines and adjudicates issues concerning the legal limits on
discretionary decision-making by government under a statute. Thus, for example, administrative law
remedies would include a government decision not approving an application for child disability support
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made available under a given statutory provision to which caregiving mothers may apply for a
discretionary benefit.
When government makes a discretionary decision that a caregiving mother believes fails to award
her sufficient funds, or services, she usually can have recourse to seek judicial review of the decision by a
court with jurisdiction to do so.1367 Ordinarily, courts can undertake a substantive or a procedural review
of government action. They will examine the government decision to discern if it was ultra vires or
outside its powers, or constituted improper fettering of discretion, or whether another abuse of discretion
had occurred.
There are a number of remedies in response to government misuse of its discretion that may be
provided, upon review. For example a court can quash a government decision, or send it back for
reconsideration as seen in Nieberg,1368 an example discussed earlier in my thesis, where a government
decision was quashed on review and sent back to have the quanta of support re-determined.
Administrative law plays a significant role in access to supports by mothers with severely
disabled children, simply because so many of the supports they require are provided discretionarily by
government pursuant to statutes and regulations. As seen in my project, there is the potential through
administrative law channels for some mothers to realize entitlement to or higher awards of support
through judicial review. However, legal scholars such as Lorne Sossin have pointed out that government
has broad discretion in its administrative decision-making. That is an issue because it permits bureaucrats
wide latitude in their decision-making, and the present culture of government bureaucracy in the area of
support is not a generous one. This situation fosters a harsh and litigious environment surrounding
support benefits that mothers with severely disabled children require.
Even if successful, judicial review is expensive, unpredictable, permits no damage awards, and
cannot change the entire support system, so it is often only helpful on a case-by-case basis.
Administrative law is complex and replete with technical requirements. Such a challenge requires
professional assistance and specialized expertise. However, a determination that government decisionmaking was ultra vires its power would affect others too, and in that regard this area of the law offers at
least some potential to remedy some difficulties caregiving mothers encounter in accessing supports. The
chief reason administrative law is unsatisfactory however is that it is a complex area of law, with built-in
limitations in terms of what can be achieved.
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Tort Law
People can sue for certain types of civil wrongs or harms that resulted in damage to them. Private parties
may be sued in tort, as can government. There are several different kinds of torts; those most likely
applicable to the situations of mothers with severely disabled children are negligence and misfeasance in
public office. Where a claimant is successful, monetary damages may be awarded.
Tort law could potentially redress civil harms to mothers and their severely disabled children in
the setting of extremely low levels of government support. For example, a class action negligence claim
was recently commenced concerning years-long government wait lists in the developmental disability
sector in Ontario. A benefit to doing this, as some judges (Justice Linden for example) point out, is
engaging the ombuds role of tort law to act as a watch-dog over government activities.1369 However,
where caregiving mothers are concerned, in order to sue in negligence, they must convince a court that
there was a private law duty of care owed by government to them as a first step, and case law establishes
that it is very difficult to attack the government for its policy.1370
Tort law has many drawbacks for caregiving mothers, including the high cost of litigation, and
the length and uncertainty involved. However, it is chiefly the sheer complexity of a dispute in this area of
law that presents as the main drawback to its use by caregiving mothers.
Human Rights Codes
Human Rights Codes are provincial and federal legislation applicable to public and private activity that
aims to protect equal rights in areas such as services, housing and employment. There are a range of
prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code (OHRC), including sex,
disability and family status. The family status category is intended to protect a caregiving family member
from discrimination. It is a relational provision in a sense, since it protects the caregiver, and derivatively
the cared for. Unfortunately protection under the OHRC has proven insufficient where mothers with
severely disabled children are concerned, as seen in the case of Cindy Moore, described earlier in the
thesis.1371
Not only human rights claims have proven problematic for caregiving mothers. The policy
manual of the OHRC itself, which defines family status as a parent-child relationship, is also
problematic.1372 For instance, it discusses the relationship between family status and the ground of
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disability discrimination, using the example of the requirement of an employer to accommodate a mother
employee with an autistic child, as comprising a legal obligation. Unfortunately, in this example the
family status provisions in the human rights legislation are under-inclusive of the needs of working
mothers with severely disabled children, because their circumstances are vastly more complex and much
more unpredictable than the example provided. This means this avenue of redress is subject to noncontextual approaches: i.e. working as the mother of a disabled child is a very different context than doing
so with a severely disabled child. The accommodations required of an employer are of a different order.
This provides another example of the anomalous-to-law caregiving mother that Herring described. It also
is an example of the difficulty with the model of the bounded self being applied to a caregiving mother
employee, who has life and death care obligations that crop up without warning. Legal scholar Judith
Mosoff, whose work is referenced in the thesis, observed that those individuals who are furthest from the
norm are helped the least by human rights codes. Her research found that individuals with severe
disabilities appeared rarely in decisions.1373 The chief reason that Human Rights Codes are not the most
promising avenue is that provisions are under-inclusive of the realities of maternally complex care in the
setting of severe disability.
International Human Rights Law
As previously stated, Canada is signatory to a several international human rights instruments.
Most relevant to my thesis, are the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child1374 ; the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)1375 ; the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)1376 ; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)1377 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).1378 These instruments set out a range of human rights obligations to which Canada is
committed.1379 They have bearing on Canadian (domestic) law.
The Supreme Court of Canada moreover “has repeatedly recognized that when interpreting the
scope and content of human rights, Canada’s international obligations and relevant principles of

1373

Judith Mosoff. “Is the Human Rights Paradigm Able to Include Disability” Who’s In-Who Wins What-Why”
(2000). Queen’s LJ, 225.
1374
CRC, supra note 880.
1375
CRPD, supra note 35.
1376
CEDAW, supra note 893.
1377
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 [ICESCR].
1378
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810,
(1948) [UDHR].
1379
Canada has ratified all of these instruments. Department of Justice Canada, “International Human Rights
Treaties to which Canada is a Party” online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/icg-gci/ihrl-didp/tcp.html>.

286
international law set out the minimum level of protection” to which people are entitled.1380 The Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Divito supports this assertion.1381 Referencing Divito and regarding the role
of these instruments in the legal rights to support I examined in my thesis, Gilmour states that “the
understanding of domestic law is reinforced by international human rights agreements to which Canada is
a party.”1382
All of these instruments have significance to my project and this can be readily discerned in the
literature and legal cases I examined in my thesis (Coates for example).1383 I point out but a few further
examples here. The introduction to CEDAW states that the provisions for maternity and child-care are
proclaimed as essential rights and incorporated into all areas of that Convention whether dealing with
employment, family law, health care or education. Yet domestic support law and how it is dealt with by
government do not reflect CEDAW’s aims. Article 25(2) of the UNDHR, provides that motherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.1384 State responsibilities to mothers are plain and this
does not exclude mothers with severely disabled children.
The CRPD and the CRC both contain provisions for disabled children. Article 20 of the CRC
provides that, “[a] child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in
whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special
protection and assistance provided by the State.”1385 This has application to situations where caregiving
mothers require state supports. The CRPD, ratified in 2010, provides that states have binding obligations
concerning the realization by disabled children of their rights. Article 23.5 provides if immediate family
cannot care for a disabled child, states parties shall, “undertake every effort to provide alternative care
within the wider family, and failing that, within the community in a family setting.”1386 Again, this has
relevance to the support rights of mothers with severely disabled children, particularly in situations such
as that described by the Ontario Ombudsman in 2005, described earlier. In addition, the Best Interests of
the Child Principle expressed in international law must inform government decisions pertaining to
children, including those who are severely disabled. Yet, as seen in many in legal cases involving state
support for severely disabled children, it has not.
In spite of these provisions, the situation of mothers with severely disabled children is often
absent from deliberations at all levels. For example, The First Report of Canada to the Committee on the
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Rights of Persons with Disabilities that was filed in 2014,1387 under the heading ‘Children with
Disabilities’, sets out Federal government initiatives for disabled children in 140 words. There was no
discussion of the needs of caregiving mothers. In the Concluding observations on the initial report of
Canada1388 the direction given by the UN committee is for Canada to introduce guidelines among all
levels of administration on how to implement the principle of the best interests of the child in the design,
implementation and monitoring of legislation and policies concerning children with disabilities. The
primary reason that International Human Rights Law is of limited use on its own is that it is not directly
enforced by Canadian courts.
Constitutional Law
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms forms part of Canada’s Constitution, and limits government action.
Individuals who believe that a law violates one of their rights listed in the Charter may bring a claim to
court or an administrative tribunal. In this section I briefly address three rights contained in the Charter
that are most germane to my dissertation: s15 (right to equality), s7 (right to life, liberty and security of
the person), and s12 (right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment). Below I comment on the
ability and inability of caregiving mothers to make use of these sections of the Charter to assert or win
adequate support.
Section15 of the Charter provides that “Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.” Women in a variety of circumstances have relied on s.15 in an effort to advance their
equality rights. Cases include Brooks1389 (maternity leave), Withler1390 (widow’s pensions), Tomasson1391
(adoptive mothers parental leave) and Harris1392 (disability pension for disabled caregiving mothers),
amongst others. Likewise, disabled people and their advocates have relied upon s.15 to advance equality
rights claims. Some such cases include Eldridge1393 (health care) and Granovsky1394 (pension). Interested
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parties, including mothers as named plaintiffs and as guardians ad litem for their disabled children, have
brought claims to advance the equality rights of disabled children, for instance in the autism litigation.1395
Notably, the Charter is aimed at ensuring constitutional rights for individuals. This reality poses
problems for litigating caregiving mothers who represent a relational situation.1396 There are cases
demonstrating that the Charter is challenged to capture the complexity of relationships that require
protection from equality rights breaches or other constitutional rights infringements. This is in part
because those adjudicating claims often revert to formal tests for equality (i.e. treat likes alike), which do
not permit an accounting for the inequality experienced by mothers with severely disabled children. This
happens notwithstanding the rejection by the Supreme Court of Canada of this approach to equality.
Adjudicators are reluctant to use contextual approaches, which makes it difficult for them to “see” how
legal arrangements further inequality. This was apparent in Harris, a case examined in the dissertation,
involving a disabled mother with a disabled child, who claimed employment benefits.1397
Section 15 has however been successfully used to advance the support rights of severely disabled
adult children living with their lone mothers.1398 As well, s15 may present an opportunity for caregiving
mothers to advance an equality rights claim based on “enumerated and analogous grounds”.1399
However, one problem that arises in the determination of s 15 claims is that fact patterns are
frequently interpreted in the context of ‘formal’ equality, despite jurisprudence to the contrary. What this
means is that our courts are opining one way, but then deciding in another. When this occurs, it fails to
‘capture’ inequality in the circumstances of ‘care’, or ‘mothers with severely disabled children who
require substantive approaches to equality rights determinations. Arguably, caregiving mothers could
claim discrimination based on analogous grounds, but this is complex and the result uncertain. The
continued use of formal rather than substantive interpretations of equality present a chief reason why this
avenue is not the most promising one.
Mothers and disabled children through their legal guardians have also relied on s 7 of the
Charter, to advance rights to support. Section 7 provides that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
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security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice”.1400 Section 7 has been relied upon successfully by a mother in child protection
litigation. New Brunswick v G (J.) 1401 held that failure to provide legal aid to a mother who needed to
reply to a child protection application breached her s.7 right to security of the person. This case
underscored that economically vulnrerable mothers with children at risk of apprehension do have
constitutional rights.
Section 7 was also one of two Charter rights relied upon in a challenge to a provincial family law
provision in relation to adult child disability support. However, the s 7 challenge was ultimately
unsuccessful.1402 Section 7 was relied upon in autism litigation.1403 These claims too were unsuccessful.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Gosselin provides another example of narrow judicial
interpretation of s 7.1404 Gosselin involved a representative plaintiff of a large class in a class action
lawsuit, who challenged the constitutionality of Quebec’s Social Aid Act. The statute included a provision
protecting social rights, and Gosselin asserted claims of s 7 (as well as s 15) infringements. She claimed
the Act infringed her rights because it provided her with a below subsistence benefit. The majority
dismissed the claim as non-justiciable, holding that to succeed, Gosselin would have to show special
circumstances that justified imposing a positive obligation on the state to act. In her dissenting judgment,
Justice Arbour held that the Act did infringe Gosselin’s s7 rights and that the government did have an
obligation, under the particular facts, to support Gosselin.
Even the two most promising s7 cases, G.(J.)1405 and Gosselin1406 , therefore have built-in
limitations. Neither is on all fours with the situation of mothers with severely disabled children. In short,
caregiving mothers would have an uphill battle to show that s7 imposes positive obligations on
government to provide economic support under this section of the Charter. In conclusion s 7 still does
not reliably serve to advance socio-economic rights, since it is still the case that courts are reluctant to
find that it imposes positive obligations to support on government.
Lastly I discuss and apply s12 of the Charter, which states “Everyone has the right not to be
subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”1407 Section 12 has been successfully relied
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upon in a case involving government-funded health care for refugees, many of whom were poor women
with medically in-need children.1408
Section 12 of the Charter As Providing a Remedy
Section 12 provides that everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment. Although uncommonly used in civil law, s12 infringement has been claimed in challenges to
government decisions revolving around refusal to support vulnerable individuals.
I focus on s12 because the finding of a court that government’s treatment of mothers of severely
disabled children seeking support comprises cruel and unusual treatment would have significant impact.
First, it would require government to revisit its law and policy in the areas I addressed in my thesis.
Second, such a finding would relay to government that there was something amiss in its law and policy
vis-à-vis international human rights norms (CEDAW, UNDRPD, UNDHR). Thus government would
need to consider its international human rights obligations to severely disabled children and their mothers
in light of its law and policy. Third, such a finding would be a strong statement from the court regarding
the status of caregiving mothers and similarly of severely disabled children i.e. that they rank among
those holding effective legal rights to support. Such a finding would serve to further the status recognition
of mothers with severely disabled children, as mothers attempting to establish their legal rights through
litigation. Presently their unique status as mother is either masked by the many myths about them and/or
is ignored.
I commence by describing the legal test used to determine whether government conduct has
infringed s 12. The test in Canada was set out in R v Smith, and considered recently in the civil context in
Doctors for Refugee Care.1409 In the civil context a key feature that must be shown is that those asserting
their rights were infringed, came under government control.1410 Then it must be established whether their
treatment meets the threshold of cruel or unusual treatment. This would establish a breach, and the test
moves on to s.1. Then a court must inquire into whether the state is justified in causing the suffering that
has been established.1411 In order to provide an example of the test as applied to a case concerning
government funding of needed care to a vulnerable group that included poor mothers and medically in
need children, I turn to examine the facts of Doctors for Refugee Care1412 Then I also comment on the
recent Supreme Court of Canada case R v Boudreault which has to do with criminal law that required
1408
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impoverished offenders to pay money to the state pursuant to a mandatory victim surcharge levied against
them as part of the conviction for summary and indictable offences.1413
Doctors for Refugee Care involved a challenge to federal government cuts to the Interim Federal
Health Program (IFHP), which provided funding for refugee health care.1414 In making its determination
the court inquired into whether the program in question was a “benefit”. It determined that it was.1415 This
meant that the IFHP was subject to government regulation, as were those people who relied upon it. In
applying the test to the facts, the court held that cutting funding to this population constituted treatment
within the meaning of s 12 of the Charter. The treatment was also found to be cruel.
In determining what was ‘cruel’ treatment, the court noted treatment that was illogical and
unjust,1416 and treatment that was degrading to human dignity and worth were cruel.1417 Using examples
of health care refusal to child refugee claimants provided in evidence, the court opined that penalizing a
child in need of care was an ineffectual and unjust way to deter a parent.1418
Doctors for Refugee Care held that, “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment must be drawn
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”1419 Various
considerations may be taken into account, such as whether treatment goes beyond what is required to
achieve a legitimate government aim; whether there were alternatives; whether it was arbitrary or had a
social purpose; whether the treatment is unacceptable to a large segment of the population; whether it
accords with notions of public decency or propriety; shocks the general conscience, or is unusually severe
and hence degrading to human dignity and worth.1420 Further, the court noted that the treatment in this
case was not in compliance with the UNCRC,1421 nor compliant with the best interests of the child
standard in domestic law. 1422
While government argued that “difficult and potentially unpopular choices have to made” at
times,
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were not ‘saved’ by s 1.1424 This resulted in a finding that government action breached s12, a decision
upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.1425
In 2018 in R v Boudrealt the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that a mandatory
victim surcharge that was levied upon offenders, including those who were extremely impoverished and
disabled individuals met the test for punishment and not only treatment.1426 The court reasoned that
although the sum of money of the victim surcharge set out in the impugned provision was not a
significant amount for many Canadians to pay, it was nevertheless far beyond the means of many of those
individuals being charged and convicted, especially as the court noted, they were grappling with addiction
and mental health and other disability related issues1427 . The decision notes that many of those individuals
were forced to return to court repeatedly to explain that they were unable to pay the required amount. The
Supreme Court of Canada opined that this process amounted to “a public shaming” of offenders who
were unable to pay.1428 These features were decided to comprise a significant impact on the offender’s
liberty and security interests and as such the surcharge was found to be grossly disproportionate. Even
though the court opined that the bar demonstrating a breach of s 12 was set high, and even though it was
only on rare occasions that a sentence infringes s12, it held the surcharge to be cruel and unusual
punishment.1429 The Beaudrealt court seemed to be swayed by socio-economic and disability related
arguments pertaining to the unconstitutionality of a money-related punishment. The court also made
reference to valid alternatives to this surcharge. It was not the only avenue open.
Applying s12 to State Support of Mothers with Severely Disabled Children
As shown in my thesis, government benefits are likewise a crucial source of support to mothers
with severely disabled children. The literature review and legal research in my thesis revealed this dyad to
be vulnerable and disadvantaged in the area of needed care. This reality mirrors Doctors for Refugee
Care.1430
As with the refugees in Doctors for Refugee Care, in seeking benefits, caregiving mothers fall
under one form of government control or another. In reality, as my research revealed, they often fall under
many forms of it, not just one, as was the case in Doctors for Refugee Care. Moreover it can be argued
that the very nature of these supports forms part of what is cruel about the treatment of mothers needing
them. For example, the hit and miss nature of support described by policy scholar Michael Prince and
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legal scholar Lorne Sossin, and the weak or non-existent accountability of government in relation to the
supports.
As noted above, the test used for infringement of s 12 provides that “cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment must be drawn from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”1431 One can argue that the alternating indifference and harsh treatment of mothers with severely
disabled children by a succession of provincial governments, over a now lengthy period of time, is both
cruel and unusual. These two features (indifference and harshness) were apparent in legal cases I
examined, in the important 2005 Ombudsman’s Report, in various media reports and in what is a growing
body of research about the negative health effects under-supported care has on caregiving mothers and
their children. Indeed, this was the consistent thread running throughout my research.
Having regard to the findings I have detailed about how caregiving mothers are treated in law and
policy, which as noted run the gamut from indifferent to cruel, I presented scholarly literature from
diverse fields concerning the circumstances of caregiving mothers. I also reviewed governments’ own
reports on unmet needs of severely disabled children. These reports have often pledged to alter the status
quo for the better. In spite of desperate caregiving mothers’ interviews in media pleading for help, their
published narratives of continuing unmet need of care, their public protests about their untenable
circumstances and government promises to do better, little changes. Mothers continue to be faced with
levels of responsibilization that fail to adequately attend to their and their children’s lived realities.
Then there is their litigation, which also demonstrates the blatant disregard of women’s suffering,
particularly evident in the way government has responded to the manifold and multifarious claims of
caregiving mothers for needed support. As seen, mothers are met with strong government opposition,
with complex litigation tactics and even (according to one judge) at times irrational,1432 and unreasonable
approaches to their claims.1433 Yet, in spite of this mothers continue to litigate, highlighting the very same
issues. This was seen when Desmarais brought her application many years after Larcade’s case was
decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 2006.1434 This suggests again critical consciousness in legal
action towards a shared goal, which in this case was to access state support.
The circumstance underlying this legal activity is mothers whose needs have borne the brunt of
retreat from already inadequate or unavailable support and who are subject to almost continual changes in
policy offerings, making such supports a moving target. This approach by government is disturbing, given
the context of the claims, which involve very serious health and social care needs of marginalized
children and their often socio-economically disadvantaged mothers.
1431
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The threshold of s 12 requires “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment must be drawn from
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”1435 This very same question
can be posed in relation to the kind and amount of care that mothers with severely disabled children are
tasked with as a result of government action. For example, there is a growing body of research and also
evidence from litigation that shows that the impact of complex forms of care is physically damaging to
those mothers who provide it in today’s care arrangements. The literature I reviewed described this,
underscoring how different the care which they provide is, and which I refer to as maternally complex
care.
It is cruel that provincial governments have largely withdrawn from the provision of complex
forms of care and support for mothers with severely disabled children. It is cruel that (for example)
mothers across Ontario have had no choice but to leave their age of majority, disabled children at a
government office.
It is also cruel that mothers have had no choice but to give up their minor children, ‘consenting’
to a stigmatized form of ‘care’ through the provinces’ child protection jurisdiction, when support for care
is unavailable to them. On this issue, the deliberate conflation of ‘care’ with ‘wardship’ is a punitive and
unjust ‘choiceless choice’ given to, and made, by caregiving mothers. A ‘choice’ made in spite of the
associated legal and physical child loss. This form of government treatment relies on the myth of the
failed caregiving mother to see it through. That is a cruel fiction. Canadian society moreover has already
decided that institutionalization of severely disabled children is no longer acceptable.
An added argument may be made based on Boudreault, discussed above. That disabled offenders
(those with psychiatric disability, addiction and other disabilities) were found to have been treated
(punished) in a manner that violates s 12 raises some relevant points. The opinions expressed about
punishment in Boudreault resonate with the way the government treats mothers who cannot afford to
support their severely disabled children and are as a result forced to relinquish custody of them children to
state child protection authorities. Not being able to afford to pay for care has parallels with being unable
to pay a small surcharge. Arguably this too comprises public shaming during that legal process (in
addition to the trauma of child loss). It has been experienced as punishment by mothers who have been on
the receiving end of an unwanted child protection finding, when the issue was actually one of
unaffordable (for them) child health care. It is widely seen as shameful and publicly humiliating to have a
child taken into state care.
Considering the many problems with supports to mothers with severely disabled children, a court
ought to consider the research discussed in my thesis, which found a number of disturbing health effects.
One was the earlier death of caregiving mothers. Another was more frequent illness in the context of
1435
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extraordinary levels of care that are the result of inadequate support arrangements and which my thesis
shows the government has itself reported on in its own statistical research. The suicides, attempted
suicides and filicides reported in media and reviewed in the thesis, comprise another outcome that arises
in the context of present, cruel, under-supported care arrangements. Together these features of caregiving
mothers’ lives should be factored into judicial consideration of what is cruel treatment. The remaining
question after finding s 12 is violated in analysis under s 1, is whether the state can establish it is justified
in causing the suffering that has been established in the cases I examined as well as in the literature.1436
Government bears the onus of proof under s 1 of the Charter. 1437
A successful s12 claim, could lead to provincial governments changing their approaches to
disability support policy, including how it affects mothers, and how it harmfully assumes their
unremunerated support of disability writ large. By writ large, I refer to mothers’ provision of all kinds of
supports to disabled children, youth and adults of all ages. This makes the point that even unsuccessful
cases can lead to desired policy changes.1438
I have shown that governments’ ableisms imposed on mothers are likewise cruel. Section 12 of
the Charter provides a base upon which the many aspects of government policy can be brought to court in
order to allow mothers with severely disabled children to legally realize their right to support.
Legal Remedies – The Status Quo
I have shown in my thesis that caregiving mothers have legal rights. I have shown they have the right to
bring claims for support under certain statutes. I have shown that they have the right to apply for and to
receive government benefits if they are eligible. I have also described legal rights under human rights
codes that apply to their lived circumstances as mothers with disabled children. I have explained that
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there are obligations on Canada under international human rights law that should be considered in
government decision-making concerning mothers with severely disabled children. Also I have provided
examples of mothers seeking remedies in administrative law, tort law and constitutional law.1439 However,
in spite of the above, my research found that litigating mothers were often unable to realize their legal
right to support for a number of reasons. Teasing out the reasons was a focus in chapters four, six and
seven.
At the outset, I asked: what are the legal rights to support of mothers with severely disabled
children and what should they be. I further asked what are the legal rights of children with disabilities to
state support and what should they be. In addition, I asked how the legal rights of the severely disabled
child ‘fit’ with the legal rights of mothers to public support within existing frameworks.
I found that although there were recognizable claims, realizing their rights to support with their
factual realities was fraught with difficulties. One difficulty was that their support claims were greater in
scope and different in kind than provisions in both private and public law anticipated. Another difficulty
was that some of the mothers’ other claims were not recognizable by the court. Their claims and the
reality of their lives seemed to fall outside all legislation that might pertain to the support under
discussion. While mothers sought to remedy the gaps and barriers with the realization of their support
rights politically, little changed. This was seen in the advocacy and then litigation surrounding the
Larcade case.1440 Neither s 15 nor s 7 anticipate claims by mothers with severely disabled children and
shoe-horning their rights to support into s 15 or trying to have courts read them into s 7 poses challenges.
Having referred to areas of law that described caregiving mothers’ situation, the legal remedies
they might use to try to realize their legal rights to support, and the deficiencies in doing so, I proposed
that s12 of the Charter could provide an opportunity for caregiving mothers to pursue a claim for
infringement of their constitutional rights and briefly discussed how that claim could be approached.
In Conclusion
My research questions asked (i) what are the legal rights of mothers of children with severe disabilities to
state support in Canada? (ii) What should the legal rights of mothers of children with severe disabilities
be? (iii) What are the legal rights of children with disabilities to state support? And (iv) how do the legal
rights of the child with a disability fit with the legal rights of mothers to public support within existing
frameworks? Having undertaken research in the relevant areas of support law and policy, I considered
what would be a more just alternative to the state supports currently available to mothers under primarily
provincial, but also federal, law in Canada.
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In order to do that, as stated in this final chapter, I first described the rights examined in my
thesis. I then revisited the literature review, highlighting in this chapter some of the scholars and how
their work informed my thesis. In referring back to their work in this chapter, I provide an explanation of
how my research and analyses contribute to and build upon the body of scholarly work that preceded it, in
particular focusing on those whose work informed my own.
Subsequently, I provided a summary of my research findings. It revealed that even where
caregiving mothers have legal rights, they find realizing such supports difficult or impossible. The
reasons for this were described. This section also revealed the tremendous shortfalls and gaps in support
offerings that require mothers to perform forms of extraordinary care. These in turn carry numerous
burdens, many of which have not previously been examined in this context. These burdens of care are
described as being harmful in many ways.
Following on that I analyzed legal remedies potentially available to mothers with severely
disabled children and their shortfalls. These were administrative law, tort law, human rights codes,
international human rights law and constitutional law.
This chapter ended with a brief analysis of how s12 of the Charter might be employed to
encourage the state to re-consider its present woeful approach to the support of mothers with severely
disabled children. This section, along with those that preceded it, reveals that the rights of caregiving
mothers are next-to non-existent, where they should be automatically available. Their children’s rights are
lacking and excluded where they should be adequate and integrated. Further, their children’s rights did
not fit with the rights of their mothers, as the existing support frameworks in law and policy ignore the
particulars of their support needs as well. In sum, as caregiving mothers Tolmie and Bachmeier stated, the
government supports as currently structured increase maternal burdens.1441
Having examined numerous cases and considering rights in the ways I describe, I conclude that
although mothers with severely disabled children do have different avenues along which to pursue
support, any ‘rights’ they are thought to have often fail along a range of different fault lines. Cases
examined shone a light on these fault lines, showing that rights to support are subjected to weak
accountability and frank opposition. I interpreted this as the failure of the state to respect these rights.
What rights to support there are, are inadequate. To be adequate, their rights must be tied to actual needs.
In spite of maternal activism and litigation, the system of supports has not changed and unjust care
burdens of many kinds persist.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Canadian Blogger. Life with a Severely Disabled Child

My Prayer
In this moment I accept that I have been given care of a very fragile person.
I accept that I may likely never know why this task has been passed to me.
In this moment, I accept that I need not know more than the fact that what I do has value.
With that, I will care for this person to the best of my abilities.
I will forgive myself for the days I could do better, but don't.
I will forgive myself for the days I would do better, but cannot.
I seek to have clarity of thought that I might make choices most in balance with the many intertwining
lives, including my own.
I seek to be supported in whatever ways financial and emotional that will maintain this balance.
I seek to learn how to draw from a well of infinite patience and energy.
I open myself up to the possibility of joy, of fulfillment, and of grace.
I accept that, in this moment, it is all I can do.1442

1442

Claire (no last name), the blogger of Life with a Severely Disabled Child, supra note ##. She has an M.A. and a
diploma in Montesorri teaching. Her 2009 Blog entry is about problems with homecare in Ontario at the intersection
of child welfare and SSAH (which she refers to as “homecare”). She quotes Ontario NDP MPP Cheri Di Novo that
year as stating that the issue of insufficient support is one of political will.
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Appendix B: Quotation from Bowen v Gilliard 483 U.S. 587 (1987)

In 1975, federal statutes governing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
required, as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance assign to the State any right to receive
child support payments for any family member included in the family unit, but a recipient of aid (the
amount of which is determined by the number and income of persons in the family unit) could exclude a
child for whom support payments were being made from the family unit if it was financially
advantageous to do so, even though the child continued to live with the family. The Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 (DEFRA) amended the AFDC program to require families to include in the filing unit all children
living in the same home, including those for whom support payments were being received. Under a
separate amendment, the first $50 per month of child support collected by the State must be remitted to
the family and not counted as income in determining its benefit level. Thus, if the assigned support
exceeded $50 plus the difference in the benefit level resulting from adding the child to the family unit, the
family would suffer financially as compared with its total income prior to the amendment. In a class
action, the Federal District Court held that North Carolina's implementing regulations were in
conformance with the statute, but that the 1984 statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and its equal protection component, as well as the Takings Clause of that Amendment.
Bowen v Gilliard 483 U.S. 587 (1987).1443

1443

In Bowen v Gilliard the court relayed the information that the standard of review was whether Congress had “a
rational basis” for its decision and the United States Supreme Court decided that it did.
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Appendix C: My son’s school exercise book dated 1997
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Appendix D: Two of My Children
For years, several times a day and during the night, my (then) four year old son breathed with the support
of mist produced from the ampules of steroids then ventolin with his nebulizing machine.
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My eldest son, shown here at age eight, receiving an adult dose of intravenous anti-viral treatment for
herpetic esophagitis, an uncommon life-threatening condition in immune compromised children.
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At around age 6 a make-believe soldier incorporates his brothers’ nebulizer mask.
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In the bright NICU, I am allowed to hold my premature daughter who no longer required oxygen. She had
sepsis and her chart stated her condition was guarded. I was a law student at the time and this was an
exam week.

351

352

Appendix E: State Representation of Care

Princess Diana in Pakistan

1444

1444

“Princess Diana Retrospective”, online: Gettyimages <http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/newsphoto/princess-diana-princess-of-wales-cradles-a-sick-child-news-photo/76214656>. This child is reported to have
died shortly after this photograph was taken.
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Duchess of Cambridge Kate Middleton in Alberta

1445

1630

Rebecca English, “The Little Girl Who Didn't Stand on Ceremony: Six-Year-Old Cancer Sufferer Flings Herself
into Kate's Arms for a Hug”, DailyMail (8 July 2011) online: Daily Mail <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2012370/Duchess-Cambridge-Kate-Middleton-embraces-cancer-sufferer-Diamond-Marshall.html#ixzz3ylrJ81PT>.

354
Trina Pelletier and the Queen in Brantford, Ontario in 1973

1446

1446

Mary Ormsby, “How I Met the Queen: Trina Pelletier, an Easter Seals Ambassador, Still Has the Dress She
Wore”, The Star (25 May 2012) online: The Star
<http://www.thestar.com/news/world/royals/2012/05/25/how_i_met_the_queen_trian_pelletier_an_easter_seals_am
bassador_still_has_the_dress_she_wore.html>.
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Appendix F: March of Dimes “Marching Mothers”

40,000 mothers marched. “Marching Mothers” is a registered Trade Mark. Canada’s first female federal
cabinet minister was honorary leader of the March of Dimes campaign.1447

1447

“Marching Mothers”, online: March of Dimes
<https://www.marchofdimes.ca/EN/AboutUs/about%20modc/history/Pages/marchingmothers.aspx>.
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Appendix G: Preamble to the Alberta Family Support For Children with Disabilities Act

Preamble
WHEREAS the people of Alberta honour and respect the dignity and equal worth of children with
disabilities;
WHEREAS the Legislature of Alberta recognizes and values the ability of families to care for and to
promote the development of children with disabilities;
WHEREAS the Legislature of Alberta acknowledges the value of family-centred support and services in
empowering and preserving families of children with disabilities;
WHEREAS the Legislature of Alberta recognizes that the individual needs of children with disabilities
are most effectively met through an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach; and
WHEREAS the Legislature of Alberta recognizes the importance of facilitating the inclusion of children
with disabilities in community life:
THEREFORE HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of
Alberta, enacts as follows: …
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Appendix H: Dr. Nicole Desmarais, in December 2014
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APPENDIX I: Letter to Prime Minister Rt Hon David Cameron MP from Jane Raca

10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA
9 December 2013
Open Letter (by email and post)
Dear Prime Minister
I am the mother of a severely disabled child. He has cerebral palsy, epilepsy, learning disabilities, challenging
behaviour, and is severely autistic. He uses a wheelchair, can’t walk or talk, can’t use his left hand and is doubly
incontinent. I am writing to you to express my concern over the lack of social care provision for children like him.
Many local authorities are failing to provide respite and home carers, and this is causing great suffering. There are
parents trying to survive for years, raising their children on little sleep, with no breaks and no help. They are
experiencing depression, exhaustion and marital breakdown. They have no hope of affording the ongoing specialist
care which is needed. If they can summon the strength to take on their local social care department, they face a
lengthy, ineffectual complaints process. What they need is a fast, independent forum, with the power to award the
necessary support for their child.
The children and families’ bill misses a golden opportunity to achieve this. It introduces joint education, health and
care (EHC) plans in place of statements of special educational needs. For the first time parents will have all their
disabled child’s needs recorded in one place. But they will still only be able to appeal the education content of the
plans to an independent tribunal, as is the case now. That happened to my family; we won an appeal over my son’s
school, but it took us another five years to get the social care he needed. Why can’t the bill provide a right of appeal
to tribunal, over all the contents of EHC plans?
The government has said that it doesn’t support a right of appeal against social care issues. It doesn’t want local
authorities to be under a statutory duty to provide the care part of individual EHC plans, since they may not have
enough money to look after both disabled children and children at risk.
This is the finite resources argument, and goes to the heart of the matter. We define ourselves as a society by the
priorities we choose. Surely these priorities include providing humane levels of support to people who from birth
will never be able walk or talk, let alone work? This should not have to be at the expense of protecting children at
risk of abuse. Pitching those two sets of critical needs against each other is unacceptable.
The National Autistic Society has presented the government with a petition of over 10,000 signatures on the
importance of a single point of appeal from all parts of EHC plans. That is a lot of parents, but it is also just the tip
of the iceberg. They are telling you that they are not prepared to carry on battling on all sides. They need the EHC
plans to make a real difference to the most vulnerable people in our society.
Yours sincerely
JANE RACA

Author Standing up for James

